Table Of ContentArgumentation Library
Joseph Andrew Bjelde
David Merry
Christopher Roser Editors
Essays
on Argumentation
in Antiquity
Argumentation Library
Volume 39
SeriesEditor
FransH.vanEemeren,UniversityofAmsterdam,Amsterdam,TheNetherlands
EditorialBoard
FernandoLealCarretero,UniversityofGuadalajara,Guadalajara,Jalisco,Mexico
MauriceAFinocchiaro,DepartmentofPhilosophy,UniversityofNevadaatLas
Vegas,LasVegas,NV,USA
BartGarssen,FacultyofHumanities,TAR,UniversityofAmsterdam,Amsterdam,
Noord-Holland,TheNetherlands
SallyJackson,Communication,UniversityofIllinoisUrbana-Champaign,Urbana,
IL,USA
WuPeng,SchoolofForeignLanguages,JiangsuUniversity,Zhenjiang,China
SaraRubinelli,UniversityofLuzern,Nottwil,Luzern,Switzerland
TakeshiSuzuki,SchoolofInformationandCommunication,MeijiUniversity,
Chiyoda-ku,Tokyo,Japan
CristiánSantibañezYañez,FaculdaddePsicologia,UniversityofConcepción,
Concepción,Chile
DavidZarefsky,SchoolofCommunication,NorthwesternUniversity,Evanston,
IL,USA
SaraGreco,IALS,UniversitàdellaSvizzeraItaliana,Lugano,Ticino,Switzerland
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· ·
Joseph Andrew Bjelde David Merry
Christopher Roser
Editors
Essays on Argumentation
in Antiquity
Editors
JosephAndrewBjelde DavidMerry
InstitutfürPhilosophie InstitutfürPhilosophie
Humboldt-UniversitätzuBerlin Humboldt-UniversitätzuBerlin
Berlin,Germany Berlin,Germany
ChristopherRoser
InstitutfürPhilosophie
Humboldt-UniversitätzuBerlin
Berlin,Germany
ISSN1566-7650 ISSN2215-1907 (electronic)
ArgumentationLibrary
ISBN978-3-030-70816-0 ISBN978-3-030-70817-7 (eBook)
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Introduction
Ancientthoughtaboutargumentationisstrikinglydifferentfrommostcontemporary
thought about it. Consider the central issue of what makes for good arguments.
Accordingtoaconservativecontemporaryview,goodargumentsmustbedeductively
valid.Thestandardcontemporaryviewisabitbroader.Itwouldfaultthisconservative
viewofgoodargumentationforrequiringdeductivevalidity,andwouldseektoextend
theconservativeviewbygeneralizingintherightwayfromdeductivevalidity.That
generalizationmighttakeoneofseveralforms:perhapstheinclusionofdefeasible
argumentation, or of a Bayesian theory of inductive inference. The standard view
isnotuniversal,ofcourse.InthewakeofToulmin’ssustainedcriticismofit([5]),
argumentation theorists inspired by the ancients have developed alternatives to it.
But the standard view remains widespread. We suspect that this is in part because
philosophersfearthatanyfurtherbroadeningoftheconceptionofargumentationand
itsuseswillleadusrapidlyawayfromthedomainofphilosophyandthepursuitof
truth,andintosales,self-help,orpolitics.Forsuchreaders,wehopethiscollection,
by showcasing the philosophical richness of ancient thought about argumentation,
will help usher in a less constricted view about argumentation. Readers who are
instead inclined to doubt the standard view will discover ample support for their
doubts.
Forancientthoughtfairlybristleswithheresiesagainstthestandardcontemporary
view.Plato’sSocratesoftendemandsrathermoreofanargumentthanmerelythatits
premisesaretrueanditsconclusionfollowsdeductively.Whenheoffersaprotreptic
argument, he hopes that it will actually convince his interlocutors to change their
wholeoutlook—includingtheirdesires—forthebetter.Incontrast,Aristotleinthe
Topicsdemandsratherless.Becausedialecticalargumentationisinpartacompetition
toprovewhoisthemoreskilledarguer,downrightfallaciousargumentshavetheir
place.1 And when the point is to persuade an opponent, it can be reasonable to
argue from false premises, so long as one’s opponent believes them. Other rules
of dialectical argument are even more foreign. Arguments must be kept relatively
shortbecauseoftimelimitsondialecticaldebates.Andananswerermustacceptan
1TopicsI.18.108a26–31;TopicsII.3.110a24–28forAristotleencouraginguseofequivocationin
dialectic.
v
vi Introduction
epagogeiftheyareconfrontedwithaseriesofexamplesinwhichthegeneralization
holds, and they cannot think of an exception. If the point of argumentation is to
carrytruth,orjustification,fromthepremisestotheconclusionbywayofasecure
inference,thenthisruleisnogood.Butdialecticoftenhadadifferentandequally
noblegoal:showingsomeonetheydidnotknownearlyasmuchaboutatopicasthey
thoughttheydid.Withthisgoalinmind,theruleseemsmuchbetter.Andthatgoal
itselfisrecognizably—perhapsparadigmatically—philosophical.
