Table Of ContentLed by a Lion
The US Role in Preserving
Editorial Abstract: This article is a wake-up
reminder that the Gulf War denouement is
Gulf Security
still unfolding. Although Balkan problems
and Asian tension may have temporarily
MAJ BRENT J.TALBOT,USAF eclipsed media attention on the Gulf, the hot
2D LT JEFFREY J. HICKS, USAF spot fanned by Iraq and its dictator is much
more than a glowing ember. We must realize
that we cannot extinguish this long-term
A S THE GULF War slowly fades into problem by sprinting but have to commit our-
the history books, it is important to selves to marathon-like endurance. The Gulf
scenario involves a complex interaction of
realize that the Middle East re-
economic, political, and military forces
mains a region scarred by conflict
thrown into further turmoil by a long history
and tension. While the United States strug
of ethnic and religious differences. It is very
gles to control the myriad problems such as
much to our advantage that a miscalcula
guaranteeing the flow of Persian Gulf oil, de
tion somewhere does not cause an eruption
terring Iraq and Iran, and moving the Arab-
on a grand scale. Here, Major Talbot and
Israeli peace process forward, many people
Lieutenant Hicks explore the strategic issues
wonder if the United States can “go it alone”
and policy options.
in this critical area of the world. Not only has
the Middle East threatened to overload the
resources of the military, but also a growing
77
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78 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2000
anti-American sentiment has subjected Amer whether such a force reduction should take
ican troops to increasing terrorist threats in place and whether the GCC can increase its
the last decade. In response to these recent security role in the Gulf.
trends, many individuals within the political The article assesses US-GCC cooperation
and military arenas have pushed for a re efforts to maintain the flow of oil in the Gulf,
gional security arrangement that places a discusses obstacles to these efforts, examines
greater responsibility for the region’s defense the US effort to contain Iraq and Iran, ad-
on the Arab countries themselves. Using the dresses the ongoing Arab-Israeli peace process,
Gulf War as a catalyst, the United States has and concludes with a discussion of national
committed itself to uniting the Gulf Coopera security strategy for the Gulf that best guides
tion Council (GCC) into a defensive security US policy for the region. It argues that at this
regime.1 Although drawbacks exist, such as a time we cannot rely upon the GCC to in-
potential loss of US control within the region, crease its role in providing regional security.
official security-strategy documents have US forces, therefore, remain crucial to main
identified this regional cooperation as a na taining Gulf security and must be kept at cur-
tional objective.2 rent levels—at least until Saddam Hussein
Moreover, pressures are mounting—even falls from power in Iraq. Thus, the reduced
within the military—to bring US forces home, threat will allow for a decreased US presence,
as evidenced by the Air Force Times headline and, in the long term, the GCC will increase
“Ryan to JCS: Give Us a Break!”3 Currently, we its ability to provide for its own security.
have seven thousand airmen in the Middle
East, and since the end of the Gulf War, be-
Gulf Security
tween 10,000 and 28,000 US military forces
have maintained constant vigilance in the and US-GCC Cooperation
Persian Gulf and surrounding region.4 Oper
ations in other regions of the world have Whenever Gulf oil flow has been threat
come and gone, but the Gulf deployments ened, the United States has watched with ut
continue on a significant scale, driving opera most concern. The oil crises of 1973, 1979,
tions tempos to all-time highs for the military and 1991 were all associated with conflict.
services. Why the continued large-scale pres During the Yom Kippur War of 1973, the oil
ence when the threat has diminished? Most states in the Gulf suspended shipments to the
analysts agree that Iraq’s forces, which failed United States because of its exports of mili
so miserably against coalition forces, are less tary hardware to Israel. The Iranian revolu
than half as capable as they were during tion of 1979 sent oil prices soaring. The sub-
1991,5 and Iran is making friendly overtures sequent Iran-Iraq War led to the so-called
across the Gulf to its Arab neighbors and the tanker war, which threatened Gulf shipping
United States. Moreover, given the efforts al and in which Americans and Russians coop
ready put forth to strengthen the GCC (e.g., erated to “flag” Kuwaiti tankers in order to pro
the military buildups of Kuwait and Saudi tect them from Iranian attack. During 1991,
Arabia, the pending purchase of 80 F-16s by oil prices temporarily soared again because of
the United Arab Emirates [UAE], and the the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Since then, US
general overall improvement in the quantity forces have been constantly present to main
and quality of weapons within the militaries tain both oil flow and stability in the Gulf.
