Environmental Recourse at the Multilateral Development Banks

96 Pages·2020·3.234 MB·English

by  Susan Park

ElementsinEarthSystemGovernance
editedby
FrankBiermann
UtrechtUniversity
AartiGupta
WageningenUniversity
ENVIRONMENTAL
RECOURSE AT THE
MULTILATERAL
DEVELOPMENT BANKS
Susan Park
University of Sydney
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Contents
1 InternationalRecourseforEnvironmentalandSocialHarm 1
2 InternationalGrievanceMechanismsandProcedural
EnvironmentalRights 10
3 AccesstoJusticeinEnvironmentalMattersthroughthe
Problem SolvingPracticesoftheIndependent
AccountabilityMechanismsoftheMDBs 35
4 AccesstoJusticeinEnvironmentalMattersthroughthe
ComplianceInvestigationsoftheIndependent
AccountabilityMechanismsoftheMDBs 58
5 ProvidingEffectiveInternationalRecoursefor
EnvironmentalandSocialHarm 71
ListofAbbreviations 76
Bibliography 77
EnvironmentalRecourseattheMultilateralDevelopmentBanks 1
1InternationalRecourseforEnvironmentalandSocialHarm
Canenvironmentalandsocialharm,suchasspeciesextinctionandlossofland,
be effectively addressed at the international level? Although harms such as
thesemaybeinflictedonindividuals,communities,andecosystemswithinthe
confinesofterritorialborders,rapidchangesintheinternationalpoliticalecon-
omy over the last few decades has increased the possibility of environmental
and social harm caused or facilitated by transnational or international actors
such as multinational corporations (MNCs) and intergovernmental organisa-
tions (Mason 2005). While environmental and social harm caused by actors
operating beyond the state is by no means new, over time the volume of
interactionshasincreased,resultinginfurtherenvironmentaldegradationwith
the likelihood for conflict and greater harm (Carmen and Agyeman 2011;
Temperetal.2018).Moreover,corporations,states,andinternationalorganisa-
tionsincreasinglyworktogetherinpublic–privatepartnershipsthatraiseques-
tions as to their responsibility and accountability (Andonova 2017; Biermann
2014).
Inresponsetothesetrendstherehasbeenanattendantproliferationofglobal
governance, such as multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) and their
secretariats that seek to regulate states environmental impact (Biermann and
Siebenhuner 2009; Mitchell 2002–2019). Yet states have also allowed trans-
nationalprivatebodiesandinternationalorganisationstheauthoritytoestablish
global norms and rules (Block-Lieb and Halliday 2017; Park and Kramarz
2019). Thisauthority has extended to thesettlement ofinternational disputes,
particularlyforcommercialactorssuchasforeigninvestors,withenvironmen-
talandsocialimplications(MattliandDietz2014;Tienhaara2009).Ithasalso
led to new avenues for people and communities to hold actors to account for
environmentalandsocialharmbeyondthestate(HertoghandKirkham2018).
Thissectionoutlinesthedifferencebetweenlegalandnon-legalavenuesfor
internationalrecoursetohighlightanunderexaminedglobaltrendtowardsthe
proliferation of international grievance mechanisms (IGMs), defined as inter-
national mechanisms created by transnational orinternational actors that give
affectedorpotentiallyaffectedpeopletherighttoseekrecoursefortheimpacts
of their activities, especially where they have no access to a liability
mechanism.1 This is important, given arguments that global governance is
undemocratic, state driven, and selective in opening up participation
(Moravcsik 2004; Tallberg et al. 2013). As grievance mechanisms move to
theinternationallevel,thereneedstobeathoroughinvestigationofhowthey
addressenvironmentalandsocialharm.
