Essays on Amartya Sen's Capability Approach

207 Pages·2013·1.5 MB·English

by  Thomas Wells

REASONING ABOUT DEVELOPMENT:
ESSAYS ON AMARTYA SEN’S CAPABILITY APPROACH

REDENEREN OVER ONTWIKKELING:
ESSAYS OVER AMARTYA SEN’S CAPABILITY APPROACH

THESIS

to obtain the degree of Doctor from the
Erasmus University Rotterdam
by command of the
rector magnificus

Prof.dr. H.G. Schmidt

and in accordance with the decision of the Doctorate Board.

The public defence shall be held on

Thursday 27 June 2013 at 13.30 hrs
by

THOMAS RODHAM WELLS
born in Zomba, Malawi.
Doctoral Committee

Promoters:
Prof.dr. J.J. Vromen
Prof.dr. I. Robeyns

Other members:
Prof.dr. I. van Staveren
Dr. R.J.G. Claassen
Dr. G. van Oenen
Contents

Introduction: How Should We Think about Poverty and Development? .. 1
Chapter 1: An Outline of Sen’s Capability Approach .................................. 12
Chapter 2: Two Critiques of Sen ....................................................................... 39
Chapter 3: Judgement in Sen’s Capability Approach .................................. 59
Chapter 4. Sen’s Adaptive Preferences and Adam Smith’s Impartial
Spectator ................................................................................................................. 88
Chapter 5: Transformation Without Paternalism ....................................... 111
Chapter 6. Which Capabilities Matter for Social Justice? Democratic
Politics Versus Philosophy. .............................................................................. 145
Conclusion: Evaluation and Valuation .......................................................... 180
Bibliography ......................................................................................................... 187
Appendix A: Nederlandse Samenvatting ...................................................... 199
Appendix B: Curriculum Vitae......................................................................... 203

Introduction: How Should We Think about Poverty and
Development?

Most of the world is enjoying the best standard of living, the greatest
wealth, and the greatest freedom to live valuable and meaningful lives of
any time in human history. But at the same time vast numbers of people
are living lives of stark deprivation which are made even more appalling
by the contrast. Indeed, it is the perspicuous contrast between the
quality of life open to some people but not others that both defines and
condemns poverty in the contemporary world: poverty is an
unnecessary state of deprivation that can and should be remedied. In
the poor world the general term for the removal of entrenched
deprivation is ‘development’.
Moreover, remediable deprivation exists not only in faraway places
with small economies, armed conflicts, or government repression, but
also within the rich world, with its homeless, jobless, sick, and socially
excluded or stigmatised. Deprivation can co-exist with great opulence.
For instance, even in a relatively wealthy country with an effective
welfare state, where urgent and straightforward human physiological
needs are largely met, there may be a great deal of absolutely real
‘relative poverty’, such as deprivation in the “social bases of self-
respect” (cf Rawls 1999). The rich world too seems to be in need of
development.
We are continually confronted with images of poverty and its
dramatic consequences for human lives on our television screens and
newspapers, and also with public debate about how to understand it and
what to do about it. But poverty is so pervasive that it seems to escape
human comprehension let alone solution. There are vast numbers of
people affected in many different contexts. Their poverty is apparent in
many different ways, from poor health to disabilities to lack of
opportunities or aspirations. The causes of poverty are likewise
numerous and include the interaction of physiological, environmental,
economic, social, and political factors.
The basic concern is with our capability to lead the kinds of lives we
have reason to value. (Sen 1999a, 285)

