Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion

271 Pages·2014·1.082 MB·English

by  Clayton Littlejohn, John Turri

Epistemic Norms

Epistemic Norms
New Essays on Action, Belief,
and Assertion
EDITED BY
Clayton Littlejohn and John Turri
1
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Contents
Contributors vii
ListofAbbreviations viii
Introduction 1
ClaytonLittlejohn
1. IntellectualFlourishingastheFundamentalEpistemicNorm 11
BeritBrogaard
2. LenientAccountsofWarrantedAssertability 33
E.J.Coffman
3. HavingFalseReasons 59
JuanComesañaandMatthewMcGrath
4. OnKnowingOne’sReason 81
JonathanDancy
5. KnowledgeversusTruth 97
JohnGibbons
6. EpistemicNormativity 115
JonathanL.Kvanvig
7. TheUnityofReason 135
ClaytonLittlejohn
8. EpistemicLuck,Safety,andAssertion 155
DuncanPritchard
9. EpistemicAgencyandJudgment 173
ErnestSosa
10. YouGottaBelieve 193
JohnTurri
11. TheSpectraofEpistemicNorms 201
MattWeiner
12. ReasonsforBelief,ReasonsforAction,theAimofBelief,
andtheAimofAction 219
DanielWhiting
vi contents
13. TheDual-AspectNormsofBeliefandAssertion:AVirtue
ApproachtoEpistemicNorms 239
SarahWright
Index 259
Contributors
BERIT BROGAARD,UniversityofMissouri,StLouis
E. J. COFFMAN,UniversityofTennessee,Knoxville
JUAN COMESAÑA,UniversityofArizona
JONATHAN DANCY,UniversityofReadingandUniversityofTexas,Austin
JOHN GIBBONS,UniversityofNebraska
JONATHAN L. KVANVIG, BaylorUniversity
CLAYTON LITTLEJOHN, King’sCollegeLondon
MATTHEW MCGRATH, UniversityofMissouri,Columbia
DUNCAN PRITCHARD, UniversityofEdinburgh
ERNEST SOSA, RutgersUniversity
JOHN TURRI, UniversityofWaterloo
MATT WEINER, UniversityofVermont
DANIEL WHITING, UniversityofSouthampton
SARAH WRIGHT, UniversityofGeorgia
List of Abbreviations
BR BeliefRequirement
JBA JustifiedBeliefAccount
JPR JustificationandPracticalReason
KA KnowledgeAccount
KPR KnowledgeandPracticalReason
NRI NoRationalInconsistency
RCA RationalCredibilityAccount
SAC SelflessAssertionCases
WKA Would-BeKnowledgeAccount
Introduction
Clayton Littlejohn
Weoftenbelieveasweshouldn’t,reasonasweshouldn’t,saywhatweshouldn’t,
andactasweshouldn’t.Ifthereaderwantsareasontothinkthattherearenorms
thatgovernbelief,deliberation,assertion,andaction,thisshouldsuffice.Norms
setstandards.Aswe’vejustseen,weoftenviolatethem.
The chapters in this collection are concerned with epistemic norms. They
focusontwoquestions.Thefirstquestionisaboutthesubstanceofthesenorms.
What must we do to conform to the norms that govern belief, deliberation,
assertion,andaction?Thesecondhastodowiththesignificanceofthesenorms.
Whatcanwelearnbystudyingthem?
In the relevant literatures, epistemic norms are often assumed to have this
structure:
Oneshould/shouldnotϕunderconditionC.
Borrowing von Wright’s terminology, let’s say that ‘ϕ’ designates the norm act
and‘C’theconditionofapplication.1Inofferinganaccountofepistemicnorms,
wehavetospecifytherelevantnormacts(e.g.,assertingp,believingp,treatingp
as a reason for believing q, etc.) and then the conditions of application. These
conditions are supposed to determine the normative standing of the norm acts
thenormgoverns.
Much of the recent interest in epistemic norms was sparked by Timothy
Williamson’s (2000) discussion of the norm of assertion, so a natural place for
usto startis with that discussion. Williamsonargued that assertion isgoverned
bytheknowledgenorm:
KA: Onemust:assertponlyifoneknowsp(2000:243).
IfKAisagenuinenormandonedoesnotknowwhetherp,onemustnotassertp.
Williamson argued that KA was the constitutive rule for assertion.
A constitutive rule helps to define what something is, not (simply) determine
1 vonWright(1963).