Table Of ContentDuping the Soviets
The Farewell Dossier
Gus W. Weiss
We communists have to string substantive topics. The Soviets
alongwith thecapitalistsfora viewed dØtente as (cid:147)peaceful coexist
while. We needtheircredits, ence(cid:148) and as an avenue to improve
theiragriculture, andtheir tech their inefficient, ifnot beleaguered
nology. But wearegoingto economy using improved political
continue massive milita~ypro relations to obtain grain, foreign
gramsandby the middle 1980s credits, and technology. 1 In pure sci
we willbe in aposition to return ence, the Soviets deserved their
to a much moreaggressivefor impressive reputation, and their
eignpolicydesignedtogain the space program demonstrated original
upperhandin our relationshsp ityand accomplishment in rocket
engineering(cid:151)but they lacked
with the West. pro
The Soviets viewed dØtente duction know-how necessary for
long-term competition with the
as (cid:147)peaceful coexistence(cid:148) Leonid Brezhnev. Remarks in
and as an avenue to 1971 to the Politburo at the UdinfifticeudltSytaitnest.raSnosvliaettinmgalnaabgoerrastohryad
beginning ofdØtente.
improve their inefficient, if results to products, quality control
was poor, and plants were badly
beleaguered During the Cold War, and especially
not economy organized. Cost accounting, even in
using improved political in the 1970s, Soviet intelligence car the defense sector, was hopelessly
ried out a substantial and successful inadequate. In computers and micro
relations to obtain grain, clandestine effort to obtain technical electronics, the Soviets trailed
and scientific knowledge from the
foreign credits, and Western standards by more than a
West. This effort was suspected by a decade.
technology. few US Government officials but not
documented until 1981, when
9, French intelligence obtained the
ser
vices ofCol. Vladimir I. Vetrov, Soviet S&T Espionage
(cid:147)Farewell,(cid:148) who photographed and
supplied 4,000 KGB documents on The leadership recognized these
the program. In the summer of shortcomings. Toaddress the lag in
1981, President Mitterrand told Pres technology, Soviet authorities in
ident Reagan ofthe source, and, 1970 reconstituted and invigorated
when the material was supplied, it the USSR(cid:146)s intelligence collection for
led to a potent counterintelligence science and technology. The Council
response by CIA and the NATO ofMinisters and the Central Com
intelligence services. mittee established a new unit,
Directorate T ofthe KGB(cid:146)s First
President Nixon and Secretary of ChiefDirectorate, to plumb the
State Kissinger conceived ofdØtente R&D programs ofWestern econo
as the search for ways ofeasing mies. The State Committee on
chronic strains in US(cid:151)Soviet rela Science and Technology and the
GusW. Weiss has served as a Spe tions. Theysought to engage the Military-Industrial Commission
cial Assistant to the Secretary of USSR in arrangements that would were to provide Directorate T and
Defense and as Director ofInterna move the superpowers from confron its operating arm, called LineX, with
tional Economics for the National tation to negotiation. Arms control, collection requirements. Military
Security Council. trade, and investment were the main Intelligence (GRU), the Soviet
121
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The Farewell Dossier
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FarewellDossier
Academy ofSciences, and the State States to visit firms and laboratories higher grain prices for consumers, and
Committee for External Relations associatedwith their commissions. taxpayers provided for a 25-percent-a
completed the list ofparticipants. LineX, ever alert, populated these bushel export subsidy. Those ofus
The bulk ofcollection was to be delegationswith its own people: in observing these arabesques began to
done by the KGB and the GRU, an agricultural delegation of 100 question the USSR(cid:146)s total commit
with extensive support from the East about one-third were known or sus ment to the spirit ofdØtente.
European intelligence services. A for pected intelligence officers. On a
midable apparatus was set up for visit to Boeing, a Soviet guest
scientific espionage; the scale ofthis applied adhesive to his shoes to US Computer Export Policy
structure testified to its importance. obtain metal samples. In another epi
The coming ofdØtente provided sode, the ranking scientists and
In late 1973, President Nixon asked
aacvceensusesforfoLrienxeplXoiatantdioonp.eSnoevdienteiwntel emlaencatgroenriscsofintdhuestSroyvioebttcaionmepdutaevrisaand his Council on International Eco
ligence took full advantage. for the specific purpose ofvisiting nomic Policy to determine which
the Uranus Liquid Crystal Watch computers and associated production
technology might be prudently sold
In the early 1970s, the Nixon admin Company ofMineola, Long Island
pisotlriactyiofnorhaedconnoomciocmprreelahteinosnisvweith T(ahrfeiremdnaoyst abemfoornegtthheedFeolretgautnieon5(cid:146)s00). wtoasConemcmeussnairsytbeccoauuntsreiedsØ.teTnhties study
implied the expansion ofcommercial
the USSR. The sale ofstrategic arrival, they requested an expansion
opportunities with Eastern Europe
ggoovoedrsnteodCboymtmhuenCiosotrdcionuanttirniegsCwoasm oUfSthceomiptiunteerarryantdo isnecmliucdoenndeuacrtloyrall and the USSR; a new and more lib
mittee ofNATO (COCOM), which firms. This maneuverwas done to eral set ofCOCOM rules was
administered Alliance-agreed list observe (that is, collect) the latest required to fit these prospects, how
ofproducts anadndata embargoed for technology, and it was executed at ever illusory they may have been.
