Table Of ContentEXPERIENCE AND ITS SYSTEMATIZATION
EXPERIENCE AND ITS
SYSTEMATIZATION
STUDIES IN KANT
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NATHAN ROTENSTREICH
Second and enlarged edition
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THE HAGUE
MARTINUS NIJHOFF
1972
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AUTHOR'S NOTE
If one dares to add one more book on Kant to the immense litera
ture existing - he does it with a view not to present a book which
contains an analysis of the sequenc::e of Kant's thought.
This book selects some pivotal issues in which, as it were, the
whole philosophy of Kant is brought to a focus. Henceforth an at
tempt has been made to show how Kant, while starting with an analy
sis of empirical knowledge, proceeds on the basis of this analysis to
outline a system of knowledge, ethics and aesthetics as· well. This book
proposes to expound the problems and the difficulties inherent in
Kant's program.
I am grateful to Mrs. Z. PORAT, Mr. E. GEFFNER and M. KUBOVI
for their help. Thanks are due to Mrs. RITA SAPIDR for her help in
reading the proofs.
This second edition contains in addition to some technical cor
rections a new chapter on Substance and Ideas.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Author' s Note v
Chapter One THE TWO LOGICS AND THEIR RELATION 1
Chapter Two THE SCHEMATISM IN ITS CONTEXT. 26
Chapter Three THE CONCEPT OF METAPHYSICS: 44
Chapter Four THE CONCEPT OF DIALECTIC • 59
I. Totality . 59
II. Hypostasis. . 63
III. Illusion 68
IV. Dialectical Opposition. 71
V. The Antinomy between Verstand and Vernunft 77
VI. General Observations on the Structure of
Dialectic. 86
Chapter Five THE SCEPTICISM OF THE 'CRITIQ.UE OF JUDGEMENT' 88
Chapter Six THE PRIMACY OF PRACTICAL REASON III
I. The Idea of Practical Reason . III
II. The Meaning of Primacy. 114
III. Freedom. 120
IV. Postulates . 124
Chapter Seven SUBSTANCE AND IDEAS 132
Appendix INTERPRETATIONS AND SYSTEMS ON APPROACHES TO
THE 'CRITIQ.UE OF PURE REASON' • 160
I. The W orId as an Image 165
II. From Illusion to Fiction 169
III. The Realistic Turn 173
IV. The Rule of Method. 178
V. Knowledge and Human Finitude 190
Index 20~
CHAPTER ONE
THE TWO LOGICS AND THEIR RELATION
I
Before going into a detailed analysis of Kant's distinction between
Formal Logic and Transcendental Logic, let us recall the definitions
of these two sphet:es given in the Critique oj Pure Reason: (a) Formal
or General Logic contains the strictly necessary rules of thinking,
regardless of differences in its objects;l (b) Transcendental Logic is
concerned with the origins of our a priori knowledge of objects and
is the science of the pure knowledge through which we think ofobjects.s
These two definitions present the difference between the two spheres
in terms of their relationship to objects, insofar as we can abstract from
objects or in turn are concerned precisely with the knowledge of
objects.
This difference will be the subject-matter of the present analysis.
Clearly, if there is a Logic of the knowledge of objects and not only
a Logic of the rules of thinking, then there must be a fundamental
validity of a priori forms referring to objects; the precise relationship,
however, between the Logic of thinking and the Logic of forms of
knowledge remains to be examined in detail.
It is pertinent to examine this distinction because the development
of this problem and the new philosophical approaches to it did not
bring about any fundamental change either in the distinction itself or
in the characteristics which distinguish the one sphere from the other.
As we have said, Formal Logic is abstract by nature, because it is
independent from all the given data of cognition and from any differ
ences in objects. This characteri~tic has both a positive and a negative
aspect. On the one hand Formal Logic contains the forms of thinking
which relate thinking to itself: it is the totality of the forms of the pure
relations of thinking. On the other hand, this point underlines the
abstract nature of Formal Logic: the problem of the origin of knowl-
1, Kritik der reinen Vernurift (2nd German ed.), p. 78; in Norman Kemp.Smith's translation
(Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, London, 1950), pp. 94 f. We will henceforth adopt
the following style in references to this work: K. d. r. V., B 78 (transl., pp. 94 f.).
I K. d. r. V., B 80-81 (transl., pp. 95 f.).
