Epistemic Values: Collected Papers in Epistemology

375 Pages·2020·3.014 MB·English

by  Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski

Epistemic Values

Epistemic Values
Collected Papers in Epistemology
LINDA TRINKAUS ZAGZEBSKI
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Zagzebski, Linda Trinkaus, 1946– author.
Title: Epistemic values : collected papers in epistemology / Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski.
Description: New York, NY, United States of America : Oxford University Press, 2020. |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2020018286 (print) | LCCN 2020018287 (ebook) |
ISBN 9780197529171 (hardback) | ISBN 9780197529195 (epub)
Subjects: LCSH: Knowledge, Theory of.
Classification: LCC BD161 .Z335 2021 (print) | LCC BD161 (ebook) |
DDC 121—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020018286
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020018287
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Printed by Integrated Books International, United States of America
Dedicated to the memory of William P. Alston
friend, mentor, and exemplary philosopher

Contents
Acknowledgements ix
Introduction 1
I. KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING
1. What Is Knowledge? 11
2. Must Knowers Be Agents? 39
3. Recovering Understanding 57
4. Toward a Theory of Understanding 78
II. INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE
5. Intellectual Virtues: Admirable Traits of Character 93
6. Trust 108
7. Intellectual Virtue Terms and the Division of Linguistic Labor 124
III. EPISTEMIC VALUE
8. From Reliabilism to Virtue Epistemology 141
9. The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good 152
10. Intellectual Motivation and the Good of Truth 168
11. Epistemic Value and the Primacy of What We Care About 186
IV. VIRTUE IN RELIGIOUS EPISTEMOLOGY
12. Religious Knowledge and the Virtues of the Mind 207
13. Phronesis and Religious Belief 228
14. Religious Trust, Anti-T rust, and Reasons for Religious Belief 245
viii Contents
V. INTELLECTUAL AUTONOMY
AND AUTHORITY
15. Ethical and Epistemic Egoism and the Ideal of Autonomy 263
16. A Defense of Epistemic Authority 275
17. Intellectual Autonomy 289
VI. SKEPTICISM AND THE GETTIER PROBLEM
18. The Inescapability of Gettier Problems 311
19. First Person and Third Person Reasons and the Regress Problem 320
20. The Moral Transcendental Argument against Skepticism 333
Index 353
Acknowledgements
I am grateful for the generous and very capable work of my Research Assistant,
Zach Reimer, and for encouragement in collecting these papers from my
Department Chair, Wayne Riggs. The papers themselves owe a tremendous
amount to the many philosophers mentioned in these chapters and to many
more whose work has inspired me over the decades. I am dedicating the volume
to the memory of Bill Alston, who became a mentor and friend from the first
time I gave a public talk in philosophy in 1984.