Empiricism and Experience

278 Pages·2006·1.69 MB·English

by  Anil Gupta

Empiricism and Experience
Anil Gupta
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
empiricism and experience
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Empiricism and Experience
Anil Gupta
1
2006
1
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Gupta,Anil
Empiricismandexperience/AnilGupta.
p. cm.
Includesbibliographicalreferences(p.)andindex.
ISBN-13978-0-19-518958-2
ISBN0-19-518958-2
1. Experience. 2. Knowledge,Theoryof. 3. Empiricism. I. Title.
B105.E9G87 2006
146'.44—dc22 2005055485
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preface
My principal concern in this book is to understand the logical rela-
tionshipofexperiencetoknowledge.Experience,itappears,makes
some contribution to our knowledge of the world. What is this
contribution? Say that I look out of my window and see that it is
raining.AsIlookout,Ihaveavisualexperienceandcomethereby
to believe that it is raining. My belief is reasonable, and it would
appear, it is so in part because of my visual experience. But how
does my visual experience contribute to the reasonableness of my
belief?Thisquestionhasnoeasyanswer,andIdevotechapter1to
bringing into clear view the principal obstacle that must be over-
comeifwearetofindasatisfactoryanswer.Itisimportanttofindan
answer, for without it, we cannot assess the claims of empiricism.
My approach to the problem of experience and knowledge
is shaped by three convictions. The first conviction is that the
classicalempiricistresponsetotheproblemdeservesrespect.Igrant
that classical empiricism is unacceptable. However, in the process
ofthrowingawayitsdetaileddoctrines,weshouldtakecarenotto
throwawaythedisciplinewithinwhichitworksandtheproblems
that it addresses. Classical empiricism, as I see it, is founded on
genuine constraints and a natural idea. It is not a product of some
silly little argument from illusion, or of some pathological preoc-
cupation with skepticism. I argue in chapter 2 that classical em-
piricism is a powerful—and inevitable—development of a natural
idea.Hence,agenuinealternativetoclassicalempiricismcannotbe
viii Preface
obtainedcheaply.Itwillnotbefound,forexample,byreturningto
the comfort of common sense, or by browsing the racks of natu-
ralized psychology, or through a refuge in some sort of mythical
behaviorism. I argue for all this in chapters 2 and 5. (Especially
relevantarexx2Eand5B,whereIdiscussWillardV.O.Quine’sand
Wilfrid Sellars’s responses to classical empiricism.)
My second conviction is that the problem requires us to take
seriously certain interdependencies. In chapter 4, I highlight the
relevant interdependencies and go on to develop a proposal about
the logical relationship of experience to knowledge. My entire
approach here is guided by the work I have done on the logical
theoryofinterdependentdefinitions.(Iprovideinchapter3abrief
introduction to this theory.) This work has made me realize that
logicalinterdependencyisnotsomethingtobeavoidedandfeared
but something to be accepted and exploited. It is a common prej-
udicethatlogicalinterdependencyisasourceofproblems;actually,
itisoftentheroutetoasolution.Thefundamentalerrorinclassical
empiricism—indeed,inalltraditionalthinkingaboutknowledge—
issues, it seems to me, from its flight from interdependence. The
essence of this book can be summed up thus: it is an attempt to
address the concerns of the classical empiricists, within the con-
straintstheywouldinsiston,butwithatooltheydidnotpossess—
the logic of interdependence. It is not a new thought that classical
empiricism has elements that deserve to be preserved. And, in
contemporary philosophy, logical interdependence is increasingly
recognizedaslegitimateandpowerful.ThewayinwhichIhaveput
these two ideas together may, I hope, hold some interest.
My third conviction is that this change in logical perspective
yieldsapromisingempiricism,anempiricismthatdoesnotneedto
bebuttressedbyidealismoranotherformofantirealism.Inchapters
5and7,Iarguethatthechangeofperspectiveyieldsanempiricism
thatisviable.Thechangeprovidesempiricismwithanewtoolfor
dealing with troublesome challenges. In chapters 6 and 8, I argue
thattheempiricismweobtainisanattractiveone.Itdoesnotneed
to make claims that earn it enemies and that embarrass its friends.
Thesearetheconvictionsthatunderliethisbook.Ihaveargued
forthem,butIamacutelyawarethatitisnoteasytodefendthese
convictions,muchlesstoprovethem.Thisbookismerelyafirststep
towardthedefense.Ihavenotclutteredthebookwithaprofusionof
‘perhaps’,‘maybe’,and‘seemstome’.Butitshouldbeunderstood
that it is with great tentativeness that I put forward the theory
Preface ix
sketchedbelow.Theissuesaredifficultandcomplex,andindealing
withthem,itisparticularlyeasytomistakeillusionforinsight.Our
subject has known many an arduous program that seemed to its
proponents to be insightful—indeed, to provide the only feasible
approach—but that was deeply flawed in its very first steps; the
entireprogramlooks,inretrospect,quixotic.Hence,itisessentialin
thissubjecttoscrutinizewiththegreatestcarethefirststepsbefore
onelaunchesintolongandelaborateinvestigations.Ihaveaimedto
provideinthisbookonlysuchdetailsasaresufficienttodetermine
thestructuralsoundnessofthepictureIpresent.Iamwellawarethat
anumberofelementsinthepicture—includingthenotionsofview
andadmissibility—needgreaterelaboration.Thecentralquestionis
whether these elements deserve further elaboration, whether the
basicplanofthetheorysurvivesacarefulfirstscrutiny.Ifthetheory
is deemed quixotic, I wish to have the comfort of knowing that I
sparedthereaderuselessandboringcomplexity.
The book ends with a ‘‘Supplement on ‘Experience’.’’ Here, I
gather together earlier remarks that clarify the concept of experi-
encein play in thebook, andIhave addedsomefurther clarifying
comments. Since the supplement presupposes the preceding
chapters, I have placed it at the end. But it may be consulted any
timethepressure ofthe question,‘‘What on earth doesthe author
mean by ‘experience’?’’ becomes too great for the reader to bear.
i have been thinking about the problems of experience
andknowledgefromtheverybeginningofmyphilosophicalcareer.
These problems were on my mind when I worked in the early
months of 1980 on ideas that evolved into the revision theory
of truth; my first, inchoate thoughts about the present proposal
date from this period. I did not begin to develop these thoughts,
however,untiltheearly1990s.Idevotedapartofmystay,in1998–
1999, at the Center for Advanced Studies in the Behavioral Sci-
ences, Stanford, to working out the present proposal. I thank the
Center for providing an ideal research environment, and I thank
Indiana University and the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation for
supportingmystaythere.Ibeganseriousworkonwritingthisbook
inearly2001,andbeforetheunsettlingeventsofthefallinterrupted
mywork,Ihadgooddraftsofchapters1,3,and4.(Iwroteadraftof
apartofchapter2alsobutdiscardedalmostallofit.)Iwrotemuch
oftherestofthebookintheacademicyear2003–2004,whenIwas
on a sabbatical leave from the University of Pittsburgh. The leave