Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism

150 Pages·2006·0.7 MB·English

by  Paul A. Boghossian

Fear of Knowledge
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Fear of Knowledge
Against Relativism and
Constructivism
Paul A. Boghossian
CLARENDON PRESS (cid:1) OXFORD
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For my mother,
Me´line´ Yalenezian Boghossian
PREFACE
It is rare for a philosophical idea to command widespread
acceptance in the broader intellectual community of the acad-
emy; philosophy, by its nature, tends towards claims of a scope
and generality that invite controversy.
Over thepasttwentyyearsorso,however,aremarkablecon-
sensushasformed—inthehumanandsocialsciences,evenifnotin
thenaturalsciences—aroundathesisaboutthenatureofhuman
knowledge.Itisthethesisthatknowledgeissociallyconstructed.
Although the terminology of social construction is relatively
recent, the underlying ideas, aswe shall see, engage long-stand-
ingissuesabouttherelationbetweenmindandreality,issuesthat
first attracted me to philosophy itself.
If this book appears to pay disproportionate attention to the
work of Richard Rorty that is not only because of Rorty’s huge
influence on contemporary constructivist views, but also be-
cause, as a first-year graduate student at Princeton in 1979, I
firstcametoappreciatethepoweroftheseviewsinaseminarof
his. Although theyclashed with the strongly objectivist tenden-
cies I had brought to graduate school from my undergraduate
education in physics, I found the arguments for at least some
constructivist theses—the ones concerning rational belief—dis-
quieting, and thought that academic philosophy had been too
quick to dismiss them. I have always been grateful to Rorty for
having made me see the need to engage these ideas.
Because the issues it addresses have come to attract a wide
audience, I have tried to make this book accessible not only to
professional philosophers but to anyone who values serious
argument. While I don’t know how well I have succeeded, I do
know that I radically underestimated how difficult a task that
would be.
As a result, this book has taken longer to write than I ever
expected.Alongtheway,Ihavebenefitedfromthecommentsof
alargenumberoffriends,colleaguesandstudents,amongwhom
Ishouldespeciallymention:NedBlock,JenniferChurch,Stewart
Cohen, Annalisa Coliva, Paolo Faria, Abouali Farmanfarmaian,
Kit Fine, Allan Gibbard, Anthony Gottlieb, Elizabeth Harman,
Paul Horwich, Paolo Leonardi, Michael Lynch, Anna Sara
Malmgren, Thomas Nagel, Ram Neta, Derek Parfit, James
Pryor,StephenSchiffer,NishitenShah,AlanSokal,DanSperber,
David Velleman, Roger White and an anonymous referee for
Oxford University Press. Thanks to Michael Steinberg for aes-
thetic advice, David James Barnett for preparing the index and
JoshuaSchechterforcloselyvettingthemanuscriptandformany
hoursofenjoyable conversations aboutthese andother topics.I
owe a special debt of gratitude to Dean Richard Foley, Provost
David McLanghlin and President John Sexton for their support
notonlyofmyresearchbutofthewonderfulphilosophydepart-
ment at NYU. Finally, I am grateful to Tamsin Shaw for her
encouragement and advice.
Preface (cid:2) 7
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CONTENTS
1. Introduction 1
2. The Social Construction of Knowledge 10
3. Constructing the Facts 25
4. Relativizing the Facts 42
5. Epistemic Relativism Defended 58
6. Epistemic Relativism Rejected 81
7. The Paradox Resolved 95
8. Epistemic Reasons and the Explanation of Belief 111
9. Epilogue 129
Bibliography 132
Index 137