FIRST INTERIM REPORT The Evolution of the TCOG as a Diplomatic Tool

40 Pages·2004·1.72 MB·English

IFPA Project
Interim Paper
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FIRST INTERIM REPORT
Th e Evolution of
the TCOG as a Diplomatic Tool
The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis

IFPA Project
Interim Paper
FIRST INTERIM REPORT
Th e Evolution of
the TCOG as a Diplomatic Tool
From the IFPA Research Project:
Building on the Trilateral Coordination
and Oversight Group
Exploring the Prospects for Expanding the
TCOG Process as a Key U.S.-Japan and
U.S.-South Korea Alliance Management Tool
Prepared by
James L. Schoff
jschoff @ifpa.org
November 2004
The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis

iii
Contents
Introduction 1
Th e Logic of Trilateral Cooperation 3
Th e Political and Diplomatic Backdrop for the TCOG 5
Th e Start of TCOG 8
Th e TCOG in Transition 13
Th e TCOG in a Six-Party Context and Beyond 20
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations 24
About the Author and the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 25
Appendices
TCOG Meeting Chronology 26
Select Chronology on the North Korean Nuclear Issue 28
IFPA Project Building on the TCOG
Interim Paper The TCOG's Evolution as a Diplomatic Tool

1
Introduction
One of the more successful innovations of ing of the TCOG’s strengths and weak-
the last five years in the area of U.S.-Ja- nesses, not only from the American vantage
pan and U.S.-South Korea alliance manage- point, but also from the Japanese and South
ment has been the establishment and use of Korean perspectives. The TCOG has prov-
the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight en itself to successive administrations in all
Group (TCOG) for developing common three countries that it is valuable and worth
policies toward the Democratic People’s maintaining, which is no small feat, but in
Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Ko- this process of transition the TCOG has
rea). This regular meeting of high-level dip- changed in a variety of ways, some promis-
lomats from the United States, Japan, and ing and others potentially discouraging.1
the Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Ko- The TCOG was originally established for
rea) has allowed the three governments to a specific purpose: consulting on the de-
discuss together a range of options for deal- velopment, and later coordinating the im-
ing more effectively with North Korea, and plementation, of the Perry Process, a 1999
it has provided a hitherto absent forum for official review of U.S. policy toward North
coordinating policies on a regular basis. The Korea led by former U.S. Defense Secretary
results have included a better understand- William J. Perry. The TCOG was led at the
ing among the three of each other’s policy start by very senior representatives of the
objectives and methods for achieving them, three countries, but over time it came to
a lessening of concern if ends or means do be managed at a more junior level. This is
not exactly correspond, a coordination of not necessarily an unwelcome development,
policies toward the North, and a more uni- but it does have important implications for
fied voice in dealing with the ruling regime the relative strength of the TCOG’s policy
in Pyongyang. As a result, the coordinating formulation function (largely a bottom-up
group has become the first regular, success- process) versus its implementation function
ful trilateral process that provides some de- (oversight from the top down), and it has
gree of substance to stand in for the miss- placed greater demands on the process of
ing “third leg” (the Japan-ROK connection) interagency coordination, particularly in the
in the alliance structures among these three United States and South Korea.
vital nations in the Asia Pacific region. The TCOG continues to meet frequent-
A key question that arises is the degree to ly (almost every other month instead of
which the TCOG process can and should be quarterly), though it now meets less for-
strengthened and expanded (or simply cop- mally, having dropped the habit of issuing
ied) as a way to encourage trilateral coor- statements and stopped labeling the trilat-
dination beyond issues of immediate North eral consultations as official TCOG meet-
Korean policy and, by means of such coor- ings. The participants have come to know
dination, to strengthen the two bilateral al- each other quite well, but their ability to
liances and build connecting threads be- influence the decision-making processes in
tween them – a development that is seen as their respective countries is not as strong as
essential if existing alliance structures are it was before. In addition, the group is now
to thrive in the future. Answering this ques- operating within a broader, multilateral con-
tion requires a comprehensive understand- text, and it has taken on a new role as a sort
1 Even though the three countries no longer refer officially to this North Korea trilateral policy coordination
process as the “TCOG,” this report will use the term “TCOG” to include both the formal TCOG meetings (held
before June 2003) and the regular, informal trilateral meetings that followed, for the sake of simplicity.
IFPA Project Building on the TCOG
Interim Paper The TCOG's Evolution as a Diplomatic Tool
2
of informal caucus among allies within the terrorist incidents; 2) longer-term policy
so-called six-party talks regarding North planning, such as the impact on alliance
Korea’s nuclear weapons programs.2 How planning and associated security postures
effective is today’s TCOG compared to be- of changes being triggered by the much-dis-
fore? Can it be made more effective? What cussed “transformation” of the U.S. military,
does the TCOG teach us about how bu- especially with respect to alternative basing
reaucratic change affects continuity in for- options and force structure requirements in