of the GCC’s member states), it would seem The United States has worked to improve
that the Joint Chiefs of Staff could answer the security in two ways: (1) maintain some form
call of Gen Michael Ryan, Air Force chief of of US presence and (2) bolster security assis
staff, by reducing US forces in the Middle tance through weapons sales and training in
East. This article, therefore, explores the op the use of military hardware. Prior to the Gulf
tions available to US policy makers on War, only Oman and Bahrain permitted any
LED BY A LION 79
type of US presence on their soil. Now, we ploy into the region quickly.8 Combined
have signed defense cooperation agreements training and exercises take place regularly;
(DCA) with Kuwait, the UAE, and Qatar. forces share facilities to enhance coopera
Saudi Arabia signed a less binding status-of- tion; and Kuwait picks up the tab for most in-
forces agreement.6 Most of the GCC states country costs of the US presence, such as
have increased their defense postures by sig maintenance, fuel, and food. Kuwait has fur
nificantly increasing defense spending since ther enhanced its border security by digging
the end of the Gulf War; in fact, four of the a wide, deep ditch to stop tanks and by erect
six are among the world’s top seven countries ing an electric fence along the entire 215-kilo-
in terms of the percentage of gross domestic meter border with Iraq, which is monitored
product (GDP) spent on defense (table 1). by 19 Kuwaiti guard posts.9 Furthermore, crises
Moreover, all member states have allowed have tested the US-Kuwaiti relationship, espe
some form of US presence since 1991, as de- cially during the Vigilant Warrior deployment
tailed below. of October 1994 in response to an Iraqi
Table 1 buildup of nearly one hundred thousand
troops on the border. Such crises have helped
States Spending Greatest Share to smooth out differences, and Kuwait cur
of GDP on Defense, 1999 rently views the relationship quite favorably,
as evidenced by its recent decision to allow per
State GDP Percentage Spent on Defense manent stationing of the brigade headquar-
ters.10
Eritrea 35.8 Still, the Kuwaitis have concerns. They
Saudi Arabia 15.7 have closely monitored cuts in the US defense
Afghanistan 14.5 budget and personnel since the end of the
North Korea 14.3 Gulf War, which has resulted in the ops
Oman 13.6 tempo problem noted earlier. This situation
Kuwait 12.9 became most conspicuous to Gulf residents
Qatar 12.0 when US forces in the Gulf redeployed to So
malia during January 1993 to participate in
Source:International Institute for Strategic Studies, as reported
the Restore Hope mission, sanctioned by the
in Gulfwire, 25 October 1999 (an online E-mail subscription
weekly news service provided by the National Council on US- United Nations (UN) and launched the
Arab Relations,W ashington, D.C.). month prior. Such concerns have led them to
seek backup sources of protection. Kuwait has
Kuwait signed DCAs with Great Britain, France, and
Russia11 and currently purchases arms from
The United States has contributed to Kuwaiti
all five permanent members of the Security
defense with sales of 40 F-18 fighters, 50 M-1
Council in order to ensure their support
tanks, and a number of Patriot air defense
should another crisis arise.12 In sum, the
missiles. The sale of Apache Long Bow heli
Kuwaitis’ cry is “Yankee, don’t go home!”
copters has also received approval.7 More im
Their biggest fear remains Iraq.
portantly, we have pre-positioned equipment
to outfit a mechanized brigade in Kuwait—in
Saudi Arabia
cluding manning for a permanent brigade
headquarters—and we have stationed battal Officially, the Saudis are very supportive of a
ion-sized units of troops there on a rotating US force presence since security is their
basis. Air Force fighter units of F-16s and A- number-one concern. They have continued
10s (sometimes F-15s) also deploy on a rota to support Operation Southern Watch, the
tional basis. Facilities used by these soldiers no-fly/no-drive zone established over south-
and airmen undergo upgrades to improve the ern Iraq south of the 33d parallel, which al
quality of life and to allow more aircraft to de- lows US aircraft to overfly Iraq to enforce the
80 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2000
Containment of Iraq remains a vital interest of the United States in the Persian Gulf region.
