Table Of ContentHistory of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
and
The War in Vietnam
1960-1968
Parti
20110526173
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38
I 1
History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
and
The War in Vietnam
1960-1968
Parti
Jack Schulimson
Office of Joint History
Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Washington, DC • 2011
The Library of Congress has catalogued The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War in
Vietnam, 1960-1968, Part III as follows:
Cosmas, Graham A.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War in Vietnam, 1960-1968 / Graham A. Cosmas.
p. cm. -- (History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff)
"David Armstrong edited the revised version of part 3"—Foreword.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Vietnam War, 1961-1975-United States. 2. United States. Joint Chiefs of Staff-
-History. I. Armstrong, David A. II. Title.
DS558.C678 2009
959.704'340973-dc22
2009033386
Foreword
Established during World War II to advise the President regarding the strategic
direction of the armed forces of the United States, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
continued in existence after the war and, as military advisers and planners, have
played a significant role in the development of national policy. Knowledge of JCS
relations with the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of
Defense in the years since World War II is essential to an understanding of their
current work. An account of their activity in peacetime and during times of crisis
provides, moreover, an important series of chapters in the military history of the
United States. For these reasons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed thai an official
history be written for the record. Its value for instructional purposes, for the orien-
tation of officers newly assigned to the JCS organization and as a source of infor-
mation for staff studies, will be readily recognized.
Written to complement Tlie Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy series,
Tfie Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War in Vietnam focuses upon the activities of
the Joint Chiefs that were concerned with events in Vietnam. Two prior volumes
dealt with Indochina and the prelude to Vietnam. The nature of the activities of the
JCS and the sensitivity of the sources used caused the volume to originally l>e writ-
ten as a classified document.
This volume describes those JCS activities related to developments in Vietnam
during the period 1900-1963. At times, the role of the Joint Chiefs may appear to
be submerged in the description of foreign relations, politics, economics, and other
areas having little to do with military matters. However, developments in these areas
provide essential background for understanding the military activity of the 1960s.
The original volume was a collaborative effort of the entire Historical Division
of the Joint Secretariat. The current version has been updated by Dr. Jack Shulim-
son and reviewed by Dr. Graham A. Cosmas. Dr. John Shortal edited the final revi-
sion; Ms. Susan Carroll compiled the Index; and Ms. Penny Norman prepared the
manuscript for publication.
The volume was reviewed for declassification by the appropriate US (iovern-
ment departments and agencies and cleared for release. The volume is an official
publication of the Joint Chiefs of Staff but, inasmuch as the text has not been con-
sidered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it must be construed as descriptive only and
does not constitute the official position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on any subject.
Washington, DC JOHN F. SI IORTAL
January 2011 Director for Joint History
vu
Preface
The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War in Vietnam, Part 1, 1960-1968, cov-
ens the formulation of policies and decisions during the years L960—1963 when
the United Stales expanded its initial military commitment to Southeast Asia As
the initial manuscript was written well before the war ended, the original authors
had only limited access to vital documentation. They did not have access to most
of the records available in the Pentagon Papers and other primary sources in Per-
sonal Paper collections, declassified official records, and especially the significant
amount of scholarly histories of the Kennedy presidency. I have basically used the
original manuscript as a primary source and in effect created a new history of the
Vietnam War and the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the Kennedy administration incor-
porating much of this material.
