Table Of ContentETHICS
AND VALUES
IN APPLIED
SOCIAL
RESEARCH
Allan J. Kimmel
Applied Social Research Methods Series
Volume 12
SAGE
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Kimmel, Allan J.
Ethics and values in applied social research / Allan J. Kimmel.
p. cm. — (Applied social research methods series; v. 12)
Bibliography: p.
Includes indexes.
ISBN 0-8039-2631-6 ISBN 0-8039-2632-4 (pbk.)
1. Social sciences—Research—Moral and ethical aspects.
I. Title. II. Series.
H62.K495 1988 87-25166
300'.72—del 9
FIRST PRINTING 1988
CONTENTS
Preface 7
1. Introduction 9
The Goals of Basic and Applied Science 10
Preventive Intervention: An Illustrative
Example of Applied Social Research 13
Case Studies in Social Research Ethics 15
Summary 23
Recommended Readings 24
Chapter Exercises 24
2. An Overview of Ethical Problems in Social Research 26
On Being Ethical and Moral: Is There a Difference? 26
Characteristics of Ethical Problems in Social Research 30
Typology of Ethical Problems in Applied Social Research 36
Summary 40
Recommended Readings 41
Chapter Exercises 41
3. Ethical Standards and Guidelines for Social Research 42
Ethical Theories and Moral Reasoning 42
Governmental and Professional Standards 50
Summary 64
Recommended Readings 64
Chapter Exercises 64
4. Methodological Issues and Dilemmas 66
Informed Consent and Social Research 67
Ethical Issues in the Selection and Assignment
of Research Participants 77
Summary 83
Recommended Readings 84
Chapter Exercises 84
5. Confidentiality and the Right to Privacy 85
The Nature and Goals of Privacy 86
The Need to Protect Individual Privacy and
Confidentiality of Data 90
Strategies for Protecting Privacy and Confidentiality 97
Summary 102
Recommended Readings 103
Chapter Exercises 103
6. Special Problems in Applied Settings 104
Ethical Issues in Organizational Research 104
Ethics and Evaluation: Some Illustrative Problems 110
Unanticipated Consequences: The “Dark Side” of
Prevention Research 114
Ethical Responsibilities When the Research Is Completed 117
Summary 122
Recommended Readings 123
Chapter Exercises 123
7. Attitudes and Value Commitments 124
The Role of Values in Social Research 124
Implications for Peer Review 132
Summary 136
Recommended Readings 137
Chapter Exercises 137
8. Conclusion and Recommendations 138
Summary 144
References 145
Subject Index 158
About the Author 160
P R E F A C E
My first introduction to research ethics came when I was a student
enrolled in an undergraduate experimental social psychology course at
the University of Maryland. The American Psychological Association
had just approved its current ethical guidelines for human subject
research. We discussed those guidelines and their implications in class,
but only after I had already begun work with a fellow student on an
original experiment for which we would be graded. Consistent with
most social psychological research at that time, our study was conducted
in the laboratory and it involved an elaborate deception. Our newly
acquired insights into the ethical imperatives of laboratory research,
however, quickly caused us concern about our use of deception. We
realized that it was too late in the course to redesign our experiment so
that our subjects would not have to be deceived; instead, we resolved to
take the subject debriefing that followed the collection of data a lot more
seriously than we had done previously. Although I have never felt
entirely comfortable with our decision to continue deceiving the very
persons we relied on to donate their valuable time as participants in our
study, I realize, in retrospect, that our pragmatic decision probably was
not an atypical compromise.
This book is intended to provide a discussion of and insights into
ethical problems and dilemmas faced by social scientists engaged in
applied social research. It was written in large part so that social
researchers will be better able to anticipate ethical problems in their
applied studies before they occur, in order to avoid them entirely or else
become more skillful in coping with them. All too often, it seems,
researchers do not fully appreciate the complexities of ethical issues and
dilemmas until they are caught up in them while in the midst of
conducting research. By that time, it is likely to be too late to cope
effectively with the problems in a reasoned and objective manner, and
less than satisfactory compromises between ethical and methodological
considerations are likely to result.
The book is intended primarily for advanced undergraduates,
graduate students, and researchers in the social and behavioral sciences.
It includes case studies and offers suggestions for resolving ethical
conflicts and developing research alternatives. Throughout the book,
7
8 ETHICS AND VALUES IN APPLIED SOCIAL RESEARCH
the potential conflicts between ethical and professional values are
addressed so as to assess the ethical objections that have been leveled
against applied social research tactics and goals. It is hoped that this
discussion will contribute to a fuller understanding of the methods of
social research and the organization of scientific activity.
