Table Of ContentCommand Relations at the
Operational Level of War
Kenney, MacArthur,
and Arnold
COL THOMAS E. GRIFFITH JR., USAF*
AS GEN DOUGLAS MACARTHUR’S air his ability to juggle the demands placed on
commander in the Southwest him by the theater commander, MacArthur,
Pacific theater during World War II, with those imposed by Gen Henry H. “Hap”
Gen George C. Kenney applied op- Arnold, commanding general of the Army Air
erational insights, intellectual acumen, and Forces. Establishing MacArthur’s trust and
innovative drive that made airpower a vital confidence proved essential to gaining the
part of the Allied victory. An important, in- flexibility and authority Kenney needed to
deed critical, part of Kenney’s success was employ airpower effectively, but he remained
*I presented this article as a paper at the annual meeting of the Society of Military History in Montgomery, Alabama, in 1997. The
comments of many individuals made this article better, but I would especially like to thank Dik Daso, Steven McFarland, and Tom
Hughes for their suggestions. I have also benefited from the work and advice of Herman Wolk. For efforts that illuminate General
Kenney’s contributions, see Herman S. Wolk, “George C. Kenney: The Great Innovator,” iMnakers of the United States Air Force,
ed. John L. Frisbee (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1987), 127–50; and Herman S. Wolk, “George C. Kenney:
MacArthur’s Premier Airman,” inWe Shall Return! MacArthur’s Commanders and the Defeat of Japan, 1942–1945, ed. William M.
Leary (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1988), 88–114. The latter concentrates on Kenney’s role in World War II.
50
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Command Relations at the Operational Level of War. Kenney,
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MacArthur, and Arnold
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COMMAND RELATIONS AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR 51
dependent on Arnold for the supplies, peo commander of the American air units, he
ple, and planes necessary to fight the war, bore the brunt of the blame. MacArthur’s re-
making his association with the command ports to Washington made his unhappiness
ing general equally important. Balanc-ing with Brett clear. In May 1942 President
the demands levied by officers with very dif Franklin Roosevelt sent a three-man team to
ferent perspectives and goals created a investigate conditions in Australia. When Lt
source of tension and conflict for Kenney Col Samuel Anderson returned to Washing-
throughout the war. In the end he decided ton at the end of June, he told Gen George
that he owed his primary loyalty to MacArthur, C. Marshall, Army chief of staff, that Brett
a decision highlighted in Kenney’s debates had to be relieved: “As long as Brett is there,
with fellow airmen over the use of B-29s in you won’t have any cooperation between
the Pacific. ground and air, and I don’t think you plan to
The fact that personal relationships among relieve General MacArthur.”1 In early July
commanders are important and have an im Marshall offered either Brig Gen James H.
pact on military affairs in both peace and war Doolittle, “who had impressed all of us as an
is not new. Although the armed forces spend organizer, as a leader and as a dependable
a great deal of time and energy designing or type,” or Maj Gen George Kenney, “who is
ganizational relationships and arrangements rated tops by General [John L.] DeWitt
that will ensure success, harmonious relation- [Kenney’s immediate superior officer],”2 as a
ships among commanders and other senior replacement for Brett. MacArthur opted for
leaders often provide the necessary lubrica Kenney because, he said, “It would be diff-i
tion for making the military machine run cult to convince the Australians of Doolittle’s
acceptability.”3 MacArthur claimed that the
smoothly. In the face of less-than-optimum
Tokyo Raider’s break in service during the
circumstances, good working relations can
1930s would be viewed “unfavorably” by the
make a military operation effective.
Australians. More likely, MacArthur did not
Conversely, even the best-designed organ-i
want Doolittle because he would take pub
zation cannot overcome problems created by
licity away from MacArthur.
personal friction. Although Kenney’s dilemma
Extenuating circumstances might have
is important for understanding the war in the
explained the problems in Australia, but
Pacific, it also points out a more enduring les
Arnold clearly blamed Brett, telling Kenney
son: the considerable weight that personal re
that “Brett should have done the ‘getting
lationships bear in any theater of war.