Beginning in I960, the Tinted States continued to expand its military advisory
strength in South Vietnam in response to increased Communist infiltration from
the north through Laos and to more sustained guerrilla attacks in the south. At
the same time, the United Slates also increased its contingency planning effort
for the deployment to Southeast Asia of regular IS forces in both Laos and South
Vietnam to counter any threat by Communist Army units from the north or from
China. At the same time President Kennedy called for a new emphasis upon guer-
rilla warfare, which at first received only lukewarm support from the Joinl Chiefs
of Staff. Despite this emphasis upon Southeast Asia, especially in Laos and the
establishment in South Vietnam in 1962 of the US Military Assistance and Advisory
Command, such tinderboxes as Cuba and Berlin continued to receive most of the
attention of the administration. In fact, the failed invasion of Cuba during the Bay
of Pigs episode very early in his administration caused President Kennedy to lose
his faith in the advice of the Joint Chiefs. Indeed the President appointed General
Maxwell Taylor to act as his intermediary with the Joint Chiefs until General Taylor
assumed the position of Chairman himself in October 1!H>2. Throughout the Presi
dent's tenure in office, the Kennedy administration's policy in Southeast Asia was
marked by clashes between factions in the Defense Department including the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the State Department, and the White House. By 1963, these differ-
ences involved the support the US should provide the Republic of Vietnam under
its President, Ngo Dinh Diem. The history ends its account with the killing of Diem
by a coup followed by the coincidental murder of President Kennedy a short lime
later. The interpretation of these events still remains a matter of debate among his-
torical scholars.
Dr. Jack Shuliinson
i\
Contents
1. Vietnam and the Eisenhower Administration: The View
from Washington and Vietnam 1
Prelude 1
Policy Formulation in the Eisenhower Administration 2
Vietnam Policy in the Eisenhower Administration 8
The Beginnings of a New War 19
Some Divergences 2\
Another Look at Counterinsurgency 25
The Failed Coup 26
The End of the Year and the Beginning of the New 28
2. The Kennedy Administration and Crisis Management:
Vietnam and Laos, January-March 1961 31
A New Administration 31
The Lansdale Report and the Counterinsurgency Plan 33
Civilian and Military Tensions 37
The Eisenhower Laotian Heritage ;5tt
The Initial Kennedy Laotian Policy, January-February 1961 40
Crowing Crisis in Laos, February-March, 1961 -4 4
Vietnam Again, February-March 1961 52
3. Continuing Crises: Laos and Vietnam, March-May 1961 (>1
The Trapnell Report on Laos and Status of Contingency
Planning, March 1961 61
Diplomatic Attempts to Resolve the Laotian Crisis 63
SEATO Contingency Planning, April 1961 65
To Talk or to Fight, April 1961 68
The Straggle against the Viei Cong. March-April 1961 70
The Bay of Pigs Episode, April 1961 74
Once More Laos 75
Temporary Denouement of the Laotian Situation 87
4. A New Emphasis on Vietnam 89
The Vietnam Task Force 89
The Vice President's Trip to Vietnam 95
Implementation of the New Plan, May-August 1961 97
M
5. Continuing Reassessment and the Taylor Mission 109
The Communists Renew the Offensive 109
On-Going Contingency Planning and President Diem's
Increasing Demands 110
The NSC Meeting of 11 October and the Decision to
Send General Taylor to Vietnam 116
Newspaper Speculation about the Taylor Trip 119
The Taylor Mission 121
The Taylor Recommendations 130
The Presidential Decision 133
6. From MAAG to MACV 141
A Reluctant Partnership 141
Secretary McNamara and the Buildup 146
Defoliation 148
International Public Opinion 150
Laos 152
The "Thanksgiving Massacre" 153
Proposed Changes in the US Military Organization in Vietnam .... 155
The Situation in Vietnam 161
December Honolulu Conference 166
Continuing Discussions about Vietnam Command Structure 168
New Initiatives, January-8 February 1962 172
7. A New Beginning 177
Hopes and Doubts 177
Resistance on the Home Front 179
The February Honolulu Conference 181
The New Command 185
The Attack on the Palace 186
The March Honolulu Conference 189
Operation SUNRISE 191
Continuing Deployments and the Arrival of Marine Helicopters.... 193
The Washington Scene 196
War Clouds Loom over Laos 198
8. The Continuing War in Vietnam and the Laotian Interlude . . . 199
The April Debate about the Course of the War 199
Once More Laos 203
US Contingency Planning for Southeast Asia 207
The US Political Offensive 215
The Fall of Nam Tha and the New Crisis 219