1 Ontheabsenceofliabilitymechanisms,seeRichards(n.d).
2 ElementsinEarthSystemGovernance
This Element therefore has three aims: first, it identifies the normative
standards underpinning international grievance mechanisms globally. It high-
lightshowtheyseektoupholdproceduralenvironmentalrights:specifically,the
right to participation, the right to access information, and the right to access
justiceinenvironmentalmatters.TothisIaddananalysisofhowtherightsof
naturefareinthesepeople-centredrecourseprocesses,giventheaccelerationof
globalenvironmentalchangeandthedemandscommunitiesmakeforenviron-
mentalprotection(Park2019).Investigatingtherightsofnatureisimperative
becausetheenvironmentcannotactforitselfandtodatehasfewrightsaccorded
toit(onlegalrightsaccordedtonature,seeKauffmanandSheehan2019).This
is even more compelling considering the global scale and accelerating rate of
environmental change (ESG 2018), with precipitous alterations in natural
systems(Steffenetal.,2015).TheElementisfocusedonsite-specificenviron-
mentalandsocialharm,althoughthesedofeedintoandareaffectedbylarger
ecological systems change. Second, the Element examines a class of inter-
national grievance mechanisms, the independent accountability mechanisms
ofthemultilateraldevelopmentbanks.Thisisforthreereasons:first,theyhave
amassed considerable experience in responding to environmental and social
claimsfrompeopleharmedbyinternationaldevelopmentprojectsfinancedby
theMDBsoverthelasttwodecades(seePark2019).Second,theyarecompar-
ableinfunctionandstructure,giventheyallusedtheWorldBank’sInspection
Panelasthetemplatefromwhichtotailortheirownmechanisms(Park2017).
ThisElementquestionstheactivitiesoftheinternationalgrievancemechanisms
oftheWorldBankandWorldBankGroup2;theAsian(ADB),African(AfDB),
and Inter-American Development Banks (IDB); and the European Bank for
ReconstructionandDevelopment(EBRD).Third,analysingthesemechanisms
isimportantbecauseaslarge-scale,high-profilepublicfunderstheyare‘most
likely’ cases for international grievance mechanisms to actually operate com-
paredwithlesstransparentprivatesector(MacdonaldandMacdonald2017)or
lesserknownandlessresourcedpublicfunders(Zappile2016).
2 TheInternationalBankforReconstructionandDevelopment(IBRD)ispopularlyknownasthe
World Bank, which also manages funding from the International Development Association
(IDA). The World Bank Group is composed of the International Finance Corporation (IFC),
a private-sector lender and investor; the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA),
a political risk insurer; and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID),anarbitrationbody.IFCandMIGAhavethesamememberstatesastheWorldBank
ontheirBoardsbuthavedifferentvotingweights,anddecisionsforIFCandMIGAaremade
separatelyfromtheWorldBankandfromeachother(i.e.byIFCandMIGAmanagementunder
theirexecutivevicepresidents).ThepresidentoftheWorldBankisalsothepresidentoftheWorld
BankGroup.Overthelastdecade,therehasbeenapushtobringtheseparateentitiescloser
togetherunderasingleWorldBankGroupbanner.Combined,in2018,theycommitted,dis-
bursed,andissuedriskcoverageamountingtoover$45billion(WorldBank2019).
EnvironmentalRecourseattheMultilateralDevelopmentBanks 3
Animportantcontributiontothedebateoverthevalueofhavinginternational
grievancemechanismsattheinternationallevelistoexaminehowcommunities
use them. I undertook a content analysis of 394 publicly available original
grievance claims to the independent accountability mechanisms submitted
between 1994 and the end of 2018 by people adversely affected by MDB
projects.TheanalysisrevealsthatpeopledoseekrecoursefortheBanks’failure
to provide access to participation and access to justice, and they do use the
mechanisms asa meansfor accesstojustice in environmental matters. Italso
revealsthatpeoplealsoseekrecoursefornaturebeyondtheirowndependence
onit.Finally,theElementempiricallyinvestigatestheactivitiesoftheseIAMs
aims.Indoingso,itevaluatestheproceduresestablishedbythemechanismsto
provideaccesstojusticeinenvironmentalmattersthroughtwoavenues:‘prob-
lem-solving’, which entails direct discussion and engagement with communi-
ties,theprojectsponsor,andtheBanktorectifytheproblemandstoptheharm;
and ‘compliance investigations’, which determine whether it was Bank non-
compliance withits environmental andsocialpolicies that led totheharm. In
reviewingadatabaseofalloftheclaimsmadepubliclyavailablebytheIAMs
(1,052casesbetween1994andmid-2019)alsohighlightshowaccesstojustice
inenvironmentalmattersthroughtheproblem-solvingprocessdoesnotneces-
sarilysolvepeople’sgrievances,giventhevoluntarynatureofengagementwith
communities for the Banks and (often private sector) project sponsors. While
thecomplianceinvestigationprocessdoesgenerallyholdtheBankstoaccount
for contributing to harm through environmental and social policy non-
compliance, more research is needed as to whether this in turn adequately
addresses claimant’s grievances. The remainder of this section situates and
details the contours of international grievance mechanisms, before outlining
theremainderoftheElement.3
LegalandNon legalFormsofInternationalRecourse
Two forms of international recourse, legal and non-legal, are available for
people who have suffered physical violence, loss ofproperty and livelihoods,
andirreparableenvironmentaldamagebecauseoftheactivitiesoftransnational
and international actors. Both are important, and the reason for communities
choosing one over the other may rest on several factors, aswill be discussed.