sale. Nixon(cid:146)s policyworked within the last minute so that the Defense Data processingwas the most impor
pthriosdsuycsttseme,xcaenedd,infgorthteheaepxpproorvtedoflist, Dobejpeactr.tmItewnatswloeugladl(cid:151)LniontehavXehtaidmesttoud tpaunttipnrcohdaurcgteroefqutihreinprgorjeecvti,ewa.nIdwIas
Asspcniedec,nitailifniecxacanerpertawinosgneestmeownfetrcseo,mnmtehecerescUsinaarilyt.eadnd iteoditosuardrveagnutlaagtei.ons and turned them wbfreaerrvos.iaTeadlwhesreoofpcmrtoaoemdbcpelhunetromeelsroopfgosynttsuepidcobyhllinewcoayflsoowrgitytthhheteirfniarnsts
SptteeacctthesnsifcaoarnldccootohmpemeirUasStsiiSooRnn.sseTttoopuiapscsjseosisntpros Topguoyr,cahctaqhsueiinrSoegvit5eh0tesLloaitnceks1th9ea7ie3rdcrptarrfoatnptsoepsocerhdtnsolif dnØotmeintce;gaiitnsotougthhtetUoniastseedssStthaeteesco
included agriculture, nuclear energy, the firm, then in financial difficulty, fnartoimoncaolmspeuctureirtysarliessksfertoamgatihnosstetshaeles.
computers, and the environment. would build and equip a modern (cid:147)air
As Kissinger noted: craft city(cid:148) in the USSR. Asimilar
proposition was put to Boeing (it Not surprisingly, the studyconcluded
Over time, tradeandinvestment besieges the imagination to ponder that the USSRwas short ofcomput
leaven theautarkic tenden Brezhnev appearingfrom the cabin of ers and the means to pay for
cmiaesyoftheSovietsystem, invite vaennAeerraobflleoctap7i4t7a)l.istLitneechXnipqruaectoifcepdlathye sanuablsytsainstiparlecsoummpeudtethratimtphoertSso.viOetusr
gradualassociation oftheSoviet
ing offcompetitors, and, from this intended to use their foreign exchange
with the world
economy econ bidding, the Soviets sought to gain to best advantage bypurchasing the
andfoster degree of
omy, a technical data for use at home. On most powerful computers, those that
interdependence thataddsan ele a less lofty technical plane, in 1972 also held the most national security
mentofstability to thepolitical the Soviets surreptitiously bought risk (large computers were used for
relationship.2
25 percent ofthe US grain harvest, nuclearweapons calculations and
usingphone intercepts ofthe grain cryptography). The report concluded
Beginning in 1972, delegations of dealers(cid:146) networkto listen to both sides that the export potential forAmerican
Soviet specialists came to the United ofthe market. The purchase led to data processing to the USSRwas
122
FarewellDossier
In the early 1970s, there
US intelligence
were no
collection requirements for
small and the risk great ifthe more technology transfer and no evidence does not mean it is not
powerful computers were allowed for true. The system defied movement.
sale. The study recommended raising scientific espionage, and
moderately the power ofmachines few, ifany, reporting A few alert colleagues were dispersed
allowed for COCOM release, while at among the executive departments. In
thesame time restricting the sale of sources. one episode, the Department of
technology. Export ofthe largest com (cid:145)9 Commerce discovered a Line X
puters was to be prohibited..In effort to obtain an embargoed com
National SecurityDecision Memoran puter through a dummy corporation
dum (NSDM) 247, 14 March 1974, set up for this one transaction;
U S. Policy on theExportofComputers dotal clues were at hand. In their officials intercepted the shipping
to CommunistCountries, President intelligence history, the Soviets could container and substituted sandbags.