along’ since he was the junior.” 4 In addition
to the problems between MacArthur and
Kenney and MacArthur Brett, Marshall cryptically warned Kenney
about some “personality clashes” in the
When, as a newcomer, Kenney assumed headquarters that were causing problems.5
command of Allied Air Forces in the South- In short, when Kenney landed in Australia,
west Pacific in August 1942, gaining Mac- he was thoroughly convinced of the need to
Arthur’s backing was his top priority as well get along with MacArthur. He knew that “his
as his greatest challenge. During meetings life would be very unhappy” if he did not.6
in Washington, D.C., before leaving for the Kenney’s initial meeting with MacArthur
Pacific, Kenney heard plenty about the con was not an auspicious beginning for forming
siderable friction between MacArthur and Lt a partnership. MacArthur began by deliver
Gen George Brett, the incumbent air com ing a lecture on the wretched state of air
mander. units in his command and ticked off a num
Although many problems in Australia— ber of complaints: the poor bombing accu
such as the lack of supplies, a paucity of racy of the aircrews, the lack of discipline
trained staff officers, and ill-equipped air among the air units, and—most damning to
craft—were not entirely Brett’s fault, as the MacArthur—disloyalty from the airmen. As
52 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1999
ders to communicate with MacArthur or pro-
vide advice on using airpower. Maj Gen
Lewis Brereton, air commander in the
Philippines, rarely spoke with MacArthur and
had to deal almost exclusively with
Sutherland.1 1 Like-wise, Brett complained
that “he had so much trouble getting past
Sutherland to see MacArthur that he hadn’t
seen the General for weeks.” The chief of
staff so irritated Brett that he “just talked to
Sutherland on the telephone when he had
to.” In his parting words, Brett described
Sutherland as a man with a limited know-l
Kenney (left) and Arnold. Arnold was undoubtedly an edge of air matters and “a bully, who, should
noyed by a perception of excessive parochialism in he lose the ability to say ‘by order of General
some of Kenney’s actions. Nevertheless, Kenney’s
MacArthur’ would be . . . a nobody.” The de-
ability to make things happen with the resources he
parting airman recommended a “show-down
was given made him indispensable as a senior Air
Force commander. early in the game with Sutherland.” 12
far as he was concerned, the accomplish Kenney had at least one advantage over
ments he had seen to date did not “justify all his predecessors in dealing with Sutherland.
the boasting the Air Force had been in The two officers had been classmates at the
dulging in for years.”7 After listening to Army War College almost 10 years earlier.
MacArthur vent his displeasure for nearly an Although it is unclear how friendly the two
hour, Kenney finally broke in, bluntly promis became over the year, they did work to
ing that he would straighten things out be- gether on one project for several weeks, and
cause “he knew how to run an Air Force as the exposure undoubtedly gave Kenney an
well or better than anyone else.” 8 Kenney edge over the other air commanders in un-
clearly saw that he had “two important bits of derstanding Sutherland’s personality.1 3
salesmanship that had to be put over if the Armed with his own knowledge of
Air Force was to play the role it was capable Sutherland and Brett’s advice about an early
of. I had to sell myself to the General and I showdown, Kenney looked for an opportu
had to sell him to the kids.”9 nity to confront the chief of staff. He didn’t
An indirect but important part of Ken have long to wait. On 4 August 1942, the
ney’s effort to “sell himself” involved con- day Kenney officially took command, he re
fronting the personality clashes that ceived orders for upcoming air operations.
Marshall had warned of. The Army chief of Rather than broad mission guidance,
staff directed his admonition primarily at the Sutherland sent detailed instructions, direct
struggles between previous air commanders ing takeoff times, weapons, and even tac
and Maj Gen Richard K. Sutherland, tics. Kenney was furious. He immediately
MacArthur’s chief of staff. Acknowledged as marched into Sutherland’s office, arguing, in
a brilliant though arrogant staff officer, typical Kenney fashion, that he was the
Sutherland was known both for his intense “most competent airman in the Pacific” and
loyalty to MacArthur and his ability to antag that he had the responsibility to decide how
onize people through vindictive and un the air units should operate—not
scrupulous behavior.10 Sutherland. Kenney shot down Sutherland’s
Prior to Kenney’s arrival, Sutherland had rebuttal by suggesting that they “go into the
frequently interfered with air matters and next room, see General MacArthur, and get
kept Kenney’s predecessors isolated, mak this thing straight. I want to find out who is
ing it almost impossible for the air comman supposed to run this Air Force.”14 According
to Kenney, Sutherland backed down, re-
COMMAND RELATIONS AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR 53
scinded the orders, and then apologized, formance has been marked and is directly
claiming that he had been forced to write the attributable to your splendid and effective
detailed instructions prior to Kenney’s ar leadership.”18 MacArthur was equally lauda-
rival.