Legalprocesseslikeinternationalcourtsandtribunalshaveincreasedinnumber
(Alter 2014). Of these, some, such as the International Court of Justice,
3 Ofthe1,052casesintheIAMdatabase,only394oftheoriginalclaimants’submissionsare
publiclyaccessible.Thisinpartstemsfromthedatacollectionofthemechanismsthemselves,but
isalsobasedonwhetherpeoplewanttheirclaimstobeconfidentialornot.
4 ElementsinEarthSystemGovernance
adjudicatedisputesovernaturalresources,andothers,suchastheWorldTrade
Organisation’sDisputeSettlementMechanismincreasinglydealwithenviron-
mentalandhumanhealthrisks(Foster2011;Peel2010).Thesearestate-based
legal processes, which may or may not be linked to the needs and desires of
thosedirectlyharmed.Indeed,statesareoftencomplicitwithtransnationaland
international actors in economic activities, including the extraction of natural
resources,andinfinancinglarge-scaleinfrastructureprojectssuchasminesand
roadways that facilitate harm. Moreover, because of past imperial resource
extraction,developingstateshaveusedinternationallawtoprotecttheirsover-
eignrighttoexploitnaturalresources(Pahuja2011).Thispermanentrightover
naturalresourcesrestswiththenation,notwithindividualsorlocalcommuni-
ties.Obligationsattendanttothisrighthavealsoincreasedovertimetoinclude
environmental conservation, to ‘respect the rights and interests of indigenous
peoples, and a duty to use natural wealth and resources in a sustainable way’
(Schrijver2010:7–8).
Theideathatindividualsandcommunitieshaverightstotheirenvironment
appeared in the 1972 Stockholm Declaration (Principle 1), 1992 Rio
Declaration(Principle10),Agenda21,andinthe1987WorldCommissionon
EnvironmentandDevelopmentreport(alsoknownastheBruntlandreport).Rio
specifically ‘formulated the link between human rights and environmental
protection in... procedural terms’ includingparticipation, accessto informa-
tion,andaccesstoredressandremedy.Suchproceduralrightsarebeginningto
be incorporated into multilateral environmental agreements (Ognibene and
Kariuki 2019: 176–7). However, procedural environmental rights are rarely
codifiedontheirownininternationalenvironmentallaw(Conca2015:74–5).
TwoexceptionstothisareregionalUnitedNations(UN)conventions:the1998
ConventiononAccesstoInformation,PublicParticipationinDecision-Making
and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, which is housed under the
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (otherwise known as the
AarhusConvention,Mason2005);andthe2018EscazúAgreement,abinding
regionaltreatyforLatinAmericabytheUnitedNationsEconomicCommission
forLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean.
Currently,thereareforty-sevenpartiestotheAarhusConvention,withstates
agreeingtoprovidetheirpublicswiththeserights,whiletheEscazúAgreement
has seventeen signatories and one ratification. While not yet a treaty, there is
alsothe2007UNDeclarationontheRightsofIndigenousPeoples(UNDRIP).
The declaration details that states should consult with Indigenous Peoples in
managing resources, including that no forcible relocation can occur without
their free, prior and informed consent; that Indigenous Peoples have rights to
theirtraditionallands;andthattheyhavetherighttoredressandtojust,fair,and