Nixon approved these recommenda point to the success ofthe atom (A note was enclosed, but it would
tions, and theybecame the new bomb spies, and they also had to not be politically correct to quote it.)
export guidelines. As a result, the Sovi their credit collection against indus In 1975, theApollo-Soyuz spacecraft
etswere excluded from importing trial technology in Germany during dockingwas used to gain intelligence
significantlypowerfulWestern com the 1920s. AfterWorld War II, the access to the US space program. This
puters, dØtente notwithstanding. Soviets copied theAmerican B-29 project was conceived by the Nixon
and the Rolls-Royce Nene administration as part ofdØtente,
Ifthe Soviets were to reach compara jet engine (the copy powered the and President Ford had no choice
bilitywith the United States in MiG-15). Two former members of but to continue the effort. To the
computers, their engineers would on the Rosenberg network had set up consternation ofNASA, a few weeks
their own now have to create designs the modern Soviet microelectronics before the launch counterintelligence
and produce equipment. Line X industry. Soviet intelligence was pro suspected that one ofthe Cosmo
would have to use its espionage fessional at ferreting out science and nauts was a KGB officer who had
resources to supplementwhat could technology and had the results to been collecting away over the course
be developed at home. NSDM 247 prove it. The Soviets were adept at ofthe project.
eliminated the West as an open copying foreign designs. In the style
source available to the Soviets, but ofSherlock Holmes, the clues could
Western intelligencewas unaware of almost speak for themselves: the Presidential Interest
the collection apparatus the Soviets USSRwas behind in important tech
had deployed to obtain the nologies, their intelligence was President Carter the first chief
was
technology. accomplished at collection, and executive to take an interest in tech
dØtente had opened path.
a nology loss. During his
administration, CIAhad begun to
Strong Suspicions and Skepticism Those suspicious ofa Great Game in report the diversion ofcomputers
technology espionage found that the from the West into the Soviet defense
In the early 1970s, there were no US US Governmentwas not 221 B complex, and he wanted details. In
intelligence collection requirements Baker Street(cid:151)we could make little response, theAgency assigned staffto
for technology transfer and scientific headway in persuading officials in this endeavor and produced
a more
espionage, and few, ifany, reporting charge ofintelligence requirements complete picture oftechnology loss
sources. But, by observing the behav that the United States was facing a than had been available since the start
ior ofSoviet delegations visiting US significant threat. We received dis ofDirectorate T. Carter also ordered
plants and by keeping in mind the couraging responses to our pleas for the first comprehensive studyoftech
clever 1972 grain purchase, a few help: (cid:147)No evidence(cid:148) ofa grand nology transfer, Presidential Review
government officials began to sus design; (cid:147)not usual Soviet practice;(cid:148) Memorandum 31, a document that
pect that a master plan was in place (cid:147)no requirements and no interest;(cid:148) onlydistantly addressed the threat
to obtain our know-how. Direct (cid:147)no sources.(cid:148) It seemed to have from clandestine collection. Itwas
evidence was nonexistent(cid:151)only anec escaped these authorities that having largely a missed opportunity, but
123
FarewellDossier
Carter responded to the Soviet inva ideological reasons. He supplied a nology, and with the listAmerican
sion ofAfghanistan by instituting list ofSoviet organizations in scien intelligence might be able to control
sanctions, canceling several computer tific collection and summary reports for its purposes at least part ofLine
sales, and stopping equipment des from Directorate T on the goals, X(cid:146)s collection, that is, turn the tables
tined for the Kama River truck plant. achievements, and unfilled objectives on the KGB and conduct economic
ofthe program. Farewell revealed the warfare of(cid:146) out own.
President Reagan came to office names ofmore than 200 Line X
intent on reversingwhat he saw as officers stationed in 10 KGB rezi I met with Director ofCentral
the (cid:147)window ofvulnerability(cid:148) favor dents in the West, alongwith Intelligence William Casey on an
ing the Soviets in strategicweapons. more than 100 leads to Line X afternoon inJanuary 1982. I pro
He also believed that the USSR(cid:146)s recruitments.~ posed using the Farewell material to
economy did notwork and that the feed or play back the products
Soviet system was on the way to col Upon receipt ofthe documents (the sought by Line X, but these would
lapse. His intuition led him to Farewell Dossier, as labeled by come from our own sources and
believe the Cold War could be won. French Intelligence) CIA arranged would have been (cid:147)improved,(cid:148) that
Joining Reagan(cid:146)s NSC staffwere for my access. Reading the material is, designed so that on arrival in the
those ofus who thought similarly caused myworst nightmares to come Soviet Union theywould appear
and entertained the idea that eco true. Since 1970, Line X had genuine but would later fail. US
nomic pressure would have some obtained thousands ofdocuments intelligence would match Line X
effect. The NSC staffsought to fash and sample products, in such quan requirements supplied through
ion policies to take advantage ofthe tity that it appeared that the Soviet Vetrovwith our version ofthose
USSR(cid:146)s low productivity, its lag in military and civil sectors were in items, ones that would hardly meet
technology, oppressive defense bur large measure running their research the expectations ofthat vast Soviet
den, and inefficient economic on that ofthe West, particularly the apparatus deployed to collect them.
