Ethical Theory: A Concise Anthology

399 Pages·2000·22.72 MB·English

by  Heimir Giersson

This electronic material is under
copyright protection and is
provided to a single recipient
for review purposes only.
ETHICAL THEORY
Review Copy
This page intentionally left blank
Review Copy
ETHICAL THEORY:
A CONCISE ANTHOLOGY
EDITED BY
HEIMIR GEIRSSON
MARGARET R. HOLMGREN
broadview press
Review Copy
©2000 Heimir Geirsson and Margaret R. Holmgren
Reprinted, 2001
All rights reserved. The use of any part of this publication reproduced, transmitted in
any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or other-
wise, or stored in a retrieval system, without prior written consent of the publisher —
or in the case of photocopying, a licence from CANCOPY (Canadian Copyright Licens-
ing Agency) One Yonge Street, Suite 1900, Toronto, Ontario M5E 1E5 — is an
infringement of the copyright law.
Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data
Main entry under title:
Ethical theory: a concise anthology
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 1-55111-292-2
1. Ethics. I. Geirsson, Heimir. II. Holmgren, Margaret R. (Margaret Reed),
1951-
BJ1012.E87 2000 170 COO-930904-7
Broadview Press Ltd. is an independent, international publishing house, incorporated
in 1985.
North America
Post Office Box 1243, Peterborough, Ontario, Canada K9J 7H5
3576 California Road, Orchard Park, NY 14127
Tel: [phone]; Fax: [phone];
e-mail: [email protected]
United Kingdom:
Turpin Distribution Services, Ltd., Blackhorse Rd., Letchworth, Hertfordshire SG6
1HN
Tel: [phone]; Fax: [phone]; e-mail: [email protected]
Australia:
St. Clair Press, P.O. Box 287, Rozelle, NSW 2039
Tel: [phone]; Fax: [phone]
www.broadviewpress.com
Broadview Press gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the Book Publishing
Industry Development Program, Ministry of Canadian Heritage, Government of Cana-
da.
Typesetting and assembly: True to Type Inc., Mississauga, Canada.
PRINTED IN CANADA
Review Copy
CONTENTS
CHAPTER ONE: ETHICAL RELATIVISM
Introduction 1
1. Selections from Folkways, WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER 5
2. Relativism and Objectivity in Ethics, WILLIAM H. SHAW 12
CHAPTER Two: DIVINE COMMAND THEORY
Introduction 33
3. Euthyphro, PLATO 38
4. The Story of Abraham, THE BIBLE 54
CHAPTER THREE: EGOISM
Introduction 57
5. The Myth of Gyges, PLATO 61
6. Egoism and Moral Scepticism, JAMES RACHELS 70
CHAPTER FOUR: CONSEQUENTIALISM
Introduction 81
7. Selection from Utilitarianism, JOHN STUART MILL 86
8. An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics, J.J.C. SMART 95
9. The Experience Machine, ROBERT NOZICK 106
CHAPTER FIVE: DEONTOLOGY
Introduction 109
10. Selection from The Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals,
IMMANUEL KANT 113
11. A Simplified Version of Kant's Ethics: Perplexities of Famine and
World Hunger, ONORA O'NEILL 131
12. What Makes Right Acts Right?, W.D. Ross 142
CHAPTER Six: JUSTICE
Introduction 167
13. Selection from A Theory of Justice, JOHN RAWLS 170
14. The Entitlement Theory, ROBERT NOZICK 189
Review Copy
vi Contents
CHAPTER SEVEN: VIRTUE ETHICS
Introduction 209
15. Selection from Nichomachean Ethics, ARISTOTLE 213
16. On Some Vices of Virtue Ethics, ROBERT B. LOUDEN 231
17. Virtue Theory and Abortion, ROSALIND HURSTHOUSE 247
CHAPTER EIGHT: FEMINIST ETHICS
Introduction 269
18. Selection from In a Different Voice, CAROL GILLIGAN 273
19. Women and Caring, NEL NODDINGS 285
CHAPTER NINE: THEORIES IN PRACTICE
Introduction 295
20. The Message of Affirmative Action, THOMAS E. HILL, JR. 296
21. Rich and Poor, PETER SINGER 320
22. Perspectives On World Hunger and The Extent Of Our Positive
Duties, ROBERT N. VAN WYK 340
23. Why Abortion Is Immoral, DONALD MARQUIS 355
24. Abortion Through A Feminist Ethics Lens, SUSAN SHERWIN 374
SOURCES 391
Review Copy
CHAPTER ONE
ETHICAL RELATIVISM
INTRODUCTION
Some cultures approve of abortions while other cultures do not. Some cul-
tures approve of capital punishment while other cultures do not. And some
cultures approve of slavery while other cultures do not. There is a great diver-
sity of social norms and rules, and there seem to be significant disagreements
from one culture to the next about what is right and wrong. Further, ethicists
often disagree among themselves about what is right and wrong, and ethical
theories often give conflicting answers to the same moral problems. The evi-
dence seems to suggest that there are no objective or universal moral values.
