Epistemic Relativism and Scepticism : unwinding the braid.

239 Pages·2018·2.08 MB·English

by  Steven Bland

EPISTEMIC
RELATIVISM
AND
SCEPTICISM
Unwinding the Braid
Steven Bland
Epistemic Relativism and Scepticism
Steven Bland
Epistemic Relativism
and Scepticism
Unwinding the Braid
Steven Bland
Huron University College at Western
University
London, ON, Canada
ISBN 978-3-319-94672-6 ISBN 978-3-319-94673-3 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94673-3
Library of Congress Control Number: 2018946170
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
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This book is dedicated to my daughters, Evangeline and Abigail
A
cknowledgements
No one tells you that acknowledgements are difficult to write, but they
are. At least I find them difficult, not because I have few reasons to be
grateful, but because I have so many, and my words alone seem unequal
to the task of acknowledging them. At any rate, here goes…
I am deeply grateful for my colleagues and students at Huron
University College for helping me to teach, learn, think, and act better.
This book could not have been written without their conversation and
inspiration. I owe a special debt of gratitude to my friend and colleague,
Emerson Doyle, whose insightful comments have made my work, includ-
ing this book, better in so many ways, and to Teresa Hubel, who has
been a close friend and a steady source of valuable guidance through-
out this process. I am grateful to Palgrave Macmillan’s editorial and pro-
duction teams for their skillful work, and to their anonymous referee for
their thoughtful comments and suggestions.
I am thankful for the education I received years ago while working
under the supervision of Robert DiSalle; his formidable example remains
with me still, though I often fall short of its standard.
This book could not have been completed without the loving support
of my family and friends. Chief among them are my parents, Susan and
Brian Bland, who never miss an opportunity to make my life, and the
lives of my children, better. My love and admiration for you are bound-
less. I would also like to thank my sister and brother-in-law, Kate and
Brendan Johnston, and my grandparents, Bob and Diane Booth, for
their steadfast loving kindness. To all of my friends, both within and
vii
viii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
outside of Huron: thank you for all the conversations, parties, meals,
drinks, and all around good times that enrich my life. And to Amy Bell:
thank you a million times over for your love, friendship, and indispensa-
ble guidance. Finally, I would like to thank my daughters, Evie and Abby
Bland, to whom this book is dedicated, for exceeding every reasonable
expectation of how good, kind, and fun children can be. ‘Love’ is too
shallow a word to express how I feel about you.
c
ontents
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Relativism, Scepticism, and Analytic Philosophy 3
1.2 The Anti-sceptical Strategies 7
1.3 The Dialectical Strategy 11
References 13
2 The Principal Argument for Epistemic Relativism 15
2.1 The Five Modes of Pyrrhonian Scepticism 15
2.1.1 The Agrippan Trilemma 16
2.1.2 The Modes from Relativity and Dispute 19
2.2 The Relativist’s Response 20
2.3 Epistemic Systems, Pluralism, and Incommensurability 21
2.4 The Narrow Agrippan Trilemma 28
2.5 Conclusion: The Principal Argument for Epistemic
Relativism 30
References 31
3 Epistemic Relativism in the Analytic Tradition 35
3.1 Kantian Absolutism 37
3.2 Logical Positivism 39
3.3 The Deflationary Reading of Tolerance 42
3.4 Scientific Paradigms 48
3.4.1 Incommensurability and Relativism 50
ix
x CONTENTS
3.4.2 Moderate Relativism 54
3.4.3 Epistemic Relativism 57
3.5 Conclusion 59
References 60
4 Foundationalism and Coherentism 63
4.1 Foundationalism 64
4.2 The Problem of the Criterion 67
4.2.1 Epistemic Principles 68
4.2.2 Cornerstone Principles 71
4.2.3 (KC) and the Problem of the Criterion 73
4.2.4 The Problem of Subjective Foundations 74
4.3 Coherentism 76
4.3.1 The Problem of the Criterion Revisited 77
4.3.2 The Relativity of Coherence 81
4.4 Conclusion 83
References 84
5 Externalism 87
5.1 Reliabilism and the Rejection of (KC) 89
5.2 Proper Assurance Objections 92
5.2.1 The No Doubt Constraint 93
5.2.2 Dialectical Effectiveness 96
5.2.3 The Discrimination Problem 98
5.3 Epistemic Circularity, Begging the Question,
and Epistemic Relativism 102
5.4 Conclusion 103
References 104
6 Particularism and Methodism 107
6.1 Particularism, Methodism, and Reflective Equilibrium 108
6.2 Sankey’s Naturalistic Particularism 111
6.2.1 Begging the Question: The First Charge 113
6.2.2 Begging the Question: The Second Charge 114
6.3 Luper’s Neutral Position 118
6.3.1 A Pragmatic Vindication of the Ordinary
Standard 121
6.3.2 Begging the Question 123
CONTENTS xi
6.4 Conclusion 126
References 127
7 The Charge of Incoherence 129
7.1 The Sceptic’s Dilemma 130
7.2 The Relativist’s Dilemmas 131
7.3 The Sceptic’s Dilemma Resolved 132
7.4 The Relativist’s Dilemmas Resolved 133
7.5 A New Relativist Trilemma 136
7.6 Sankey’s Reply: Strong and Weak Justification 139
7.7 The Relativist’s Way Out: Default Justification 140
7.8 Conclusion 143
References 143
8 The Wittgensteinian Position 145
8.1 Moore’s Proof of an External World 146
8.2 Hinge Propositions 147
8.3 Against Moore 149
8.4 Against Scepticism 151
8.5 Epistemic Relativism 152
8.6 Wittgenstein as a Contextualist 156
8.6.1 The Contextualist Response to Relativism 159
8.6.2 Drawbacks of the Contextualist Response 161
8.7 Wittgenstein as a Davidsonian (or Davidson
as a Wittgensteinian) 163
8.7.1 The Davidsonian Response to Relativism 166
8.7.2 Drawbacks of the Davidsonian Response 168
8.8 Conclusion 172
References 173
9 A Dialectical Strategy 175
9.1 Boghossian’s Insight 176
9.2 Seidel’s Argument 177
9.3 Strong and Weak Dependence 180
9.4 Constitutive Dependence and Kantian Absolutism 181
9.5 Resisting Epistemic Relativism 187
9.6 The Dialectical Argument for the Naturalist
Presumption 194