Table Of ContentExperimenting with
Social Norms
Experimenting with
Social Norms
Fairness and Punishment
in Cross-Cultural Perspective
Edited by Jean Ensminger and Joseph Henrich
The Russell Sage Foundation
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Larry M. Bartels Kathryn Edin Nancy L. Rosenblum
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Karen S. Cook Nicholas Lemann Shelley E. Taylor
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Experimenting with social norms : fairness and punishment in cross-cultural perspective / Jean Ensminger
and Joseph Henrich, editors.
pages cm
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-87154-500-8 (alk. paper) — ISBN 978-1-61044-840-6 (ebook) 1. Game theory—
Social aspects—Cross-cultural studies. 2. Social norms—Cross-cultural studies. 3. Experimental
economics—Cross-cultural studies. 4. Economics—Sociological aspects—Cross-cultural studies.
I. Ensminger, Jean. II. Henrich, Joseph Patrick.
HB144.E97 2014
303.3'7—dc23
2013034010
Copyright © 2014 by Russell Sage Foundation. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of
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Text design by Genna Patacsil.
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10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
CONTENTS
Illustrations vii
Contributors xix
Part I Theory, Method, and Comparative Analysis
Chapter 1 Introduction, Project History, and Guide to the Volume 3
Jean Ensminger and Joseph Henrich
Chapter 2 Theoretical Foundations: The Coevolution of Social Norms,
Intrinsic Motivation, Markets, and the Institutions of Complex Societies 19
Joseph Henrich and Jean Ensminger
Chapter 3 Cross-Cultural Methods, Sites, and Variables 45
Jean Ensminger, Abigail Barr, and Joseph Henrich
Chapter 4 Major Empirical Results: Markets, Religion, Community Size,
and the Evolution of Fairness and Punishment 89
Joseph Henrich, Jean Ensminger, Abigail Barr, and Richard McElreath
Chapter 5 Double-Blind Dictator Games in Africa and the United States:
Differential Experimenter Effects 149
Carolyn K. Lesorogol and Jean Ensminger
Chapters 6–18 are available for download at https://www.russellsage.org/publications/
experimenting-social-norms.
Part II Society Case Studies
Chapter 6 Better to Receive Than to Give: Hadza Behavior
in Three Experimental Economic Games 161
Frank W. Marlowe
Chapter 7 Cruel to Be Kind: Effects of Sanctions and Third-Party Enforcers
on Generosity in Papua New Guinea 177
David P. Tracer, Ivo Mueller, and Jennifer Morse
Chapter 8 The Tsimane' Rarely Punish: An Experimental Investigation
of Dictators, Ultimatums, and Punishment 197
Michael D. Gurven
Chapter 9 Fairness Without Punishment: Behavioral Experiments
in the Yasawa Islands, Fiji 225
Joseph Henrich and Natalie Henrich
Chapter 10 Economic Game Behavior Among the Shuar 259
H. Clark Barrett and Kevin J. Haley
vi Contents
Chapter 11 Economic Experimental Game Results from the Sursurunga
of New Ireland, Papua New Guinea 275
Alexander H. Bolyanatz
Chapter 12 Maragoli and Gusii Farmers in Kenya: Strong Collective Action
and High Prosocial Punishment 309
Edwins Laban Gwako
Chapter 13 Sharing, Subsistence, and Social Norms in Northern Siberia 337
John P. Ziker
Chapter 14 Gifts or Entitlements: The Influence of Property Rights
and Institutions for Third-Party Sanctioning on Behavior
in Three Experimental Economic Games 357
Carolyn K. Lesorogol
