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Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies
Author(s): Kenneth A. Oye
Source: World Politics, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Oct., 1985), pp. 1-24
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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EXPLAINING COOPERATION
UNDER ANARCHY:
Hypotheseasn d Strategies
By KENNETH A. OYE*
I. INTRODUCTION
N
ATIONS dwell in perpetuala narchy,f or no centrala uthority
imposes limitso n the pursuito f sovereigni nterestsT. his common
condition gives rise to diverse outcomes. Relations among states are
marked by war and concert,a rms races and arms control,t rade wars
and tarifft ruces,f inancial panics and rescues,c ompetitived evaluation
and monetarys tabilization.A t times, the absence of centralized inter-
national authorityp recludes attainmento f common goals. Because as
states,t heyc annot cede ultimatec ontrolo ver theirc onduct to an supra-
national sovereign, they cannot guarantee that they will adhere to
their promises. The possibilityo f a breach of promise can impede co-
operatione ven when cooperationw ould leave all bettero ff.Y et, at other
times, states do realize common goals through cooperation under an-
archy.D espite the absence of any ultimatei nternationala uthorityg, ov-
ernmentso ften bind themselves to mutually advantageous courses of
action. And, though no internationals overeigns tands ready to enforce
the terms of agreement,s tates can realize common interestst hrough
tacit cooperation,f ormalb ilateral and multilateraln egotiation,a nd the
creation of internationalr egimes. The question is: If internationalr e-
lations can approximateb oth a Hobbesian stateo f naturea nd a Lockean
civil society,w hy does cooperation emerge in some cases and not in
others?'
The contributorst o this symposium address both explanatorya nd
prescriptivea spects of this perennial question. First,w hat circumstances
favor the emergenceo f cooperationu ndera narchy?G iven the lack of a
* I am gratefulf or commentsb y JeffF rieden, Ralph Ginsberg,J oanneG owa, Stephen
Krasner,D avid Lake, Timothy McKeown, Paul Quirk, ArthurS tein, and the other con-
tributorst o this volume.
The essays presentedh ere focus on nation-statesa s primarya ctors in world politics,
treat national preferencesa s sovereign,a nd assume that any ultimatee scape from inter-
nationala narchyi s unlikely.O ur focusi s on non-altruisticco operationa mong statesd welling
in internationaal narchy.
2 WORLD POLITICS
centrala uthorityto guaranteea dherencet o agreementsw, hat features
of situationesn courageo r permits tatest o bind themselvetso mutually
beneficiacl ourseso f action?W hat featureso f situationsp recludec o-
operation?S econd,w hats trategiecsa n statesa doptt of ostert hee mergence
of cooperatiobny a lteringth ec ircumstanctehse yc onfrontG?o vernments
need not necessarilyac ceptc ircumstanceass given.T o whate xtenta re
situationailm pedimenttso cooperationsu bjectt o willfulm odification?
Throughw hath ighero rders trategiecsa n statesc reatet hep reconditions
forc ooperation?
The problemo f explaininga nd promotingin ternationaclo operation
encompassems anyo ft hep rincipaql uestionsin thed isciplineosf p olitical
economya nd securityst udies.H owever,d ivergentte rminologicaclo n-
ventionsa nd substantivaep plicationhs ave impededt he comparisono f
answers.I n the essaysp resentedh ere,a unifieda nalyticf ramework,
derivedf rome lementaryg ame theorya nd microeconomichs,a s been
superimposedo n cases in internationasle curityan d economica ffairs.
This use of thea usterea bstractionosf g ame theoryan d microeconomics
offerss everal advantages.2F irst,s uperficiald ifferenceos fteno bscure the
parallelismo f questions,e xplanations,a nd prescriptionisn the two fields.
By reducing concepts to fundamentals,t he use of elements of game
theory and microeconomics permits ready identificationo f parallels.