eign policy making, especially in a compli- the region; and 3) institution building, such
cated triangular arrangement? Is the TCOG as the prospects for closer coordination on
in danger of being overtaxed, or might it, regional and global arms control, including
in fact, be underutilized at this moment? broader bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral
Do the three governments view the TCOG efforts to stem the proliferation of weapons
similarly, or are there gaps in terms of per- of mass destruction in Asia.
ceptions and expectations? To what extent, This research project started in Janu-
moreover, can the TCOG model be used to ary 2004, and it is a cooperative effort of
encourage trilateral cooperation on impor- three organizations in the TCOG countries,
tant security issues beyond those directly made possible in large part by a generous
linked to the DPRK? grant from the Japan Foundation’s Center
Far from being an academic exercise, the for Global Partnership (CGP). The Institute
exploration of these questions is the only for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA) is leading
way to evaluate objectively the efficacy and the project in collaboration with the Japan
potential transferability of this unique pol- Forum on International Relations (JFIR)
icy coordination mechanism. Unfortunate- in Tokyo and Yonsei University’s Gradu-
ly, the policy makers involved in the TCOG ate School of International Studies (GSIS)
rarely have time to review the process itself, in Seoul. This is the project’s first interim
and even when they do it is only from their report and represents probably the only at-
own country’s perspective. If the process is tempt to provide a narrative focused solely
not functioning properly, it could harm pol- on the TCOG’s evolution from the perspec-
icy making vis-à-vis North Korea and weak- tives of all three participating countries.
en these important alliance relationships. If The overall project objective is to strength-
the TCOG is working well, then it could be a en the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK relation-
model for further cooperation in other policy ships, as well as to enhance regional stabil-
issue areas of concern to the three countries. ity by improving alliance management tools
Perry himself expressed this hope when he for the purpose of more effectively address-
presented his report to Congress in 1999, ing important issues of concern to all three
predicting that “this tripartite cooperation nations. Based on archival research and in-
will endure into the future, and be applied terviews with policy makers in the three
to other problems in the region, as well.”3 countries, the project will prepare a set of
These other issue areas of trilateral coor- practical recommendations for improving
dination might include 1) crisis contingen- current TCOG processes and adapting the
cy planning, such as planning for respond- mechanism to address at least one new tri-
ing to a collapse of government control in lateral policy concern (to be reported on in
North Korea, regional natural disasters, or greater detail in the second interim report
2 The six-party talks consist of China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the United States.
3 Dr. William Perry, U.S. North Korea policy coordinator and special advisor to the president and the
secretary of state, testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on East Asian
and Pacific Affairs, Washington, D.C., October 12, 1999.
Building on the TCOG IFPA Project
The TCOG's Evolution as a Diplomatic Tool Interim Paper
3
at the end of 2004). The team will then test phen Bosworth, Ashton Carter, Charles Kart-
the project’s recommendations by means of man, Jack Pritchard, and Wendy Sherman.
an exercise that simulates a TCOG meeting The author would also like to thank key
to further improve the usefulness of the rec- members of the project team for their con-
ommendations and increase their prospects tributions to this paper: Dr. Charles M. Perry
for near-term implementation. (IFPA), Mr. Jimbo Ken (JFIR), Mr. Koga Kei
This first interim report is focused pri- (JFIR), and Dr. Lee Chung-min (GSIS). I am
marily on the history and evolution of the grateful for the assistance I received at IFPA
TCOG as a diplomatic tool. More than twen- (Derek Boc and Brian Chandler, research;
ty current and former government officials Adelaide Ketchum, editing; and Christian
from the three countries were interviewed Hoffman, graphic art and publication design).
for this report on a not-for-attribution basis. The entire project team is grateful to CGP for
The author would like to thank all of those its financial support and encouragement. In
who gave their time in these interviews and this report, Korean and Japanese names ap-
generously assisted with follow-up questions. pear with the family name first and the giv-
Among those who agreed to be mentioned by en name second, as is the custom in those
name in connection with this report are Ste- countries.
TThhee LLooggiicc ooff TTrriillaatteerraall CCooooppeerraattiioonn
When North Korea ran afoul of the Interna- make sure that whatever we do with North
tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in ear- Korea does not undermine the security ar-
ly 1993, the United States, Japan, and South rangement with the United States…[and]
Korea began intensifying their coordination these considerations result in close policy
of policy toward the North through a series coordination between and among the Unit-
of ad hoc bilateral and trilateral meetings.4 ed States, South Korea, and Japan; the best
There were several reasons why a trilateral example being the TCOG.”6 Although Ja-
approach was attractive to the three coun- pan was an economic powerhouse, it was
tries. Each was involved in bilateral discus- constrained in how it could respond to