Persuasion also plays a strikingly different role in ancient conceptions of argu-
mentation than it does on the standard contemporary view. For that contemporary
viewrelegatespersuasiontotherealmofpsychologists,evangelists,salespeople,and
politicians—anyonebutphilosophers.Thejobofaphilosopher,asthatofaphysi-
cist, is to discover the truth, and whether anybody believes a word they say is not
their concern. Readers who share this view are often surprised to find Socrates in
theGorgiasagreeingwithhisinterlocutors—therhetors—inaimingnotonlyattruth
but at persuasion (though they differ on whom to persuade; cf. Gorgias 471c-2b).
Indeed, according to one reading, the Gorgias and Euthydemus are exploring how
the right, philosophical, kinds of persuasion differ from the wrong, sophistical or
rhetorical,kinds.
AuthorswritingbeforeAristotlemayhavestruggledtosharethestandardcontem-
porary view, as they did not yet have the central notion of formal logical validity.
Havinginventedsyllogistic,Aristotlewasinapositiontoformulatethethoughtthat
deductivelyvalidsyllogismsarethecentralcasesofgoodargument.Butthenitisall
themorestrikingthatAristotledoesnotseemtoadoptthatstandardcontemporary
view.EvensettingasidetheTopics,considerwhatAristotlehastosayaboutargu-
mentationintheRhetoric,ortheroleofendoxaelsewhereinAristotle’sphilosophical
works(cf.[2]),ortherecentinterpretivefuroroverhisnotionofepagoge(cf.[3]).
In each of these cases, Aristotle incorporates the earlier ideas without giving any
indicationthattheyaretobereducedtoorunderstoodintermsofhissyllogistic.
WearenotadvocatinggoingasfarasToulmin[5]didinrejectingthestandard
contemporaryviewinfavourofanempiricalstudyoftheargumentsactuallymade.
Muchlessarewesuggestingthat,ifcontemporaryphilosophersonlyknewhowto
readit,theywouldfindtheultimatetruthaboutargumentationinPlato’sEuthydemus
orAristotle’sTopics.Nonetheless,wedothinkthatthestandardcontemporaryview
askstoomuchofargumentationinsomeways,andtoolittleinothers.Andwealso
thinkthatthericharrayofviewswefinddiscussedinantiquityofferssomehelpful
insights.Argumentationtheoryhasalreadybenefitedconsiderablyfrommanysuch
insights,butourunderstandingofancientthoughtonargumentationremainslimited,
and much of what we have to learn from ancient thinkers is still inaccessible to
contemporaryreaders.Theessaysinthisvolumegosomedistancetowardsimproving
thesituation;wehopethattheywillalsoencouragefurtherimprovement.