Although this was not the final disagree
ment between the two, it was the last time
Sutherland directly interfered with Kenney’s Kenney’s credibility with the theater
combat operations. Perhaps the showdown commander helped him convince
vindicated Brett’s analysis of Sutherland as MacArthur of the advantages that
a bully who backed down when someone airpower offered in the theater. At
stood up to him. More likely, both Sutherland the same time, MacArthur’s support
and Kenney knew that the chief of staff provided the air commander the
should not have issued detailed orders to opportunity to implement his ideas
the air component commander and realized
with little interference.
that MacArthur would back Kenney in this
situation. In Kenney’s words, Sutherland
“knew he was going to lose.”15
Adding to Kenney’s self-confidence in this tory in a message to the Army chief of staff
confrontation was the knowledge that he a week later: “General Kenney with splendid
was already hard at work establishing a efficiency has vitalized the Air Force and
close personal and professional relationship with the energetic support of his two fine
with MacArthur. Although the two had had field commanders, [Maj Gen Ennis]
little contact before the war, the working and Whitehead and [Brig Gen Kenneth] Walker,
living arrangements in Australia aided is making remarkable progress. From unsat
Kenney’s efforts in this regard.1 6 Both isfactory, the Air Force has already pro
Kenney and MacArthur had their headquar gressed to very good and soon will be ex
ters offices in the Australian Mutual cellent. In comparatively few weeks I
Provident (AMP) Insurance building on the confidently expect it to be superior.”1 9 Not
corner of Queen and Edward Streets in surprisingly, two weeks later MacArthur rec
Brisbane. MacArthur’s office was on the ommended Kenney for promotion to lieu-
eighth floor, and Kenney’s was on the fifth, tenant general.20
making it convenient for the airman to see Other officers who served in the
the theater commander at any time. Kenney Southwest Pacific clearly recognized the
took full advantage of the proximity, visiting close relationship between Kenney and
MacArthur at least once a day, often timing MacArthur, which proved instrumental in es
his call so that they could eat lunch together. tablishing Kenney’s independence as an air
Also, since both men lived in the same hotel, commander. Kenney’s chief of staff judged
Kenney began visiting MacArthur “quite that his boss and MacArthur got along “very
often” in the evenings. During these occa well” and that the theater commander
sions, the two discussed both personal and “seemed to have a pretty poor opinion of the
professional matters.17 air business and what it could do before
Kenney’s efforts quickly paid off. Whether Kenney got there.”21 One ground officer said
due to a fortuitous blending of personalities, Kenney was the “only one who could tell
the improved performance of Kenney’s air- MacArthur off,”22 and Sutherland warned an-
men, or a combination of factors, Kenney other never to get into a dispute with the
earned MacArthur’s trust and confidence. In Army Air Forces because MacArthur would
early September MacArthur told Kenney that always rule in favor of Kenney.23
“it has been little more than a month since Kenney’s relationship with MacArthur was
you assumed command of the air compo important in exploiting the capabilities that
nent in this area. The improvement in its per airpower offered in the Southwest Pacific.
54 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1999
MacArthur (seated) and Kenney (far right, front row, looking to his right). The formal Japanese surrender was con
ducted aboard the USS Missouri, Tokyo Bay, 2 September 1945. MacArthur credited Kenney above all others for the
victory in the Pacific.
Not long after he arrived in the region, Near the end of the war, MacArthur
Kenney told Arnold that victory in the summed up his thoughts on Kenney’s contr-i
Southwest Pacific depended on the ability to bution, leaving little doubt about his admira-
control islands that could be used as air tion: “I believe that no, repeat, no officer sug-
bases to cut off air and sea lines of supply. gested for promotion to General has
In some cases these were true islands, but rendered more outstanding and brilliant ser-
the inability to move into the interior of large vice than Kenney. . . . Nothing that [Gen
land areas in the Southwest Pacific, such as Carl] Spaatz or any other air officer has ac-
New Guinea, converted airfields and gar- complished in the war compares to what
risons along the coast into “islands” as Kenney has contributed and none in my
well.2 4 Kenney’s credibility with the theater opinion is his equal in ability.”26 This was fit
commander helped him convince MacArthur ting testimony to Kenney’s service as an air
of the advantages that airpower offered in component commander.
