Envy: Theory and Research

451 Pages·2008·4.688 MB·English

by  Richard Smith (editor)

Title Pages
Envy: Theory and Research
Richard Smith
Print publication date: 2008
Print ISBN-13: 9780195327953
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2010
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195327953.001.0001
Title Pages
(p.i) Envy
(p.ii) Series in Affective Science
(p.iii) Envy
(p.1) Envy (p.2)
Series Editors
Richard J. Davidson
Klaus Scherer
The Nature of Emotion: Fundamental Questions
Edited by Paul Ekman and Richard J. Davidson
Boo! Culture, Experience, and the Startle Reflex
By Ronald Simons
Emotions in Psychopathology: Theory and Research
Edited by William F. Flack Jr. and James D. Laird
Shame: Interpersonal Behavior, Psychopathology and Culture
Edited by Paul Gilbert and Bernice Andrews
Affective Neuroscience: The Foundation of Human and Animal Emotions
By Jaak Panksepp
Page 1 of 4
Title Pages
Cognitive Neuroscience of Emotion
Edited by Richard D. Lane and Lynn Nadel
The Neuropsychology of Emotion
Edited by Joan C. Borod
Anxiety, Depression, and Emotion
Edited by Richard J. Davidson
Emotion, Social Relationships, and Health
Edited by Carol D. Ryff and Burton Singer
Appraisal Processes in Emotion: Theory, Methods, Research
Edited by Klaus R. Scherer, Angela Schorr, and Tom Johnstone
Music and Emotion: Theory and Research
Edited by Patrik N. Juslin and John A. Sloboda
Handbook of Affective Sciences
Edited by Richard J. Davidson,
Klaus R. Scherer, and H. Hill Goldsmith
Nonverbal Behavior in Clinical Settings
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Memory and Emotion
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Psychology of Gratitude
Edited by Robert A. Emmons and Michael E. McCullough
Thinking about Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions
Edited by Robert C. Solomon
Bodily Sensibility: Intelligent Action
By Jay Schulkin
Who Needs Emotions? The Brain Meets the Robot
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Title Pages
Edited by Jean-Marc Fellous and Michael A. Arbib
What the Face Reveals: Basic and Applied Studies of Spontaneous
Expression Using the Facial Action Coding System (FACS)
(2nd Edition)
Edited by Paul Ekman and Erika L. Rosenberg
The Development of Social Engagement: Neurobiological Perspectives
Edited by Peter J. Marshall and Nathan A. Fox
Feelings: The Perception of Self
By James D. Laird
The Handbook of Emotion Elicitation and Assessment
Edited by James A. Coan and John J. B. Allen
The Science of Emotional Intelligence: Knowns and Unkowns
Edited by Gerald Matthews, Moshe Zeidner, and Richard D. Roberts
Envy: Theory and Research
Edited by Richard H. Smith
(p.iv)
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Envy : theory and research / edited by Richard H. Smith.
p. cm. — (Series in affective science)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-19-532795-3
1. Envy. I. Smith, Richard H.
BF575.E65E58 2008
152.4'8—dc22 2008004245
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Printed in the United States of America
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Page 4 of 4
Acknowledgments
Envy: Theory and Research
Richard Smith
Print publication date: 2008
Print ISBN-13: 9780195327953
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2010
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195327953.001.0001
(p.v) Acknowledgments
I wish to thank a number of people who have helped in bringing this book to
completion. Jennifer Rapport, initially, and then, Lori Handelman, and, finally,
Helen Mules, at Oxford University Press were extremely helpful in guiding me
through every step of the process. Lori Handelman was especially flexible,
accommodating, and forgiving in orchestrating the later stages of assembling
the chapters. The managing of the editing by Helen Mules was exceptionally
thorough and helpful, and it greatly enhanced the final product. Also, my
graduate students, Caitlin Powell, David Combs, and Ryan Schurtz were very
understanding during the times when editing activities took me away from
attending to my other responsibilities. I was lucky to have a group of
contributors who followed deadlines better than I did, who responded quickly to
my requests, and who embraced the integrative goals of the book. Each chapter
is a first-rate contribution to the study of envy. I benefited from a sabbatical
leave granted by the University of Kentucky. Finally, I thank my wife, Sung Hee
Kim, and my two daughters, Rosanna and Caroline, for their loving
encouragement, patience, and good cheer throughout. (p.vi)
Page 1 of 1
Contributors
Envy: Theory and Research
Richard Smith
Print publication date: 2008
Print ISBN-13: 9780195327953
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2010
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195327953.001.0001
(p.ix) Contributors
MARK D. ALICKE, Department of Psychology, Ohio University, Athens,
Ohio
JUSTIN D’ARMS, Department of Philosophy, Ohio State University,
Columbus, Ohio
RUSSELL W. BELK, Schulich School of Business, York University,
Toronto, Ontario, Canada
DAVID M. BUSS, Department of Psychology, University of Texas,
Austin, Austin, Texas
MINA CIKARA, Psychology Department, Princeton University,
Princeton, New Jersey
DAVID J. Y. COMBS, Department of Psychology, University of
Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky
MICHELLE K. DUFFY, Carlson School of Management, University of
Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota
JULIE JUOLA EXLINE, Department of Psychology, Case Western
Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio
SUSAN T. FISKE, Psychology Department, Princeton University,
Princeton, New Jersey
CHRISTINE R. HARRIS, Department of Psychology, University of
California, San Diego, La Jolla, California
LASANA T. HARRIS, Department of Psychology, New York University,
New York, New York
SARAH E. HILL, Department of Psychology, Texas Christian
University, Fort Worth, Texas
NATHAN F. JOHNSON, Department of Anatomy and Neurobiology,
University of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky
JANE E. JOSEPH, Department of Anatomy and Neurobiology,
University of Kentucky Chandler Medical Center, Lexington, Kentucky
Page 1 of 2
Contributors
GAYANNÉE KEDIA, Department of Psychology, Bangor University,
Bangor, U.K.
