Exemplarist moral theory

289 Pages·2017·1.696 MB·English

by  Zagzebski, Linda Trinkaus

Exemplarist Moral Theory

EXEMPLARIST
MORAL THEORY
LINDA TRINKAUS ZAGZEBSKI
1
3
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers
the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education
by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University
Press in the UK and certain other countries.
Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press
198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America.
© Oxford University Press 2017
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in
a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the
prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted
by law, by license, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reproduction
rights organization. Inquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the
above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the
address above.
You must not circulate this work in any other form
and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer.
Library of Congress Cataloging- in- Publication Data
Names: Zagzebski, Linda Trinkaus, 1946– author.
Title: Exemplarist moral theory / Linda Zagzebski.
Description: New York : Oxford University Press, 2017.
Identifiers: LCCN 2016028873| ISBN 9780190655846 (hardcover : alk. paper) |
ISBN 9780190655853 (online content)
Subjects: LCSH: Ethics. | Good and evil. | Heroes.
Classification: LCC BJ37 .Z34 2017 | DDC 171—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016028873
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Printed by Sheridan Books, Inc., United States of America
Dedicated to the memory of my mother, Doris McTevia Trinkaus

Contents
Preface xi
1. Why Exemplarism?  1
1. Introduction 1
2. My Theory of Theory 5
3. Direct Reference 9
4. Direct Reference to Exemplars 14
5. The Theoretical Structure 21
6. Some Initial Worries 23
7. Conclusion 28
2. Admiration  30
1. Introduction 30
2. What Is Admiration? 32
3. Kinds of Admiration 35
4. Haidt on the Psychology of Admiration 40
5. Trusting Admiration 44
6. Painful Admiration and Resentment of the Admirable 50
3. Exemplars  60
1. Where Are the Exemplars? 60
2. Three Ways to Observe Exemplars 65
3. Leopold Socha and the Holocaust Rescuers 70
3.1. The Story of Leopold Socha 70
3.2. Psychological Studies of Holocaust Rescuers 73
3.3. Rescuers in the Laboratory 77
viii Contents
4. Jean Vanier and the L’Arche Communities 80
4.1. The Story of Jean Vanier 80
4.2. Psychological Studies of L’Arche Caregivers 83
5. Confucius and Exemplars of Wisdom 84
5.1. The Sage and the Analects 84
5.2. Empirical Studies of Wisdom 90
6. Conclusion: The Hero, the Saint, and the Sage 96
4. Virtue  99
1. The Primary Moral Terms 99
2. Defining Value Terms 103
3. What Is a Virtue? 105
4. Discovering the Virtues in Exemplars 117
4.1. The Scope of Particular Virtues 117
4.2. The Connection of One Virtue to Another 119
4.3. Virtues without a Name 124
5. Emulation  129
1. Introduction: Imitation and Emulation 129
2. How Can Emulation Produce Virtue? 133
3. Moral Reasons 139
3.1. Are Moral Judgments Based on Reasons? 139
3.2. Do Exemplars Act on Reasons? 146
4. Emulation and Autonomy 150
5. Conclusion 153
6. A Good Life  156
1. Introduction 156
2. The Desirability and Admirability of Lives 159
2.1. The Desirability of Admirable Lives 159
2.2. The Admirability of Desirable Lives 164
3. The Grounding Problem 166
4. Why Be Moral? 169
5. The Varieties of Desirable Lives 171
5.1. L’Arche: The Flourishing of Dependent Persons 172
5.2. Confucius and the Life of the Sage 173
5.3. Leopold Socha: Atonement as a Way to Flourish 175
5.4. Flaubert’s Félicité 177
6. What Values Can We Learn from Exemplars? 178
Contents ix
7. Right, Wrong, and the Division of Moral Linguistic Labor  183
1. The Principle of the Division of Linguistic Labor 183
2. The Division of Moral Linguistic Labor 186
3. The Social Importance of Deontic Terms 192
4. Wrong and Duty 194
5. A Right Act 198
6. Practical Advantages of the Exemplarist Definitions 205
8. Exemplarist Semantics and Meta- Ethics  212
1. Introduction 212
2. Moral Terms and the Necessary a Posteriori 213
3. Moral Realism without Necessity 226
4. Conclusion: What Kind of Theory Is Exemplarism? 230
Bibliography  237
Index  253