Second, intrinsicd ifferencesb etween the politicso f war and the politics
of wealth and welfare may give rise to divergent explanations and
prescriptionsA. unified analytic frameworkf acilitatese xplicit recogni-
tion of differencesi n the extent and causes of, and prospects for, co-
operation in securitya nd economic affairs.F inally, uneven intellectual
developmentm ay give rise to divergente xplanationsa nd prescriptions.
A unified analytic framework fosterst ransferenceo f useful concepts
between the fields.3
In this introductorye ssay, I submit that three circumstantiald imen-
sions serve both as proximatee xplanationso f cooperationa nd as targets
2 In this essay, I use elementaryg ame theoryi n a purely instrumentalf ashion. First,
although some referencest o the formall iteraturea re provided,t he text does not furnish
formalp roofso n the existenceo r location of equilibrium points in differentc ategorieso f
games. As Thomas Schelling notes, the equilibrium solutions identifiedb y formal game
theoristsm ay stabilizec onvergente xpectationsa mong mathematiciansb, ut unless equilibria
can also be reached through" alternativel ess sophisticatedr outes,"s uch solutionsm ay have
littlei nfluenceo n internationaol utcomes.S ee Schelling,T he Strategyo f Conflict( London:
Oxford UniversityP ress, i963), II3-I4. Accordinglyt, he contributorsse archf or" alternative
less sophisticatedr outes" to reach mutuallyb eneficiale quilibrium points and for simple
strategiest o restructursei tuationst o create mutuallyb eneficiale quilibriump oints.
3 For an extendedd iscussiono f the uses and abuses of game theoryi n the empiricals tudy
of internationalp olitics,s ee Duncan Snidal, "The Game Theoryo f InternationalP olitics,"
in this collection.
EXPLAINING COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY 3
of longer-terms trategiest o promotec ooperation.E ach of the threem ajor
sectionso f this piece definesa dimension,e xplains how that dimension
accounts for the incidence of cooperationa nd conflicti n the absence of
centralized authority,a nd examines associated strategiesf or enhancing
the prospectsf or cooperation.
In the section entitled "Payoff Structure: Mutual and Conflicting
Preferences,"I discuss how payoffsa ffectt he prospectsf or cooperation
and present strategiest o improve the prospectsf or cooperation by al-
teringp ayoffsO. rthodox game theoristsi dentifyo ptimal strategiegs iven
ordinally defined classes of games, and their familiar insightsp rovide
the startingp oint for the discussion.4R ecent works in securitys tudies,
institutionalm icroeconomics,a nd internationalp olitical economy sug-
gest strategiest oa lterp ayoffs tructureasn d therebyim provet he prospects
for cooperation.5
In the next section,e ntitled" Shadow of the Future: Single-playa nd
Iterated Games," I discuss how the prospecto f continuingi nteraction
affectst he likelihood of cooperation;6e xamine how strategieso f rec-
iprocityc an provide directp aths to cooperativeo utcomes under iterated
conditions;7a nd suggests trategiest o lengthent he shadow of the future.8
In addition,t hiss ections hows thatr ecognitiona nd controlc apabilities-
the ability to distinguishb etween cooperation and defectionb y others
4For the definitivec lassificationo f ordinallyd efined games, see Anatol Rapoport and
Melvin Guyer, "A Taxonomy of 2 X 2 Games," GeneralS ystemsii (i966), 203-I4. For an
extended reinterpretatioonf crisis bargaining in light of payoffs tructuress, ee Glenn H.
Snyder and Paul Diesing, ConflictA mongN ations: BargainingD, ecisionmakinga,n d System
Structurein InternationaCl rises( Princeton:P rincetonU niversityP ress, I977).
5 For examples, see Robert Jervis," Cooperation under the SecurityD ilemma," World
Politics3 0 (JanuaryI 978), i67-214; Oliver E. Williamson, "Credible Commitments:U sing
Hostages to SupportE xchange,"A mericanE conomicR eview (Septemberi 983), 5I9-40; John
Gerard Ruggie, "InternationalR egimes,T ransactions,a nd Change: Embedded Liberalism
in the Postwar Economic Order," in Stephen D. Krasner,e d., InternationaRl egimes( Ithaca,
N.Y.: Cornell UniversityP,r ess, i983).
