Table Of ContentJCSS Study No. 1
ENCOUNTER W ITH REALITY:
REAGAN AND
THE MIDDLE EAST
DURING THE FIRST TERM
Nimrod Novik
WESTVIEW PRESS
Boulder, Colorado
ISBN 0-8133-0323-0 (Westview)
LC 85-51349
JCSS Studies
are published for the Jaffee Center
for Strategic Studies
by
The Jerusalem Post
POB 81, Jerusalem 91000, Israel
and
Westview Press
Boulder, Colorado 80301, Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher
Printed in Israel at the Jerusalem Post Press
Copyright© 1985
Tel Aviv University
Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any
form or by any electronic or mechanical means without permission
in writing from Tel Aviv University.
Table of Contents
Page No.
Summary ........................................................................... 1
Preface ............................................ 2
Introduction ......................................................................... 3
Part I. A Prelude to a Reagan Middle East Policy
1. The Carter Legacy ........................................... 7
2. An Intervening Variable: The Slow Start ..........15
3. The Strategic Context ....................................... 21
4. Defining US Interests and Objectives ...............24
Part II. Addressing a Strategic Quandary
5. Defining the Quandary ..................................... 29
6. Security Assistance: The Saudi Deal ................33
(Table. Security Assistance: Reagan vs. Carter.....34)
7. Strategic Cooperation: The MOU and other
Arrangements ...................................................41
8. Flexing a Muscle: The Bright Star Exercises ....44
9. Crisis Management: Peace for Galilee, for
Lebanon and Beyond .......................................48
10. Conflict Resolution: The Reagan Plan .............56
11. “Regional Policeman" Revisited ..................... 63
Conclusion ...........................................................................67
Appendices
A. President Carter's Arms Sales Policy,
May 19,1977 ...............................................77
B. The Carter Doctrine, January 23,1980 ........80
C. President Reagan's Directive on Arms
Transfer Policy, July 8,1981 .......................83
D. US-Israeli Memorandum of
Understanding, November 30,1981 ...........86
E. The Reagan Plan, September 1,1982 ..........89
Notes .............................................99
Summary
After a brief review of the Carter administration's approach to
regional developments and a critical look at its accomplishments,
Part 1 traces the internal causes for the early policy incoherence in
the Reagan administration — a slow start and presidential
aloofness. It concludes by contrasting the seemingly homogeneous
world view of key Reagan administration decisionmakers with the
heterogeneity that became evident whenever broad principles had
to be translated into concrete policies.
Part 2 begins with a presentation of the gap between Reaganite
intentions and the threats the administration perceived on the one
hand, and capabilities on the other. It is this gap that constituted
the administration's strategic quandary upon assuming office.
The bulk of the study then deals with the various means employed«
by the administration in its attempt to deal with this dilemma:
security assistance, bilateral strategic cooperation, military col
laboration, crisis management in Lebanon, the Reagan Plan, etc.
The study concludes by suggesting the lessons learned by
Washington from its "trial and error" approach to Middle East
realities, and describes the course adopted toward the end of the
first Reagan administration.
Preface
The education of any US administration to the complexities of
the ever-changing Middle East is an on-going experience. It ends
only with the termination of that administration's tenure. In order
for any earlier analysis of this evolutionary process to take place,
the observer must take advantage of the most viable boundary in
time. None seems less artificial than the deadline imposed by
presidential elections. Moreover, the juxtaposition of the need to
demonstrate accomplishments and suggest a course for four more
years, with the potential of personnel reshuffles, suggests a
possible turning point worthy of note. Hence the present study
traces and attempts to analyze the Reagan administration's
Middle East policy during its first four-year term of office.
In researching and writing this study, I have benefited enor
mously from the intellectually stimulating environment of the
Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel-Aviv University, on
whose research staff I served for five most rewarding and exciting
years prior to taking a leave from academia. Having concluded the
study prior to taking up my present post at the Prime Minister's
Office, I wish to emphasize that the views and analysis therein are
my own. They do not necessarily coincide with those of any other
government official or organ.
I am grateful to my JCSS colleagues for their constructive
criticism of earlier drafts. In particular, the intellectual guidance
offered throughout by the Head of JCSS, Major General (Res.)
Aharon Yariv, left its mark.
Mrs. Heda Rechnitz-Kijner offered invaluable research assist
ance and on-going commentary and advice. Her behind-the-scenes
contribution has long been a critical component of my own work —
indeed, of any JCSS undertaking within the US foreign and security
policy sphere.
Dr. Dore Gold and the JCSS Executive Editor, Joseph Alpher,
helped transform the manuscript into a coherent study by offering
expertise in the subject matter and the editorial dimension,
respectively.
Nimrod Novik
Jerusalem, 1985
2
Introduction
Midway through President Carter's term in office, many in the
Middle East1 were convinced that his administration did not share
the concerns of America's friends in the region. Particularly
alarming to them were the mutually reinforcing phenomena of
Soviet support for radical regimes and movements, and radicals'
support for Soviet involvement. In an unusual departure from
tradition and protocol, one Saudi envoy gave expression to this
sentiment by saying that "no one in the Carter administration
seem[ed] to be listening to his government's warnings..." about
developments in "Ethiopia, where Soviet intervention altered the
balance of power on the Red Sea," as well as in "Afghanistan
and...South Yemen....Finally," he argued, "President Carter's weak
response to Brezhnev's hands-off-Iran warning...convinced Saudi
leaders that their country...[was] on its own."2 Carter's own public
admission of having failed to understand Soviet conduct and
intentions prior to the invasion of Afghanistan3 reinforced the
desire to see a change both in US conduct vis-a-vis the region, and
in Moscow's involvement therein.
It was against this backdrop that the election of Ronald Reagan
was welcomed by those who were known to consider American
support an important, if not critical, component of their national
security. Pre-election rhetoric, taken to indicate post-election
intentions, suggested that the "new Washington" was determined
to "do what it takes" to reestablish America's credibility. A more
realistic appreciation of the various threats, coupled with the
determination to meet them, were expected to reinvigorate west
ern and pro-western defenses in the region.
Four years later, it was clear that these expectations were, at
best, exaggerated. While the administration did indeed attempt to
address regional realities in a manner corresponding to intra-
regional perceptions, its success was quite limited. Domestic
constraints may provide an important explanation for this partial
failure,4 but the overall picture is clearly far more complex.
Upon assuming office, the Reagan administration was faced
with a complex mandate in dealing with the Middle East:
— It was expected to act firmly when American interests in
this region were threatened, but it lacked adequate inde
pendent means to do so. Nor was it authorized in advance to
3
use available forces for that purpose.
— It was expected to augment US capabilities with those of
friendly allies from the region, but was faced with the
potential adverse consequences to the peace process of
providing these allies with the military means necessary for
their contribution to the common objective.
— It was expected to produce Arab concessions within the
Arab- Israeli peace process, but had limited leverage over
the Arabs, and was faced with a potent, pro-Arab business
lobby at home.
— It was expected to produce Israeli concessions within the
Arab-Israeli peace process, but was restricted in pressuring
Israel to instances when the American public and Congress
were convinced that Israel alone was to blame for lack of
progress. In the absence of an Arab "partner" this was a
most difficult task.
In the following pages the administration's efforts to conduct a
coherent policy within this seemingly contradictory mandate are
traced and analyzed.
4
I. A Prelude to a Reagan
Middle East Policy