But if there are no objective moral values, then there is no absolute right or
wrong. And if there is no absolute right or wrong, we presumably have to
embrace relativism of some sort.
Relativism comes in various forms and not all of them are directly relevant
to ethical theory. Anthropology informs us of a wide variety of social norms,
and shows us that different cultures have different moral rules. But anthro-
pology is descriptive in nature and it only presents to us a descriptive form of
relativism. It tells us how people do behave and not how they should behave.
A different kind of relativism is moral relativism. Moral relativism is the
thesis that what is right or good is determined by the relevant party. If the rel-
evant party is an individual, then we have individual moral relativism. Accord-
ing to individual moral relativism, what is right or good is determined by each
individual. If the relevant party is a culture, then we have cultural moral rel-
ativism. According to cultural moral relativism, what is right or wrong is deter-
mined by each culture. Each of these versions of moral relativism holds that
there are no objective moral values, and no basic moral demands that are
binding on all moral agents. (The next section of this book addresses the lat-
ter claim more fully.)
It is important to recognize that descriptive relativism does not entail
moral relativism. In order to see why this is so, assume for the sake of argu-
ment that there are objective moral values. Given this assumption, moral rel-
ativism is clearly false. In this case there is a single truth of the matter about
morality, and individuals or cultures cannot stipulate for themselves what is
right and wrong. If an individual or culture decides on a moral standard that
conflicts with objective moral values, then their standard is mistaken. If we
assume that there are objective moral values, descriptive relativism may still
be correct, however. It is quite possible, and even probable, that some indi-
viduals and cultures will make mistakes in thinking about and determining
Review Copy
2 Ethical Theory
moral values. Mistakes may be quite diverse, as there are many different ways
of getting things wrong. Therefore, we can hold that there are objective
moral values and at the same time account for the wide variation in moral
standards from culture to culture and from individual to individual. It is
clearly possible, then, for descriptive relativism to be true and for moral rela-
tivism to be false. By the same line of reasoning, we can see that descriptive
relativism does not entail the thesis that there are no objective moral values.
It is clearly possible that there are objective moral values, but that people dis-
agree widely on the question of what these values are. Descriptive relativism
provides us with many examples of how people actually behave, but by itself
it tells us nothing about the truth of moral relativism or the truth of the
thesis that there are no objective moral values.
Is moral relativism tenable? Many people believe that individual moral rel-
ativism is not. In order to function as a society we need to agree on some basic
moral standards. We cannot simply allow each individual to make up his or
her own moral code. If we were to proceed in this manner, life would be, as
Hobbes put it, nasty, brutish, and short. The foregoing consideration does
not show that individual moral relativism is false, but it does suggest a prag-
matic reason for rejecting this position as tenable. Once we recognize that a
common moral code is needed, cultural moral relativism may seem like a
viable thesis even if we reject individual moral relativism.