Over the last 30 years the Indian philosopher-economist Amartya
Sen has developed a distinctive normative approach to evaluating well-
being in terms of individuals’ freedom to achieve the kind of lives they
2

have reason to value, and development as the expansion of that
freedom. This freedom is analysed in terms of an individual’s
‘capability’ to achieve combinations of such intrinsically valuable ‘beings
and doings’ (‘functionings’) as being sufficiently nourished and freely
expressing one’s political views.
Development in this perspective is understood in liberationist terms:
of removing unfreedoms – ‘the domination of circumstances and chance
over individuals’- and of respecting and supporting individual agency
and societal self-determination to decide on and pursue the flourishing
life. Hence the title of Sen’s most influential book, Development as
Freedom (Sen 1999a). Those who argue for the moral priority of
increasing or redistributing wealth justify this because wealth is
generally useful for the freedom to live a flourishing life. Sen argues
that we should focus directly on achieving that goal rather than
‘fetishising’ one of the means to its achievement. Others argue that
happiness is the true measure and goal of objective well-being. Sen
argues that while happiness is obviously important it is not obvious that
it is the only aspect of life we have reason to value.
Sen’s capability approach has been enormously influential, and has
been taken up and developed by academics in many disciplines, as well
as NGO, governmental, and inter-governmental institutions concerned
with development and well-being (such as the United Nations
Development Programme). It may be helpful to analyse the diffusion of
Sen’s ideas in terms of the distinction between persuasion and
recruitment coined by Albert Hirschman (Hirschman 1992, 34). While
persuasion concerns the direct influence of new ideas and arguments on
those already working on a certain area, recruitment is concerned with
the indirect influence those ideas have by exciting the interest of
outsiders to come into the field. Perhaps because Sen has been seen as
excessively free with the standard theoretical structures for
understanding poverty and development it may be noted that Sen has
struggled to persuade many theorists, particularly in economics, to take
up his approach.1 But he has been very successful in recruiting across

1 Sen’s contributions across several different fields of economics were recognised by
the award of a Nobel Prize in 1998. Yet the direct influence of Sen’s capability
approach itself on mainstream economics has not been as great as one might expect.
In many development economics textbooks, for example, his earlier work on poverty
indexes and famines is given significant attention but capabilities are mentioned
superficially, dismissively or not at all. (E.g. “For Sen, poverty is not low well-being but
the inability to pursue well-being because of the lack of economic means” (Nafziger
2006, 178).) Its influence on orthodox welfare economics has been perhaps even
3

inter-disciplinary boundaries, spawning a complex and sprawling
literature across academic disciplines as varied as ethics, sociology, and
even design and ICT. Martha Nussbaum, for example, then best known
as a classicist and Aristotelian philosopher, was drawn to Sen’s
capability approach by its non-utilitarian, non-Rawlsian features
(Nussbaum 1988) and collaborated with Sen at the World Institute of
Development Economics Research (WIDER) in Helsinki from 1987 to
1989.
Indeed, the attraction of Sen’s capability approach is not unrelated
to the fact that readers from many different backgrounds can see in it,
or project onto it, their own interests and concerns. This recruitment
effect can of course lead to fruitful inter-disciplinary research very
much in the spirit of Sen’s work. But it can also generate some
confusion (and frustration) as researchers from quite different
backgrounds bring quite different beliefs about what the capability
approach really is - a theory of justice, an account of agency, a non-
Welfarist welfare economics, a theory of sustainable development, and
so on - and therefore how it should be analysed and developed (cf
Robeyns 2005, 193–4). Freedom is thus at the heart of its appeal, but
also its difficulties in developing as a convincing coherent account.
Coherence and consistency are central virtues of analytical moral
philosophy, and so it is not surprising that the capability approach has
received a great deal of critical attention from philosophers. For
example, some have claimed that it is illiberal because it is not neutral
about the nature of the flourishing life (e.g. Sugden 2006); that it is
under-theorised (e.g. Pogge 2002); that it is excessively individualist (e.g.
Gore 1997); that its focus on freedom is ambiguous (e.g. Nussbaum
2003) or incoherent (e.g. Cohen 1993; Dowding 2006); that its
philosophical-economic understanding of agency is too abstract and
rationalistic (e.g. Giri 2000; Gasper 2002). Part of my thesis is concerned
with outlining my own understanding of the philosophical character of
Sen’s capability approach, often to the effect of showing that such
criticisms are misplaced if not mistaken. But one particular issue in the
philosophical approach to Sen’s writing on the capability approach bears
mentioning earlier because it relates to the approach I have taken in this
thesis.