Butthestudyofancientthoughtonargumentationisnotprimarilyanexercisein
excavatingcorrectivestothestandardcontemporaryview.Itisalsoourbesthopefor
learning how to engage with ancient philosophers on their own terms. Very often,
inreconstructinganargumentinPlatoorAristotlewewonderwhetheritcommitsa
fallacy,e.g.beggingthequestion.Ashistorians,itisbetterpracticetoseewhether
Introduction vii
theargumentmeetsPlato’sorAristotle’sunderstandingofbeggingthequestionthan
theunderstandinginthelatesteditionofArgumentation.Evenmoreoften,wefindan
argumentthatisverydifficulttoreconstruct.Forinstance,perhapstheauthorlefta
numberofpremiseseithertacit,ortheGreekorLatinwehaveisopaque,ambiguous,
riddled with lacunae, or different in different manuscripts. In that case, we must
makeeducatedguessesastowhatthesepremiseswere.Understandingtheauthor’s
thoughtaboutargumentationhelpsusnavigatethesedifficultstraits.Inreconstructing
Aristotle’scritiquesofPlato’stheoryofforms,forexample,weneedtoknowwhether
we should fill the gaps with premises Aristotle would have believed, Plato would
havebelieved,orboth.ApassageintheTopicssuggeststhat,inthistask,weshould
opt for Platonic doctrines, even ones Aristotle himself rejected. But the context
of the passage is difficult, and considerable care is required in its interpretation.2
Similarly, interpreters not infrequently suggest that Plato is intentionally making
Socrates argue fallaciously. If Plato’s critique of sophistic leaves room for non-
sophisticalusesoffallacy,thenthismightconfirmtheirsuspicions.Thatconfirmation
wouldinturnhaveseriousramificationsforhowweappliedtheprincipleofcharity
to Socratic arguments. For a final example, we are often left wondering just what
kindofsupportagivenpremiseissupposedtoprovideforagivenconclusion—for
instance,whethertheargumentisaninstanceofinferencetothebestexplanation.A
betterunderstandingofancientthoughtonargumentationwouldhelpanswersuch
questions. For interpreting Aristotle, a close familiarity with the argument forms
in the central books of the Topics would no doubt be a great asset in accurately
identifyingformsofargument.Butreadingthesebooksisaconfusingandfrustrating
exercise,forwhichextantscholarlyresourcesremaindeeplyinadequate.Theessays
inthisvolumegosomedistancealsotowardsimprovingourunderstandingofhow
ancientphilosophersconceivedoftheirownargumentation.
Many of the essays in this volume grew out of talks presented at a conference
‘ArgumentationinClassicalAntiquity:dialectic,rhetoric,&otherdomains’,which
tookplaceatHumboldtUniversitätzuBerlininJune2016.Inselectingessaysfrom
thatconference andbeyond, wehavepreferredcontributionswhichareofbroader
interest, rather than broader coverage of thinkers or issues. That preference has
also driven the organization of the collection into three sections: ‘Before Plato’,
‘Plato’,and‘AfterPlato’,whichreachesasfarascontemporaryargumentationtheory.
Clearly, Plato takes centre stage in this volume. But, in our view, this is a natural
casting,sincePlatooccupiesacentralpositionforstudyingargumentationinantiq-
uity. Moreover, Plato’s treatment of argumentation is deeply engaged with earlier
traditions,suchastherhetoricaltraditionwhichGorgiasandIsocratesrepresent,and
wasalsoespeciallyinfluentialforlaterphilosophicaltreatments,suchasAristotle’s.
AscholarofAristotle’srhetoriccanperhapsdowithoutaparticularlygoodunder-
standing of Gorgias, and a scholar of Gorgias may not need to take Aristotle into
account. But both need to take Plato into account, and scholars of Plato can profit
a great deal from reading both Aristotle and Gorgias. So a scholar looking to get
2TopicsVIII.5.195b16–33;cf.Theaetetus166a—b.
viii Introduction
asenseoftheoveralldevelopmentofancientthoughtaboutargumentationwilldo
welltoseePlatoasstandingatthecentreofit.
TwofurtherreasonsforthecentralityofPlatohavetodowithhisuseofdialogue
form. Inspired in part by Vlastos’s analysis of the Socratic elenchus and Kahn’s
concentrationondramaticcontexts,scholarsincreasinglyseeargumentsinPlatonot,
asthestandardcontemporaryviewwould,asmerelyfree-floatingpropositionsbound
togetherbyanx-to-1inferentialrelation,butratherasattemptsofonecharacterto
turnanothertowardsthetruthorawayfromignorancethroughpersuasion(cf.[1]and
[4]).Asaresult,theinadequacyofthestandardcontemporaryviewforcapturingwhat
is philosophically interesting in Plato’s arguments has long been relatively widely
appreciated,andexistingscholarshiponargumentationinPlatoiscorrespondingly
richerthanelsewhereinancientphilosophy.Second,Plato’sinterlocutorsoftenoffer
rhetoricalanddialecticalarguments,aboutwhichAristotlegivesadviceintheTopics
and Rhetoric. So investigating Plato’s dialogues occasions fruitful questions about
whether the interlocutors argue as Aristotle would have advised them to. Seeing
thattheydomaysometimesbekeytounderstandinganotherwisedifficultpassage
in Plato, and may by the same token illuminate Aristotle’s advice. Several of the
essaysinthisvolumemoveusfurtherinthesedirections.Moredetailsonindividual
contributionsarebelow.
