Expressing atrocities the impact of antihumanist thought on Theodor W. Adorno's radical ...

115 Pages·2017·1.02 MB·English

İSTANBUL BİLGİ ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ
FELSEFE VE TOPLUMSAL DÜŞÜNCE

EXPRESSING ATROCITIES: THE IMPACT OF ANTIHUMANIST THOUGHT ON
THEODOR W. ADORNO’S RADICAL CONSTELLATION

Dilara BİLGİSEL
114679009

Tez Danışmanı: Doç. Dr. Ferda KESKİN

İSTANBUL
MAYIS 2017
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Dedicated to Polen Ünlü

Your beautiful smile
defies the limits
of human life
and resistance
TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION 1
CHAPTER 1: AN INCOMPLETE HISTORY OF ANTIHUMANIST THOUGHT 12
1.1 The remains of humanism in post-war Europe 12
1.2 The concept of alienation and the pending question of Man 17
1.3 Antihumanist ontology toward a sharing of the world 23
CHAPTER 2: “A GROVE WHERE NO LIGHT PENETRATES” 30
2.1 Problematization of death 31
2.2 The ends of dignity 35
CHAPTER 3: PROBLEMS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 41
3.1 Problematization of ethics 42
3.2 Adorno’s antihumanist morality and politics 48
CHAPTER 4: NO RIGHT LIFE IN THE WRONG ONE? 56
CHAPTER 5: THE WORK OF ART AND INDIVIDUAL PRAXIS 68
5.1 Negative reconciliation 68
5.2 Expiatory violence and objectivity 77
5.3 Expression and the principle of hope 86
CONCLUSION 93
BIBLIOGRAPHY 103
ABSTRACT

This dissertation aims to clarify the significance of T. W. Adorno’s duality of resignation and
resistance, whose existence has given way to major interpretations of his works as
‘melancholic’ and ‘reconciliatory’. Taking the recent political upheaval in Turkey, ignited by
the suicide bomber attack in Suruç in July 2015, as starting point and motivation, the
following question is asked: How is it possible to go on living given the current state of
humanity? As a response, this dissertation draws an outline of the negative dialectic at work
in Adorno’s critique of the ontological, ethical, political and aesthetic spheres from an
antihumanist perspective. Based on the problematization of the concept of alienation, this
outline uncovers the collaboration at work between atrocities and humanist ideology, whose
expression is voiced by Adorno’s radically modest constellation.

ÖZET

Bu çalışmanın amacı, T. W. Adorno felsefesinin ‘melankoli’ ve ‘diyalektik uzlaşma’ bakış
açılarından geliştirilen eleştirilerinin çıkış noktası olan çekilme ve direnme ikilemini
yorumlamaktır. Temmuz 2015’te Suruç’ta düzenlenen canlı bomba saldırısından beri
Türkiye’nin içinde bulunduğu kanlı senaryodan yola çıkarak şu soru sorulmaktadır: İnsanlığın
günümüzdeki durumu göz önünde bulundurulduğunda yaşamaya devam etmek nasıl mümkün
olabilir? Bu çalışma Adorno’nun ontoloji, etik, pratik ve estetik alanlarında antihümanist bir
bakış açısından geliştirdiği eleştirinin altında yatan negatif diyalektiğin genel hatlarını çizerek
bu soruyu cevaplamayı hedeflemektedir. Yabancılaşma kavramının sorunsallaştırılmasına
dayanarak, vahşetle hümanist ideoloji arasındaki işbirliğinin Adorno’nun radikallikle tevazu
arasında kurduğu dinamik tarafından dışavurumuna yer verilecektir.

INTRODUCTION

In his short article dating back to March 2016, Özgür Mumcu of Cumhuriyet
suggests that we grab Theodor W. Adorno’s books, especially his Authoritarian
Personality, back from the shelves where they no longer belonged.1 The reason
for doing this, according to Mumcu, is the recent rise of right-wing trends and
ideologies all over the world, which is at the same time being resisted by the
appeal of socialism accelerated through political parties and figures such as Syriza
and Podemos. When these recent developments are taken into consideration,
Adorno’s thought is important not only for deconstructing authoritarian centres of
attention but also for explicating the regression that the individual falls into upon
facing attempts of subordination. Certainly one of the most noteworthy examples
of these attempts is being inflicted on the dissenters of the current Turkish
government. People from different kinds of cultural and political margins are
being exposed to various forms of state hostility on the streets, at work and even
at their homes. The starting point of this series of repression is marked by the
suicide bomber attack that took place on 20 July 2015 in the Suruç district of
Şanlıurfa, a southeastern city in Turkey, which is known to have housed the
Turkish-Kurdish tension along with several other neighbouring cities. On that day,
around 300 people belonging to a number of socialist organizations, such as ESP
(Socialist Party of the Oppressed) and SGDF (Socialist Youth League
Federation), were on their way to deliver life supplies, clothes and toys to the war-
stricken children of the Kurdish town of Kobanî. The ISIS attack killed 33 of
these people and injured at least 104. Less than three months later, on 10 October
2015, the elder brother of the person responsible for the Suruç massacre killed 107
civilians at the peace rally in central Ankara.
These atrocities were single-handedly directed at people who chose to
stand by the oppressed civilians of southeastern Turkey where the army has been

