EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY By John E. Roemer and Alain

112 Pages·2013·1.22 MB·English

EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY
By
John E. Roemer and Alain Trannoy
October 2013
COWLES FOUNDATION DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 1921
COWLES FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS
YALE UNIVERSITY
Box 208281
New Haven, Connecticut 06520-8281
http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/
forthcoming, Handbook of Income Distribution September 17, 2013
A. Atkinson and F. Bourguignon (eds.)
1 “Equality of opportunity*”
2
3 by
4 John E. Roemer
5 and
6 Alain Trannoy
7
8 1. Introduction
9 In the welfarist tradition of social-choice theory, egalitarianism means equality of
10 welfare or utility1. Conservative critics of egalitarianism rightly protest that it is highly
11 questionable that this kind of equality is ethically desirable, as it fails to hold persons
12 responsible for their choices, or for their preferences, or for the way they process
13 outcomes into some interpersonally comparable currency that one can speak of
14 equalizing. In political philosophy, beginning with John Rawls (1958, 1971), this
15 critique was taken seriously, and a new approach to egalitarianism transpired, which
16 inserted personal responsibility as an important qualifier of the degree of equality that is
17 ethically desirable. Thus, the development of egalitarian theory, since Rawls, may be
18 characterized as an effort to replace equality of outcomes with equality of opportunities,
19 where opportunities are interpreted in various ways. Metaphors associated with this
20 view are ‘leveling the playing field,’ and ‘starting gate equality.’ The main
21 philosophical contributions to the discussion were, following Rawls, from Amartya Sen
22 (1980), Ronald Dworkin (1981a, 1981b), Richard Arneson (1989) and G.A. Cohen

* We thank Tony Atkinson, François Bourguignon, Marc Fleurbaey, and Erik Schokkaert
for their comments on previous drafts of his chapter.
1 Welfarism is the view that social welfare (or the social objective function) should be
predicated only on the utility levels of individuals; that is, that the only information
required to compare social alternatives is that summarized in the utility-possibilities sets
those alternatives generate. It is a special case of consequentialism. See chapter 3 for
further discussion.
2
23 (1989)2. The debate is said to be about ‘equality of what,’ and the philosophical view is
24 sometimes called ‘luck egalitarianism,’ a term coined by Elizabeth Anderson (1999).
25 Economists (besides Sen) have been involved in this discussion from 1985
26 onwards. John Roemer (1993, 1998) proposed an algorithm for calculating policies that
27 would equalize opportunities for achievement of a given objective in a population. Marc
28 Fleurbaey and François Maniquet contributed economic proposals beginning in the
29 1990s, and recently summarized in Fleurbaey (2008). Other authors who have
30 contributed to the theory include Walter Bossert (1995, 1997), Vito Peragine (2004), and
31 Dirk Van de gaer ( 1993). An empirical literature is rapidly developing, calculating the
32 extent to which opportunities for the acquisition of various objectives are unequal in
33 various countries, and whether people hold views of justice consonant with equality of
34 opportunity.
35 There are various ways of summarizing the significance of these developments
36 for the economics of inequality. Prior to the philosophical contributions that ignited the
37 economic literature that is our focus in this chapter, there was an earlier skirmish around
38 the practical import of equalizing opportunities. Just prior to the publication of Rawls’s
39 magnum opus (1971), contributions by Arthur Jensen (1969) and Richard Herrnstein
40 (1971) proposed that inequality was in the main due to differential intelligence (IQ), and
41 so generating a more equal income distribution by equalizing opportunities (for instance,
42 through compensatory education of under-privileged children) was a chimera.
43 Economists Samuel Bowles (1973) and John Conlisk (1974) disagreed; Bowles argued
44 that inequality of income was almost all due to unequal opportunities, not to the
45 heritability of IQ. Despite this important debate on the degree to which economic
46 inequality is immutable, prior to Rawls, economists’ discussions of inequality were in the
47 main statistical, focusing on the best ways of measuring inequality.
48 The post-Rawls-Dworkin inequality literature changed the focus by pointing out
49 that only some kindsof inequality are ethically objectionable, and to the extent that

2 The philosophical literature generated by these pioneers is to large to list here. Book-
length treatments that should be mentioned are Rakowski (1993) , Van Parijs (1997), and
Hurley (2003) .
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50 economists ignore this distinction, they may be measuring something that is not ethically
51 salient. This distinction between morally acceptable and unacceptable inequality is
52 perhaps the most important contribution of philosophical egalitarian thought of the last
53 forty years. From the perspective of social-choice theory, equal-opportunity theory has
54 sharply challenged the welfarist assumption that is classically ubiquitous, maintaining
55 that more information than final outcomes in terms of welfare is needed to render social
56 judgment about the ranking of alternative policies – in particular, one must know the
57 extent to which individuals are responsible for the outcomes they enjoy -- whether those
58 outcomes were determined by social (and perhaps genetic) factors beyond their control,
59 or not – and this is non-welfare information.