the theater. At the same time, MacArthur’s
support provided the air commander the op-
Kenney and Arnold
portunity to implement his ideas with little in-
terference. A very pleased General Arnold In contrast to the generally smooth rap-
summed up the importance of Kenney’s ef- port that Kenney established and main-
forts by telling him, “I don’t believe the units tained with MacArthur throughout the war,
could possibly perform the missions in the his dealings with Hap Arnold were more
manner that they are doing without the most troubled. Kenney’s meetings in Washington
sympathetic support from General before leaving for the Southwest Pacific in
MacArthur. It requires complete understand- the summer of 1942 established the tone of
ing between General MacArthur and you.”25 their relationship. At that time America was
COMMAND RELATIONS AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR 55
still gearing up to produce the large numbers to fight with each day, giving little consider
of troops and supplies needed to fight a ation to the broader and more long-term
world war. In keeping with the “Europe first” problems that Arnold faced. Not surprisingly,
strategy of the United States, Arnold was his book about the war, General Kenney
determined to pit the maximum number of Reports: A Personal History of the Pacific
aircraft against Germany, despite impas War, captures this perspective.
sioned pleas from every commander. He The tension between these dissimilar ou-t
told Kenney that he could expect no more looks surfaced over many issues during the
than the six hundred aircraft already in the war—some important, others almost trivial.
Pacific and pointedly commented that Brett Kenney complained frequently about aircraft
“kept yelling for equipment all the time, a-l arriving with unneeded equipment, such as
though he should have enough already.”27 heaters (not used by aircrews flying at low a-l
The message for Kenney was clear: make titude in the tropics), or unwanted modifica
do with what you have. tions, such as the installation of a bottom gun
Although warned not to expect any more turret on B-24s to defend against fighters a-t
aircraft and aware that the national strategic tacking from below (unnecessary since most
priority called for defeating Germany before of the B-24 attacks in Kenney’s command
Japan, Kenney—after seeing the situation in took place from low altitude). The removal of
the Pacific firsthand—began pestering the copilot’s position in one bomber incensed
Arnold for more planes, people, and sup- Kenney because of the importance of this air-
plies. Arnold firmly told Kenney that he could man in combat operations. He told Arnold, “I
count on having enough aircraft to defend emphatically want [the] provision for the cop-i
against Japanese attacks and “carry out a lot left in the airplane.”30
limited offensive” but nothing more.2 8 These complaints highlight Kenney’s out-
Despite the cordial and professional na look, while Arnold’s responses provide a
ture of this exchange, the discussion points glimpse of the wider view of the war. Arnold
out that the two airmen saw the war through agreed that heating equipment might have
very different lenses. As commanding gen little value in Kenney’s theater but pointed
eral of the Army Air Forces and a member of out that other commanders needed it and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Arnold focused on that production lines lacked the flexibility to
the entire global struggle. He had to balance make aircraft without heaters. Similarly, he
strategic guidance with the current situation noted that other places needed bottom gun
and upcoming operations in order to have turrets and that building planes slated for
the right number of airplanes and people in Kenney’s use without them would entail ex
the appropriate areas. In addition he had to cessive delays and costs. Finally, the com
continually assess the costs and benefits of mands in the Army Air Forces had thor
producing existing aircraft and equipment oughly debated and tested the elimination of
against the need to start research-and-de the copilot’s position, concluding that the ad-
velopment work on newer types. All the vantages outweighed the drawbacks.31
while he worried about the image of the Kenney matched his imprudent demands
Army Air Forces and the debates about ser for equipment changes in aircraft production
vice independence that would follow the war. with a lack of appreciation for the tactical dif
Fittingly, Arnold emphasized this expansive ferences between his area of operations and
view of the war in his postwar memoir, sym others. Based on his previous experience
bolically entitled Global Mission. 29 and observations in the South-west Pacific,
At the theater level, things looked quite Kenney believed in low-altitude attacks,
different. Kenney viewed the war from a using the tactics of what was then called at-
much narrower focus and devoted his atten tack aviation. Although such tactics might
tion to more immediate decisions. He con have been valid for the enemy he faced,
centrated on the near term and what he had Kenney argued that they were “in evidence
56 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1999
every day all over the world.”3 2 Arnold in- importance. Kenney preferred to promote of
formed Kenney that he was flat wrong: ficers who had proven themselves in combat
“Attack tactics have definitely not . . . proven under his command and distrusted se-nior
officers with no combat experience.
