Table Of ContentForms, Matter and Mind
Three Strands in Plato's Metaphysics
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Forms, Matter and Mind
Three Strands in Plato's Metaphysics
by
Erik Nis Ostenfeld
University of Aarhus, Denmark
1982
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Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Library of Congr.s. Cataloging in Publication Data
bstenfeldi Erik Nis.
Forms, matter, and mind.
(Martinus Nijhoff philosophy library ; v. 10)
I. Plato--Anthropology. 2. Philosophical
anthropology--History. I. Title. II. Series.
B398.M27087 1982 128'.2 82-12619
ISBN 90-247-3051-1
ISBN-13: 978-94-009-7683-2 e-ISBN-13: 978-94-009-7681-8
DOl: 10.1007/978-94-009-7681-8
This book has been published with the help of a grant
from the Humanities Research Council of Denmark
Copyright © 1982 by Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague.
Softcover reprint of the hardcover I st edition 1982
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To Gudrun
Preface
The present work is an attempt to analyse critically Plato's views on
mind and body and more particularly on the mind-body relationship
within the wider setting of Plato's metaphysics. We seek to achieve this
by a philosophical examination"-of the dialogues on the basis of a
generally accepted order (some revision of this order is a by-product
of our examination).
Strictly speaking "soul" ought perhaps to be substituted for "mind"
in the above. But it seems to be in terms of "mind" that modern
philosophers deal with and refer to the problem that Plato tackled
(mainly) in terms of psyche, and as it is part of the motivation for
dealing with Plato's treatment that it is of importance for the modern
debate, it has been felt necessary to stress the rough identity* of the
problem in the title of the book (and in the Introduction, in the title of
Part Three and a few other places). Below this superordinate level we
try to keep "mind" as a translation typically of nous and "soul" as a
translation of psyche.
The methodological strategy, and point, of the present work is to
examine first the related concepts, or perhaps one oUght to say doc
trines, of Form and·Matter, that is to say, the setting of the mind-body
issue. It is immediately clear that matter or the physical is relevant in
an examination of (the human) body. But it will be realized very soon
in Part Two that in order to get an idea of the status of matter we need
a thorough understanding of the doctrine of Forms. The same require
ment is evident in the philosophy of mind (e.g. the Phaedo soul and
the psychogony of the Timaeus). Moreover, it has been felt necessary
to follow the development (as we see it and with the evidence that we
find relevant) of the doctrine of Forms in some detail because of the
• It ought to be emphasized, however, that Plato, as Aristotle, was concerned. with the
animate-inanimate antithesis rather than the conscious-animate contrast. Cf. Part
Three n.7.
VII
controversy that has raged on that issue for the last decades. Those
who are familiar with this rather technical topic may prefer to turn
straight to Part Two on Matter. Readers who want as brief informa
tion as possible of the idea of ihis work may be referred to Part Three
(the second half of the book). This can, with the help of back-refer
ences in the notes, be read independently of the previous Parts.
Another methodological measure is dictated by a conviction of
development. That is, we do not believe that a unitarian approach
makes sense, at least in the field under debate. To allow even minor
developments to appear we have chosen, within the superordinate
tripartite division of the material, to proceed dialogue by dialogue.
Hereby a contribution to the solution of the relative chronology of
certain dialogues of disputed date may be given as a by-product of our
examination, when·a relative order seems confirmed by reappearance
in one or two of the other contexts.
In this connection some limitations of the present study had better
be confessed. In view of the overwhelmingly large textual material we
are already confronted with we limit ourselves to the Platonic Corpus,
thus disregarding Aristotelian evidence. But there is another perhaps
more excusable reason why this step is taken: the Aristotelian evi
dence is, after all, not only secondary but controversial. Another limi
tation is that the style (if any happens to appear) of the present work is
bound to bear some marks of its spiritual origin, the analytic
philosophical seminars on ancient philosophy held in Oxford around
1970. This is to some extent reflected in the bibliography. Thirdly, the
present study may run the risk of being misunderstood if not taken
with that grain of salt which is advisable in all human affairs, not least
in the arts. A thesis concerning Plato's development is put forward
and made as probable as could be done by the author. Absolute
certainty in these matters is aimed at, nbt claimed to have been
obtained. If in some cases some evidence should appear to have been
dealt with somewhat unsatisfactorily (ntmlected, distorted, etc.) the
reader is asked to suspend judgement till the book "as been read in its
entirety. The cumulative evidence is of weight in a study that does not
and cannot pretend to be straight deduction. Moreover, it may readily
be admitted that the tripartite development outlined may, in spite of
its complexity, be a simplification, that overlap must be admitted, etc.
However, if the main thesis stands long enough to provoke discussion,
then the effort has perhaps been worth-while.