Chapter 15 Cooperation and Punishment in an Economically Diverse
Community in Highland Tanzania 377
Richard McElreath
Chapter 16 Social Preferences Among the People of Sanquianga in Colombia 391
Juan-Camilo Cardenas
Chapter 17 The Effects of Birthplace and Current Context on Other-Regarding
Preferences in Accra 421
Abigail Barr
Chapter 18 Prosociality in Rural America: Evidence from Dictator, Ultimatum,
Public Goods, and Trust Games 445
Jean Ensminger and Kathleen Cook
Index 465
illuSTraTiONS
Table 3.1 Samples Sites and Mean Market Integration 49
Table 3.2 Ethnographic Summary of Societies in the Study 52
Table 3.3 Mean Demographics, by Society 61
Table 4.1 Mean Summary Statistics on Offers and Rejections, by Society 102
Table 4.2 Dictator Game, Ultimatum Game, and Third-Party Punishment Game:
Linear Regressions for All Offers 107
Table 4.3 Linear Regressions for Dictator Game Offers 110
Table 4.4 Linear Regressions for Ultimatum Game Offers 113
Table 4.5 Linear Regressions for Third-Party Punishment Game Offers 115
Table 4.6 Linear Regressions for Offers in the Ultimatum Game and the
Third-Party Punishment Game With and Without the Mean
Minimum Acceptable Offer as a Predictor 116
Table 4.7 Linear Regressions on the Difference Between Mean Dictator Game
and Third-Party Punishment Game Offers 119
Table 4.8 Linear Regressions for the Difference in Ultimatum Game and
Third-Party Punishment Game Offers 119
Table 4.9 Ordered Logistic Regressions for the Minimum Acceptable Offer
in the Third-Party Punishment Game, Using Community Size 123
Table 4.10 Ordered Logistic Regressions for the Minimum Acceptable Offer
in the Third-Party Punishment Game, Using LNCS 125
Table 4.11 Ordered Logistic Regressions for the Minimum Acceptable Offer
in the Ultimatum Game, Using Community Size 127
Table 4.12 Ordered Logistic Regressions for the Minimum Acceptable Offer
in the Ultimatum Game, Using LNCS 128
Table 5.1 Statistical Tests of Null Hypothesis Comparing Offers for the
Double-Blind Dictator Game and the Dictator Game for Each Site 154
Table 6.1 Results in the 2002 Round Compared to the 1998 Rounds 165
Table 6.2 Linear Regressions of Hadza Dictator Game Offers 167
Table 6.3 Linear Regressions of Hadza Ultimatum Game Offers 167
Table 6.4 Linear Regressions of Hadza Third-Party Punishment Game Offers 169
Table 6.5 Linear Regressions of Hadza Ultimatum Game Minimum
Acceptable Offers 171
Table 6.6 Linear Regressions of Hadza Third-Party Punishment Game Minimum
Nonpunished Offers 171
viii Illustrations
Table 7.1 Linear Regressions of Au Dictator Game Offers 190
Table 7.2 Linear Regressions of Au Ultimatum Game Offers 191
Table 7.3 Linear Regressions of Au Ultimatum Game Minimum Acceptable Offers 192
Table 7.4 Linear Regressions of Au Third-Party Punishment Game Offers 193
Table 7.5 Linear Regressions of Au Lowest Game Offers Not Punished
in Third-Party Punishment Game 194
Table 8.1 Statistical Comparison of Game Samples Drawn from
the Tsimane', Hadza, and Germans 205
Table 8.2 Linear Regressions of Tsimane' Dictator Game Offers 206
Table 8.3 Linear Regressions of Tsimane' Ultimatum Game Offers 209
Table 8.4 Linear Regressions of Tsimane' Ultimatum Game Minimum
Acceptable Offers 211
Table 8.5 Linear Regressions of Tsimane' Third-Party Punishment Game Offers 215
Table 8.6 Linear Regressions of Tsimane' Third-Party Punishment Game
Minimum Acceptable Offers 216
