Table Of ContentE COLD WAR
1945-19 60
REARMING FOR About the Author
THE COLD WAR
1945-1960
In Rearming for the Cold War, the first publication
in a multivolume series on the history of the acquisition
of major weapon systems by the Department of Defense,
author Elliott Converse presents a meticulously
researched overview of changes in acquisition policies,
organizations, and processes within the United States
military establishment during the decade and a half
following World War II. Many of the changes that
shaped the nature and course of weapons research and
development, production, and contracting through the
end of the century were instituted between 1945 and
1960; many of the problems that have repeatedly
challenged defense policymakers and acquisition
professionals also first surfaced during these years.
Although a large body of published literature
exists on specific aspects of weapons acquisition,
primarily studies of individual systems, this study is
the first to combine the histories of the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the military services Elliott V. Converse III
into one account. The volume is organized
A retired Air Force colonel with a doctoral
chronologically, with individual chapters addressing
history from Princeton University, Dr. Converse
the roles of OSD, the Army, Navy, and Air Force in
was the lead historian on the Defense
two distinct periods. The first, roughly coinciding with
President Truman's tenure, covers the years from the end Acquisition History Project team. His Air Force
of World War II through the end of the Korean War. career included assignments as an air
The second spans the two terms of the Eisenhower
intelligence officer in Thailand during the
presidency from 1953 through early 1961. The volume
Vietnam War, a faculty member at the U.S. Air
approaches the subject through discussion of the
Force Academy and the Air War College, a
evolution of acquisition policies, organizations, and
processes; the interservice and intraservice political strategic planner on the staff of the Joint Chiefs
context of acquisition; the relationship between rapidly of Staff, and commander of the Air Force
advancing technology and acquisition; the role of the
I 1 isiorical Research Agency. He is the author of
defense industry in new weapons development; the
Circling the Earth: United States Plans for a
origins and growth of a specialized acquisition
Postwar Overseas Military Base System,
workforce; and acquisition reform. Case studies of
individual systems illustrate the various forces 1942-1948 (2005); principal author of The
influencing weapons programs. Exclusion of Black Soldiers from the Medal of
These instruments of warfare—aircraft, armored
Honor in World War II (1997); and editor of
vehicles, artillery, guided missiles, naval vessels, and
Forging the Sword: Selecting, Educating, and
supporting electronic systems—when combined with
Training Cadets and Junior Officers in the
nuclear warheads, gave the American military
unprecedented deterrent and striking power. They were Modern World (1998).
also enormously expensive. This study documents the
efforts of political and military leaders in the Truman
and Eisenhower administrations to overcome intractable
political, technological, organizational, and financial
challenges to arming the United States military for the
Cold War struggle.
HISTORY OF ACQUISITION IN THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Volume I
REARMING FOR
THE COLD WAR
1945-1960
Elliott V. Converse III
Historical Office
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Washington, D.C. • 2012
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Converse, Elliott Vanveltner.
Rearming for the Cold War, 1945-1960 / Elliott V. Converse III.
p. cm. — (History of acquisition in the Department of Defense ; v. 1)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Weapons systems—United States—History—20th century. 2. United States—Armed
Forces—Weapons systems—History—20th century. 3. United States—Armed Forces-
Procurement—History—20th century. 4. United States. Dept. of Defense—Procurement-
History—20th century. 5. Military research—United States—History—20th century. 6. Cold
War. I. United States. Dept. of Defense. Historical Office. II. Title.
UF503.C66 2011
355.8'2097309045-dc23
2011034768
HISTORY OF ACQUISITION IN THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Volume I
Editorial Board
Glen R. Asner, Series Editor
Historical Office
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Erin R. Mahan, Chief Historian Richard W. Stewart, Chief Historian
Historical Office U.S. Army Center of Military History
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Jeffrey G. Barlow
J. Ronald Fox Naval History and Heritage Command
Harvard University
Alfred Goldberg
David A. Hounshell Historical Office
Carnegie Mellon University Office of the Secretary of Defense
F. M. Scherer Timothy R. Keck
Harvard University Air Force Headquarters History Office
^°Uo^A}3u^
Foreword
Throughout the second half of the twentieth century, the introduction of new
technologies led to remarkable advances in aircraft, missiles, ships, satellites,
land vehicles, electronic equipment, and many other weapons and supporting
systems employed by the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. At the same
time, however, the projects undertaken to develop and produce these systems
frequently resulted in large cost overruns and schedule slippages, disrupting
budgets and schedules in the Defense Department and in Congress.
