Table Of Content0401 Chiefs 10/14/97 10:01 AM Page 13
The Wave of the Future
By F R A N K B. K E L S O I I
Navy photo . . . From the Sea
S
U.
T
he Cold War is over, but in its wake shifted to littoral warfare and direct support
we are left with an uncertain of ground operations.
world. Although the risk of global Operation Desert Storm reemphasized
war is greatly reduced, the United the need for the Armed Forces to operate ef-
States and its allies still face threats. As we fectively together and to acquire equipment
have just begun to realize, these new threats which is compatible. Because joint opera-
are often difficult to predict. In response to tions involving all the services provide the
this challenge, our national security policy is greatest range of capabilities for the smallest
shifting from deterrence of global conflict to- investment, the Navy and Marine Corps
ward regional, littoral contingencies and con- launched an extensive, year-long study of
flicts, often in coalition with other nations. future naval roles and capabilities, in terms
With no credible, global naval threat, of their relevance to the 21st century and a
today’s strategic environment has a very dif- joint warfare environment. The results of
ferent meaning for our maritime forces. The that study are known as “...From the Sea.”
need for separate, independent naval opera- The Navy’s new strategy represents a
tions at sea for indirect support of the land fundamental shift away from emphasis on
war has been greatly reduced, and as a result open-ocean warfighting on the sea toward
our maritime operational focus has now joint operations conducted from the sea. By
exploiting naval access to littoral regions,
military planners can realize the power pro-
Admiral Frank B. Kelso II is the twenty-fourth Chief of
jection strength of naval forces while com-
Naval Operations. Previously he served as Supreme Allied
plementary capabilities of other services
Commander Atlantic; much of his early career was spent
punctuate their impact and effectiveness.
on board nuclear-powered submarines.
Summer 1993 / JFQ 13
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1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED
1993 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-1993 to 00-00-1993
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The Wave of the Future ...From the Sea
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National Defense University,Institute for National Strategic Studies,260 REPORT NUMBER
Fifth Ave SW Fort Lesley J. McNair,Washington,DC,20319
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0401 Chiefs 10/14/97 10:01 AM Page 14
t
J F Q F O R U M
Naval operations in littoral regions airborne assaults. The joint task force staff
transform the classic AirLand battle into a embarked in the Third Fleet flagship to main-
unified sea-air-land-space engagement, but tain overall control of the exercise as the
dominance over an enemy in the littoral en- Joint Force Air Component Commander
vironment cannot be assumed. Likely adver- (JFACC) coordinated all air operations re-
saries enjoy the advantage of concentrating motely from the continental United States.
and layering defenses. Mines, diesel sub-
Model for Joint Interoperability
marines, high-speed tactical aircraft, fast pa-
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) op-
trol boats, sea-skimming missiles, and tacti-
erations have attained new levels of joint
cal ballistic missiles launched from shore
understanding, cooperation, efficiency, and
batteries are typical littoral threats. Such
combat effectiveness. In the Persian Gulf an
complex challenges demand specialized
Air Force composite wing operates on a daily
skills that only are provided by a completely
basis with its Navy and Marine Corps coun-
integrated joint force.
terparts to enforce no-fly zones. Army, Ma-
Joint Forces rine Corps, and special operations forces ex-
In the brief time since “...From the ercise together routinely. Navy ships enforce
Sea” appeared efforts to implement this new U.N.-imposed sanctions with the assistance
strategic direction have accelerated and ex- of maritime surveillance provided by Air
panded to all levels in the sea services with Force Airborne Warning and Control System
special emphasis on the issues of joint inte- (AWACS) aircraft. The CENTCOM environ-
gration and interoperability. The Navy and ment is ideal for developing joint concepts
Marine Corps are aggressively redefining and conducting joint training. In a recent
naval roles in joint exercises. exercise also in the Persian Gulf, for exam-
In 1992 U.S. Atlantic Command (LANT- ple, an afloat JFACC successfully developed,
COM) demonstrated improved integration planned, and executed a mini-air campaign
of joint forces and naval doctrinal changes including a simulated strike mission with
in Exercise Ocean Venture. For the first time over 70 Navy and Air Force aircraft.
the Navy de- In the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific,
ployed a flexi- Navy-led counterdrug joint task forces offer
the Navy’s new strategy represents
ble and robust another example of joint operations. They
a fundamental shift away from em- command and exploit naval air and open-ocean surveil-
control facility lance capabilities as well as command, con-
phasis on open-ocean warfighting
ashore permit- trol, communications and intelligence (C3I).
on the sea toward joint operations
ting the naval Navy ships, maritime patrol aircraft, and air-
conducted from the sea force comman- borne radar aircraft operate with assets from
der to collocate the other services and Federal agencies. A
with the joint Coast Guard squadron commander and staff
force commander and other component embark aboard the Navy task group com-
commanders. mander’s flagship to monitor and control
Last year in Exercise Ellipse Bravo, U.S. surface activity. Coast Guard law enforce-
European Command (EUCOM) tested the ment detachments operate from Navy ships
ability of the services to assemble a joint task to board, search, and if necessary seize ves-
force to conduct a rapid emergency evacua- sels smuggling narcotics.
tion operation. Established within 48 hours,
Joint Communications
a 22,000-strong Army, Navy, Marine Corps,
During the past decade significant
and Air Force task force demonstrated effec-
progress has been made in standardizing
tive continuity of command as its headquar-
procedures and procurement of interopera-
ters was relocated from land to sea.
ble systems for joint communications.