Although Arnold eventually managed to
send some officers to the Southwest Pacific,
In his efforts to control the B-29s,
Kenney felt he was getting Arnold’s castoffs
Kenney found himself not only
and quickly ended the experiment.35 Kenney
working to carry out the theater
dispatched one officer back to Washington
commander’s wishes but also going with a comment that he probably applied to
so far as to work against the de - many other senior officers sent out: “His
sires of his service. mind is not flexible enough and he does not
think clearly or fast enough.”3 6 In keeping
with his attitude of going against Arnold’s
sound ‘every day all over the world’ ” (em- wishes in this area, when asked to send his
phasis in original).3 3 Arnold realized, as deputy back to Washington, Kenney howled
Kenney evidently did not, that antiaircraft in protest.3 7
guns were causing heavy losses to low-fly Kenney’s prodding for more planes, sup-
ing aircraft. When the Army Air Forces had plies, and people—although often con
attempted such low-altitude tactics in ducted with a lack of grace and tact—does
Europe, the results were disastrous. On one not suggest that he had no knowledge of the
mission all 11 aircraft in a formation that pressures Arnold faced. Indeed, Kenney re
used these tactics were lost.3 4 alized that Arnold must have found his att-i
One can excuse Kenney for not knowing tude exasperating. At one point he even
everything that occurred in other theaters, apologized for his incessant complaining: “I
but his comments reflect an attitude that ig know you are harassed to the point of ex
nored the wider realities of the war and the haustion and that you are doing your
implications of his suggestions. He may not damnedest to keep me quiet, but I will trust
have known the conditions in other theaters, to your continued good nature and keep on
but this should have made him cautious in telling you my troubles.”38
proposing tactics. Similarly, his background No doubt Kenney’s grumbling was a
in aircraft production should have given him source of friction, but throughout most of
more insight into the problems that his pro- 1942 and 1943, Arnold overlooked much of
posed modifications would cause. At times the griping, realizing—as did Kenney—that
Kenney displayed an attitude that melded many of the requests were part of the nor
arrogance with ignorance—a dangerous mal give-and-take between commander and
combination. subordinate. Arnold expected Kenney to
Kenney’s provincial attitude extended to solve the problems that he could but knew
personnel matters. As commanding general that Kenney would sometimes need assis
of the Army Air Forces, Arnold believed in tance. In a very real sense, Kenney com
rotating officers between his staff in peted with the other theater air commanders
Washington and the combat areas. Arnold for people and equipment. A B-24 sent to
was especially sensitive to this issue and England or the Mediterranean for combat
gave it his personal attention because dur was one fewer aircraft that would see action
ing World War I, he had been stuck in in the South-west Pacific. As Kenney put it,
Washington and missed out on combat duty. his complaints were “about the only way I
To him, moving people boosted morale and can present the picture as it confronts me.”39
benefited the service. Although this ap In short, Arnold expected Kenney’s re-
proach proved successful in most theaters, quests, and his position required him to
Arnold had difficulty convincing Kenney of its weigh the demands put forward by various
COMMAND RELATIONS AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR 57
B-29s on Guam, 1945. More than any other issue, Kenney’s attempts to gain operational control over the B-29s
strained his relationship with Arnold.
air commanders. For his part Kenney had to ground or “entice the enemy fighters into
“lobby” for the things he needed. combat and destroy them in the air” by se-
The record of Kenney’s command—a lecting targets that the opposing air force
bright spot for the Army Air Forces during would have to defend. The primary objective
this time—also underlay the commanding during these latter attacks was not the target
general’s forgiving mood: “You are doing per se, although that might be important too,
great things,” Arnold told him.4 0 Perhaps the but the hostile fighters. Kenney admitted that
strongest evidence of Arnold’s esteem came the plan sounded deceptively simple, but in
in October 1943, when he asked Kenney for reality it made for “a long and difficult job.”43
advice on using airpower in the cross-chan- Arnold appreciated the advice and for-
nel invasion of Europe. This was a particu- warded the letter to several officers on his
larly bad time in the European air campaign, staff, General Marshall, and General
and a troubled Arnold turned to Kenney be- Brereton—the senior American air officer in
cause “there has probably been more inge- England planning the cross-channel invasion.
