Enemies in Agreement: Domestic Politics, Uncertainty, and Cooperation between Adversaries The ...

398 Pages·2014·6.52 MB·English

Enemies in Agreement: Domestic Politics,
Uncertainty, and Cooperation between Adversaries
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Vaynman, Jane Eugenia. 2014. Enemies in Agreement: Domestic Politics, Uncertainty, and
Cooperation between Adversaries. Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University.
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http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:13070027
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Enemies in Agreement:
Domestic Politics, Uncertainty, and Cooperation between
Adversaries
A dissertation presented
by
Jane Eugenia Vaynman
to
The Department of Government
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in the subject of
Political Science
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts
July 2014
c 2014 – Jane Eugenia Vaynman
�
All rights reserved.
Dissertation Advisor: Professor Beth Simmons Jane Eugenia Vaynman
Enemies in Agreement:
Domestic Politics, Uncertainty, and Cooperation between Adversaries
Abstract
Adversarial agreements, such as the nuclear weapons treaties, disarmament zones, or
conventional weapons limitations, vary considerably in the information sharing provisions
they include. This dissertation investigates why adversarial states sometimes choose to
cooperate by creating restraining institutions, and how their choices for the form of that
cooperation are constrained and motivated.
I argue that uncertainties arising out of domestic political volatility, which includes
leadership changes or public unrest, make arms control agreements more likely because these
moments create the possibility of foreign policy change. When states consider one another as
relatively cooperative, increasing uncertainty about the adversarys security incentives leads
them to hedge and pursue low monitoring agreements instead of relying on informal cooper-
ation. Conversely, under highly competitive conditions, increased uncertainty makes states
more willing risk cooperation and form agreements with intrusive information provisions
where no agreements were previously possible.
Ishowsupportforthetheorythroughtestsusinganoriginaldatasetofalladversarial
cooperation agreements (1816-2007) and their provisions. Controlling for other determinants
of arms control, I show that both types of domestic political volatility contribute to a higher
likelihood of an agreement. As expected, the e↵ect of volatility on types of information
provisions is conditional on the prior relationship between the states. A detailed study of
the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (US-Soviet Union, 1987) traces how shifts created
by Gorbachevs new leadership contributed to greater uncertainty among US policymakers
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about Soviet intentions, giving both sides the negotiating space to design an intrusively
monitored treaty. I then demonstrate the generalizability of the theory across a wider range
of cases by looking at the e↵ects of domestic volatility on agreement outcomes for adversaries
experiencing dtente; for those engaged in post-conflict competition, and for asymmetric
powers negotiating new weapons limitation.
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Contents
1 Adversarial Security Institutions in International Relations 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Research Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3 Between Security and Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.4 Explaining Agreement Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.5 The Approach in this Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2 Treaties Under Uncertainty: A Theory of the Domestic Political Determi-
nants of Agreement Design 45
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.2 A Model of Treaty Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.3 Sources of Uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
2.4 Alternative Explanations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
2.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
3 Testing the E↵ects of Political Volatility: A Quantitative Analysis of
Treaty Provisions 96
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
3.2 Hypothesis Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
3.3 New Data on Arms Control Treaties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
3.4 Research Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
3.5 Hypothesis 3: E↵ects of Domestic Political Volatility on Treaty Signature . . 130
3.6 Hypotheses 1 and 2: E↵ects of Domestic
Political Volatility on Information Provisions in Treaty Forms . . . . . . . . 133
3.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
4 Soviet Leadership Change and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty 151
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
4.2 Case study analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
4.3 Early negotiations: 1981-1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
4.4 Domestic Political Volatility in the USSR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
4.5 Late negotiations: 1985-1987 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
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4.6 Considering the alternative explanations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
4.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
5 Theory Applications: Uncertainty and Adversarial Cooperation in South
Asia and the Middle East 242
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
5.2 Generalizability of the Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
5.3 India, Pakistan, and the Lahore Declaration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249