60 One must mention that another major non-welfarist theory of justice, but an
61 inegalitarian one, was proposed by Robert Nozick (1973)who argued that justice could
62 not be assessed by knowing only final outcomes; one had to know the process by which
63 these outcomes were produced. His neo-Lockean view, which proposed a theory of the
64 moral legitimacy of private property, can evaluate the justness of final outcomes only by
65 knowing whether the history that produced them was unpolluted by extortion, robbery,
66 slavery, and so on. Simply knowing the distribution of final outcomes (in terms of
67 income, welfare, or whatever) does not suffice to pass judgment on the distribution’s
68 moral pedigree. So the period since 1970 has been one in which, in political philosophy,
69 non-welfarist theories flourished, on both the right and left ends of the political spectrum.
70 In this chapter, we begin by summarizing the philosophical debate concerning
71 equality since Rawls (section 2), presenting economic algorithms for computing policies
72 which equalize opportunities – or, more generally, ways of ordering social policies with
73 respect to their efficacy in opportunity equalization (sections 3, 4 and 5), application of
74 the approach to the conceptualization of economic development (section 6), discussion of
75 dynamic issues (section 7), a preamble to a discussion of empirical work (section 8),
76 evidence of population views from surveys and experiments concerning conceptions of
77 equality (section 9), and a discussion of measurement issues, and summary of the
78 empirical literature on inequality of opportunity to date (section 10). We conclude with
79 mention of some critiques of the equal-opportunity approach, and some predictions
80 (section 11).
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81
82 2. Egalitarian political philosophy since Rawls
83 John Rawls (1958) first published his ideas about equality over fifty years ago,
84 although his magnum opus did not appear until 1971. His goal was to unseat
85 utilitarianism as the ruling theory of distributive justice, and to replace it with a type of
86 egalitarianism. He argued that justice requires, after guaranteeing a system which
87 maximizes civil liberties, a set of institutions that maximize the level of ‘primary goods’
88 allocated to those who are worst off in society, in the sense of receiving the least amount
89 of these goods. Economists call this principle ‘maximin primary goods;’ Rawls often
90 called it the difference principle. Moreover, he attempted to provide an argument for the
91 recommendation, based upon construction of a ‘veil of ignorance’ or ‘original position,’
92 which shielded decision makers from knowledge of information about their situations
93 that was ‘morally arbitrary,’ so that the decision they came to regarding just allocation
94 would be impartial. Thus Rawls’s (1971) project was to derive principles of justice
95 from rationality and impartiality.
96 Rawls did not advocate maxi-minning utility (even assuming interpersonal utility
97 comparisons were available), but rather maxi-minning (some index of) primary goods.
98 This was, in part, his attempt to embed personal responsibility into the theory. For Rawls,
99 welfare was best measured as the extent to which a person is fulfilling his plan of life: but
100 he viewed the choice of life plan as something up to the individual, which social
101 institutions had no business passing judgment upon. Primary goods were deemed to be
102 those inputs that were required for the success of any life plan, and so equalizing
103 primary-goods bundles across persons (or passing to a maximin allocation which would
104 dominate component-wise an equal allocation) was a way of holding persons responsible
105 for their life-plan choice. The question of how to aggregate the various primary goods
106 into an index that would allow comparison of bundles was never successfully solved by
107 Rawls (and some skeptical economists said that the subjective utility function was the
108 obvious way to aggregate primary goods).
109 Rawls defended the difference principle by arguing that it would be chosen by
110 decision makers who were rational, but were deprived of knowledge about their own
111 situations in the world, to the extent that this knowledge included information about their
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112 physical, social, and biological endowments, which were a matter of luck, and therefore
113 whose distribution Rawls described as morally arbitrary. He named the venue in which
114 these souls would cogitate about justice the ‘original position.’ In the original position,
115 souls were assumed to know the laws of economics, and to be self-interested. They were,
116 moreover, to be concerned with the allocation of primary goods, because they did not
117 know their life plans, or even the distribution of life plans in the actual society. Nor were
118 they to know the distribution of physical and biological endowments in society.
119 Here we believe Rawls made a major conceptual error. If the veil of ignorance
120 is intended to shield decision makers from knowledge of aspects of their situations that
121 are morally arbitrary, and only of those aspects, they should know their plans of life,
122 which, by hypothesis, are not morally arbitrary, because Rawls deems that persons are
123 responsible for their life plans. Secondly, although a person’s particular endowment of
124 resources, natural and physical, might well be morally arbitrary ( to the extent that these
125 were determined by the luck of the birth lottery), the distribution of these resources is a
126 fact of nature and society, and should be known by the denizens in the original position,
127 just as they are assumed to know the laws of economics. Therefore, Rawls constructed
128 his veil too thickly, on two counts, given his philosophical views.
