Table Of ContentEurasianism and the European Far Right
Eurasianism and the European Far Right
Reshaping the Europe–Russia
Relationship
Edited by Marlene Laruelle
LEXINGTONBOOKS
Lanham•Boulder•NewYork•London
PublishedbyLexingtonBooks
AnimprintofTheRowman&LittlefieldPublishingGroup,Inc.
4501ForbesBoulevard,Suite200,Lanham,Maryland20706
www.rowman.com
UnitA,WhitacreMews,26-34StannaryStreet,LondonSE114AB
Copyright©2015byLexingtonBooks
Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthisbookmaybereproducedinanyformorbyany
electronicormechanicalmeans,includinginformationstorageandretrievalsystems,
withoutwrittenpermissionfromthepublisher,exceptbyareviewerwhomayquote
passagesinareview.
BritishLibraryCataloguinginPublicationInformationAvailable
LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationData
EurasianismandtheEuropeanfarright:reshapingtheEurope-Russiarelationship/editedbyMar-
leneLaruelle.
p.cm.
Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex.
ISBN978-1-4985-1068-4(cloth:alkalinepaper)–ISBN978-1-4985-1069-1(ebook)
1.Europe,Western–Relations–Russia(Federation)2.Russia(Federation)–Relations–Europe,West-
ern.3.Eurasianschool.4.Radicalism–Europe,Western.5.Radicalism–Russia(Federation)6.Dugin,
Aleksandr–Politicalandsocialviews.7.Ideology–Politicalaspects–Europe,Western.8.Ideolo-
gy–Politicalaspects–Russia(Federation)9.Europe,Western–Politicsandgovernment–1989-10.
Russia(Federation)–Politicsandgovernment–1991-I.Laruelle,Marl?ne.
D1065.R9E872015
327.4047–dc23
2015013549
TMThepaperusedinthispublicationmeetstheminimumrequirementsofAmerican
NationalStandardforInformationSciencesPermanenceofPaperforPrintedLibrary
Materials,ANSI/NISOZ39.48-1992.
PrintedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica
Contents
Foreword vii
Introduction xi
MarleneLaruelle
1 DangerousLiaisons:Eurasianism,theEuropeanFarRight,and
Putin’sRussia 1
MarleneLaruelle
PartI:AlexanderDugin’sTrajectory:MediatingEuropeanFar
RighttoRussia 33
2 AlexanderDuginandtheWestEuropeanNewRight,1989–1994 35
AntonShekhovtsov
3 MoscowStateUniversity’sDepartmentofSociologyandthe
ClimateofOpinioninPost-SovietRussia 55
VadimRossman
PartII:France,Italy,andSpain:Dugin’sEuropeanCradles 77
4 ALong-LastingFriendship:AlexanderDuginandtheFrench
RadicalRight 79
Jean-YvesCamus
5 FromEvolatoDugin:TheNeo-EurasianistConnectioninItaly 97
GiovanniSavino
6 ArribaEurasia?:TheDifficultEstablishmentofNeo-
EurasianisminSpain 125
NicolasLebourg
v
vi Contents
PartIII:Turkey,Hungary,andGreece:Dugin’sNewConquests 143
7 “FailedExodus”:Dugin’sNetworksinTurkey 145
Vügarİmanbeyli
8 DecipheringEurasianisminHungary:Narratives,Networks,
andLifestyles 175
UmutKorkutandEmelAkçali
9 TheDawningofEuropeandEurasia?:TheGreekGoldenDawn
andItsTransnationalLinks 193
SofiaTipaldou
PartIV:Conclusion:TheEuropeanFarRightatMoscow’sService? 221
10 Far-RightElectionObservationMonitorsintheServiceofthe
Kremlin’sForeignPolicy 223
AntonShekhovtsov
References 245
Index 259
AbouttheContributors 273
Foreword
It is almost trite to observe that the extended region that is the focus of this
volume—Europe, including Russia—has seen profound upheaval in the
course of its writing. We set out some two years ago to explore a specific
topic—AlexanderDuginandhisEurasianistschoolofthought,includinghis
reach into the intellectual and policy worlds of contemporary Russia. That
purposeremainsvalid,anditistakenupinseveralofthechaptersherein.But
clearlythereisasalienceandgrowingrelevancewellbeyondRussia,beyond
thecontentiousquestionofthedegreeofauthorityDuginwieldsinthecorri-
dors of Kremlin power. It was this realization that led us to look beyond
Dugin, or at least beyond Dugin in Russia, and to examine the rise of far-
rightmovementsacrossEuropeandtheiroftenwarmopinionofRussia.