BeforePlato
For earlier thinkers, where we lack any record of reflection about argumentation,
a careful examination of the structure of their argumentation is called for. This is
especiallythecaseforParmenides’poem,whichisoftencitedasthefirstexample
ofexplicitphilosophicalordeductiveargumentation.So,inTruthAttendingPersua-
sion, Stephen White details Parmenides’ debts to traditional styles of argument,
as well as his pioneering argumentative innovations. In particular, White argues
that the overall structure of the poem is elenctic, in the sense that it supports its
conclusions byshowinghowtheirdenials leadtocontradictions.Underthatnovel
structure,however,lietraditionalandinformaltechniquesthatarebestcharacterized
asrhetoricalstrategies.
Lisa Indraccolo’s ‘Argumentation and Persuasion in Classical Chinese Litera-
ture’revealsthatsimilarissueswereimportantinChinaduringtheWarringStates
period (475–221 BCE). Indraccolo describes and analyses the texts of ‘wandering
persuaders’ who acted as advisors and diplomats to local rulers. Even at the time,
someofthem—especiallythoseassociatedwiththe‘schoolofnames’—wereharshly
criticized for their use of words. As no handbook or manual on classical Chinese
rhetorichasbeentransmitted,scholarsofChineserhetoricinthisperiodmustextrap-
olatethekeytechniquesfromargumentativetexts.Indraccolo’schapterdiscussesa
rangeoftechniquesdrawnfromarepresentativeselectionofdialoguesfromClassical
Chinese pre-Imperialand early imperialtexts (4thcentury BCE–2nd century CE).
Itfocusesontheuseofauthoritativequotes,historicalallusions,rhetoricaldevices,
Introduction ix
tropesandargumentsfordiscussion,andtransitionwords.Itfurthershowshowthese
techniquesaredeployedinarelativelyconsistentpatternacrossdifferenttexts,indi-
cating a well-established set of compositional rules and conventions. Indraccolo’s
chaptermakestheseissuesaccessibletoanon-Sinologicalaudience.Asidefromthe
intrinsicinterestofthematerial,Indraccolo’schaptersuggestsavenuesforcompar-
isonandcontrastwithwhatwasoccurringinthewesterncanonatthetime.Afull
understandingofthoughtonargumentationinancientGreeceinvolvessituatingitin
itshistoricalglobalcontext,andshowinghowitisdistinctiveandhowitissimilarto
othertraditions.Ahistoryofthoughtaboutargumentationthatfocusessolelyonits
originswithinancientGreeceisstrikinglyincomplete.OurhopeisthatIndraccolo’s
chapterwillfacilitatethecross-disciplinaryworkrequiredtoprovideamoreglobal
perspectiveontheissuesdiscussedinthisvolume.
WolfgangMann’sessayconsidersGorgias’evaluationofargumentation(logos)
in the Defense of Palamedes and the Encomium of Helen. He shows that Gorgias
actuallyarguesfortheshortcomingsofargumentationinhisspeeches.Thisshows
thatGorgiashadamuchmorescepticalviewofthestrengthofargumentationthan
PlatoattributestohimintheGorgias.WhilePlato’scharacterGorgiasintheGorgias
suggeststhatargumentationisenormouslypowerful,therealGorgiasemphasizesits
weakness.
Mathieu Marion explores how ideas of dialectic were formed. In particular,
he argues it arose as a specialized form of dialogue for purposes of inquiry and
refutation.Insodoing,heelucidatestherelationbetweendialectic,asaspecialized
form of argumentation, and other forms of argumentation in Plato’s dialogues, by
using early classifications of the dialogues in terms of their purposes and modern
argumentationtheory.
Plato
Plato’sownreflectiononargumentationisasenigmaticasitisseminal.Thecontri-
butions here focus on how Plato understands different kinds of argumentation and
howheincorporatesinfluencesfromSocrates,rhetors,andsophists.
ChristopherRoserconsidershowPlatodistinguisheddialecticalfromrhetorical
usesofarguments.Hearguesthatnoneofthesevendifferentattemptstounderstand
thedistinctionprovidesageneralcriterionofdistinction.Thisshowsnotonlythat
the difference between them is more tacit than has often been thought, but also
thatthecommonspecificationsofdialecticalargumentationdonotprovideasharp
definitionofit.However,hearguesthatweshouldnotconcludefromthisthatthere
isnosignificantdifferencebetween thesetwoformsofargumentation. Instead,he
proposes that Plato distinguishes the two by specifying paradigmatic differences
betweenthem.
AdifferentkindofsophisticinfluenceinPlatoistracedinDavidCrane’sessay,
Platonic βραχυλoγι´α and Aristotle on Say-What-You-Believe. Crane uses Aris-
totle’s remarks about sophistic uses of say-what-you-believe to bring out a richer
