Feelings. The Perception of Self

271 Pages·2007·3.55 MB·English

by  James D. Laird

F e e l i n g s
Series in Affective Science
Series Editors
Richard J. Davidson
Klaus Scherer
The Nature of Emotion Music and Emotion
Fundamental Questions Theory and Research
Edited by Paul Ekman and Edited by Patrik N. Juslin
Richard J. Davidson and John A. Sloboda
Boo!
Handbook of Affective Sciences
Culture, Experience, and the Startle Reflex
Edited by Richard J. Davidson, Klaus R.
by Ronald Simons
Scherer, and H. Hill Goldsmith
Emotions in Psychopathology
Nonverbal Behavior in Clinical Settings
Theory and Research
Edited by Pierre Philippot, Robert S.
Edited by William F. Flack Jr.
Feldman, and Erik J. Coats
and James D. Laird
Shame Memory and Emotion
Interpersonal Behavior, Psychopathology, Edited by Daniel Reisberg and
and Culture Paula Hertel
Edited by Paul Gilbert and
Bernice Andrews Psychology of Gratitude
Edited by Robert A. Emmons and
Affective Neuroscience
Michael E. McCullough
The Foundations of Human and
Animal Emotions Thinking about Feeling
By Jaak Panksepp Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions
Edited by Robert C. Solomon
Extreme Fear, Shyness, and Social Phobia
Origins, Biological Mechanisms,
Bodily Sensibility
and Clinical Outcomes
Intelligent Action
Edited by Louis A. Schmidt
By Jay Schulkin
and Jay Schulkin
Cognitive Neuroscience of Emotion Who Needs Emotions?
Edited by Richard D. Lane The Brain Meets the Robot
and Lynn Nadel Edited by Jean-Marc Fellous
and Michael A. Arbib
The Neuropsychology of Emotion
Edited by Joan C. Borod What the Face Reveals
Basic and Applied Studies of Spontaneous
Anxiety, Depression, and Emotion
Expression Using the Facial Action Coding
Edited by Richard J. Davidson
System (FACS) (second edition)
Persons, Situations, and Emotions Edited by Paul Ekman
An Ecological Approach and Erika L. Rosenberg
Edited by Hermann Brandstätter
and Andrzej Eliasz The Development of Social Engagement
Neurobiological Perspectives
Emotion, Social Relationships, and Health
Edited by Peter J. Marshall
Edited by Carol D. Ryff and Burton Singer
and Nathan A. Fox
Appraisal Processes in Emotion
Theory, Methods, Research Feelings
Edited by Klaus R. Scherer, Angela The Perception of Self
Schorr, and Tom Johnstone By James D. Laird
F E E L I N G S
The Perception of Self
JAMES D. LAIRD
1
2007
3
Oxford University Press, Inc., publishes works that further
Oxford University’s objective of excellence
in research, scholarship, and education.
Oxford New York
Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi
Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi
New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto
With offices in
Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece
Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore
South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam
Copyright © 2007 by Oxford University Press, Inc.
Published by Oxford University Press, Inc.
198 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016
www.oup.com
Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means,
electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise,
without the prior permission of Oxford University Press.
Library of Congress Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
Laird, James D.
Feelings : perception of self / by James D. Laird.
p. cm.
ISBN-13 978-0-19-509889-1
ISBN 0-19-509889-7
1. Emotions. 2. Self-perception. 3. Psychophysiology. I. Title.
BF531.L29 2006
152.4—dc22 2005025705
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Printed in the United States of America
on acid-free paper
For Nan, who worked harder on this project than I did.
This page intentionally left blank
Preface
Over 100 years ago, William James proposed a view of emotions that most
of us would know immediately was incorrect, if not downright silly, be-
cause it directly contradicts our common sense. Common sense says that
the feelings of emotion are the first part of an emotional response, and the
rest of the response—facial expressions, physical responses of the body
and actions—are caused by the feelings. Common sense says we see a
loved one, feel happy, and the happiness makes us smile and approach
them. James argued that this was exactly backwards—that first we react
and our perception of these reactions as they are occurring is the feeling.
We first attack and then feel angry, flee and then feel afraid, approach and
then feel love.
Although James’ view is counter-intuitive, in fact the evidence is strong
that James was correct, and his “silly” hypothesis true. Indeed, James’
claims seem to have been too modest. The purpose of this book is to re-
view the evidence supporting the Jamesian view of emotion, and to ex-
tend his hypothesis to include all kinds of feelings, not just those of