Table 9.1 Comparison of Yasawan Offer Distributions 229
Table 9.2 Linear Regressions of Yasawan Dictator Game Offers 236
Table 9.3 Linear Regressions of Yasawan Ultimatum Game Offers 237
Table 9.4 Linear Regressions of Yasawan Ultimatum Game
Minimum Acceptable Offers 238
Table 9.5 Linear Regressions of Yasawan Third-Party Punishment Game Offers 239
Table 9.6 Linear Regressions of Yasawan Third-Party Punishment Game Minimum
Acceptable Offers 240
Table 9.7 Genetic Relatedness on Behavioral Measures 241
Table 9.8 Market Integration Variables 242
Table 9.9 Correlation Coefficients for Market Integration 243
Table 9.10 Experimenter Effects on Behavioral Measures 244
Table 9.11 Number of Examples Used to Explain the Games 245
Table 9.12 Number of Responses to the Question: “How Much Should Player 1
Send to Player 2?” 246
Table 9.13 Number of Responses to the Question: “In the Third-Party Punishment
Game, if Player 1 Sent $0 to Player 2 and Kept $20, How Would
Players 2 and 3 Feel?” 246
Table 9.14 Number of Responses to the Question: “In the Ultimatum Game,
How Would You Feel if You Received an Offer of $0 from Player 1?” 246
Table 9.15 Number of Responses to the Question: “What Does This Game
Remind You Of?” 247
Table 9.16 Cooperative Activities in Teci and Dalomo 252
Illustrations ix
Table 10.1 Linear Regressions of Shuar Dictator Game Offers 267
Table 10.2 Linear Regressions of Shuar Ultimatum Game Offers 269
Table 10.3 Linear Regressions of Shuar Ultimatum Game Minimal Acceptable Offers 269
Table 10.4 Linear Regressions of Shuar Third-Party Punishment Game Offers 270
Table 10.5 Linear Regressions of Shuar Lowest Unpunished Offers
in the Third-Party Punishment Game 270
Table 11.1 Reduction in Wage Labor in New Ireland Province, 1990 to 2000 276
Table 11.2 Household Economic Activity in Northern and Southern New Ireland
Province, 2010 277
Table 11.3 Dictator Game Player 1 Offers 285
Table 11.4 Ultimatum Game Player 1 Offers and Six Demographic Variables 286
Table 11.5 Ultimatum Game Player 1 Offers and Household Wealth 287
Table 11.6 Ultimatum Game Player 1 Offers and Land 288
Table 11.7 Ultimatum Game Player 2 MAOs 289
Table 11.8 Ultimatum Game Player 2 Minimum Acceptable Offers 290
Table 11.9 Player 1 in Dictator Game Compared to Player 1 in Third-Party
Punishment Game 291
Table 11.10 Third-Party Punishment Game Player 1 Offers 292
Table 11.11 Third-Party Punishment Game Player 3 Highest Offer Punished 293
Table 11.12 Sursurunga Postgame Responses to the Question: “Did This Game
Remind You of Any Aspect of Customary Life?” by Range of Offer 294
Table 11.13 Aggregated Results of Table 11.12 294
Table 11.14 Sursurunga Player 2 Rejections of Fifty-Fifty Offers in
the Ultimatum Game 301
Table 12.1 Demographic Differences Between Maragoli and Gusii Players 320
Table 12.2 Linear Regressions of Dictator Game Offers for the Maragoli
and the Gusii 331
Table 12.3 Linear Regressions of Ultimatum Game Offers for the Maragoli
and the Gusii 332
Table 12.4 Linear Regressions of Combined Dictator Game and Ultimatum
Game Offers for the Maragoli and the Gusii 333
Table 12.5 Linear Regressions of Third-Party Punishment Game Offers for
the Maragoli and the Gusii 333
Table 12.6 Linear Regressions of Minimum Acceptable Offers in the Ultimatum
Game for the Maragoli and the Gusii 335
Table 12.7 Linear Regressions of Minimum Acceptable Offers in the Third-Party
Punishment Game for the Maragoli and the Gusii 335