As Anton Shekhovtsov observes, Dugin’s worldview is rooted in West-
ern,ratherthanSlavic,intellectual tradition. As AndreasUmland andothers
have pointed out, Dugin’s intellectual forebears are Western New Right
thinkerssuchasAlaindeBenoist,Jean-FrançoisThiriart,andRobertSteuck-
ers,andhehasatwenty-yearhistoryofengagementwithfar-rightideologists
in many European countries. And as Marlene Laruelle argues, Dugin draws
upon these with a clear strategic purpose—to use them as an intellectual
foundationforRussiatoregainitslostgreat-powerstatus.
RecenteventsinEuropehaveonlyreinforcedtheDugin/Europenexus,in
anumberofways.The2015attacksonCharlieHebdoinParisandinCopen-
hagen have provided strong cannon fodder for many of Dugin’s European
bedfellows. First, their ultranationalist rhetoric mirrors Dugin’s own call for
“genocide . . . of the race of Ukrainian bastards,” echoing Nazi ambitions
against Europe’s Jews. Second, the rightist animus is strongly anti-immi-
grant,eventhoughthesuspectedperpetratorsoftheCharlieHebdomassacre
werenotimmigrants.InFrance,MarineLePen,leaderoftheFrontNational,
vii
viii Foreword
whom many now see as the front runner in the 2017 presidential election
race, spoke of “inaction and denial. . . . The country’s two main political
parties have failed to stem the Islamist tide.” The French far-right organiza-
tion Bloc Identitaire echoed this, declaring, “No one could claim they were
fighting jihadism without questioning massive immigration and Islamiza-
tion.” In Italy, Matteo Salvini, leader of the xenophobic Northern League
party, proclaimed, “We are housing our own enemies. . . . Block the illegal
immigrantinvasion, NOW!”In Austria, theIdentitarianmovement spoke of
“anattackonallEuropeansthatdefendthemselvesagainsttheIslamicization
oftheirhomeland.”
Butthepictureismorecomplicatedthanthis.DuginhimselfisanIslamo-
phile who has been supportive of Russia’s increasing links to the Islamic
world, at least to those countries seen as anti-American. However, his con-
nections in Europe are, with some exceptions, more clearly Islamophobic
than he is, and this contradiction can be explained by Dugin’s long “bedfel-
lowing” with radical far-right movements inspired by fascism and postwar
Nazism.Moreover,inthewakeoftheGreekelectionsinJanuary2015,much
has been made of Dugin’s links to the upper ranks of the new leftist-led
Syriza government.Ironically, there are alsodemonstrabletiesbetweenDu-
gin and Syriza’s improbable coalition partner, the ultra-Right Independent
Greeks party, and with the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn. In a climate of mutual
acrimonywhileGreeceseekstoextendits$172billionrescueprogramwith
foreign creditors, especially Germany, the prospect of getting support from
Russia as a bulwark against the Western “Atlanticist” powers beckons ap-
pealinglyforaGreeceincrisis.
Finally,itmustbeaddedthatthisconcatenationofeventsshouldnotlead
usto read too muchinto their unfolding. The fact that Greece’snewforeign
minister,NikosKotzias,invitedDugintospeakatPiraeusUniversityin2013
does not render invalid Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras’ opposition to sanc-
tionsonRussia.Noristhereanequivalence,assomehavetriedtoconstruct,
between the invitation to Dugin and Tsipras’s first official invitee to his
residence following the election—Russian ambassador Andrei Maslov.
There are circumstances in play here that go well beyond Dugin and his
influence, the main one being Russia’s rising soft power among European
partiesandcountriesthatfeelvictimsoftheEuropeanUnion “technocracy,”
and that look for new allies to denounce the current “mainstream” and its
austeritypolicy,andcallonthe“periphery”toresistthe“system.”
Allthisistosaythatthesechaptersandtheircentraltopic,neo-Eurasian-
ismanditsEuropeanfar-rightconnections,areofvitalandtimelyrelevance.
Onbehalf of theCarnegieCouncilforEthics in InternationalAffairs,which
administered part of the project, I thank a remarkable team of scholars from
acrossEurope,representingthetruevanguardofthosewhostudyandreport
on the far right; and, especially, Dr. Marlene Laruelle, the wise and deter-