sions with the DPRK before 1993, and it North Korean threats both militarily (by its
was apparent to all that their negotiations constitution and World War II legacy), and
with the North were inextricably linked diplomatically (lacking a permanent seat on
with one another. the UN Security Council). By sticking close
A senior official at Japan’s embassy in to Washington and Seoul, Tokyo strength-
Washington explained, “We always held ened its hand in dealing with Pyongyang
a wider vision than that of simply manag- and kept itself well informed of its partners’
ing our bilateral relations with North Ko- overtures to the North.
rea…[and] realized that the issue involving The ROK, of course, had been involved in
the Korean peninsula is first and foremost a bilateral talks with the DPRK on a variety of
matter for the two Koreas.5 We [must also] issues for years, but its negotiations with the
4 One of the earliest trilateral meetings on the subject occurred on March 22, 1993, in New York to discuss
North Korea’s March 12 announcement that it intended to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-proliferation
Treaty (NPT).
5 Japan began a series of bilateral meetings with North Korea to discuss the potential for normalizing relations
in January 1991. After eight meetings, the talks broke down in November 1992 and did not resume until
April 2000.
6 Yamamoto Tadachi, “Japan’s Role for Peace and Security in Northeast Asia: North Korea’s Nukes, Missiles,
and WMD,” The ICAS Lectures, no. 2003-0214-TMY, February 14, 2003.
IFPA Project Building on the TCOG
Interim Paper The TCOG's Evolution as a Diplomatic Tool
4
North became increasingly complex and in- with the DPRK, the United States, and its
fluenced by outside events when Tokyo and regional neighbors were becoming impor-
Washington began their high-level meetings tant domestic political issues and attracting
with Pyongyang in 1991 and 1992, respec- greater interest from the executive branch.8
tively. At that time, Seoul worried when U.S.- North-South relations were on an up-
DPRK relations seemed to moving forward swing in late 1991, when the two finalized
too quickly, and it strove to link progress in a nonaggression agreement and the North-
those talks with its own North-South dia- South Denuclearization Declaration in De-
logue. Seoul was also wary of any moves that cember, but this all fell apart in the sec-
could suggest a weakening of America’s secu- ond half of 1992 and early 1993 because of
rity commitment to South Korea and the sta- ROK election-year politics and the North’s
tioning of thirty-seven thousand U.S. troops tussle with the IAEA. Kim Young Sam de-
in the country. At the same time, and reflect- feated Kim Dae Jung in the ROK presiden-
ing the ROK’s delicate position, Seoul was tial election in December 1992, in part by
also cautious when Washington wanted to painting his opponent as too conciliatory
upgrade defenses for its forces and the South toward the North. Kim took office on Feb-
Korean military as a hedge against a break- ruary 25, 1993, right after Bill Clinton as-
down in negotiations – with, for example sumed the U.S. presidency in January and in
the dispatch of a U.S. Patriot missile battal- the midst of a fierce DPRK-IAEA argument
ion to the ROK in 1994 – for fear of provok- over nuclear inspections. Two weeks later,
ing Pyongyang. Pyongyang announced it was withdrawing
Moreover, the loci on Seoul’s diplomatic from the NPT, touching off the first North
map were multiplying around this time, as Korean nuclear crisis and more than a year
it managed to normalize relations with the of tense standoffs and off-and-on negotia-
Soviet Union in 1990 and China in 1992, tions. The United States and its allies de-
and both South Korea and North Korea en- veloped and promoted a plan for sanctions
tered into the United Nations (UN) in 1991. at the UN when negotiations faltered, and
This complicated South Korea’s foreign pol- the U.S. military began preparing for a pos-
icy calculus and contributed to the appeal sible violent North Korean reaction if sanc-
of trilateral meetings. The United States re- tions went forward. The crisis did not sub-
mained the cornerstone of Seoul’s foreign side until the United States and North Ko-
relations, and though some ROK officials rea worked out the Agreed Framework in
were less than thrilled to share Washing- 1994 that froze the North’s nuclear program
ton’s attention with Tokyo, Japan’s econom- in return for oil supplies, a U.S. promise to
ic strength and clout at the UN made it an oversee the construction of nuclear reactors,
increasingly important international player.7 and a sketchy roadmap for normalization.
All of this coincided with a strengthening As U.S. officials involved in the discus-
of participatory democracy in South Korea, sions later described, “Managing the North
coming on the heels of its first popular bal- Korean crisis felt like playing a multi-tiered
loting for president since 1971, an electoral chess game on overlapping boards. It re-
process in which Seoul’s foreign relations quired dealing with the North, the South,
7 The United States was the ROK’s military ally in deterring and preparing to defeat a potential invasion
from the North, as well as its guarantor of energy security and its largest trading partner at the time. Japan
was South Korea’s second-largest trading partner and a major source of direct investment. Though Japan
lacked a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, it was the second-largest financial contributor to the
UN and held a rotating seat on the council as often as procedures would allow.
8 For a detailed discussion of the trilateral security dynamic, see Victor D. Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism:
The U.S.-Korea-Japan Security Triangle (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1999).
Building on the TCOG IFPA Project
The TCOG's Evolution as a Diplomatic Tool Interim Paper