During Exercise Tandem Thrust,
Nonetheless problems still occur, especially
mounted by U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM)
in highly specialized communications sys-
in 1992, a 15,000-man joint force consisting
tems. One example was the format and
of land, sea, and air forces concluded its
medium used to send Air Tasking Orders
training with amphibious landings and Army
(ATOs) during Operation Desert Storm. They
were incompatible with naval communica-
14 JFQ / Summer 1993
0401 Chiefs 10/14/97 10:01 AM Page 15
tions systems and as a re- mary authority for developing both Navy
sult carrier-based aircraft and naval doctrine, it will provide a coordi-
were dispatched daily to nated, integrated sea service voice in joint
pick up one-hundred and combined doctrine. Priority will be given
page documents from to doctrine development that addresses the
Riyadh for delivery to new geostrategic environment and its chang-
ships in the Persian Gulf ing threat, and to enhancing the integration
S. Navy photo atshingedn AmRTeeOdn tiSsn ewtao.a sCm voiesnrsyvio etnritm ianesg-- ottiifoo nnnssa. v tToalh jofiosi nricste fwsu ainnrdf ijagomhinteitnn atgan lid nt oct honmea fvbuaitnlu ecrdoe .notpriebrua--
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consuming. In a significant departure from tradi-
Admiral Kelso with the
Finding the permanent solution to this tional single-service deployments, the Navy
fleet.
problem became a joint, post-war priority and Marine Corps are working closely with
project that is now well in hand. In recent the Joint Staff to improve ways to organize,
joint exercises ships at sea have received and train, and deploy joint forces. The goal is to
transmitted Desert Storm-sized ATOs elec- provide unified commanders with forces
tronically in less than five minutes. All de- specifically tailored, trained, and deployed
ployed aircraft carriers have this capability to satisfy regional operational requirements.
while other carriers have been partially mod- Interservice boards such as the Navy-Air
ified to allow complete installation in less Force-Marine Corps Board and the Army-
than 24 hours. Procurement plans have been Navy-Marine Corps Board have been estab-
altered to ensure that all amphibious assault lished to encourage formal cooperation and
ships and aircraft carriers are permanently increase efficiency among forces across a
equipped with this vital capability. broad range of areas. These boards have suc-
ceeded in transforming several single-service
Navy Organizational Changes
air-to-ground weapons programs into one
Since Operation Desert Storm the Navy
joint program and expanding interservice
has taken additional steps to improve its
cooperation in land-based refueling for
ability to work in the joint arena in opera-
naval aircraft. Progress can also be noted in
tions, planning, procurement, and admin-
both the Joint Tactical Information Display
istration and to improve communications
System and the Global Positioning System
between the staff of the Chief of Naval Oper-
acquisition programs.
ations (OPNAV) and the Joint Staff and be-
tween the Navy Department and Depart- Redirecting Spending
ment of Defense. Funding represents the ultimate organi-
In July 1992, the OPNAV staff was reor- zational indicator of priorities and a measur-
ganized to mirror the structure and functions able sign of change. The redirection of
of the Joint Staff. As part of this change, the spending has already been discussed,
new Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for namely, in modifying systems and ships to
Resources, Warfare Requirements, and Assess- accommodate joint staffs and operations
ments established six joint mission assess- and in expanding cooperation in joint ac-
ment areas: joint strike, joint littoral, joint quisition programs. The Navy and Marine
surveillance, joint space and electronic war- Corps have also instituted a deliberate orga-
fare/intelligence, strategic sealift and its pro- nizational process to redirect funding priori-
tection, and strategic deterrence. Under this ties to enhance naval contributions to joint
system, Navy procurement programs are warfighting capabilities.
scrutinized and evaluated against their spe- Furthermore, with the publication of
cific contributions to joint warfighting. If “...From the Sea” in September 1992, the
they fail this test, they are not included in Department of the Navy dissected and ex-
the Navy budget. amined its budget line-by-line against the
In March 1993 the Naval Doctrine Com- guiding principles of our new strategic direc-
mand was formally established. As the pri- tion. This process examined how well the
overall budget supported that new direction.
As a result some investment plans were
Summer 1993 / JFQ 15
0401 Chiefs 10/14/97 10:01 AM Page 16
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J F Q F O R U M
redirected to strengthen joint littoral warfare In the past year Military Sealift Com-
including the following changes: mand ships proved their value in joint
t increasing procurement of precision-guided peacetime operations almost as dramatically
munitions to support the joint land campaign; as they did during the Gulf War. Navy ships
t accelerating enhancements in joint com- carried relief supplies to Florida, Guam, the
mand, control, and communications systems to Baltic nations, and Russia for distribution by
support a JTF commander and his staff afloat; and U.S. units ashore. Marine Prepositioning
t renewing the commitment to satisfy the Squadron ships were the first to arrive in So-
Marine Corps requirement for sufficient medium malia, and by January 14, 1993, nearly thirty
lift capability to permit rapid movement ashore
were operating in direct support of Opera-
in support of an amphibious ground campaign.
tion Restore Hope.
Overall, the Navy and Marine Corps Our operating forces are on the cutting
redirected $1.2 billion within their budgets edge of joint warfighting. All naval staffs
to support the new naval strategy and joint and shore support establishments are com-
warfighting operations. mitted to the concept of jointness. The
Recognizing the value of well-equipped, Naval Doctrine Command will ensure that
highly mobile forces to meet various chal- our focus remains on finding ways to im-
lenges, unified commanders regard sealift as prove the efficiency of joint warfare. The
a critical ingredient of warfighting success. Navy-Marine Corps team is committed to
As we reduce manpower and material over- joint operations and the pursuit of innova-
seas, strategic sealift will be more vital to tive means for employing our forces in sup-
providing required heavy equipment and port of joint warfighting. JFQ
sustainment to forces in all parts of the
world. Consequently, we have raised the pri-
ority of sealift in procurement planning,
conveying to Congress its importance to our
Nation’s defense capabilities.
16 JFQ / Summer 1993