The term "defense acquisition" has evolved during the past five decades
from the terms "procurement," "research and development," and "production."
During the same period, the management of defense acquisition has slowly
improved, but not without painful periods of recreating and re-experiencing
acquisition management problems of the past. It is my belief that the painful
periods have resulted to a significant degree from the absence of a comprehensive
history of defense acquisition or even a formal record of lessons learned.
In the late summer of 2001, the U.S. Army Center of Military History
invited me to deliver the keynote address at a symposium to mark the beginning
of a multivolume research and writing project to produce a comprehensive history
of defense acquisition covering the period 1945 to 2000. The project was endorsed
and sponsored by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics, Dr. Jacques Gansler. The Chief Historian of the Office of the
Secretary of Defense headed a Joint Oversight Board that designated the U.S.
Army Center of Military History as the project's executive agent. I was pleased to
accept the invitation to be part of such a worthwhile effort.
In his letter authorizing the study, Under Secretary Gansler pointed out
that "during the more than fifty years since the National Security Act of 1947,
the Department of Defense acquisition function has experienced great change
and received extraordinarily high public visibility and congressional attention.
We are missing, however, a comprehensive record of Defense acquisition
accomplishments and failures from which we may have an opportunity to learn."
The Defense Acquisition History Project objective was to provide a
comprehensive history that describes and analyzes the formulation of acquisition
ii Foreword
policies, the development of acquisition organizations, and the evolution of the
acquisition process. This basic history could then be used as a reference for future
acquisition decision makers, project managers, and educators describing how
the complex problems associated with defense acquisition, including both its
successes and failures, were dealt with in the past.
The three-day Acquisition History Symposium was scheduled for September
10, 11, and 12, 2001, in McLean, Virginia, near the Pentagon and Washington,
D.C. On September 10,h the keynote address and opening-day meetings occurred
as scheduled, but the tragedy in New York City, Pennsylvania, and at the Pentagon
on the second day, 9/11, brought the symposium to an abrupt end.
In the months following the symposium, a team of respected historians
under the direction of the U.S. Army Center of Military History's Chief Historian,
initially Dr. Jeffrey J. Clarke and later Dr. Richard W. Stewart, began to conduct
extensive research and writing for what would become the multivolume study,
History of Acquisition in the Department of Defense. The project continues today
under the management of the Historical Office of the Office of the Secretary of
Defense. I had the honor of serving as senior acquisition advisor to the project.
Elliott Converse, the team leader of the acquisition historians, is a retired
Air Force colonel with a doctorate in history from Princeton University. His Air
Force career included assignments as an intelligence officer with the 8th Tactical
Fighter Wing during the Vietnam War, as a faculty member at the Air Force
Academy and the Air War College, as a strategic planner with the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, and as commander of the Air Force Historical Research Agency. He is the
author of several books on military history and was chosen to prepare the first
volume of the series, dealing with defense acquisition from 1945 to 1960. It did
not take long for those of us associated with the project to be impressed with the
masterful skill, care, and dedication Dr. Converse brought to his research and
writing for what was to be a volume that set high standards for the project.
As work on the Defense Acquisition History Project advanced, six topics or
themes were selected to be addressed in varying degrees throughout the volumes.
The topics include:
• The Evolution of Acquisition Policies, Organizations, and Processes
• The Political Context of Acquisition
• The Relationship among Technology and Acquisition Policies,
Organizations, and Practices
• The Origin and Outcomes of Acquisition Reform
• The Role of the Private Sector in Defense Acquisition
• The Development of the Defense Acquisition Workforce
The construction of each acquisition history volume is more narrative
than analytical, but includes ample interpretations and a number of conclusions.
The volumes are based on extensive primary source materials from the Office
Foreword iii
of the Secretary of Defense and the military services along with a number of
secondary accounts.
The Defense Acquisition History Project caps fifty stimulating and
enjoyable years of my own research and teaching various aspects of defense
acquisition, as well as four years as a naval officer, two years as project manager
for the design of the Polaris Program cost planning and control system, two years
as deputy assistant secretary of the Air Force, two years as assistant secretary of
the Army, and two decades as a professor at the Harvard Business School. It has
been an honor and a pleasure for me to work with the Army Center of Military
History, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the historians participating
in this project.
