Table Of ContentFuture of the Grid
Massoud Amin*, D.Sc.
H.W. Sweatt Chair and Director of CDTL
Professor of Electrical & Computer Engineering
Center for the Dev. of Technological leadership
University of Minnesota, Twin Cities
*Most of the material and findings for this presentation were developed while the author was
at the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) in Palo Alto, CA. EPRI’s support and
feedback from colleagues at EPRI is gratefully acknowledged.
EPRI Grid Reliability & Power Markets
Enterprise Information Security (EIS) Program
September 30, 2003
TThhee PPaasstt aanndd PPrreesseenntt CCoonntteexxtt::
UUttiilliittyy ccoonnssttrruuccttiioonn eexxppeennddiittuurreess
1
TThhee PPaasstt aanndd PPrreesseenntt CCoonntteexxtt::
CCaappiittaall IInnvveesstteedd aass %% ooff eelleeccttrriicciittyy rreevveennuuee
Context: Transmission Bottlenecks Are
Impacting Interconnected Regions
BBoottttlleenneecckkss TTrraannssmmiissssiioonn LLooaadd RReelliieeff EEvveennttss ((NN>>22))
AArree IInnccrreeaassiinngg BByy YYeeaarr aanndd BByy MMoonntthh
TTrraannssmmiissssiioonn LLooaadd RReelliieeff EEvveennttss ((NN>>22))
AArree IInnccrreeaassiinngg IInn TThhee MMiiddwweesstt
2
Context: Generation Capacity Margin in
North America
35.0
30.0
n 25.0
gi
r20.0
a
M
15.0
y
cit10.0
a
p 5.0
a
C
0.0
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
Source: Western States Power Crises White Paper, EPRI, Summer 2001
Context:
Transmission Additions in The U.S.
30
25
20
Electricity
15 Demand
10
Transmission
5 Capacity
Expansion
0
1988-98 1999-09
3
Transmission Investment, 1975-2000
Billions of 1997
Dollars per year
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Source: Electric Perspectives, July/August 2001
Context: U.S. Actual and Planned
Capacity Additions 1998 – 2007
2 ,824
7 ,465
660 1 ,509 1 4,677
New England
1,330 5 ,934 1 4,780
770
80
245 9 ,056 1 4,124 8 ,836
4,847 1 2,037 550
1,017 2 5,921 4,9 4 7 7,886 3 ,410
3 ,931 4,370
2 0,034 5 ,404
3 ,549
1 2,886 4,88 2 4 ,197 4 ,762
1 ,572 1 0,103
1 1,938
1 0,362
3 7,827
8 ,089 New Capacity
in MW
1 8,494 10,001 and Above
5,001 to 10,000
1,001 to 5,000
Total = 305,304
00 ttoo 11,,000000
4
Past Practice is Inadequate
35,000 6
Transmission Investment $B)
2
30,000 5 99
1
25,000 nt (
e
4 m
att st
w 20,000 e
Mega 15,000 3 sion Inv
s
2 mi
10,000 ns
a
Tr
1
5,000
New Generation
0 0
1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
• Many more bottlenecks showing up
Context: Spending Less on Transmission
Transmission Expenses & Investments (1990 = 1)
1.00
0.95
Capital Investment
0.90
0.85
Maintenance
0.80
0.75
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Source: FERC, EIA
5
Power Law Distributions:
Frequency & impacts of major disasters
Hurricane and Earthquake Losses 1900–1989
Flood Losses 1986–1992
Electric Network Outages 1984–2000
r
10 times e 101
p
per year nts Outages DF =lo –o0d.s74
e Model
v
E Data
Once of 100
a year mber Year Earthquakes
u
Ondcecea pdeer ve N10-1 D = –0.41 HDu r=r i–c0a.n9e8s
ati
ul
m
Once per Cu10-2
century 1 10 100 1,000 10,000
Loss Per event (million 1990 dollars)
Historical Analysis of U.S. outages in terms of
the amount of electric load lost (1991-2000)
100
s
e
c 11999966 ––22000000 OOuuttaaggeess
n
••7766 OOccccuurrrreenncceess oovveerr 110000 MMWW
e
r ••11,,006677 AAvveerraaggee MMWW
r
u
c
c
O 10
f
o
r
e 1991 –1995 Outages
b
•66 Occurrences over 100 MW
m
•798 Average MW
u
N 1
100 1,000 10,000 100,000
MW Lost
6
Historical Analysis of U.S. outages in terms of
Affected Customers (1991-2000)
110000
ss
ee
cc 11999966 ––22000000 OOuuttaaggeess
nn
ee ••5588 OOccccuurrrreenncceess oovveerr 5500,,000000 CCoonnssuummeerrss