1 For the original Turkish version of the article, “Is There Hope?”, see:
http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/koseyazisi/491140/Umut_var_mi_.html
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committing numerous war crimes. These people who advocated peace and
fraternity instead of the Kurdish-Turkish dichotomy of violence were brutally
murdered whereas the perpetrators have still not been revealed. Against the
implementation of a single identity ideology by the government, the dissenting
individual is forced to raise its voice actively while suffering from the emotional
wreck created by these atrocities. It is especially within this tragic frame that
Adorno’s experience of Jewish identity following Auschwitz and his viewpoint on
the theory-praxis duality matter to a great extent. When we do an overall reading
of his philosophical works, it is easy to discern a dialectic of resignation and
resistance: accepting, on the one hand, the defeat and removing oneself from the
realm of praxis while on the other hand, giving the term critique a central position
in his life in order to reach the truth content in the twisted portrayals of everyday
life. This dissertation aims to clarify the significance of resignation and resistance,
specifically within the context of experiencing atrocities such as the above and
their aftermath. Taking the recent political upheaval in Turkey as its starting point
and motivation, the following question is going to be looked into: how is it
possible to go on living given the current state of humanity? Based on the two
strongholds of Adorno’s thought, resignation and resistance, this dissertation
intends to form a constellation which acquires its theoretical motivation from the
antihumanist discipline.
The element of resignation in Adorno’s thought is clearly visible in his
view of Kafka’s works where we are confronted with “an endless procession of
bent figures chained to each other, no longer able to raise their heads under the
burden of what is” (Adorno, 2004, p. 345). The melancholic weight placed upon
the individual here is directly relatable to our limited area of praxis when
confronted with the loss caused by major acts of oppression. In Adorno’s case,
this experience had defining value for his entire life, interchanging the mood of
his writings between that of a hopeful but critical voice of humanism and that of
pessimism with a well-justified insistence on the primacy of the object. A prolific
writer and art critic, Adorno committed himself to his work in order to escape the
disappointment and depression that waited for him right outside his door. His
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melancholic tendency is at its most vivid in his unusually strict dictum that it
would be atrocious to write poetry after Auschwitz. However, Adorno’s revision
of this well-known maxim is usually overlooked. In Negative Dialectics, he writes
that “perennial suffering has as much right to expression as a tortured man has to
scream; hence it may have been wrong to say that after Auschwitz you could no
longer write poems,” however, it is all the more problematic “to raise the less
cultural question whether after Auschwitz you can go on living” (p. 362).
Experiencing or surviving atrocities is a vital detriment to the life of resistance but
the individual who is only distantly involved with an atrocity also stands trial. The
dysfunctionality caused by such massive traumatic events is further exacerbated
due to the awareness of the individual that she is actually among the people
targeted in these bloody events. This grim spectrum is sufficiently clear in
Adorno’s feeling that living after atrocities is especially painful for the ones “who
escaped by accident,” the ones “who by rights should have been killed” (p. 363).
Even though it is more than easy to sympathize with Adorno on the above
sentiment, his philosophy’s tendency toward melancholy resignation forms the
basis for the majority of critique directed at his thought. The term praxis, for him,
is oftentimes overshadowed by the term theory, as a result of which he limited his
writings to philosophy and art criticism. His stance on the May ‘68 events is
especially important in this sense. Many would be familiar with the Busenattentat
in 1969 where three students protested against an Adorno who had decided that
his classroom be painted grey for better concentration on the lectures during the
events. His insistence on refraining from any collective act of resistance
happening on the streets is certainly questionable. As a philosopher who never
attempted to come up with alone-standing formulas for sociological issues and a
full-time thinker who posed one of the harshest critiques to mass movements and
authoritarian inclinations, his point of view, it seems, might at best be excused
thanks to his melancholy-mind crafted by the aftermath of Auschwitz. He appears
to support this excuse by writing in Negative Dialectics that “thinking men and
artists have not infrequently described a sense of being not quite there, of not
playing along, a feeling as if they were not themselves at all, but a kind of
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spectator” (2004, p. 363). Adorno was indeed a spectator most of the time,
probably confined to his study, writing on German idealism or Schönberg’s
dissonant music. All the same, there is enough reason in his “Resignation” that he
was in fact concerned with more than that: “One who has not quit thinking has not
resigned yet” (Adorno, 2005a, p. 203). As a philosopher who not only came up
with one of the most efficient criticisms of human praxis in general but who also
revealed the truth content of the significant political events, thoughts and works of
art produced during the 20th century, Adorno’s disposition toward resignation is in
a dialectical relationship with its Other, resistance.
An outstanding critique of Adorno on the issue of praxis came from
Gillian Rose’s Melancholy Science. The importance of Rose’s work for Adorno
scholarship has been unquestionable for decades now, perhaps because it is based
on a crucial statement in the very first pages of Negative Dialectics, which tells us
that “the introverted thought architect dwells behind the moon that is taken over
by extroverted technicians” (Adorno, 2004, p. 3). The acceptance Adorno gives to
being an unseen thought arbiter instead of being on the upfront could not be
summarized more efficiently because he never opted to become part of a
collective movement or a scheme that claimed to explain away all the broken lines
between theory and praxis in his day. Rose (2014) believes that he and Max
Horkheimer “created an academy precisely to criticise traditions which the
academic community abused or ignored”; however, she follows up on this by
stating that “neither men, Adorno least of all, was a ‘public’ man”; that “they were
not suited for responsibility in the sense of providing any platform” (p. 10). This
recoil from the outside world led us only back to “the evils of the old academic
community”, which was, according to Rose, happy with “indulging in intense,
idiosyncratic cultural criticism deeply imbedded in the scholarly and institutional
constraints which they were committed to transcend” (p. 10). The above argument
can be supported even further thanks to our knowledge that Adorno and
Horkheimer drew a fine line between themselves and the textbook Marxist
political stance that gave priority to and positioned hope within the proletariat.
Adorno, especially, “gave up the proletariat as the subject-object of history, as
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