6For orthodox game-theoretica nalyses of the importanceo f iteration,s ee R. Duncan
Luce and Howard Raiffa,G amesa nd Decisions( New York: Wiley, I957), Appendix 8, and
David M. Kreps, Paul Milgram,J ohnR oberts,a nd RobertW ilson, "Rational Cooperation
in Finitely-RepeatedP risoner's Dilemma," Journalo f Economic Theory2 7 (August i982,
245-52. For the resultso f laboratorye xperiments,s ee Robert Radlow, "An Experimental
Study of Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game," Journalo f ConflictR esolution9
(Junei 965), 22I-27. On the importanceo f indefinitiet erationt o thee mergenceo f cooperation
in business transactions,s ee Robert Telsor, "A Theory of Self-EnforcingA greements,"
Journalo f Business5 3 (Januaryi 980), 27-44.
7On how iteratedP risoners'D ilemmas environmentlsi terallys electf orT it-for-Tats trat-
egies, see Robert Axelrod, The Evolutiono f Cooperation( New York: Basic Books, i984).
For a formal statemento n the effectso f reciprocityo n equilibrium outcomes in iterated
games, see Drew Fudenberg and Eric Maskin, "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games
with Discounting and with IncompleteI nformation,"E conometricaf, orthcoming.
8 On enhancing iterativenesst hroughd ecompositiono f payoffso ver time, see Schelling
(fn. 2), 43-46, and Axelrod (fn. 7), I26-32.
4 WORLD POLITICS
and to respondin kind-can affectth ep owero fr eciprocitayn, d suggests
strategiest o improve recognitionc apabilities.9
In the thirds ection," Number of Players: Two-Person and N-Person
Games," I explain why cooperationb ecomes more difficulats the number
of actors increases; present strategiesf or promotingc ooperation in N-
actor situations; and offers trategiesf or promotingc ooperation by re-
ducing the number of actors necessary to the realization of common
interests.G ame theoristsa nd oligopoly theoristsh ave long noted that
cooperation becomes more difficulta s numbers increase, and their in-
sightsp rovide a startingp oint for discussions Recent work in political
economy focuseso n two strategiesf or promotingc ooperationi n thorny
N-person situations:f unctionalista nalystso f regimes suggest strategies
for increasing the likelihood and robustnesso f cooperationg iven large
numbers of actors;" analystso f ad hoc bargaining in internationalp o-
liticale conomys uggests trategieso f bilaterala nd regionald ecomposition
to reducet he numbero f actorsn ecessaryt o the realizationo f some mutual
interests,a t the expense of the magnitude of gains from cooperation.12
Each of the three circumstantiald imensionss erves both as an expla-
nationo f cooperationa nd as a targeto f strategiest o promotec ooperation.
The concluding section of this essay provides a roadmap to our efforts
to test these preliminarye xplanations and strategies.B y applying this
common analytic frameworkt o cases in economic and securitya ffairs
and by searching for explicit parallels and differencesin the incidence,
causes, and prospectsf or cooperation,t he authors hope to contributet o
a deeper understandingo f internationalc ooperation.
II. PAYOFF STRUCTURE:
MUTUAL AND CONFLICTING PREFERENCES
The structureo f payoffsi n a given round of play-the benefitso f
mutual cooperation (CC) relative to mutual defection (DD) and the
benefitso f unilateral defection( DC) relativet o unrequited cooperation
(CD)-is fundamental to the analysis of cooperation. The argument
9Ibid., I39-4I-
10S ee Martin Shubik, Gamesf or Society,B usinessa nd War: TowardsA Theoryo f Gaming
(New York: Elsevier, I975). For a formals tatemento n the importanceo f the number of
playerst o cooperationi n iteratedg ames, see Fudenberg and Maskin (fn. 7).