rr
rr ••440099,,885544 AAvveerraaggee CCoonnssuummeerrss
uu
cc
cc
OO 1100
ff
oo
rr
ee
bb
mm
11999911--11999955 OOuuttaaggeess
uu
NN ••4411 OOccccuurrrreenncceess oovveerr 5500,,000000 CCoonnssuummeerrss
••335555,,220044 AAvveerraaggee CCoonnssuummeerrss
11
1100,,000000 110000,,000000 11,,000000,,000000 1100,,000000,,000000
NNuummbbeerr ooff AAffffeecctteedd CCoonnssuummeerrss
Context: Major Recent Changes
• Energy infrastructure security issues in the wake of the
9/11 attack
• Western states power crisis and subsequent ongoing
financial crisis
• Loss of investor confidence
• Restructuring slowdown and issues surrounding SMD
• Environmental issues and progress in addressing them
• Technology advances on a broad front --but incentives
to invest have not kept pace
• Major outages of August and September 2003 in the US,
UK and Italy…
7
Summary of August 14 Blackout Statistics
– Reported as affecting 50 million people
– 60-65,000 MW of load initially interrupted
• Approximately 11% of Eastern Interconnection
– 400+ Generating units tripped
– Cascading lasted approximately 12 seconds
– Thousands of discrete events to evaluate
Source: NERC and Joint U.S.-Canada Task Force
Joint U.S.-Canada Task Force
US-Canada
Power Outage Task Force
(Co-chaired)
Spencer Abraham, U.S. DOE
Herb Dhaliwal, NR Canada
Electric System Nuclear Security
Working Group Working Group Working Group
Source: NERC and Joint U.S.-Canada Task Force
8
Investigation Organization Overview
Steering Group U.S. –Canada Vegetation/ROW
P. Barber Task Force Mgmt.
A. Silverstein
Investigation Team
D. Hilt
Project Planning and Root Cause Analysis Report Preparation
Support – Cooper Systems TBD/D. Nevius
Gerry Cauley/Jim Dyer Cooper Systems/Joe Eto
MAAC/ECAR/NPCC NERC & Regional Operations -Tools, Transmission System
Coordinating Group Standards/Procedures SCADA/EMS Performance,
C. Durkin E.H&u lClso/Mm. pDleiaLnacuera & CommPulnaincnaitniogns Op PMroatienctt.i o&n D, aCmonatgreol
MAAC V. Sulzberger V. VanZandt & R. Stuart/John Theotonio
P. Landrieu Sequence of Events T. Kucey/D. Benjamin
P. EMCuAlcRhay DJ.a RtMao baRinnesaqogunee/Mmst.e sSn iadtnodr FCTraoermqlou sVe aMnncadryeti/nrAveoCzr/Et ProtPeeGcrtefioonrnem,r aaCtnoocrne t,r o ls
C.N DPuCrCkin SysJt.e Dma gMleo/dJ.e Elimngd eand DSF.ey Mssiatgecenmd,o &P/J l.S aTntwunitdcinhieegsll, MaGGinaortrr.y d& oB nuD Sllaocmcoktat/ge
Simulation Analysis
MEN Study Grp B. Mittelstadt/
E. Schwerdt R. Cummings Source: NERC and Joint U.S.-Canada Task Force
12:05:44 – 1:31:34 PM
“PreliminaryDisturbance Report” Source: NERC
Several generator
trips between noon OONNTTAARRIIOO
and 1:30 pm in
22
central and
33
northern Ohio and
in the Detroit area,
11
caused the electric
power flow pattern
to change.
9
2:02 – 3:41:33 PM
“PreliminaryDisturbance Report”
Source: NERC
Between 3:06 and
3:41 three ONTARIO
transmission lines in
Ohio tripped--part of
the pathway into
northern Ohio from
6
eastern Ohio.
5 7
One of these lines is
known to have tripped
due to contact with a
tree, but the cause of
the other line trips has
not been confirmed.
“PreliminaryDisturbance Report”
3:06 pm EDT
Chamberlain –Harding 345kV line tripped
Cause not reported
Chamberlain – Harding
Graphics developed by Jeff Dagle (DOE/PNNL) August 16, 2003 20
Map © 2000 North American Electric Reliability Council
10
Description:Sep 30, 2003 at the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) in Palo Alto, CA . EPRI's support
and feedback Source: FERC, EIA Energy infrastructure security issues in the
wake of the Cooper Systems/Joe Eto . ROPES, TRELSS, market/risk
assessment, … Wind speed Technologies that may Fill th