5.4 Egypt, Israel, and the 1979 Peace Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270
5.5 A contemporary case: US-Iran negotiations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285
5.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302
6 Conclusion 306
6.1 Summarizing the Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306
6.2 Future Research on E↵ects of Arms Control Treaties . . . . . . . . . . . . . 312
6.3 Implications for Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 316
6.4 Arms Control Without Arms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320
Appendices 322
A Appendix for Chapter 2 – Formal Theory 323
A.1 Appendix for Chapter 2: Formal Theory Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 323
B Appendix for Chapter 3 – Quantitative Analysis 350
B.1 Appendix I – Control Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 350
B.2 Appendix II – Full Statistical Results
and Robustness Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 357
Bibliography 368
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List of Tables
2.1 Beliefs and Treaty Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.1 Number of Treaties by Information Provision Types (Detail) . . . . . . . . . 108
3.2 Treaties Information Provision Types and Members . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
3.3 Percent of Observed Dyads by Treaty Type [Volatility] . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
3.4 Percent of Observed Dyads by Treaty Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
5.1 Theory predictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
B.1 Logit Results – E↵ects on Probability of a Treaty (odds ratios reported) . . . 359
B.2 Logit Results – E↵ects on Probability of a Treaty (odds ratios reported) . . . 360
B.3 GOLogit – Cabinet or Executive Change Top Down Volatility
E↵ects on Probability of Treaty Types (generalized ordered logit, odds ratios
reported) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 362
B.4 GOLogit – Demonstrations, Riots or Strikes Bottom Up Volatility
E↵ects on Probability of Treaty Types (generalized ordered logit, odds ratios
reported) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 363
B.5 MLogit – Cabinet or Executive Change Top Down Volatility
E↵ects on Probability of Treaty Types (multinomial logit, relative risk ratios
reported) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 366
B.6 MLogit – Demonstrations, Riots or Strikes Bottom Up Volatility
E↵ects on Probability of Treaty Types (multinomial logit, relative risk ratios
reported) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 367
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List of Figures
1.1 Beliefs about State Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.1 Theory outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.2 Comparative Statics Plot – optimal monitoring selected . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
2.3 Comparative Statics Plot – minimal monitoring for an agreement . . . . . . 69
3.1 State Participants in Arms Control Treaties by Provision Type . . . . . . . . 110
3.2 Arms Control Treaties over Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
3.3 Dependent Variable Treaty Coding, Dyadic View . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
3.4 E↵ect Domestic Political Volatility Probability of a Treaty . . . . . . . . . . 132
3.5 E↵ects of Cabinet or Executive Change on Treaties (Gen. Ordered Logit) . . 142
3.6 E↵ects of Demonstrations, Riots and Strikes on Treaties (Gen. Ordered Logit)143
3.7 Percent Change in the Probability of a Treaty with Cabinet or Executive
Change vs Stable Conditions (Gen. Ordered Logit) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
B.1 E↵ects of Cabinet or Executive Change on Treaty Types (Multinomial Logit) 364
B.2 E↵ects of Demonstrations, Riots and Strikes on Treaty Types (Multinomial
Logit) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 365
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Acknowledgments
Like any project that required many hours and many turns in the road, this disserta-
tion would not have been possible without the support of people who have given me advice
and inspiration.
I am grateful for the thoughtful and multifaceted guidance of my advising committee.
Beth Simmons inspired me to focus the project on the questions about which I was most
curiousand Iam gratefulfor herencouragementtocross-pollinateideasandapproachesfrom
international relations subfields. Scott Sagan has continuously challenged me to look for the
puzzle in any research question, which has been a source of inspiration for me for more than
a decade. Iain Johnston has broadened my thinking about security studies from both theory
and regional perspectives and his creativity has motivated me to investigate questions from
new directions.
A number of other professors have helped me to make this project a blend of re-
search approaches. Alex Montgomery was incredibly generous with his support of my work,
discussing ideas and guiding me on methods and data. The dissertation has also benefited
from discussions with Timothy Colton, Arthur Spirling, and Greg Koblentz. I am grateful
to Frank Gavin for his commitment to promoting the work of young scholars; I have found
tremendous support from him and the community he has built.
My years in Cambridge would not have been the same without the encouragement
and positivity of my friends, Andrea Tivig, Serene Hung, Didi Kuo, Shahrzad Sabet and
Chika Ogawa. Our dinners were the moments to celebrate successes, the spaces to vent, and
ultimately a place for real help on all the elements of life that make research and writing
possible. Didi Kuo and Serene Hung also read multiple chapters of this dissertation and I
am grateful for their comments and countless edits.
Friends and colleagues have motivated new ideas for this project and helped me talk
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