2 THE TWO LOGICS AND THEIR RELATION
edge or of the forms is not relevant to this Logic. The forms of Formal
Logic define the relations within pure thought in terms of form, be
its origin empirical or not. Thought is pure and we shall not decide
at this juncture whether this purity is due to our breaking the tie
between pure thought and its contents or because it was pure from
the start. Formal Logic is indifferent to the question of the source of
thought: it is involved in the examination of the essence of self
referential or pure thought (pure, because it does not refer to any
given).l
As opposed to Formal Logic, Transcendental Logic bears upon the
relation between knowledge and its given contents. Here .thought
refers to a manifold given which plays the role of matter or content in
knowledge and without which Transcendental Logic beco~es Formal
Logic.2 The main problem of Transcendental Logic, which is rooted
in its very definition, is the problem of the arrangement of these con
tents by the forms of thought. This is what establishes the difference
between the two domains of Logic: Formal Logic investigates the
forms of thought-enclosed-within-itself and thus cannot be held
responsible for the problem of the validity of its forms. We thereby
assume that the validity ofits forms is determined by this self-referential
essence of thought, i.e., this very relation of thought to itself determines
the validity of the forms of this relation. In other words, thought'S
relation to itself cannot be doubted, and the evident character oft his
relation guarantees the validity of the forms. This relation, however,
is not external to these forms - the forms are embedded in it; if we
accept the fact of the relation as undeniable, it follows that we accept
the forms of the relationship as well.
The problem of validity only arises where there is a synthesis of
two opposing elements: thought and the manifold given by intuition
. (Anschauung). Because this relation is between elements which are not
of the same kind, it is first·necessary to prove the validity of the relation
itself. Only through this proof will it be possible to arrive at a proof
of the validity of the forms of the relation. It is this very fact - that the
relation is not 'doubt-proof - which makes impossible to use it to
establish the validity of the forms. In other words, the actuality of the
relation cannot establish its validity; it is rather the affirmation of the
validity of this relation that will establish its actuality.
It is this fundamental point that justifies our giving priority to the
1 K. d, r. V., B 78 (transl., p. 94).
I K. d. T. V., B 75 (transl., p. 92).
THE TWO LOGICS AND THEIR RELATION 3
sphere of Formal Logic, this Logic which poses no problem of the
validity of its forms because the validity of its forms is clear from the
very beginning. Formal Logic is, to a certain extent, descriptive: we
discover its forms by describing the structure of thought which relates
to itself; there is no need to establish their validity, nor to determine
them by proving their validity. This is what makes it the primary
Logic. And since there is no problem as to its validity, we may use it
as a point of .departure for the epistemological discussion, i.e., as a
point of departure for the consideration of the forms of thought which
are beyond the sphere of Formal Logic. The assumption behind this
reasoning is that that which is not problematical, i.e., the simple sphere
as it were, must be primary as regards that which is problematical,
.i.e., the sphere whose forms cannot be considered until the problem
of the validity of these forms has been solved.
The giving of priority to Formal Logic over Transcendental Logic
is thus entailed by the very essence of the two Logics. Now, this brings
us to another aspect of this question: In Kant's conception of Tran
scendental Logic we find a fusion of two elements between which we
should clearly distinguish when dealing with the problem of the
validity of the forms (which, as we have seen, is of fundamental im
portance in distinguishing between the two Logics and in giving
priority to Formal Logic). Transcendental Logic is, on the one hand,
a Logic of objects, a Logic that contains the forms which establish
the relations between objects, as opposed to the forms ofe mpty thought.
From this standpoint we can call Transcendental Logic "objective
Logic" - if we specify that by object we mean a given content and not
necessarily a content categorized by the forms. On the other hand,
however, the fundamental characteristic of Transcendental Logic is
that it does not merely consider the forms of the relations between
objects in and among themselves: it deals with the forms of these
relations as the conditions for knowing these objects. In other words,
the forms of the relations between objects are none but the forms which
thought invests in its relation to objects. Here we cannot try to disclose
forms through description since the forms are the conditions of the
objects and are not embedded in the objects. Thus, the problem of the
validity of the relation between thought and given objects is central
to the discussion of Transcendental Logic for the very reason that
this relation determines the forms of the relations which are the con
ditions for knowledge of given objects. In short, Transcendental Logic
is not an objective Logic in the simple sense of this concept, neither
4 THE TWO LOGICS AND THEIR RELATION
is it a Logic of objects: it is the Logic of the conditions for the knowledge
of objects; and so the central problem of this Logic is the problem of
the validity of the conditions in relation to whatever is conditioned
by them.