nuity displayed in your operations than in In addition, Arnold arranged for Kenney to
any other theater.”41 meet with Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower to ex-
In a letter to Arnold, Kenney gave a plain his thoughts further. Arnold even sent
straightforward reply about his views on air one of Kenney’s deputies, Brig Gen Freddie
warfare: “I stick to one principle—get control Smith, to Europe to help implement the
of the air situation before you try anything ideas.4 4
else.”42 The best way to accomplish that end Even as Arnold approached Kenney for
was to strike aircraft while they were on the advice on the air war in Europe, however,
58 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1999
their relationship had started to sour and used them against the home islands of
would actually deteriorate over the coming Japan—not the peripheral areas Kenney
months. Although differing perspectives be- mentioned. Even before Kenney’s request,
tween the service headquarters and the Arnold had initiated a study of possible
theater air commander account for some of bases in China from which to use them
the strain between the two, the debate over against Japan itself. The Chinese locations,
the B-29 highlights the fact that the source however, would serve only as an interim so
of the tension was Kenney’s loyalty. lution. Arnold’s real hope for using the B-29s
Although Kenney identified with Arnold as to defeat Japan lay in acquiring bases in the
an airman, he felt that he owed his primary Mariana Islands.
loyalty to his immediate commander, Even after hearing about the plans for the
General Mac-Arthur. As Kenney argued, Chinese bases, Kenney continued to lobby
“Every once in a while Arnold would get for the aircraft, asking to “borrow” them as
sore at me about something or other. He they flew from the United States to China.
thought I was still working for him, but I Arnold told Kenney he would think about the
wasn’t. I was working for MacArthur.”45 proposal but “could not commit himself to
Kenney felt that Arnold exerted a great deal routing any B-29s via Australia.” Even this
of influence over air operations in Europe ambiguous response buoyed Kenney’s spir
and wanted to do the same in the Pacific. its, and he told engineers to give immediate
Kenney realized that MacArthur resented priority to building an air depot and length
any interference from Washington and ening the runways at Darwin, Australia, to
would never have agreed to the level of handle 50 of the new bombers.50
control over theater air operations that he The dispute between Kenney and Arnold
thought Arnold hoped to exert. Although over the B-29s grew more divisive in early
Kenney believed that he acted as a buffer 1944, when it became clear that the
between the two, he clearly went beyond bombers would never fly in the Southwest
this neutral role.4 6 In his efforts to control Pacific. In January Kenney attended a con
the B-29s, Kenney found himself not only ference at Pearl Harbor to coordinate plans
working to carry out the theater comman for the coming year, a meeting that pitted
der’s wishes but also going so far as to him squarely against Arnold’s ideas for de
work against the desires of his service. ploying the B-29s. On the one hand, the of
Kenney had started pushing for the B-29 fensive through the Central Pacific under the
soon after his arrival in Australia. Although the direction of Adm Chester Nimitz would at-
bomber was then in the earliest stages of its tack the Mariana Islands and Formosa en
development, he proposed using it to elim-i route to Tokyo. MacArthur, on the other
nate or neutralize oil refineries and petroleum- hand, would continue his advance through
production sites.47 Perhaps prompted by re- New Guinea, move north, and liberate the
ports of B-29 test flights, Kenney queried Philippines before invading Japan. Although
Washing-ton for information a year later both options would eventually defeat the
under the assumption that he would “get the Japanese, combining forces along one axis
first B-29 unit.”48 Arnold cautioned against of attack might end the war sooner5.1
putting too much hope in acquiring the air- An important consideration behind the
craft in the near future, pointing out that “no Central Pacific thrust was the desire to cap
units are scheduled for your theater prior to ture the Mariana Islands and base the B-29s
June of next year.”49 there. Kenney disagreed with the logic be-
Although the commanding general held hind the plan, asserting that the bombing
out some hope that Kenney would receive missions against Japan—a “series of costly
these aircraft, Arnold and his staff viewed stunts”—would accomplish little.52 Although
the B-29s as weapons that would contribute Kenney’s opinion was just one factor in the
the most to the war if the Army Air Forces discussions, it must have carried a great