Can we defend cultural moral relativism? Before we answer this question,
let us consider more carefully what this position entails. In order to function
as a society, we need to agree on some basic moral standards. But this is not
to say that all societies need to agree on the same moral standards. Further,
subcultures within a society do not have to agree on all moral rules. They can
differ significantly from one another and for the most part coexist peaceful-
ly, although their differences may sometimes erupt in violence or even civil
wars. A cultural moral relativist need only hold that the predominant moral
standards accepted by a given society determine what is right and wrong for
the members of that society.
At first glance, however, this position may seem to lead to inconsistencies.
Suppose that Amy and Grant are talking about abortion, and that Amy is a
cultural moral relativist while Grant believes there are objective moral values.
Amy starts by arguing that there is nothing morally wrong with abortion. By
citing a few examples, Grant gets Amy to concede that some cultures regard
abortion as morally wrong. He then accuses Amy of inconsistency, claiming
that her position entails both the conclusion that abortion is not morally
wrong (because in some cultures it is not) and the conclusion that it is moral-
ly wrong. But Grant is on the wrong track here. Cultural moral relativism is
not inconsistent. Suppose that culture X believes that abortion is morally
wrong, and culture Y believes that abortion is not morally wrong. The cultur-
al moral relativist will make the following two claims: (1) it is true that it is
Review Copy
3 Ethical Relativism
morally wrong for persons in culture X to have abortions, and (2) it is true
that it is not morally wrong for persons in culture Y to have abortions. These
two claims are fully compatible with one another. The cultural moral relativist
holds that actions are not right or wrong per se—they are only right or wrong
relative to a given moral framework. It is obviously possible for an action to
be right relative to one moral framework and wrong relative to another.
If Grant is smart, he will reframe his objection to Amy's position. Although
cultural moral relativism is not inconsistent, it seems to conflict with some of
our most basic intuitions about morality. Suppose that you meet an individ-
ual from culture Z, a culture that practices a brutal form of slavery. This indi-
vidual, Zack, informs you that the practice of slavery is considered morally
legitimate in his society, and that it is morally legitimate for him to buy and
sell certain individuals, to torture them at will, and to hold them as slaves. If
cultural moral relativism is true, then it is true that it is morally permissible
for Zack to engage in this practice, and it is also true that it would be moral-
ly wrong for you to practice slavery, given that you are a member of a culture
which abhors such a practice. In the context of this position, there is really no
source of disagreement between you and Zack. You might be tempted to tell
Zack that slavery is morally wrong, but if you are a cultural moral relativist,
the only claim you can make is that slavery is wrong relative to the moral code
that your society accepts. If you look at the situation objectively, you will rec-
ognize that slavery is morally permissible relative to the moral code that
Zack's society accepts. In order to respond to Zack in an appropriate and
enlightened manner, you should say something like "How interesting that
your society accepts such an extensive practice of slavery. My society does not
accept this practice at all. Our societies are quite different, but there is no
objective way to adjudicate between our competing moral codes."
Intuitively, however, most of us would not consider this to be an adequate
response. We would want to argue strenuously that it is morally abhorrent to
enslave and torture human beings. We would want to offer many strong rea-
sons why one ought not to torture people and hold them as slaves, and to
assert that if they constitute good reasons for people in our culture not to
behave in this manner, they also constitute good reasons for people in culture
Z not to behave in this manner. We would want to ask Zack what arguments
he could possibly make to justify such a practice. And we would probably want
to condemn culture Z in the strongest possible terms. It is not clear, then, that
cultural moral relativism provides an adequate account of moral disagree-
ment, nor is it clear that we should accept the claim that there is nothing
wrong with torture and slavery in a society in which these practices are
accepted as legitimate.
Similar points can be made with respect to disagreement within a society.
Suppose that there is a single member of culture Z who firmly believes that
their practice of slavery is morally abhorrent, and who does everything in her