structure. Reaganwas the first presi United States. Our science was sup
dent forwhom this line ofthought porting their national defense. Losses Ifsome double agent told the KGB
would have been even remotely were in radar, computers, machine theAmericans were alert to Line X
acceptable. tools, and semiconductors. Line X and interf(cid:146)eting with their collec
were
had fulfilled two-thirds to three- tion by subverting, ifnot sabotaging,
fourths ofits collection require the effort, I believed the United
A Defector in Place ments(cid:151)an impressive performance. States still could not lose. The Sovi
ets, being a suspicious lot, would be
Into the receptive climate ofthe likely to question and reject every
Reagan administration came Presi Interest in TechnologyTransfer thing LineX collected. Ifso, this
dent Mitterrand, bearing of would be a rarity in the world ofespi
news
Farewell(cid:151)that is, Colonel Vetrov. In Overnight, technology transfer onage, an operation that would
a private meeting associated with the became a top priority, rising from succeed even ifcompromised. Casey
July 198lOttawa economic summit, the basement ofIntelligence Com liked the proposal.
he told Reagan ofthe source and munity interest. CIAset up a
offered the intelligence to the United TechnologyTransfer Intelligence
States. It was passed through Vice Center, and the Pentagon created A Deception Operation
President Bush and then to CIA. groups to assess damage and find
The door had opened into Line X. ways to tighten technology controls. As was later reported inAviation
But careful study ofFarewell(cid:146)s mate WeekandSpace Technology, CIA and
Vetrovwas a 53-year-old engineer rial suggested that more than just a the Defense Department, in
assigned to evaluate the intelligence few committees could come out of partnership with the FBI, set up a
collected by Directorate T, an ideal this wealth ofintelligence. With the program to do just whatwe had
position for a defector in place. He Farewell reporting, CIA had the Line discussed: modified products were
had volunteered his services for Xshopping list for still-needed tech- devised and (cid:147)made available(cid:148) to Line
124
FarewellDossier
X collection channels. The CIA National Security Directive exchange. And the discovery ofAlas
project leader and his associates stud kan North Shore oil contributed to
ied the Farewell material, examined On 17January 1983, to define his the 1986 fall in petroleum prices, cut
export license applications and other policy for political, military, and eco ting the revenues not only ofOPEC
intelligence, and contrived to intro nomic relations with the USSR, but also ofthe USSR. Coincident
duce altered products into KGB Reagan approved National Security events and deliberate government
collection. American industry helped Decision Directive (NSDD) 75, policy had the twin effects ofadding
in the preparation ofitems to be U S. Relations with the USSR, doc to the burden on the Soviet system
a
(cid:147)marketed(cid:148) to Line X. Contrived ument spelling out purposes, themes, and ofshifting the superpower com
computer chips found their way into and strategy for competing in the petition to advanced technology,
Soviet military equipment, flawed where the United States held clear
Cold War. It specified three policy a
turbines were installed on a gas pipe elements: containment and reversal advantage. -
line, and defective plans disrupted
ofSoviet expansionism, promotion
the output ofchemical plants and a ofchange in the internal system to
tractor factory. The Pentagon intro reduce the power ofthe ruling elite, Good-by to Farewell
duced misleading information
and engagement in negotiations and
pdeefretnisnee,ntantodsttaecatlitchalaiaricrrcarfatf,t.s?aTchee agreements thatwould enhance US About the time I metwith Casey,
NSoAviSeAt SdpeascigenS.h5uWtthleenwaCsaaseryejteocltded iNntSerDesDts.75Inhiegcholnioghmtiecdptohleicny,eed to Vaewtoromvafnellanidntoa faetlrlaogwicKeGpBisoodfefiwceirth
President Reagan ofthe undertaking, control technology; Farewell(cid:146)s in a Moscowpark. In circumstances
tithhneetelpraratogtjeeernccwtyapscrooeovnpteehdruasttioiaosbtnei,ca.wimItonhdtetilhmeeo,f irDeniprgoertctetsicvhhenaotdloompgoyuvtleoesdms,pthahaonssdiestwhroeintipnrgetvheent kbtihulatlteddairdtehnenooottffkciilclelearrt,haehnedwosttmhaeabnnb.esdtHaabenbdewdas