(p.x)
ALISON DUNCAN KERR, Department of Philosophy, The Ohio State
University, Columbus, Ohio
SUNG HEE KIM, Department of Psychology, University of Kentucky,
Lexington, Kentucky
COLIN WAYNE LEACH, Department of Psychology, University of
Sussex, Brighton, England
CHARLES LINDHOLM, University Professors Program, Boston
University, Boston, Massachusetts
W. GERROD PARROTT, Department of Psychology, Georgetown
University, Washington, DC
CAITLIN A. J. POWELL, Department of Psychology, University of
Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky
PATRICIA M. RODRIGUEZ MOSQUERA, Department of Psychology,
Brunel University, Uxbridge, Middelsex, England
PETER SALOVEY, Department of Psychology, Yale University, New
Haven, Connecticut
JOHN M. SCHAUBROECK, Lebow College of Business, Drexel
University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
SOLOMON SCHIMMEL, Hebrew College, Newton Centre,
Massachusetts
DAVID RYAN SCHURTZ, Department of Psychology, University of
Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky
JASON D. SHAW, Carlson School of Management, University of
Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minneapolis
RICHARD H. SMITH, Department of Psychology, University of
Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky
STEPHEN M. THIELKE, Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences,
University of Washington, Seattle, Washington
BÉNÉDICTE VIDAILLET, Institute for Business Administration,
University of Lille, Lille, France
ANNE L. ZELL, Department of Psychology, Augustana College, Sioux
Falls, South Dakota
ETHAN ZELL, Department of Psychology, Ohio University, Athens,
Ohio
DANIEL JOHN ZIZZO, School of Economics, University of East
Anglia, Norwich, England
Page 2 of 2
Introduction
Envy: Theory and Research
Richard Smith
Print publication date: 2008
Print ISBN-13: 9780195327953
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2010
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195327953.001.0001
Introduction
Richard H. Smith
Sung Hee Kim
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195327953.003.0001
Abstract and Keywords
This introductory chapter begins with a discussion of envy and how many people
find it difficult to rid themselves of this painful emotion; a situation made worse
by the presence of societal norms rendering the emotion shameful. An overview
of the subsequent chapters is then presented.
Keywords:   envy, human behavior, emotion, social norms
“Envy, isn’t that when you see somebody with something you want, and you go
buy it?” This was the bemused response of a friend when we told him that we
were studying envy. And he had a point. There is something about envy that can
render it simple and harmless, maybe silly to study. In social psychology, most
introductory textbooks pass it over, even though it is hard to think of a more
social emotion. How fitting it is that envy might suffer an inferiority complex.
Part of the problem may be definitional. It is an inconvenient fact for
understanding envy that when people think of it, they may summon up one of at
least two types: benign and malicious. Our friend was thinking of benign envy
(Foster, 1972; Rawls, 1971; Silver & Sabini, 1978). With benign envy, one notices
something desirable enjoyed by another person and acknowledges its value. It
may spur one to seek a similar enjoyment. Its expression will be open,
unguarded, and free of ill will.
Benign envy is a common everyday conception of envy. In a recent study, it
represented half of the cases described by participants when asked to recall a
Page 1 of 14
Introduction
recent experience of envy (van de Ven, Zeelenberg, & Pieters, 2007). As Russell
Belk shows in chapter 12 of this book, benign envy may be a wide, interesting
territory in its own right. It may provide much of the energy behind the ever-
running engine of marketing in capitalist cultures, for example.