J. Ronald Fox
Jaime and Josefina Chua Tiampo
Professor of Business Administration, Emeritus
Harvard Business School
Preface
This volume is a history of the acquisition of major weapon systems by the
United States armed forces from 1945 to 1960, the decade and a half that
spanned the Truman and Eisenhower administrations following World War
II. These instruments of warfare—aircraft, armored vehicles, artillery, guided
missiles, naval vessels, and supporting electronic systems—when combined
with nuclear warheads, gave the postwar American military unprecedented
deterrent and striking power.1 They were also enormously expensive. A Brookings
Institution study estimated that from the end of World War II through the mid-
1990s the United States spent over $5 trillion (including the cost of the wartime
atomic bomb project) on the development, production, and deployment of
nuclear weapons, and on the systems for delivering and defending against them.
Twenty percent ofthat sum was expended between 1945 and I960.2
Although there is a large body of published literature on specific aspects
of weapons acquisition, primarily studies of individual systems, no in-depth
analysis has yet appeared that combines the histories of the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the military services into one account. Such a
study is badly needed. World War II was a watershed for acquisition. The postwar
defense environment was dramatically different from that existing before the war.
So too were the policies, organizations, and processes that governed the acquisition
of new weapons. Many of the changes that shaped the nature and course of
acquisition through the end of the century were instituted between 1945 and
1960. Additionally, many of the problems that have repeatedly challenged defense
policymakers and acquisition professionals since World War II first surfaced
during those years. History does not repeat itself exactly; but by revealing long-
term trends and the reasons for past choices, it can help illuminate the path
forward for those who must grapple with the complex issues surrounding the
development, production, and deployment of major weapon systems.
The volume is organized chronologically, with individual chapters
addressing the roles of OSD, the Army, Navy, and Air Force in two distinct
periods. The first, roughly coinciding with President Truman's tenure, covers the
years from the end of World War II through the end of the Korean War in
vi Preface
1953. The second spans the two terms of the Eisenhower presidency from 1953
through early 1961. The year 1953 marked a natural breakpoint between the two
periods. The Korean War had ended. President Eisenhower and his defense team
began implementing the "New Look," a policy and strategy based on nuclear
weapons, which they believed would provide security and make it possible to
reduce military spending. The New Looks stress on nuclear weapons, along with
the deployment of the first operational guided missiles and the rapid advances
subsequently made in nuclear and missile technology, profoundly influenced
acquisition in the services throughout the 1950s and the remainder of the century.
Much more attention is paid in this volume—more than double the number
of chapters—to the services' roles in acquisition than to OSD's. Comparable
studies of later periods will likely reverse that emphasis. Before 1947, the Army
and Navy possessed nearly complete independence in acquisition, subject only
to the president and Congress. The National Security Act of 1947 created a new
defense structure that interposed a civilian secretary of defense between the
military departments and the president. In theory, the act gave the secretary of
defense authority over acquisition, but, in practice, the services retained much
of their autonomy in this arena through the end of the 1950s. Only slowly did
OSD seek to exercise more power over acquisition, mostly through its control of
the budget. While intervention by OSD could be dramatic (Secretary of Defense
Louis A. Johnsons summary cancellation of the Navy's flush-deck carrier United
States in 1949 is perhaps the best-known example), other than involvement in the
budget cycle, it played no formal, systematic role in the acquisition process.
As used in this study, the term "acquisition" encompasses the activities
by which the United States obtains weapons and other equipment. The process
begins with the identification of a requirement for a system, passes through its
research and development, test and evaluation, purchasing and production, to
its fielding with operational units and its subsequent modification, sustainment,
and eventual disposition.3 Oddly enough the word "acquisition" was rarely used
to describe this process for most of the period from 1945 to I960.*
During those years, the word usually employed was "logistics."5 Not until
the late 1950s and early 1960s did "acquisition" become part of the vocabulary of
weapons procurement. As time passed, the term assumed more and more of the
umbrella meaning that had originally been associated with the term "logistics."
Ironically, by the end of the twentieth century, logistics had taken on a much
narrower meaning—generally referring to the support of weapons already
fielded. In this volume, "acquisition" will be used in the overarching sense that it
currently possesses.
