Ethics at 3am : questions and answers on how to live well

361 Pages·2017·1.64 MB·English

by  Richard

i

Ethics at 3:AM
ii
iii

Ethics at 3:AM
Questions and answers on
How to Live weLL
Edited by RichaRd MaRshall
3
vi
3
O
xford Unviersyti Pres si a deparmt en tof hte Unviersyti of Oxford .I tfurhters
hte Unviersytis’ obejcvite of exceelnce ni research ,schoalrshpi ,and educaoitn
by pubsilhnig wordlwdie .Oxford si a regsietred rtade mark of Oxford Unviersyti
Press ni hte UK and ceratni ohter counrteis.
Pubsilhed ni hte Unetid Satets of Amercia by Oxford UnviersytiP res
198 Madsion Avenue ,NewY ork ,NY 10016 ,Unetid Satets of Amercia.
© Oxford Unviersyti Pres2 017
A lrgihst reserved .No par tof htsi pubcilaoitn may be reproduced ,sotredni 
a rerteiva lsysetm ,or rtansmetid ,ni any form or by any means ,whtiouht te
proir permsisoin ni wrnitig of Oxford Unviersyti Pres ,or as expresyl permetid
by alw ,by cilense ,or under etrms agreed whti hte appropraiet reproducoitn
rgihst organziaoitn .Inqurieis concernnig reproducoitn oustdie hte scopeo fht e
above shoudl be sen tot hte Rgihst Deparmt en ,tOxford Unviersyti Pressa ,ht te
addressa bove.
You mus tno tcricualet htsi work ni any ohterf orm
and you mus tmi pose htsi same condoitin on any acqurie.r
CIP daat si on fel a thte Lbirary of Congres
ISBN9 780–1– 9 0–6 35725–
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Prnietdb yS herdianB ooksI n,cU ,.netidS atetso Af mercia
v