11S ee Robert 0. Keohane, AfterH egemony:C ooperationan d Discordi n the WorldP olitical
Economy( Princeton:P rincetonU niversityP ress, i984), and Krasner (fn. 5).
See John A. C. Conybeare," InternationalO rganization and the Theory of Property
12
Rights,"I nternationaOl rganization3 4 (Summer i980), 307-34, and Kenneth A. Oye, "Belief
Systems,B argaining,a nd Breakdown: InternationalP olitical Economy I929-I936," Ph.D.
diss. (Harvard University,i9 83), chap. 3.
EXPLAINING COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY 5
proceedsi n threes tages.F irst,h ow does payoffs tructuraef fectt he
significancoef c ooperationM? oren arrowlyw, heni s cooperationd,e fined
in termso f consciousp olicyc oordinationn,e cessaryt o the realization
of mutuali nterestsS?e cond,h ow does payoffst ructuraef fectt he like-
lihood and robustnesosf cooperation?T hird,t hroughw hat strategies
can statesi ncreaset he long-termp rospectfs orc ooperationb y altering
payoffst ructures?
Beforet urningt o theseq uestionsc, onsiderb rieflyso met angiblea nd
intangiblde eterminantosf payoffst ructureTs.h e securityan d political
economyl iteratureesx aminet hee ffectosf militaryf orces tructuraen d
doctrine,e conomic ideology,t he size of currencyr eserves,m acro-
economicc ircumstancea,n d a hosto f otherf actorso n nationala ssess-
mentso f nationali nterestsI.n "Cooperationu nder the SecurityD i-
lemma," RobertJ ervish as explainedh ow the diffusiono f offensive
militaryte chnologyan d strategiecsa n increaser ewardsf romd efection
and therebyr educet hep rospectfs orc ooperationI.n "InternationaRl e-
gimes,T ransactionsa,n d Chance:E mbeddedL iberalismin theP ostwar
EconomicO rder,"J ohnR uggieh as demonstratehdo w thed iffusionof
liberale conomici deas increasedt he perceivedb enefitosf mutuale co-
nomic opennesso ver mutual closure( CC-DD), and diminishedt he
perceivedr ewardsf roma symmetridce fectionr elativet o asymmetric
cooperation(D C-CD). In "Firmsa nd TariffR egimeC hange,"T imothy
McKeownh as shownh ow downturnisn theb usinessc yclea ltern ational
tastesf orp rotectioann d therebyd ecreaset hep erceivedb enefitosf mu-
tual opennessr elativet o mutual closurea nd increaset he perceived
rewardso f asymmetridce fection.'3
In thep resents ymposiumid, eologicaal nd cognitived eterminantosf
nationalp referenceasr e emphasizedi n StephenV an Evera's essayo n
the originso f the First World War and KennethO ye's chaptero n
monetaryco nflicdt uringt he 1930s. RobertJ ervis'ess sayo n the emer-
genceo f concertf ollowingsy stemiwc arse lucidatesin ternationsatl ruc-
turald eterminantosf payoffsJ. ohnC onybeare'sc omparativset udyo f
tradew ars,K ennethO ye's studyo f monetaryco nflicitn the 1930S, and
CharlesL ipson's studyo f bankers'd ilemmase xaminem acroeconomic
determinantosf payoffs tructureG. eorge Downs, David Rocke, and
RandolphS iversonin vestigatdeo mestics tructuradle terminantosf pay-
offs tructurien theire ssayo n cooperationin armsr aces.P ayoffst ructure
3 See Jervis( fn. 5); Ruggie (fn. 5); Timothy J. McKeown, "Firms and Tariff Regime
Change: Explaining the Demand for Protection,"W orldP olitics3 6 (January1 984), 215-33.
On the effectso fa mbiguityo f preferenceos n the prospectso f cooperation,s ee the concluding
sectionso f Jervis( fn. 5).