129 Given the paucity of information available to the decision makers in the original
130 position, it is not possible to use classical decision theory to solve the problem of the
131 desirable allocation of primary goods. Indeed, the only precise arguments that Rawls
132 gives for the conclusion that the difference principle would be chosen in the original
133 position occur at Rawls (1999[1971], p. 134), and they essentially state that decision
134 makers are extremely risk averse. For example:
135
136 The second feature that suggests the maximin rule is the
137 following: the person choosing has a conception of the good such
138 that he cares very little, if anything, for what he might gain about
139 the minimum stipend that he can, in fact, be sure of by following
140 the maximin rule. It is not worthwhile for him to take a chance
141 for the sake of further advantage, especially when it may turn out
142 that he loses much that is important to him. The last provision
143 brings in the third feature, namely, that the rejected alternatives
144 have outcomes one can hardly accept. The situation involves
145 grave risks.
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146
147 But extreme risk aversion, which Rawls here depends upon for his justification of
148 maximin, is certainly not an aspect of rationality.
149 Thus, despite its enormous influence in political philosophy, Rawls’s argument
150 for maximin is marred in two ways: first, its reliance on deducing the principle of justice
151 from the original position was crucially flawed in depriving the denizens of that position
152 of knowledge of features of themselves (life plans) and of the world (the distributions of
153 various kinds of resources, including genetic ones, and ones possessed by families into
154 which a person is born) which were notmorally arbitrary3, and second, for its assumption
155 (despite claims to the contrary by Rawls and others) that decision makers were extremely
156 risk averse. The value of Rawls’s contribution is in stating a radical egalitarian position
157 about the injustice of receiving resources through luck – and, in particular, the luck of the
158 birth lottery – and that it shifted the equalisandum from utility to a kind of resource,
159 primary goods. In our view, however, the project of deducing equality or maximin from
160 rationality and impartiality alone was a failure. Indeed, Moreno-Ternero and Roemer
161 (2008) argue that some solidaristic postulate is necessary to deduce maximin or, more
162 generally, to deduce some kind of egalitarianism as the ordering principle for social
163 choice. Although egalitarians might wish to deduce their view from postulates that can
164 garner universal approval (like rationality and impartiality), this is not possible.
165 Therefore, an egalitarian theory of justice cannot have universal appeal, if the solidaristic
166 postulate, which we believe necessary, is contentious.
167 Although Rawls is usually viewed as the most important egalitarian political
168 philosopher of the twentieth century, one may challenge the claim that his view is
169 egalitarian: to wit, the just income distribution, for Rawls, allows incentive payments to
170 the highly skilled in order to elicit their productive activity, even though this produces
171 inequality. The main philosopher who challenges Rawls’s acceptance of incentive-based
172 income inequality is G.A. Cohen, upon which more below.

3 We reiterate it is the distribution of traits which is a fact of nature, and hence not
morally arbitrary, while the endowment of a given individual may well be morally
arbitrary, in the sense of being due to luck.
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173 In 1981, Ronald Dworkin published two articles that essentially addressed the
174 problems in the Rawlsian argument that we have summarized, although he did not use the
175 Rawlsian language (original position, primary goods). His project was to define a
176 conception of equality that was ethically sound. In the first of these articles, he argued
177 that ‘equality of welfare’ was not a sound view, mainly because equality of welfare does
178 not hold persons responsible for their preferences. In particular, Dworkin argued that if
179 a person has expensive tastes, and he identifies with those tastes, society does not owe
180 him an additional complement of resources to satisfy them. (The only case of expensive
181 tastes, says Dworkin, that justifies additional resources are those tastes that are addictions
182 or compulsions, tastes with which the person does not ‘identify,’ and would prefer he did
183 not have.) In the second article, Dworkin argues for ‘equality of resources,’ where
184 resources include (as for Rawls) aspects of a person’s physical and biological
185 environment for which he should not be held responsible (such as those acquired through
186 birth).
