Table Of ContentTERRORISM: Force Protection Follies
TERRORISM: Force Protection Follies
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The New War
January 30, 2003: Force protection has become a major concern within the Department of Defense and other U.S. government
agencies. Attacks on U.S. embassies and military bases overseas was already a concern before September 11, 2001, but after
the attacks on New York City and Washington, the scramble for security became even more frantic. As more people looked
more closely at how to protect personnel and places, it became apparent that there was a lot more vulnerability than earlier
thought. But the situation was worse than that. Many of the most notable attacks on Americans, starting with the 1983 suicide
bomb attack on a Marine barracks in Lebanon, were caused by deliberately sacrificing security for political and diplomatic
considerations. The Marines were ordered to drop many of their standard security measures so as not to "cause diplomatic or
political problems" with the Lebanese. In 1996, a Saudi Arabian apartment building (Khobar Towers), was hit by a truck bomb,
killing 19 Americans. Again, attempts to improve security were thwarted by an unwillingness to offend the locals. When the USS
Cole was hit with a boat bomb in a Yemen harbor in 2000, it was another case of security taking last place to diplomatic goals.
But it isn't just diplomacy and politics that cripple security. There's also a money angle. Increased security is expensive. One
reason for sending the USS Cole to a Yemen port to refuel was because there were not enough fleet oilers to refuel the Cole at
sea. After Khobar Towers and the USS Cole bombing, money was found to improve security. Congress has never been
enthusiastic about spending billions to increase security at embassies and military bases overseas, but will respond, momentarily,
to a bloody attack.
There are hundreds of U.S. military and diplomatic sites around the world. And if terrorists just want to get at Americans, there
are thousands of American owned business properties in dangerous (for Americans) regions. But terrorists realize that they make
more of a point by attacking U.S. government targets, and there are plenty of them out there. But not all overseas locations are
equally at risk. Some countries are easier for terrorists to operate in, so that narrows down the target list. But that only helps you
if your intelligence operation is good at keeping track of which terrorists are doing what where. Congress has been reluctant to
authorize, or pay for, a lot more American agents snooping around where the terrorists operate. Too uncertain, and prone to
produce ugly, messy incidents.
September 11, 2001 loosened Congressional purse strings and other restrictions. As a result, a lot of planned terrorist attacks
have been derailed. But the bad guys are still trying, and will continue to do so for another decade, or generation, if past
experience means anything. So force protection has become a big, ongoing business in the Department of Defense and State
Department.
Some of the solutions already developed are pretty obvious. In the 1990s, as American troops were sent to the Balkans as
peacekeepers, force protection was enhanced by putting the troops under house arrest. This was expensive, for lavishly
equipped bases, full of amenities, had to be built lest morale took a dive. Despite that, American troops catch a lot of ribbing
from other NATO troops, who are allowed to spend their off duty time with the locals. Existing bases overseas have added more
fences, cameras, guards and tedious security checks. Embassies have become like fortresses, although somewhat discrete
fortresses.
However, in this age of Information War, it is becoming evident that the best protection is superior information. Keeping tabs on
what terrorist movements are up to can be effective, but it does not inspire the same sense of security as physical, largely passive
defenses. Information is also valuable when force protection techniques are exchanged between government agencies and
nations. This is an idea that, while excellent in theory, has proved difficult to implement in practice. Bureaucracies are not
comfortable sharing their secrets, particularly those relating to personal security.
Unfortunately, improvements in force protection are driven more by successful terrorist attacks than anything else. In the
immediate aftermath of a terrorist attack, exchanging force protection information no longer seems so risky. But this attitude
quickly fades and pretty soon everyone is back to throwing money, rather than ideas, at the problem.
January 29, 2003: Air Force General Ed Eberhart, head of Colorado Springs-based Northern Command and NORAD, said on
January 18th that war with Iraq could spark an attack on the United States -- from the Iraqi agents, terrorists sympathetic to
Saddam Hussein or a copycat attacker.
The FBI had also launched a concerted search for 3,000 or more illegal Iraqi immigrants who have gone missing while visiting the
United States and are among those being sought for voluntary interviews in advance of a possible war with Iraq. According to the
Washington Post, these investigations have apparently not altered the FBI's view that Hussein loyalists inside the United States
are limited primarily to diplomatic circles, and that most are already under US surveillance.
However, the FBI may also be ignoring the possibility that Hussein agents may have been taken into the United States after the
1991 Gulf War. There was ample opportunity for Hussein's agents to infiltrate into the Rafha refugee camp. At one point, Rob
Frazier (the second secretary at the American Embassy in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, and a former military intelligence officer) saw a
pile of cash on a table - an indicator that something underhanded was being funded. Over 12,000 "refugees" (including at least
6,000 Iraqi soldiers) were later resettled in America, despite protests from some veterans groups and members of Congress.
Establishing a concrete link between Iraq and Al Qaeda has been a tough task. According to coalition intelligence sources, senior
al Qaeda leader Abu Mussab al Zarqawi may provide a link between that terrorist group and Iraq. Zarqawi is a Jordanian
recently accused by Jordanian officials of masterminding the assassination of US diplomat Laurence Foley in Amman in late
October 2002.
However, a series of small victories against Al Qaeda on January 23-24 by international Law Enforcement Agencies also
revealed a threat to Allied rear area bases. Near Venice, Italy, five Moroccan men (with links to Al Qaeda suspects) in Britain
were seized during a raid They had C-4, as well as a map of a NATO base at Verona highlighted with the letters “BXB” and the
historic cathedral in Padua with a “B”. Islamic militants arrested in Britain earlier in January may have been plotting to lace the
food supply on at least one British military base with the poison ricin.
Spanish police also rounded up 19 suspected Al Qaeda members in predawn raids against suspected terrorist cells in Barcelona
and the surrounding region. That same day, Spain announced that it would allow the US to use it's bases for war on Iraq. Spain
had been a transit point for terrorists. Prior to this incident, Spain had arrested more than 20 suspects since 2001 believed to
have ties to Al Qaeda, including eight men suspected of having played a role in the September 11, 2001 attacks on New York
and Washington. - Adam Geibel
January 28, 2003: During the 1991 war, Iraqi military intelligence dispatched forty teams, each of two men, to conduct sabotage
and terrorist missions against the US around the world. Saddam would not enlist outside terrorist groups, preferring to keep the
operation under strict government control. The problem was that the would-be terrorists were hopelessly inept. One team hid
their bomb so poorly it was found and disarmed by the embassy gardener; another team blew themselves up with their own
bomb. Once the US became aware of the campaign, it quickly established that all of the teams were working out of the local
Iraqi embassy (which had been under close surveillance) and all 80 of these commandoes had sequentially-numbered Iraqi
passports (making them easy to identify and track). All but a few of them were rounded up in short order; a few were able to
return to Iraq after abandoning their missions. What could be expected in a new war? Will Iraq continue to use only military
intelligence officers operating out of embassies (for internal political reasons) or will Iraq enlist foreign mercenaries and
independent terrorists that it cannot strictly control? In the end, it will be Saddam or his sons who make that decision, and it is
anybody's guess if they can or will "think outside of the box" and use agents who are harder to track but harder to control. --
Stephen V Cole