slighter. While Sen’s work on social choice has been very influential, only a few welfare
economists have followed up his reformist agenda for a non-welfarist Welfare
Economics (for example Marc Fleurbaey, Erik Schokkaert, and Wiebke Kuklys).
4

Reading Sen as a Philosopher
Philosophers have shown interest in Sen’s practical philosophy right
from the beginning, but they have not always read him as charitably as
they might.2 The Oxford Companion to Philosophy defines the principle
of charity in interpretation as holding “that (other things being equal)
one's interpretation of another speaker's words should minimize the
ascription of false beliefs to that speaker” (Mackie 2005). It seems to me
that quite a number of Sen’s critics in academic philosophy have not
tried hard enough to set their own views temporarily aside and to
understand Sen’s work as far as possible in its own terms. They have
moved too quickly to identify his differences with their own views and
expectations as errors. Consequently some of the problems they identify
with Sen’s account are the products of misinterpretation rather than
bone fide problems for its credibility (cf Robeyns 2000). This can result
in the premature dismissal of Sen’s substantive claims (e.g. Roemer
1998; Pogge 2002; Dowding 2006; Sugden 2006) or excessively drastic
reconstructions (such as by Nussbaum, who rejects much of Sen’s
framework as too vague, worrying, or unworkable).3
I think that this unfortunate lapse may be partly explained (though
not justified) by Sen’s somewhat unorthodox style of doing philosophy,
which may in turn be related to his background in economics and its
rather more pragmatic orientation to theoretical work.4 Three aspects of
this unorthodox style seem to me particularly relevant to reading Sen as
a philosopher.

2 Exceptions to this, and somewhat responsible for the high profile Sen’s capability
approach has had in academic philosophy from the outset, include Bernard Williams, a
leading British moral philosopher, who provided comments on Sen’s second Tanner
Lecture on the capability approach (Williams 1989); Hilary Putnam who has written
extensively on Sen’s ‘Smithian economics’ (Putnam 2002; e.g. Putnam 2008); and John
Rawls, who taught a course on Social Justice at Harvard University with Amartya Sen
(and Kenneth Arrow) in 1968-9, and adapted his concept of primary goods somewhat
in the light of Sen’s “forceful” critique (Williams 1989, 168 fn. 8; Rawls 2005, 178–187
particularly 179 fn. 6). This influence can also be attributed to Sen’s early interest in
philosophical topics even at the start of his economics career (e.g. Sen 1966; Sen 1967)
and the close links he developed with leading Anglo-Saxon philosophers (including,
apart from those named above, Isaiah Berlin, Ronald Dworkin, Derek Parfit, Thomas
Scanlon, and Robert Nozick).
3 I discuss two such critiques, by Thomas Pogge and Nussbaum, in some detail in
chapter 2.
4 This small-p pragmatism is also apparent in Sen’s underlying concern with better-
worse relations rather than right-wrong dichotomies in his approach to rationality,
ethics, and political philosophy.
5