President had agreed (so KGB arrested, and, in the ensuing investi
FBI handling domestic requirements a
and CIA responsible for defectorworking for a foreign intelli gation, his espionage activities were
osupcecreastsi,onasn.dTihtewapsrongevrearmodhveeatredscetgaersde.at go1ef9n8pc3re,essiRedereavnigtciaeanlppuprtolohipicosys)s.etdLaatmthpeeroSinDnIa,part dCtuiItsAecophvreaordteedec;tniohveuegwchaosuinnettxeelerlcmiuegtaeesndcuerientso.1i9n8s3t.i
which Gorbachev and the Soviet
iucnt,aCfuarstehyerseunstetohfetDheepFuatreyweDlilrepcrtoord military took far more seriously In 1985, the case took a bizarre turn
ofCentral Intelligence to Europe to thanAmerican commentators. SDI when information on the Farewell
tell NATO governments and intelli would, ifdeployed, place unaccept Dossiersurfaced in France. Mitter
gence services ofthe Line X threat. able economic and technical rand came to suspect thatVetrov had
These meetings led to the expulsion demands on the Soviet system. all along been a CIA plant set up to
or compromise ofabout 200 Soviet Even Reagan(cid:146)s 1983 (cid:147)evil empire(cid:148) test him to see ifthe material would
intelligence officers and their speech had its economic effect, for be handed over to theAmericans or
sources, causing the collapse ofLine immediately thereafter the Soviet mil kept by the French. Acting on this
X operations in Europe. Although itaryasked for a budget increase, this mistaken belief, Mitterrand fired the
military intelligence officers on top ofalready-bloated defense chiefofthe French service, Yves
some 6
expenditures. Bonnet.
avoided compromise, the heart of
Soviet technology collection
crum
bled and would not recover. This Two events beyond presidential con
mortal blow camejust at the begin- trol dovetailed with NSDD 75. The An Important Contribution
fling ofReagan(cid:146)s defense buildup, his Federal Reserve(cid:146)s restrictive mone
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), tary policy ofthe early 1980s led to a In 1994, Gorbachev(cid:146)s science
and the introduction ofstealth air fall in gold and primary product adviser, Roald Sagdeev, wrote that in
craft into US forces. prices, sources ofSoviet foreign computers and microelectronics(cid:151)
125
I
FarewellDossier
As for Farewell, his
contribution led the
to
collapse of crucial
a
the keys to modern civil and military collection program at just
technology(cid:151)the Soviets trailed West-
em standards by 15 years and that the time the Soviet military
the most striking indication oftheir needed it, and it resulted in
backwardness the absence of
was a
forceful and effective
domestically made supercomputer. a
The Soviets considered a supercom NATO effort to protect its
puter a (cid:147)strategic attribute,(cid:148) the lack technology.
ofwhich inexcusable for
was a super
power.7 LineX did not acquire ~9
designs for such machine,
a nor
could Soviet computer scientists
build one on their own(cid:151)and 4. Schweizer, Peter. Victory: The
NSDM 247 had stopped Western ReaganAdministration(cid:145)s SecretStrat
help. As for Farewell, his contribu egy thatHastenedthe Collapseofthe
Soviet Union. NewYork: The
tion led to the collapse ofa crucial Atlantic Monthly Press, 1995,
collection program atjust the time pp. 187-90.
the Soviet military needed it, and it
resulted in a forceful and effective 5. ConversationwithJames Fletcher,
NATO effort to protect its technol Administrator, NASA.
ogy. Alongwith the US defense
6. Porch, Douglas. TheFrenchSecret
buildup and alreadyfloundering
an Services. NewYork: Farrar, Straus
Soviet economy, the USSR could no and Giroux, 1995, p. 448.
longer compete, a conclusion
reached by the Politburo in 1987. 7. Sagdeev, Roald Z. TheMakingof
aSovietScientist. NewYork:Jolui
When historians sort out the reasons Wiley& Sons, 1994, pp. 298-301.
for the end ofthe Cold War, perhaps
Farewell will receive a footnote. It
would be deserved.
NOTES
1. Kissinger, HenryA. WhiteHouse
Years. Boston: Little, Brown and
Company, 1979, pp. 1, 142.
2. Kissingeron detente. Thomas G.
Patersonand DennisMerrill (Ed.),
MajorProblemsinAmericanFor
eignRelations, Volume II, 1995,
p. 600.
3. For aprimarysource from a
former KGB officer, see Oleg
Gordievskyand Christopher
Andrew, KGB: TheInsideStory.
NewYork, Harper Collins, 1991.
126