emotion. This latter, more general view is usually called Self-Perception
Theory. The basic test of the Self-Perception Theory sequence is to manip-
ulate the behaviors that are related to feelings, and then to observe
whether the appropriate feelings occur. In literally hundreds of experi-
ments, manipulations of behaviors have led to corresponding changes
in feelings. The emotional behaviors have included facial expressions,
postures, patterns of gaze, autonomic arousal, and instrumental actions.
These behaviors have been used to induce happiness, anger, fear, sadness,
disgust, pride, surprise, and romantic love. In addition to these emotional
behaviors and feelings, other bodies of research have manipulated actions
viii Preface
and speech, and found changes in attitudes and beliefs. Even such cogni-
tive feelings as familiarity and the tip-of-the-tongue feeling fit this model.
In fact, wherever people have explored the origins of feelings, the result
has been to confirm the Self-Perception view. However, the volume and
breadth of this evidence seems not to be widely known, and the first task
of this book is to persuade the reader that Self-Perception Theory is prob-
ably true.
One unexpected observation emerged from some of the Self-Perception
research, that not all people fit the simple version of the theory. While
some people feel happy if they are induced to smile, and love if they share
mutual gaze with an appropriate partner, others do not. These differences
in response to bodily and behavioral cues are stable and emerge with
many kinds of feelings. This apparent limitation of the theory has actually
been extremely useful in extending its application to new phenomena,
such as anxiety, panic, placebo response, and premenstrual tension.
We might expect that a theory that directly contradicts common sense
would have substantial reverberations in broader theoretical realms, and
the second purpose of this book is to explore those ideas. The most direct
implication of Self-Perception Theory is that feelings cannot be causes of
behavior. Asimple reversal, that feelings are results rather than causes, is
also too simple. Instead, feelings seem to be different kinds of things from
behaviors and bodily responses. Feelings are information, or knowledge,
about just those behaviors and responses.
The later chapters of this book are directed at developing a way of
thinking about feelings, knowledge and action that is not simply mecha-
nistic, that lacks simple mechanistic causes, and instead sees feelings as
components of control systems. These control systems are stacked to oper-
ate at increasing levels of organization. These levels of organization of our
behavior are in turn matched by levels of organization in the world as
well. I would not claim that any of these more abstract theoretical insights
are original with me, but I hope that taken together, and organized as I
have presented them, they will provide a useful perspective on psycho-
logical processes.
Acknowledgments
Academics lead really excellent lives. We get to choose the problems and
questions that interest us most, and then we get paid (granted, not like in-
vestment bankers) to try to answer these questions. It is not much differ-
ent from doing crossword puzzles, except that sometimes the solutions
have practical significance too. I hope this book conveys some sense of
how much fun it was to write it and to do the thinking and research that
led me to write it.
One of the major reasons this kind of project is so much fun is the peo-
ple that you get to work with. I have been very lucky to have had many
colleagues, and even more students, who helped along the way, and who
made the work even more enjoyable by their participation. All of my own
research has involved collaboration with a series of extremely bright, cre-
ative people who really did make it all possible. Rather than listing them
here, in a long and boring list that would only be read by those who
wanted to make sure I hadn’t forgotten them, I have preferred to try to
make their various contributions explicit in the book itself. However a few
important people and institutions do not get explicit mention in the main
body of the text and deserve specific thanks.
Among my research collaborators whose contributions are mentioned
in the text, some also read parts or all of the book in its earlier forms, and
made many useful suggestions. Bill Flack, Simone Schnall, Alex Genov,
Sarah Strout, Boyd Timothy, and Nick Thompson were especially helpful
at various stages of the project.
Two institutions were extremely accommodating in helping me work on
the book while on sabbatical: Oxford University and the Maison des Sci-
ences de l’Homme. Maison Suger in Paris, which is maintained by MSH to