There are a number of people to thank for their assistance during the
preparation of this volume. I am especially grateful to Debra Rog and
Leonard Bickman, editors of the series, for giving me the opportunity to
write it. They, as well as two reviewers, Thomas Murray and Greg
Andranovich, commented on an earlier draft and offered a number of
useful suggestions that I have tried to incorporate in the chapters that
follow. I believe their suggestions have made for a fuller and richer
book. Donald Campbell furnished helpful background materials,
including some of the working papers he prepared for the National
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and
Behavioral Research. He also provided a number of enviable insights
into the subtle ethical problems likely to be encountered in the conduct
of preventive intervention research. Finally, I am particularly indebted
to Ralph Rosnow, who served not unlike a “silent partner” in this
enterprise. His many comments and repeated feedback on earlier drafts
of the chapters were invaluable and he is in large part responsible for
inspiring me to write the book.
Allan J. Kimmel
Fitchburg, Massachusetts
1
Introduction
Since World War II, ethical issues in the social sciences have become a
topic of growing concern as researchers try to ensure that their studies
are directed toward worthwhile goals and that the welfare of their
subjects and their research colleagues is protected. In recent decades,
scientific and societal mechanisms and collective guidelines have
evolved to provide assurance both to investigators within social science
disciplines (anthropology, political science, psychology, and sociology)
and to the general public that the resolution of research dilemmas will be
morally acceptable. But ethical decision making depends largely on the
individual researcher’s awareness and interpretation of these mechan
isms and guidelines and, in many cases, the issues lack the clarity
required for resolution.
The ethical issues encountered in applied social research are subtle
and complex, raising difficult moral dilemmas that, at least on a
superficial level, appear unresolvable. These dilemmas often require the
researcher to strike a delicate balance between the scientific require
ments of methodology and the human rights and values potentially
threatened by the research. As such, the underlying guiding research
principle is to proceed both ethically and without threatening the
validity of the research endeavor insofar as possible. It thus is essential
that investigators continually ask how they can conduct themselves
ethically and still make progress through sound and generalizable
research. In subsequent chapters, current ethical standards and regula
tions will be reviewed, and their implications as guiding mechanisms will
be discussed in the context of dilemmas encountered in actual research
cases.
The intent in this first chapter is to highlight the importance of
questions of ethics and values in social research. Toward that end, the
goals of applied social research are described and contrasted with those
of basic research endeavors, and some illustrative case studies of
ethically controversial investigations in the research literature are
reviewed to sensitize the reader to the importance of ethical considera
tions at all stages of the research process.
9
10 ETHICS AND VALUES IN APPLIED SOCIAL RESEARCH
THE GOALS OF BASIC
AND APPLIED SCIENCE
While sharing certain fundamental principles of research, social
scientists may choose to direct their scientific activity from a “pure” or
“applied” orientation. The basic distinction—albeit an oversimplified
one—underlying this dichotomy is that “pure” science remains un
challenged by practical, concrete social problems and issues while
“applied” research is essentially atheoretical in nature (Pepitone, 1981).
Individuals who limit their scientific activity to purely theoretical work
unrelated in any apparent way to real-world problems are typically
referred to as “basic”researchers. Basic researchers hold that the proper
course of science is the objective study and ultimate solution of basic
scientific questions, regardless of whether their solutions have practical
applications.
Around the turn of the twentieth century, social science research first
became largely guided by a mechanistic paradigm or conceptual scheme
borrowed—not by accident—from the experimental approach of the
natural sciences. Since that time, basic researchers typically have viewed
themselves as value-free “technicians,” maintaining an active role in the
discovery of truth but a passive role in determining the societal use of
their findings (Rosnow, 1981). The assumption underlying this position
of scientific nonresponsibility was (and still is, to a large extent) that
although research findings can be used for good or bad ends, knowledge
is ethically neutral. Working from this value-free tradition, basic
researchers generally agree that their work is objective and morally
neutral (as implied by the labels “pure” and “basic”), since their goal is
the disinterested and impersonal pursuit of scientific knowledge for its
own sake.