We cannot discover the forms of Transcendental Logic within the
objects themselves; how then do we come to postulate these forms,
and what is the basis for their assumption? Kant approached this
point by two ways. On the one hand, he tried - in the Prolegomena -
to disclose the forms of Transcendental Logic through their use, i.e.,
he tried to abstract these forms from the actual principles of the sciences.
In other words, starting from science, the logical foundation ofs cience
(its prior logical forms) is disclosed through an abstraction from science,
i.e., through a critique of science. Kant thus assumed the 'validity of
the principles of science. If we can discover the conditions of these
principles within science, then these conditions will be valid as well.
On the other hand - in the Critique ofP ure Reason - we find the opposite
method: an attempt to derive the forms of Transcendental Logic from
simpler forms. As opposed to the method of abstraction from the
hypotheses of science, which is a method of reduction, Kant applied
here the method of adding meaning to the simple forms, i.e., to the
forms of the judgments of Formal Logic. Thus, in the first approach
the forms of Transcendental Logic served as conditions, while the
second approach deals with the conditions of those conditions or, at
any rate, with the foundation of conditions.
This brings us to the second reason for giving priority to Formal
Logic and deriving the forms of Transcendental Logic from its forms.
For beyond being free from any problem of validity, the forms of
Formal Logic are also simpler. Kant based the priority of Formal
. Logic on the actual process of knowing: since this process draws
thought out of its confinement, and adds something to pure thought
that was not there before, we conclude that pure thought is simpler
than thought in relation to data. To put it differently, pure thought
has less content than thought related to a given; thus the thought
which is the poorer in contents is prior to the other. Content increases
in the process of knowing: something is added to something else; i.e.,
an increment is added which is, so to speak, a step forward from pure
thought. 1 'This reason for giving priority to Formal Logic has thus
1 Kant, Ober eine Entdeckung, nach der aile neue Kritik tier Teinen Vemurift dUTch eine iiltere
e.ntbehrlich gemacht werden solt, Vorlander ed., (in I. Kant, Kleinere Schrijten, 2nd ed., Leipzig,
1913), 71.
THE TWO LOGICS AND THEIR RELATION 5
nothing to do with the problem of the validity of the forms; it is a
phenomenological and descriptive reason in which the key concept
is, as it were, "quantity of contents." The simple is prior to the complex,
just as what is primordially true is prior to a truth requiring justifica
tion. Actually, in Kant's philosophy these two elements are confound
ed: the simple element has primary validity while the complex has
only secondary validity. In spite of this we are entided to distinguish
between the two reasons for giving priority to Formal Logic, especially
in view of the following analysis of the concept "simple."
It should be clear by now that from the point of view of validity the
formal forms are absolutely primary because their validity need not be
based on any forms prior to them. From the standpoint of simplicity,
however, we cannot attribute absolute simplicity to them. Because we
can reduce the formal forms to their terms (e.g., to dismande a judg
ment into its component concepts), die simplicity of the formal forms
is only relative to the more complex character of the transcendental
forms. However, the formal forms themselves are complex relative to
the terms that make them up. In other words, if we look up from the
ground level of the concepts to the first level of the judgments, then
even the forms of Formal Logic are tied to the process of knowing;
just as' the forms of Transcendental Logic ar~ tied to it when they are
looked upon as the level above the judgments of Formal Logic. Now
it is this analysis that entitles us to separate the two reasons that
brought Kant to give precedence to Formal Logic and its forms. The
problem of validity gives a slightly different meaning to this priority
than does the problem of simplicity and the relation of the forms to
the process of knowing.
, A third reason that caused Kant to accord priority to Formal Logic
is historical (while the preceding two were fundamental). Kant
thought that this classification of the forms of Formal Logic had ex
hausted all the functions of the understanding,! i.e., he thought that
he had disclosed all the possible forms of Formal Logic and that there
was no adding to them. Now these forms, of which we can be perfectly
sure, can serve as foundation for the discovery of others which are yet
to be disclosed. Those forms which, historically speaking, are given,
serve as a starting point for the derivation offorms which are not given.
Here, as we said above, the reason for giving priority to Formal Logic
is not fundamental; the reason is rather of a technical order - the
1 K. d. T. V., B 106 (transl., p. 113).