In comparison with other areas within Plato's philosophy surpris-
VIII
ingly little work has been done on Plato's general psychological
theory. Of course, a wealth of articles has appeared in the last fifty
years or so dealing with special topics such as the tripartite soul, the
immortality of the soul, pleasure, eros, theology, etc. But one is not
seldom left with a feeling that a particular analysis of this or that
aspect of Plato's psychology might have benefitted from a better
appreciation of the general psychological picture and indeed of the
place of the psychological theory within the larger metaphysical
scheme. The general metaphysical concepts of psyche and nous and,
more general still, of eidos and genesis are the framework within which
the specialist analyses have to be carried out. The latter are, of course,
indispensable, the matter, so to speak, of our understanding, but they
ought to be guided, or formed, by a fair comprehension of the wider
setting. Plato's philosophy is, as philosophy probably ought to be, a
whole, in the sense that dealing with one aspect inevitably involves
one in dealing, alas, with all aspects. It is understandable when scho
lars generally nowadays prefer the piecemeal analytic approach. But
theorizing about the ever increasing data, including sub-theories,
remains a necessity and the risk of construing a (possibly false)
psychological theory must be ventured, provided that the premises are
laid out in the open. There is an element of play (paidia) in such
enterprises, which seems unavoidable and probably in Plato's spirit.
Fortunately scholars stand on the shoulders of their predecessors.
Much work, one dare say, has been done since antiquity both in data
collecting and in theory construction. But this vast amount of learning
must obviously itself be controlled by a high degree of familiarity with
the Platonic texts. Hence the task of giving an outline of Plato's gene
ral psychology does indeed seem beyond human powers. But once
again, to a large extent it is not so much a question of proving the
correctness of the fairly numerous premisses necessary for the theory.
In so far as those premisses are clearly stated and the reader can be
directed to where detailed arguments for this or that premiss can be
gathered, then the remaining ink and paper can be used for drawing
the pattern one thinks one sees in the data. But quite often recourse to
the text and consequent argument has been necessary.
Oddly enough no book has as yet appeared, as far as the lIUthor
knows, on the mind-body issue in Plato. T.M. Robinson's Plato's
Psychology (Toronto 1970) does, however, in part overlap our topic.
It usefully collects and discusses the most important passages where
psyche is dealt with expressis verbis. But there still seems to be a need
IX
for an inquiry into the philosophical web of which the philosophy of
mind is just a single knot. That is, a need has been felt for an examina
tion of the underlying assumptions and implications of the Platonic
conception of the soul.
Mr. I.M. Crombie, in the chapter "The Philosophy of Mind" in his
Examination of Plato's Doctrines, vol. I, (London 1962), has done
Platonic scholarship a great service in probing deeper in Plato's
philosophical commitments, expressing inter alia the view that there is
an "Aristotelian" strand in the later dialogues. It seems to be the place
to acknowledge here a great personal debt both to his books, to con
versation and to correspondence during the initial stages of the com
pletion of the present work. My thanks are due also to prof. David
Hamlyn, Birkbeck College, University of London, who most kindly
read the ms. in its entirety at short notice. The appearance of the
present work owes a great debt to prof. Hamlyn's unhesitating encour
agement and support. I am pleased to express my gratitude also to
professor A. McKinnon, McGill University, Montreal, to professor J.
B. Skemp, Cambridge, to professor Lennart Nordenfelt, Stockholm
University, to professor Uffe Juul Jensen and to professor Johs. Sl(llk,
Aarhus University. They have all offered their kind help and support
in connection with the publication. Many others ought to be men
tioned, but acknowledgement is expressed, I hope, by discussing their
work in the notes. It goes without saying that the blame for possible
blemishes should be laid at my door only.
The Danish Research Council for the Humanities is to be thanked
for generous financial support and so are the Publishers Martinus
Nijhoff, The Hague, who, by accepting the work in the Classical
Philosophy Library, have provided a most helpful means of communi
cation. Finally, I am pleased to have the opportunity to thank Mrs.
Birthe Jakobsen who efficiently typed the manuscript, and, most of
all, my wife, to whom the book is dedicated, for patience and encour
agement during a long period of completion.
The text employed is Burnet's OCT edition and the few and brief
translations are either from Hamilton and Cairns (edd.) or my own.
Aarhus University April 1982 E.O.
x
Contents
Preface VII
I General Introduction 1
Part One: Forms
Introduction 9
II Concrete Common Qualities 11
III Transcedent Simples 23
IV Natural Kinds 37
Part Two: Matter
Introduction 81
V Wholes of Concrete Common Qualities 83
VI Wholes of Form-Copies 87
VII Geometrical Solids in Space 105
Part Three: Mind
Introduction 153
VIII Part of Concrete Whole 157
IX Transcedent Simple Soul 173
X Dynamic-telic Structure 225
XI General Conclusion 275
A Note on Chronology 281
Abbreviations 285
Notes 287
Bibliography 337
XI