CONTENTS

Glossary of Ethical Terms vii

List of Contributors ix

Introduction 1

SECTION 1 | Meta-E thics

1 Philip Kitcher: “Life After Faith” 9

2 Allan Gibbard: “Thinking How to Live” 20

3 Jonathan Dancy: “Ethics Without Principles” 32

4 Ruth Chang: “The Existentialist
of Hard Choices” 42

5 Joseph Raz: “From Normativity
to Responsibility” 54

6 John Martin Fischer: “Deep Control,
Death and Co.” 72

7 Mark A. Schroeder: “Being For” 80

8 Thomas M. Scanlon: “The Contractualist” 89

SECTION 2 | Normative Ethics

I | Virtue Ethics

9 Richard Kraut: “Against Absolute Goodness” 103
vi

10 KaatjM araiV og“t :TheP yrhonainS cepcti” 124

1 NcioalsB ommartoi“ :BuddhsitE thcis” 135

I | DeontoolgciaE lthcis

12 MathewK ramer“ :Lawa ndE thcis” 147

13 JohnG ardner“ :Lawa sa L eapo Ff athi” 160

14 StephenD arwa“ :lFromt heS econdP erson” 175

I | ConsequenatisitEl thcis

15 TorböjrnT ännsöj“ :TheH edonsictiU tailtirain” 187

16 Katarzynad eL azar -i Radek“ :Fromt heP onit
of Veiwo f theU nvierse” 199

SECTION3 | AppeildE thcis

17 RebeccaG ordon“ :SaynigN ot oJa ckB auer” 209

18 LoGr i ruen“ :Pholisophyo Cf apvtityi” 220

19 JapaP akilkathay“ :liRethniknigt heF ormual
oHf umantyi” 233

20 Kmi beerilB rownele“ :Consceince
andC onvciotin” 241

21 SbiyS lchwarzenbach“ :CviciF reindshpi” 251

22 ChrsitopherL ebron“ :TheC oolr
oOf urS hame” 270

23 VrigniaiH edl“ :TheE thciso Cf are” 287

24 CalreC hambers“ :SexC ,utulreJu ,sctie” 296

25 LucainoF olrdi“ :iPholisophyo tf heZ etabyte” 304

26 KathnikaE vers“ :Neuroethcis” 316
Index 341
vi | Contents
vi

GLOSSARY OF ETHICAL TERMS
Cognitivism is the view that ethical sentences express propositions and can
therefore be true or false (i.e., they are truth-a pt). Thus, moral judgments
are capable of being objectively true, because they describe some feature of
the world.
Consequentialism is the doctrine that the morality of an action is to be
judged solely by its consequences.
Contractualism is a distinctive account of moral reasoning “whereby an
act is wrong if its performance under the circumstances would be disallowed
by any set of principles for the general regulation of behaviour that no one
could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced, general agreement”
(Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other [Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, 1998] p. 153).
Deontological ethics or deontology (from Greek δέον, deon, “obligation,
duty”) is the normative ethical position that judges the morality of an action
based on the action’s adherence to a rule or rules. It is sometimes described
as “duty-” or “obligation-” or “rule-” based ethics, because rules “bind you to
your duty.”
Expressivism is a form of moral antirealism or nonfactualism:  the view
that there are no moral facts that moral sentences describe or represent, and no
moral properties or relations to which moral terms refer.
Moral realism (or moral objectivism) is the meta-e thical view that there
exist such things as moral facts and moral values, and that these are objective
and independent of our perception of them or our beliefs, feelings, or other
attitudes toward them.
Noncognitivism is the meta- ethical view that ethical sentences do not
express propositions (i.e., statements) and thus cannot be true or false (they
are not truth-a pt).
vi
Ruel utiliarainsim si a form of uatilitrainsim hta tsays an acoitn si rgih t
asc ti onformsot a r uelht ael tadsot ht eg reaetsg toodo ,rht a“ thter gihntesso r
wrongnesso fa p arcitualra coitnsi a f uncoitno fht ec orecntesso fht er uelo f
whcihsi ti a nni satnce”.
Utiliarainsim si ht ed ocrtnieht aa tcoitnsa rer gihfi tht eya reu sefuo lrf or
hteb enefo tfa m aojryti.
Vritue thcis sic urenylto neo htf reem aojar pproachesni n ormavite htcis .
mI taniy ,aitibyl ,die enfitedahts oe nhte eam t phasziehts ve riuteosm ,r orcah lar -
acetni r,c onrtasot tht ea pproachht ae tmphasziesd ueitso r uels( deonotolgy)
orht aw t hcihe mphasziesht ec onsequenceso fa coitns( consequenaitsilm).
vi | Golssary of EthciaT lerms
xi

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
Nicolas Bommarito is currently a Kathinka Evers is a Professor
Bersoff Fellow in the Department of of Philosophy at the University of
Philosophy at New York University Uppsala and a codirector of the EU
and an Assistant Professor of Flagship Human Brain Project.
Philosophy at the University at
John Martin Fischer is the
Buffalo.
Distinguished Professor of
Kimberlie Brownlee is an Associate Philosophy at the University
Professor in Legal and Moral of California, Riverside.
Philosophy at Warwick University.
Luciano Floridi is Professor
Clare Chambers is University
of Philosophy and Ethics of
Senior Lecturer in Philosophy and
Information at the University of
Fellow of Jesus College, University
Oxford where he is also Director
of Cambridge.
of Research and Senior Research
Fellow of the Oxford Institute and
Ruth Chang is a philosopher at
Governing Body Fellow of St Cross
Rutgers University, New Brunswick.
College.
Jonathan Dancy is a philosopher
at the University of Texas at Austin John Gardner is Professor of
(half-t ime) and a leading proponent Jurisprudence at Oxford and a Senior
of moral particularism. Research Fellow at All Souls College
in Oxford.
Stephen Darwall is the Andrew
Downey Orrick Professor of
Philosophy at Yale University and the
John Dewey Distinguished University
Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at
the University of Michigan.