6 WORLD POLITICS
serves as an interveningv ariable between cognitive,d omestic,a nd in-
ternationals tructuralf actorsa nd internationalc ooperation.
A. PAYOFF STRUCTURE AND COOPERATION
How does payoffs tructured eterminet he significanceo f cooperation?
More narrowly,w hen is cooperationd, efinedi n termso f conscious policy
coordination,n ecessaryt o the realizationo f mutualb enefitsF? or a mutual
benefitt o exist, actors must preferm utual cooperation (CC) to mutual
defection( DD). For coordinationt o be necessaryto the realization of the
mutual benefit,a ctors must preferu nilateral defection( DC) to unre-
quited cooperation( CD). These preferenceo rderingsa re consistentw ith
the familiar games of Prisoners' Dilemma, Stag Hunt, and Chicken.
Indeed, these games have attracteda disproportionates hare of scholarly
attentionp reciselyb ecause cooperation is desirable but not automatic.
In these cases, the capacityo f statest o cooperate under anarchy,t o bind
themselvest o mutuallyb eneficialc ourses of action withoutr esortt o any
ultimatec entrala uthority,is vital to the realization of a common good.
Many internationals ituationsd o not fall within this class of games.
First, consider cases in which cooperation will not be necessaryt o the
realization of mutual interests.I f actors preferu nrequited cooperation
(CD) to unilateral defection (DC), no incentive to cheat exists. The
pursuit of self-interestw, ithout regard to the action of others, will
automaticallyl ead to mutual gains. For example, pure economic liber-
als-more common on economics facultiest han in trade ministries-
believe that unrequited openness is preferablet o unilateral protection.
Irrespectiveo f the actions of others,a liberal believes that openness is
best. In a world of pure liberals,p olicyc oordinationw ill not be necessary
to the realization of openness. In such situations,w here interestsa re in
full harmony,t he capacity of states to cooperate under anarchy is ir-
relevantt o the realization of mutual benefits.'4
Second, consider cases where no mutual benefit can be realized
through cooperation. If at least one actor prefersn ominal mutual de-
fection( DD) to nominal mutual cooperation( CC), "policyc oordination"
cannotl ead to mutual gain; the term" cooperation"b ecomes inapplicable.
Symmetrica nd asymmetricg ames of Deadlock fall into this category.
For example, if both the Soviet Union and the United States prefera rms
racingt o arms control,c onflicti s inevitable.O r considera trade example:
a believer in autarkyw ill preferm utual protectiont o mutual openness.
To speak of cooperationb etween a pure liberala nd a believeri n autarky
I4For an extended discussion of the distinctionb etween cooperationa nd harmony,s ee
Keohane (fn. II), 5I-55.
EXPLAINING COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY 7
is nonsense. Where harmonyp revails,c ooperationi s unnecessaryt o the
realization of mutual interests.W here deadlocks exist, the term "co-
operation" is devoid of meaning, and conflicti s inevitable. Neither
harmony nor deadlock has attracteds ubstantiala ttentionf rom game
theorists-preciselyb ecause cooperativea nd conflictualo utcomes follow
so directlya nd simply from the payoffs tructure.
What functiond o games of Harmony and Deadlock serve in this
collection? In courses on diagnosis,m edical studentsa re taught," When
you hear hoofbeats,t hinkh orse beforey ou thinkz ebra." Harrison Wag-
ner has offereds imilar advice to analystso f internationalr elations.1H5 e
warned that Stag Hunt, Chicken, and Prisoners' Dilemma are often
inappropriatem odels of internationals ituations.W hen you observec on-
flict,t hink Deadlock-the absence of mutual interest-before puzzling
over why a mutual interestw as not realized. When you observe co-
operation,t hinkH armony-the absence of gains fromd efection-before
puzzling over how states were able to transcend the temptationso f
defection.B y devotings ubstantiala ttentiont o the specificationo f payoff
structurest, he contributorss eek to heed these warnings.