UN-established zone.13 The Saudis host the as 60 Tornado fighters from Europe. A major
bulk of the coalition forces that enforce South- purchase of US F-16s may occur in the future
ern Watch: Prince Sultan Air Base is home to as the Saudis replace their fleet of F-5s.16 Early
approximately 60 US Air Force fighters as well buyers of the airborne warning and control
as French and British warplanes, all on tempo system aircraft, they now lead GCC efforts to-
rary rotational deployments, usually lasting 90 ward building an integrated ground-based
days. Still, with the exception of 1994’s Opera radar system for air defense, currently under
tion Desert Fox, they have not allowed the construction. They are also driving GCC’s
purchase of a secure telecommunications sys
launch of preplanned combat ground-attack
tem and have plans for a combined com
sorties against Iraq from their soil.
mand, control, communications, and intelli
To improve GCC’s and its own military ca
gence center.17
pabilities, Saudi Arabia houses the 10,000-
man Peninsula Shield combined force based
The Southern Gulf
in the King Khalid Military District in the
northeast sector of the country.14 The Saudis Iran, not Iraq, poses the greatest threat to the
have also recently purchased 75 F-15S fighters Southern Gulf states. A dispute over ownership
equipped with the latest advanced medium- of the Tunbs and Abu Musa islands remains
range air-to-air missiles (AMRAAM),15 as well the primary source of contention between
LED BY A LION 81
the UAE and Iran. As recently as October the UAE, and Qatar, who face manpower
1999, the UAE ambassador to the UN called shortages.28 Oman, perhaps the strongest sup-
Iran’s military presence on the islands “a porter of the US presence in the Gulf, signed
threat to the UAE.”18 To build its defenses, its access agreement with the United States in
the UAE plans to buy the latest Block-60 ver 1981, an unpopular time to do so. It hosts
sion of the F-16 aircraft, including the latest three Air Force pre-positioning sites with sup-
AMRAAMs and high-speed antiradiation mis- port equipment for 26,000 personnel as well
siles.19 However, like Saudi Arabia, the UAE as required equipment and fuel to maintain
has chosen not to rely on US fighter technol three air bases.29 Moreover, Oman’s neutral
ogy alone and is buying an additional 33 Mi stance during the Iran-Iraq War has allowed it
rage 2000-9s from France. It is also upgrading to keep positive relations with Iran, and it is
the 30 Mirages already in its inventory to the only Gulf State invited to observe Iranian
match the capabilities of the 2000-9s.20 Russia military exercises. The fact that Oman also
has also benefited from the UAE’s arming ef functions as mediator in the island dispute
forts with sales of portable surface-to-air mis between the UAE and Iran30 could make it a
siles (SAM), including the SA-7, -14, and -16; useful intermediary for US-Iranian and GCC-
an SA-12 unit; and the lease of four IL-76 Iranian relations.
transport aircraft.21 As noted above, the Gulf states tend to buy
Qatar has agreed to host pre-positioned a variety of weapons from a variety of sources,
equipment for an Army brigade now 80 per- symbolizing more of an effort to buy alliances
cent in-place,22 and in 1996 it hosted an air than build a technologically competent force.
expeditionary force consisting of 30 fighters Anthony Cordesman refers to this phenome
and four tankers. Air Force pre-positioning is non as technological turbulence.31 Without a
also likely,23 given the ongoing construction focus on manpower training, interoperability,
of what may be the premier air base in the and force sustainability, the Gulf efforts to ac
Gulf at Al-Udeid. One analyst suggested that quire high-technology weapons may do more
the Qatari philosophy behind construction harm than good for the building of a Gulf
was “build it and they will come.”24 In other coalition. Such massive arms buildups with-
words, one obtains the best defense by pro out a focus on the mission leaves sustainabil
viding the best facilities for US and coalition ity in question. This remains a problem, de-
forces. As for weapons buys, the fact that the spite recent announcements that the GCC is
Qataris purchase 70 percent of their military “striving for an unprecedented level of inte
hardware from France creates difficulties in gration between their militaries”32 and de-
terms of integrating systems in the GCC’s de spite the Saudis’ efforts, described earlier, to
fense structure. Purchases have included 12 integrate air defense, communications, and
Mirage 2000-5 fighters.25 Moreover, Bahrain command and control.