But malicious envy is a thing apart. Consider these lines from Paradise Lost:
Satan—so call him now; his former name
Is heard no more in Heaven. He, of the first,
If not the first Archangel, great in power,
In favour, and preëminence, yet fraught
With envy against the Son of God, that day
Honoured by his great Father, and proclaimed
Messiah, King Anointed, could not bear,
Through pride, that sight, and thought himself impaired.
(p.4)
Deep malice thence conceiving and disdain,
Soon as midnight brought on the dusky hour
Friendliest to sleep and silence, he resolved
With all his legions to dislodge, and leave
Unworshiped, unobeyed, the Throne supreme. (Milton, 1667/1962, p.
126)
In Milton’s conception, Satan, as one of God’s highest archangels, is powerful
and favored, yet “fraught with envy” against the Messiah, who is even more
favored by God. Satan, his pride wounded, thinks himself “impaired” by this fact.
This arouses “deep malice” in him, and he plans a disobedient, disdainful
revenge. So evil is thrust on the world.
Mirroring Milton’s poetic vision, conceptions of malicious envy (which, for
convenience, we will now call “envy”) typically emphasize at least two features
that make this type of envy distinct from benign envy. First, it hurts; envy is
mental pain. As many of the chapters in this book emphasize, the superiority of
rivals in the competitive arenas of life has concrete, unpleasant consequences
for work and romance. Also, their superiority implies a lowered self-evaluation,
an “impaired” self, which is another form of pain and a wound to pride. Second,
it is hostile in nature. The envying person feels anger or ill will toward the
envied person. Scholars may differ on the precise nature of these feelings
(D’Arms & Kerr, chap. 3, this volume; Leach, chap. 6, this volume), but they
agree that some form of anger or ill will, from “deep malice” to lesser amounts,
is a defining ingredient of envy.
Envy, conceived in this way, is a force to be reckoned with. Envy in this form
explains why it seems linked to so many unsavory outcomes, as most scholars
claim, regardless of their disciplinary vantage point, when the emotion is placed
under a microscope (Schoeck, 1969; Smith & Kim, 2007).
Page 2 of 14
Introduction
Envy seems an almost inevitable outcome of the human condition (Foster, 1972;
Hill & Buss, chap. 4, this volume; Schoeck, 1969), although cultural factors are
likely to play a strong role (Lindholm, chap. 13, this volume) in the prevalence
and in the form envy takes. Any human system in which differences among
people have consequences for obtaining resources and for enhancing
reproductive fitness creates dilemmas for individuals finding themselves
relatively disadvantaged. Because disadvantage matters, there is likely to be an
emotion that quickly informs them that it matters. Inferiority should register on
the system, and it is likely to orient people toward doing something about it.
Therefore, envy should be painful yet self-assertive in its nature (Hill & Buss,
chap. 4, this volume; Silver & Sabini, 1978; Smith & Kim, 2007).
Unfortunately for the person feeling envy, the general inevitability of envy is
combined with its repugnance. On the one hand, people should be repeatedly
vulnerable to at least temporary states of relative inferiority, therefore priming
them for envy. On the other hand, the likelihood that their envy will be appeased
may be low, given the scarcity of prized resources in most cultures and the
noticeable benefits granted to those who enjoy superiority. Moreover, because
envy may motivate hostile and aggressive actions, societies should develop
norms to prevent the overt expression and actionable potential (p.5) of the
emotion. Envy, and especially acting on one’s envy, disturb the status quo and
cast doubt on prevailing standards for how scarce resources are distributed.
Therefore, it seems that most cultures find ways to label envy as repugnant
(Foster, 1972; Schoeck, 1969). In sum, although envy is an adaptive, frequent
response to disadvantage, many people do not find it easy to rid themselves of
this painful emotion, a situation made worse by the presence of societal norms
rendering the emotion shameful (Heider, 1958; Silver & Sabini, 1978; Smith &
Kim, 2007).
The tension between the common potency of envy and societal limits on its
expression reveals itself in varied ways. One sees it in struggles to devise
systems of government that citizens perceive as fair, just, and workable (de la
Mora, 1987; Schoeck, 1969). Memorable slogans capture the themes of
competing systems. “From each according to his ability, to each according to his
needs!” famously summarizes part of Karl Marx’s thinking on how a communist
system should work (Critique of the Gotha Program, 1875). There are utopian
novels in which the main thrust is to solve the problem of envy, usually by a
leveling process of making people as equal as possible. “Every valley shall be
exalted” is the theme of Hartley’s (1960) novel, Facial Justice. Here, people are
given facial surgery to homogenize beauty.
B. F. Skinner’s solution in his novel, Walden Two, which described a utopian
community guided by behaviorist principles, was to use conditioning techniques
to eliminate envy and other negative emotions (Skinner, 1948). At an early age
children wore lollipops around their necks and were instructed not to lick them
Page 3 of 14