In the class of games-including Prisoners'D ilemma, Stag Hunt, and
Chicken-where cooperation is necessaryt o the realization of mutual
benefits,h ow does payoffs tructurea ffectt he likelihood and robustness
of cooperation in these situations? Cooperation will be less likely in
Prisoners'D ilemma than in Stag Hunt or Chicken. To understandw hy,
consider each of these games in conjunctionw ith the illustratives tories
fromw hich they derive their names.
PrisonersD' ilemma: Two prisonersa re suspected of a major crime.
The authoritiesp ossess evidence to secure convictiono n only a minor
charge. If neitherp risoner squeals, both will draw a light sentence on
the minor charge (CC). If one prisoners queals and the others tonewalls,
the rat will go free( DC) and the sucker will draw a veryh eavy sentence
(CD). If both squeal, both will draw a moderate sentence (DD). Each
prisoner'sp referenceo rderingi s: DC > CC > DD > CD. If thep risoners
expect to "play" only one time,e ach prisonerw ill be bettero ffs quealing
than stonewalling,n o matterw hat his partnerc hooses to do (DC > CC
and DD > CD). The temptationo f the rat payoffa nd fearo f the sucker
payoffw ill drive single-play Prisoners' Dilemmas toward mutual de-
fection.U nfortunatelyi,f both prisonersa ct on this reasoning,t heyw ill
draw a moderate sentenceo n the major charge,w hile cooperationc ould
have led to a light sentenceo n the minor charge (CC > DD). In single-
I5Wagner, "The Theory of Games and the Problem of InternationalC ooperation,"
AmericanP oliticalS cience Review 70 (June i983), 330-46.
8 WORLD POLITICS
play Prisoners' Dilemmas, individuallyr ational actions produce a col-
lectivelys uboptimal outcome.
Stag Hunt: A group of hunters surround a stag. If all cooperate to
trap the stag, all will eat well (CC). If one person defects to chase a
passing rabbit,t he stag will escape. The defectorw ill eat lightly( DC)
and none of the others will eat at all (CD). If all chase rabbits,a ll will
have some chance of catching a rabbit and eating lightly( DD). Each
hunter'sp referenceo rdering is: CC > DC > DD > CD. The mutual
interesti n plentifulv enison (CC) relativet o all othero utcomes militates
stronglya gainst defection.H owever, because a rabbiti n the hand (DC)
is bettert han a stag in the bush (CD), cooperationw ill be assured only
if each hunter believes that all hunters will cooperate. In single-play
Stag Hunt, the temptationt o defectt o protecta gainst the defectiono f
othersi s balanced by the strongu niversalp referencef ors tag over rabbit.'6
Chicken: Two drivers race down the centero f a road from opposite
directions. If one swerves and the other does not, then the firstw ill
suffert he stigma of being known as a chicken (CD) while the second
will enjoy being known as a hero (DC). If neither swerves,b oth will
sufferg rievouslyi n the ensuing collision (DD). If both swerve,d amage
to the reputationo f each will be limited (CC). Each driver'sp reference
orderingi s: DC > CC > CD > DD. If each believes thatt he otherw ill
swerve, then each will be tempted to defect by continuingd own the
centero f the road. Bettert o be a live hero than a live chicken. If both
succumb to this temptation,h owever, defectionw ill result in collision.
The fear that the other driver may not swerve decreases the appeal of
continuing down the center of the road. In single-playC hicken, the
temptationso f unilateral defectiona re balanced by fear of mutual de-
fection.17
In games that are not repeated, only ordinally defined preferences
matter.U nder single-playc onditions,i nterval-levepl ayoffsi n ordinally
defined categories of games cannot (in theory)a ffectt he likelihood of
cooperation.I n the illustrationsa bove, discussionso f dominants trategies
i6 KennethW altz borrowedR ousseau's parableo f thes taghuntt o illustratet he infeasibility
of realizing mutual interestsu nder internationaal narchy.R ousseau used the staghuntt o
illustratet he possibilityo f cooperationd uring his firstp eriod of primatives ocial interde-
pendence. He argued that individualsc ould cooperateo n "mutual undertakings"t o realize
"presenta nd perceptiblei nterest"t hrough" some kind of freea ssociationt hat obligated no
one and lasted only so long as the passing need that formed it." This essay returnst o
Rousseau's use of the staghunt.S ee Waltz, Man, the State,a nd War (New York: Columbia
UniversityP ress, 1959), and JeanJ acquesR ousseau: The Firsta nd Second Discourses,t rans.