has signed a deal for 10–12 F-16 fighters, Still, Secretary of Defense William Cohen
which, like the UAE’s, will have AMRAAMs.26 has encouraged GCC’s efforts by recently pro-
Bahrain allows the US Air Force to pre-position posing a “cooperative defense initiative,”
equipment to support eleven hundred per which envisions sharing early warning infor
sonnel as well as flight-line maintenance and mation, promoting theater missile defense,
medical-evacuation supplies.27 Officially, both and improving deterrence through conse
Bahrain and Qatar remain very supportive of quence management. The latter entails the
the US presence in the Gulf. sharing of passive systems such as protective
Less able to afford military technology clothing and vaccines against biological and
than its neighbors, Oman still ardently sup- chemical threats and training the GCC states
ports the GCC’s Peninsula Shield combined in dealing with humanitarian catastrophes re
military force and provides soldiers to mili sulting from nuclear, biological, and chemi
taries of other Gulf states, including Kuwait, cal (NBC) attacks.33 Such efforts move the
82 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2000
GCC toward greater military cooperation and proposal is likely to increase rather than
improve the likelihood of self-reliance in the lessen the involvement of the United States in
future, but US policy makers must be careful the region. Most experts agree that we cannot
before deciding to move US forces over the make the GCC force into something it is not
horizon. Indeed, Secretary Cohen’s recent and that Saudi efforts such as the integrated
LED BY A LION 83
radar system are in their infant stages, requir four positives. First, the GCC, a coalition-in-
ing a more robust plan for deployment. In being since 1984, has assembled a 10,000-
other words, there is no “budding North At man Peninsula Shield force and is improving
lantic Treaty Organization (NATO)” in the defense cooperation with shared air defense
near future of the GCC, despite some reports and communications networks. Second, the
to the contrary.34 Gulf states have provided more basing sup-
Obviously, then, the Gulf states are buying port (fuel, logistics, etc.) to the United States
the forces to bolster security and have signifi than other allies in other regions of the world
cantly improved their inventories since the where America has deployed troops. Third,
end of the Gulf War, especially Saudi Arabia, GCC states pay cash for weapons purchases
Kuwait, and the UAE (table 2). The other and paid for much of the US operations costs
countries’ efforts are more modest, but one during the Gulf War. Other areas of the world
should emphasize their gains in order to keep have more typically relied upon outside fi
policy makers working toward continued US nancial assistance. Fourth, no Gulf state cur
involvement in the region, especially in light rently demands the removal of US troops
of technological turbulence and additional from its soil. Moreover, Dr. Anthony recom
obstacles to GCC cooperation, mentioned mends that we should be careful to avoid giv
below. Dr. John Duke Anthony of the Na ing the Gulf Arabs the impression that we are
tional Council on US-Arab Relations stresses not committed to staying in the region as
84 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2000
long as necessary to provide security.35 In- one envisioned a military alliance. To illus
deed, much of their concern stems from past trate, Kuwait saw the GCC as a potential Arab
inconsistencies and recent reports that the common market with economic benefits,
United States will reduce forces. Secretary whereas Saudi Arabia had plans of preserving
Cohen visited the Gulf in October 1999 to as- the political status quo on the Arabian Penin
sure GCC members that “we will keep the sula and ensuring itself of the dominant role.
same level of forces in the region for the in- Oman was keen to create a Gulf version of
definite future.”36 NATO and stressed the need to coordinate
strategy with the United States. The smaller
Table 2 states simply felt that the GCC represented
“added insurance” and that they would gain
Comparison of Forces: Iran, Iraq, and GCC from the benefits of economic and military
cooperation. With these differences in mind,
Iran Iraq GCC the GCC role remains unclear, and it has even
“done everything conceivable, in both word
Active Military Forces 545,600 429,000 308,600
and deed, to avoid being perceived as a mili
Active Main BattleT anks 1,390 1,900 1,447 tary alliance against any nation.”38
Total Combat Aircraft 307 353 689 Moreover, the tribal or family aspect of the
Gulf monarchies results in many ongoing ri
valries that drive a wedge between closer GCC
Source: Anthony Cordesman, “The Military Balance in the Mid
relations, and individual state policies often
dleE ast—GulfO verview: Part VIII,” CSIS,29D ecember1 998,5 ,
11, 34. work at cross-purposes with one another.
Oman, for example, believes that the Saudis
readily oppose most of the ideas and initia
Obstacles to US-GCC
tives of the other states in an effort to domi
Cooperation nate the GCC. The Saudis’ de facto “veto” of
Sultan Qaboos’s recommendation in 1991 to
I and my brothers against my cousin; I and
increase the size of the Peninsula Shield’s
my cousins against the stranger.