187 But how can one ‘equalize resources,’ when these comprise both transferable
188 goods, like money, and inalienable resources, like talents, families into which persons are
189 born, and even genes? Dworkin proposed an ingenious device, an insurance market
190 carried out behind a veil of ignorance, where the ‘souls’ participating represent actual
191 persons, and know the preferences of those whom they represent, but do not know the
192 resources with which their persons are actually endowed in the world. In this insurance
193 market, each participant would hold an equal amount of some currency, and would be
194 able to purchase insurance with that currency against bad luck in the birth lottery, that is,
195 the lottery in which nature assigns souls to persons in the world (or resource endowments
196 to souls). Dworkin argued that the allocation of goods that would be implemented after
197 the birth lottery occurred, the state of the world was revealed, and insurance policies
198 taken behind the Dworkinian veil were settled, was an allocation that ‘equalized
199 resources.’ It held persons responsible for their preferences – in particular, their risk
200 preferences—and was egalitarian because all souls were endowed, behind the veil, with
201 the same allotment of currency with which to purchase insurance. Impartiality with
202 respect to the morally arbitrary distribution of resources was accomplished by shielding
203 the souls from knowledge of their endowments in the actual world associated with the
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204 birth lottery (genetic and physical). Thus, Dworkin retained Rawls’s radical egalitarian
205 view about the moral arbitrariness of the distribution of talents, handicaps, and inherited
206 wealth, but implemented a mechanism that held persons responsible for their tastes that
207 was much cleaner than discarding preferences and relying on primary goods, as Rawls
208 had done.
209 Despite the cleverness of Dworkin’s construction, it can lead to results that many
210 egalitarians would consider perverse. To illustrate the problem, consider the following
211 example. Suppose there are two individuals in the world, Andrea and Bob. Andrea is
212 lucky: she has a fine constitution, and can transform resources (wealth) into welfare at a
213 high rate. Bob is handicapped; his constitution transforms wealth into welfare at exactly
214 one-half of Andrea’s rate. We assume, in particular, that Andrea and Bob have
215 interpersonally comparable welfare. The internal resource that Andrea possesses and
216 Bob lacks is a fine biological constitution (say, a healthy supply of endorphins).
217 We assume that Bob and Andrea have the same risk preferences over wealth: they
218 are each risk averse and have the von Neumann – Morgenstern utility function over
219 wealth u(W)= W . Suppose that the distribution of (material) wealth in the world to
220 (Andrea, Bob) would be (WA,WB), with no further intervention. Thus each individual is
221 endowed with an internal constitution and some external resource.
222 We construct Dworkin’s hypothetical insurance market as follows4. Behind the
223 veil of ignorance, there is a soul Alpha who represents Andrea, and a soul Beta who
224 represents Bob. These souls know the risk preferences of their principals, and the
225 constitutions of Andrea and Bob, but they do not know which person they will become in
226 the birth lottery. Thus, from their viewpoint, there are two possible states of the world,
227 summarized in the table:
228
229
State 1 Alpha becomes Andrea Beta becomes Bob
State 2 Alpha becomes Bob Beta becomes Andrea

4 Dworkin did not propose a formal model, but relied on intuition. The model here is a
version of an Arrovian market for contingent claims.
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230
231 Each state occurs with probability one-half. Weknow that state 1 will indeed occur, but
232 the souls face a birth lottery with even chances, in which they can take out insurance
233 against bad luck (that is, of becoming Bob).
234 There are two commodities in the insurance market: a commodity x , a unit of
1
235 which pays the owner $1 if state 1 occurs, and a commodity x a unit of which pays $1 if
2
236 state 2 occurs. Each soul can either purchase or sell these commodities: selling one unit
237 of the first commodity entails a promise to deliver $1 if state 1 occurs. Each soul
238 possesses, initially, zero income (behind the veil) with which to purchase these
239 commodities. In particular, they have equal wealth endowments behind the veil in the
240 currency that is recognized in that venue. Thus, the insurance market acts to redistribute
241 tangible wealth in the actual world to compensate persons for their natural endowments,
242 which cannot be altered, in that way which the souls, who represent persons, would
243 desire, had they been able to insure against the luck of the birth lottery. It is an institution
244 that transforms what Dworkin calls ‘brute luck’ into ‘option luck.’ The former is luck
245 which is not insurable; the latter is luck whose outcome is protected by insurance, or the
246 outcome of a gamble one has chosen to take.
247 An equilibrium in this insurance market consists of prices (1,p) for commodities
248 (x ,x ) , demands (x(cid:1),x(cid:1)),(x(cid:2),x(cid:2)) by souls Alpha and Beta for the two contingent
1 2 1 2 1 2
249 commodities, such that
1 1 WB +x(cid:1)
(x(cid:1),x(cid:1)) maximizes WA+x(cid:1) + 2
250 (1) 1 2 2 1 2 2
subj. to x(cid:1) + px(cid:1) =0
1 2
1 1
(x(cid:1),x(cid:1)) maximizes WB +x(cid:1) + 2(WA+x(cid:1))
251 (2) 1 2 2 1 2 2
subj. to x(cid:1) + px(cid:1) =0
1 2
252 (3) x(cid:1) +x(cid:2) =0 for s=1,2 .
s s
253 Let us explain these conditions. Condition (1) says that Alpha chooses her
254 demand for contingent commodities optimally, subject to her budget constraint – that is,