Roger D. and JudithR . Masters( New York: St. Martins,i 964), 165-67.
I The illustrativep referenceo rderings strike most mature observersa s perverse: the
driversn eed not place themselvesi n the game.
EXPLAINING COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY 9
do not hingeo n the magnitudeo f differenceasm ongt he payoffsY. et
the magnitudeo f differencebse tweenC C and DD and betweenD C
and CD can be large or small,i f not preciselym easurablea, nd can
increaseo r decrease.C hanges in the magnitudeo f differenceisn the
value placed on outcomesc an influencet he prospectfs orc ooperation
throught wo paths.
First,c hangesi n the value attachedt o outcomesc an transformsi t-
uations fromo ne ordinallyd efinedc lass of game into another.F or
example,i n "Cooperationu ndert he SecurityD ilemma" RobertJ ervis
describedh ow difficulPtr isonersD' ilemmasm aye volvei ntol ess chal-
lengingS tag Hunts if theg ainsf romm utualc ooperation(C C) increase
relativet o theg ainsf rome xploitatio(nD C). He relatedt hes tructuroef
payoffst o traditionacl onceptso f offensivaen d defensived ominance,
and offensivaen d defensived ominancet o technologicaaln d doctrinal
shiftsE. rnstH aas, MaryP at Williamsa, nd Don Babai havee mphasized
thei mportancoef c ognitivceo ngruencaes a determinanotf t echnological
cooperationT. he diffusionof commonc onceptionos f the naturea nd
effectos f technologyen hancedp erceivedg ains fromc ooperationa nd
diminishedp erceivedg ains fromd efectiona,n d mayh ave transformed
some PrisonersD' ilemmasi ntoH armony.'8
Second, under iteratedc onditions,t he magnitudeo f differences
among payoffws ithina givenc lass of games can be an importandt e-
terminanotf cooperationT. he mores ubstantiatlh eg ains fromm utual
cooperation(C C-DD) and thel ess substantiatlh eg ainsf romu nilateral
defection(D C-CD), theg reatert hel ikelihoodo fc ooperationIn. iterated
situationst,h e magnitudeo f the differencbee tweenC C and DD and
betweenD C and CD in presenta nd futurer oundso f playa ffecttsh e
likelihoodo fc ooperationin thep resentT. his pointi s developeda t length
in the sectiono n the shadowo f thef uture.
B. STRATEGIES TO ALTER PAYOFF STRUCTURE
If payoffst ructuraef fecttsh el ikelihoodo fc ooperationt,o whate xtent
can statesa lters ituationbs y modifyinpga yoffs tructureas,n d thereby
increaset hel ong-termli kelihoodo f cooperationM? anyo f thet angible
and intangiblde eterminantosf payoffst ructured,i scusseda t theo utset
of this section,a re subjectt o willfulm odificatiotnh roughu nilateral,
bilaterala,n d multilateraslt rategieIsn. "Cooperationu ndert heS ecurity
Dilemma," RobertJ ervish as offereds pecifics uggestionfs or altering
payoffs tructuretsh roughu nilaterasl trategiesP.r ocuremenpto licyc an
i8 Haas, Williams, and Babai, Scientistasn d WorldO rder:T he Useso f TechnicalK nowledge
in InternationaOl rganization(sB erkeley:U niversityo f CaliforniaP ress, I977).
Description:Structure in International Crises (Princeton: Princeton University Press, I977). 5
For examples, see Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,"