combined force from 10,000 to one hundred
—Arab proverb thousand troops derived from a political ri
valry with Oman.39 A high-ranking Omani of
Despite bilateral cooperation, agreements ficial also feels that less trust exists among
with the United States, and GCC’s multilat GCC members since the Gulf War, claiming
eral cooperative efforts, mentioned above, that many people in his country think the
the Gulf Arabs remain fragmented for a vari Saudi royal family is too powerful and that
ety of reasons that we must address in order the power division between Crown Prince Ab
to evaluate security prospects for the Gulf. dullah (who commands the regular army)
Moreover, military cooperation efforts with and Prince Sultan (who commands the Na
other Arab countries beyond the Gulf have tional Guard) will lead to a power rivalry after
failed to materialize. King Fahd’s passing—one that would impair
Outside observers would likely view an or stability within the GCC.40
ganization such as the GCC as a Pan-Arab Furthermore, Qatar has angered the Saudis
movement, but Arab nationalism has actually and the Kuwaitis by reestablishing diplomatic
died a quiet death within the Gulf, and na relations with Iraq. Qatar also initiated a
tional sovereignty has become the focus of natural-gas deal with the Israelis and signed a
the Middle Eastern states.37 There were at series of agreements with Iran against GCC’s
least three contending perceptions with re wishes at the time. In turn, the surrounding
gard to joining the GCC, according to UAE states continued to support the deposed emir
professor Abdul Khaleq Abdulla, and only of Qatar, Sheik Khalifa, by offering a “head of
LED BY A LION 85
state” welcome,41 leading to Qatar’s pullout holding to the fundamentalists’ views, recog
from spring 1996 exercises conducted by the nize that they must appease such religious
Peninsula Shield force.42 Moreover, border perceptions if they wish to maintain power.
disputes exist between Qatar-Bahrain and
Qatar-Saudi Arabia, which led to a bloody en-
counter between the latter two in 1992.
Many Arabs believe that Western culture
Bahrain faces internal disputes due to its
represents an attack on their own reli
Shia majority in the Sunni-controlled state.
The Shia may not serve in the military or po gion and culture, perceiving it as a
lice force, requiring Bahrain to rely on re threat as dangerous as any military in
cruits from other GCC states to fill its ranks. vasion they may face.
In the past, Iranian groups have also been
found in Bahrain making contact with the
Bahraini Shia and stirring up trouble against They hope that an improved regional-security
the government.43 More recently, however, arrangement dominated by Arab nations will
the Iranians are having less success with the increase their own internal security while qui
Arab-Shia of Bahrain as they face their own eting the fundamentalists’ calls for an end to
legitimacy crisis at home.44 American “imperialism.”
The regional cooperation that does exist The Gulf states thus find themselves in an
stems from the belief that the Gulf states are interesting and, in some respects, embarrass
sovereign and should not be subject to attack ing dilemma. As proud Muslims, many find it
or threats from beyond the peninsula. Such disgraceful that they have become so reliant
threats come not only from Iraq and Iran but upon Western powers. However, despite strong
also from the United States (or such is the sentiments and rhetoric, many Arabs believe
perception), albeit not in the traditional that the US presence is a necessary evil until
sense. Many Arabs believe that Western cul they can stand by themselves within an inde
ture represents an attack on their own reli pendent security regime. Indeed, as men
gion and culture, perceiving it as a threat as tioned earlier, no government has called for a
dangerous as any military invasion they may reduction of US forces, and doubts remain as
face. Some Gulf states, in particular Saudi to whether the GCC can completely provide
Arabia, believe that a stronger regional secu its own security anytime in the near future.
rity arrangement will result in a smaller US Immediately following the Gulf War, the
presence within the region, helping to estab GCC states realized that one of their greatest
lish their own sovereignty while eliminating obstacles to security was a lack of military
the influence of American culture. Although manpower, primarily due to small popula
such governments as Saudi Arabia’s appreci tions in most GCC states. The problem also
ate the security and business that the Ameri stemmed from the unwillingness of the au
can presence brings to the region, they must thoritarian regimes to place too much power
balance their own wishes with those of the in the hands of the military by conscripting a
people in the long term. Many Saudi Arabian large force. In response, the GCC states
citizens despise the American presence, an signed an agreement with Egypt and Syria to
occupation of sorts in their eyes. These citi provide needed manpower for a “Gulf secu
zens, if they cannot find recourse within their rity regime” (also known as the “Damascus
own government, often turn to fundamental Declaration” or “six plus two” agreement) in
ist movements that readily take up the cause order to prevent a repeat of the Gulf War.
of purging the region of Western influence, The GCC states hoped that Egyptian and Syr
as evidenced by the Khobar towers bombing ian forces would be on hand to deter or stop
of 1996 in Saudi Arabia. The governments of future Iraqi attacks until US or other Western
these Gulf states, although not necessarily enforcements arrived to push back any poten-
