Table Of ContentFINLAND'S SEARCH FOR SECURITY THROUGH
DEFENCE, 1944-89
Also by Risto E. J. Penttilli
PUOLUSTUSLINJAT (LINES OF DEFENCE)
Finland's Search for
Security through
Defence, 1944-89
Risto E. J. PenttiHi
Palgrave Macmillan
ISBN 978-1-349-11638-6 ISBN 978-1-349-11636-2 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-11636-2
©Risto E. J. Penttilii 1991
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1991 978-0-333-52585-2
All rights reserved. For information, write:
Scholarly and Reference Division,
St. Martin's Press, Inc., 175 Fifth Avenue,
New York, N.Y. 10010
First published in the United States of America in 1991
ISBN 978-0-312-04895-2
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
PenttiHi., Risto E. J., 1959-
Finland's search for securuty through defence, 1944-89/Risto
E. J. Penttilii.
p. em.
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 978-0-312-04895-2
1. Finland-Military policy. 2. Finland-Foreign relations
Soviet Union. 3. Soviet Union -Foreign relations - Finland.
4. Finland-foreign relations-1945- 5. Soviet Union-Foreign
relations- 1945- I. Title
UA829.F5P45 1990
355'.03304897 - dc20 90-34613
CIP
Contents
Acknowledgements vii
Map of Finland viii
Introduction 1
1 'The Years of Danger', 1944 6
The Political Context 6
The Modernist Reaction 9
The Traditionalist Reaction 17
The Peace Treaty of 1947 23
2 The Cold War Reaches the North, 1948-49 26
Nordic Adjusbnent to Peace 26
The Finnish-Soviet Treaty 29
A Communist Coup in Finland? 34
The Rumour Behind NATO 37
3 'Do Not Tease the Bear', 1949-55 42
Finland's Low-Profile Defence Policy 42
Declining Military Preparedness 48
'Teaching Modernism' 51
Renewed Attention to Armed Defence 55
4 The Soviet Withdrawal from the Porkkala Naval
Base, 1956 61
The Political and Military Significance of the
Porkkala Base 61
Soviet Foreign Policy and the Withdrawal
from Finland 65
Soviet Strategic Thinking and the Withdrawal
from the Porkkala Base 71
The Finnish Reaction to the Soviet Withdrawal 75
v
vi Contents
5 One-Armed Neutrality, 1956-61 77
Kekkonen Takes Charge 77
Modest Military Spending 82
Military Procurement from the Soviet Union 85
'Total Defence' 89
6 The Note Crisis: Its Strategic Reasons
and Consequences, 1961-63 93
The Military Context to the Soviet Note 95
The Defusion of the Crisis 100
New Emphasis on Finland's Defence
Preparedness 103
The Nordic Balance 108
7 Security through 'Active Foreign Policy', 1964-70 111
Foreign Policy Regains Predominance 111
Territorial Defence 115
New Declared Defence Policy 120
The Fall of the Commander-in-Chief 124
8 Neutrality Under Pressure, 1970-81 127
Soviet Criticism of Finland's Neutrality 128
The Upgrading of Finland's Defences 133
Cruise Missiles and the Threat of Invasion 140
The Downgrading of Sweden's Defences 144
9 Towards Symmetric Defence, 1982-89 149
The Post-Kekkonen Era 149
High-Profile Defence 153
Challenges of the Future 159
Appendix: Note on Military Expenditure, 1960-88 163
Notes 166
Select Bibliography 196
Index 205
Acknowledgements
This book is based on my doctoral dissertation at Oxford. Consequently,
I am in a debt of gratitude to several British academics. I wish especially
to thank Dr Roy Allison for his insightful supervision and invaluable
support. I am also beholden to Professor Adam Roberts who, during the
early stages of my study, helped me to focus my research on Finland's
defence policy. Professors Robert O'Neill and Anthony Upton deserve
a special mention for invaluable suggestions as how to best convert the
thesis into a (hopefully) interesting book.
Man does not live of books alone. I wish to extend my warmest thanks
to Reverend Bill Sykes for his contribution to my non-academic education
at University College, Oxford.
In Finland I am indebted to more people than I can mention here: bit
I would like to record a special debt of gratitude to Dr. Marui Haikio,
Dr Pauli JIDenpaa and Mr Rene Nyberg for stimulating discussions,
comments and encouragement. I am also grateful to my interviewees in
Finland. Without their comments my understanding of Finland's defence
policy would have remained very limited.
I would also like to thank the Finnish Institute of Military Science for
providing me with a working space during the summer of 1989. In Sweden
I am particularly beholden to Dr Bo Huldt for the use of the facilities at
the Swedish Institute of International Affairs.
I would like to acknowledge the financial support I have received from
the Academy of Finland, the Puolustusvoimien Tuki Foundation and the
Rotary International Foundation.
Last but by no means least, I am grateful for the support and tolerance
of my parents, my siblings and my friends both in Great Britain and in
Finland.
vii
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FINLAND
Frontiers of 1939
Map of Finland
Introduction
This book looks at the development of Finland's international position in
the postwar era. In contrast to most studies dealing with this issue, the
present book does not attempt to evaluate the conduct of Finland's foreign
policy. Instead the argument concentrates on the defence component of
Finland's security policy.
Finland's history as well as its strategic position has always been marked
by the country's proximity to the Soviet Union or Russia. Finland was
part of the Russian empire for more than a hundred years from 1809
to 1917. Since its independence in 1917 Finland has shared a long land
border with the Soviet Union. Because of this geographic proximity it
is not surprising that Finland has had to deal with keen Soviet interest,
and sometimes even suspicion, about the character and aims of Finland's
security policy. Despite this close attention and suspicion on the part of the
Russians, Finland has been successful during the time period covered in this
study in building up a position of neutrality which includes an efficient but
non-provocative defence component. This book attempts to explain how
this position was achieved.
Clausewitz, who divided wars into total and limited wars, emphasised
that the defence of a country had to be tailored according to the type of
war a state was likely to be involved in. A state could not use the same type
of defence against an enemy intent on occupying the country as against an
enemy intending only to utilise (or occupy) a limited area of that state.l
This expressed Finland's dilemma after the war: it continued on the one
hand to defend itself against the eventuality of a Soviet occupation while
on the other hand it had to develop its defence potential against any possible
use of Finnish territory or airspace by NATO or the Soviet Union to attack
each other.
The basic questions that this study addresses arise from this dilemma
of Finland's defence tasks: to what extent has Finland's post-war defence
policy (both declared and actual) been determined by the threat of a Soviet
occupation of Finland? Additionally, to what extent has Finland's defence
policy been tied to the possibility that Finnish territory or airspace would be
used for an operation against one of Finland's neighbours? And most sig
nificantly, what role did Finland's defence preparations for these two threat
scenarios play in the development of Finland's international position?
