DTIC ADA540645: Analysis of Deterrence (Briefing charts)

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by  Defense Technical Information Center

AAnnaallyyssiiss ooff DDeetteerrrreennccee
CDR (s) Harrison Schramm
NNaavvaall PPoossttggrraadduuaattee SScchhooooll
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1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED
JAN 2011 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-2011 to 00-00-2011
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
Analysis of Deterrence
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Naval Postgraduate School,Monterey,CA,93943 REPORT NUMBER
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Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
2011 Force Structure Workshop, TASC Heritage Conference Center, Chantilly, VA, 24-27 January 2011
14. ABSTRACT

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Agenda
• WWhhaatt iiss ddeetteerrrreennccee??
• A review of Analytic Methods
• CCase SStuddiies
• Implications and prospects for deterrence
2
Motivation
“(I want) to take the lessons of the 
ppaasstt iinn nnuucclleeaarr ddeetteerrrreennccee aanndd 
apply them moving forward” –
ADM Mike Mullen
”the instruments of war do have a 
role to play in preserving the 
peace. And yet this truth must 
coexist with another ‐ that no 
matter how justified, war promises 
human tragedy.”
‐‐ President Obama’s Nobel Peace 
speech
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Deterrence:
Is.. Is challenging to study because…
• A coercive strategy which aims  • We only gain partial 
to maintain the status quo by  information about 
fforciing an addversary tto re‐ effffecttiiveness.
consider the costs and 
– When we (or others are 
benefits of their actions attacked) we can conclude that 
our deterrence was insufficient
• RReeqquuiirreess::
– When attacks to not happen, it 
– The ability to inflict harm to 
may be because of our 
something the adversary values
deterrent, or another effect.
– The Will to inflict this harm
• WWee nneevveerr ttrruullyy kknnooww tthhee 
– Effective communication of 
motivations / utilities of our 
the ability and will
adversaries. 
• Can sum these up in one 
– Their private utilities are 
wwoorrdd::  CCRREEDDIIBBIILLIITTYY 
probbabblly ‘‘unkknowabblle’’ 
NNoo oonnee wwaannttss ttoo bbee iinn tthhee ppoossiittiioonn ooff ffiinnddiinngg aa pprroobblleemm bbootthh iimmppoorrttaanntt 
for study and without good analytic methods to tackle it.  ‐ Jervis 
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Analytic Methods
• Critical Thinking / Systems Analysis
– Kent’s First Strike Stability
• Statistical Analysis:  fitting models to datasets 
– DDiiffffiiccuullttiieess::  CCooddiinngg ddaattaa, mmooddeell ssppeecciiffiiccaattiioonn, ddeessccrriippttiivvee 
statistics.  Presupposes model format.
– Huth, Signoriono
• GGame TThheory
– Difficulties:  presupposes an ability to compute utilities
– Schellingg,  Zaggare and Kilggour
• History
– Difficulties:  May not be applicable to future campaigns
– MMeeeerrsshhiimmeerr, KKeeeeggaann, ootthheerrss
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General Conclusions
• Deterrence requires all the levers of national power – it is not 
simpplyy a militaryy pproblem – ((all methods)) 
• Deterrence is most likely to fail when:
– At least one side perceives the campaign will be ‘quick’ and 
‘easy’ (History, Strike Stability)
– At least one side perceives the campaign feels that they 
aarree iinn aa ‘uussee oorr lloossee’ ssiittuuaattiioonn ((HHiissttoorryy, GGaammee TThheeoorryy))
– Deterrence postures irrelevant if not effectively 
communicated (History, Statistics) 
– Communication Fails (History) 
• The objective of deterrence cannot be ‘Everything –
EEvveerryywwhheerree’’ – wwee sshhoouulldd pprriioorriittiizzee wwhhaatt wwee wwiisshh ttoo ddeetteerr.
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Who is deterrable?
Deterrable Not deterrable
• Nations that seek to  • Groups who do not seek to 
minimize costs minimize costs
– Because they don’t count 
them
– Because they have ideological 
imperatives to act
– Because theyy seek conflict
• Nations that feel secure in 
• Nations who feel they are in 
their nuclear (and other) 
a use // lloose siittuattiion.
deterrents
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Nuclear Deterrence: The Gold Standard?
• Sources of Stability:
•Kent’s model of Nuclear 
– CClleeaarr CCoommmmuunniiccaattiioonnss
DDeetteerrrreennccee
– Assured Retaliation 
•Advantages:  tractable, 
• Sources of Instability:  
simpple,, eleggant
– “Splendid First Strike”
•Disadvantages:  Measures the 
– Deterrence capability made 
‘costs’ of attacking first versus 
irrelevant:
tthhe ‘‘costts’’ off attttackkiing secondd
• Communication lapses i.e. 
•The closer this ratio is to  Saddam Hussein
unityy,, the more stable the  – “Mandates” – Political or 
personal motives that force a 
system is.
solution
• Germany WWII?
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Kent’s Model of deterrence
FFiirrsstt ssttrriikkee SSttaabbiilliittyy IInnddeexx::
CC CC
AA,11 BB,11
FFSSSSII  
C C
A,2 B,2
Where: C represents costs; several definitions have been used 
RRaattiiooss ddoonn’tt tteellll tthhee wwhhoollee ssttoorryy;; mmaaggnniittuuddee ooff ppootteennttiiaall ccoossttss kkeeyy aass 
well.  
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