Some critics of the basic science tradition maintain that pure research
is not value free since, in their view, it is immoral not to use the
knowledge we have from theoretical research to attempt to reduce
real-life social problems (e.g., Baumrin, 1970; Weber, 1949). But other
critics of the supposed moral neutrality of basic science (e.g., Giddens,
1976,1979; Smith, 1978) have argued the reverse point by claiming that,
in fact, there have been past abuses in applications of “pure knowledge”
(such as splitting the atom and Hiroshima, in vitro fertilization and test
tube babies, and the like). Further, critics contend that basic research
often entails the use of unethical procedures for obtaining knowledge (as
when human subjects are harmed during a theoretical study), and they
INTRODUCTION 11
point out the potential destructiveness of some knowledge for personal
and social life, such as the undermining of character and social customs
(Luria, 1976; Smith, 1978). Thus when one considers the basic scientist’s
“right to know” within a larger social perspective, it is apparent that
such a right—which is an implicit assumption within the pure science
framework—can conflict with the obligation to do no harm (Steininger,
Newell, & Garcia, 1984).
Perhaps in reaction to the apparent constraints and limited utility of a
purely theoretical approach, some social scientists have made serious
attempts to introduce and firmly establish social relevance into their
work. In psychology, for example, a shift away from a purely theoretical
approach has occurred at various stages in the development of the
profession. Until World War I, psychology avoided any shift toward
application in order to maintain its stature as a pure and objective
science. Any tendency toward application was criticized adamantly by
the more traditional basic researchers, such as E. B. Titchener, a staunch
experimentalist. Titchener vigorously criticized the establishment of the
behaviorism school during the 1920s for asking psychologists to trade a
science for a technology that was not firmly rooted in theory (O’Donnell,
1979). Years later, William McGuire (1965, p. 139), another leading
experimentalist, proclaimed that a research approach that emphasized
application rather than theory was one “as inelegant and inefficient as
trying to push a piece of cooked spaghetti across the table from the back
end.” Since World War I, apparently in reaction to social and
professional forces, the pendulum has at times swung away from pure
research and toward application as opportunities emerged for an action-
oriented science in psychology. However, each attempt at relevance
brought with it a set of subtle, complex ethical issues that seriously
threatened the ideals of scientific objectivity and moral neutrality
(Rosnow, 1981).
It may be that in their impatience to find relevance in their work
psychologists failed to consider the ethical implications of using many of
their established laboratory procedures in applied settings. Argyris
(1975) has suggested, for example, that because so much scientific social
psychology has been based on the manipulation and control of variables
in laboratory experiments, psychologists who attempt to solve social
problems do so by trying to manipulate and control variables in the
natural world, perhaps inappropriately. If this assessment is valid, it is
not difficult to understand why many of the ethical dilemmas en
countered in theoretical laboratory research (such as those involving
12 ETHICS AND VALUES IN APPLIED SOCIAL RESEARCH
informed consent, debriefing, and confidentiality) have appeared in
applied settings as well. Only recently have psychologists begun to
consider alternative strategies for conducting research and for producing
social change, such as enlisting individuals as collaborators, rather than
“subjects.” Advocates of this so-called “role play” approach maintain
that the enterprise of collecting data or producing change can thus better
serve the mutual interests of both psychologist and co worker participant.
Other social science disciplines, such as political science, have
undergone similar shifts in orientation during their development. In
political science, a focus on methodology and objective inquiry
gradually gave way during the 1940s to an emphasis on problems that
arise in the adjustment of individuals to their society. This policy-science
approach stressed that the political scientist should choose problems for
study that have a bearing on the major policy issues of the time, and that
are consistent with his or her values and the goals and objectives of
democratic society (Lasswell, 1951). See Lerner and Lasswell(1951) and
Rein (1976) for in-depth considerations of the policy approach in
political science.
Many individuals within the scientific community would argue that
research ethics become increasingly important as the results of investiga
tions acquire policy, professional, and personal implications outside the
social science professions. However, this is not meant to imply that one
can avoid responsibility for knowledge produced by restricting his or
her scientific activity to a basic science approach. Conversely, the view
that only applied research is ethical because of its assumed potential for
social benefits is a short-sighted one, since some of the greatest
breakthroughs in science have come about through basic theoretical
research. For example, chemistry did not advance as a science until
chemists shifted away from an applied end (the creation of gold) to a
concern for understanding chemistry at a theoretical level (Diener &
Crandall, 1978).
When the dichotomy between pure and applied science is more
closely evaluated, moral distinctions tend to blur. There are those who
currently maintain that the “pure” versus “applied” distinction is a
misconception and should be rejected (Georgoudi & Rosnow, 1985;
Pepitone, 1981). According to this argument, because applied research
often leads to theoretical understanding, and theoretical advances
permit practical applications, the two types of research may not be as
different as they initially appear. Theory does not arise in a social
vacuum apart from concrete events that gave impetus to it (Sarason,