First, Sen often bypasses traditional philosophical distinctions and
coins his own in order to focus on specific aspects relevant to what he
wants to say, which is often something different than the standard
vocabulary is most useful for. For example, freedom is a complex and
ambiguous idea but one influential distinction in the philosophical
literature (popularised particularly by Isaiah Berlin) is between the
concepts of positive and negative freedom. Yet Sen largely bypasses that
terminology and opts instead for a distinction between the “aspects” of
opportunity and process in freedom (Sen 2002a, 585–7) which is more
apt for the social choice perspective he wants to bring.5 Though it has
something in common with Berlin’s distinction it brings a different way
of looking at freedom.
The philosophical reader has to be aware of the unconventionality of
Sen’s terminology in order to avoid attributing positions to him that he
does not hold.6 I believe such a misreading accounts, among others, for
G.A. Cohen’s accusation that Sen distorts the proper meaning of
freedom as individual control in talking of such things as “freedom
from malaria” (Cohen 1993; Cohen 1994; cf Kaufman 2006); and Martha
Nussbaum’s rejection of Sen’s freedom talk because of her construal of
it as negative liberty and her association of that with neo-liberalism
(Nussbaum 2003, 44–7), a point I discuss further in chapter 2.
The second aspect of Sen’s unorthodox style is the limited and
pragmatic use he often makes of the terminology he coins. It often
seems intended to further a particular argumentative point by labelling
a relevant distinction, rather than to identify viable operative concepts
suitable for systematic theoretical analysis in the manner the analytical
philosopher is trained to expect. Failing to recognise this aspect of Sen’s
style can lead to confusion or frustration in the philosophical reader
and to the perception of Sen’s work as unphilosophical and in need of
reconstruction (or outright rejection).
Consider Sen on commitments, a ‘concept’ that has been taken up by
academic philosophers and has even had a special issue of Economics

5 Opportunity freedom is about access to valuable states (i.e. capability), while process
freedom is concerned at the systemic level with properties like fairness and at
personal level with properties like non-interference (Sen 2002b, 624).
6 And this is not only the case for philosophical terminology. For instance, Sen’s
carefully worded endorsement of “maximisation” in his account of rationality has
sometimes been misunderstood (e.g. Anderson 2001; Sen 2001, 57–58). Economists
often conflate “utility optimisation” with “maximising behaviour” but Sen distinguishes
the two. While optimisation requires choosing the best option, maximisation “only
requires choosing an alternative that is not judged to be worse than any other” (e.g.
Sen 1997a, 746).
6

and Philosophy devoted to it (21(1), 2005). This is the closest Sen came
to defining it in his famous Rational Fools paper:

Commitment is, of course, closely connected with one’s morals. But
moral this question is in a very broad sense, covering a variety of
influences from religious to political, from the ill-understood to the
well-argued (Sen 1977, 329).

As a positive definition of a philosophical concept this is distinctly
unsatisfactory. It is vague and ambiguous in exactly the way many
philosophical critics of Sen accuse him of being. Yet if one looks instead
at how Sen uses the term ‘commitment’ to draw a perspicuous contrast
to assumptions of egoism in economic theory it is as precise, clear, and
effective as one could wish a philosophical argument to be.

If the knowledge of torture of others makes you sick, it is a case of
sympathy; if it does not make you feel personally worse off, but you
think it is wrong and you are ready to do something to stop it, it is a
case of commitment. I do not wish to claim that the words chosen
have any very great merit, but the distinction is, I think, important.....
The characteristic of commitment with which I am most concerned
here is the fact that it drives a wedge between personal choice and
personal welfare, and much of traditional economic theory relies on
the identity of the two. (Sen 1977, 326, 329 emphases added)

It seems to me that philosophical readers are sometimes distracted
from considering what Sen is very clearly saying because they are overly
concerned with what exactly his terms mean. In this case a distinction
that pretty effectively demolishes a foundational tenet of orthodox
utility theory may be misread as proposing a unitary concept of
commitment. Without ever attempting to clarify the nature of
commitment as a concept, rather than a class of exceptions to
(extended) egoism, Sen goes on to show that his distinction does real
work, by opening a space for a broader understanding of rational choice
that better fits how humans actually behave as well as better
recognising human agency (e.g. Sen 2005, 10–12).
The third aspect of Sen’s style that needs to be stressed is the
philosophically unorthodox way that the ‘concepts’ he identifies relate
to each other. Many of these are negative rather than positive. That is,
like ‘commitment’, they are meant to show the insufficiency of a
particular theoretical perspective rather than the sufficiency of a new
operative concept. Yet even Sen’s positive conceptual apparatus seems