Table Of Content(cid:2)
USS Begoroff Hungnam
as port facilities are
destroyed.
Escape by Sea
Center
Historical
Naval
The Hungnam Redeployment
By D O N A L D C H I S H O L M
T
he two great military extrac- The tally was staggering: 105,000
tions from the beach of the troops, 91,000 civilians, 17,500 vehi-
20th century occurred at cles, and 350,000 tons of supplies were
Dunkerque in 1940 and pulled from Hungnam. When the port
Hungnam in 1950. In both cases a large was closed on Christmas Eve 1950, all
number of troops were withdrawn in facilities were blown up and nothing
the face of superior enemy strength. was left to the advancing commun-
And although they are often invoked ists.1 By every standard, the redeploy-
in the same breath, Hungnam may be ment was a success on the tactical, op-
the more impressive. Conducted by erational, and strategic levels.
Rear Admiral James Doyle, Comman-
der, Combined Task Force 90 (CTF 90), Into a Doctrinal Void
the operation was a true redeployment. Notwithstanding their amphibi-
ous capabilities, the Navy and Marine
Corps were geared to assaults, not ex-
Donald Chisholm teaches in the Joint Military Operations Department at the
tractions. Experience during World
Naval War College and is the author of Waiting for Dead Men’s Shoes: Origins and
War II included no such reversals,
Development of the U.S. Navy’s Officer Personnel System, 1793–1941.
54 JFQ / Spring/Summer 2001
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Escape by Sea. The Hungarian Redeployment
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Chisholm
though it was thought that some oper-
Refugees boarding
ations were in doubt (such as Buna
landing ship.
and Biak in New Guinea and Salerno
in Italy) and evacuation might be re-
quired. Extant amphibious doctrine
only provided for planning and organ-
izing assaults. Thus commanders on
the scene had neither specific doctrine
nor comparable experience to guide
their decisionmaking.
Hungnam presents an ill-struc-
tured problem. It is not that these co-
nundrums have no structure, rather
that decisionmakers cannot discern it.
Problems are distinguished by the de-
gree to which their constituent parts
the magnitude of Hungnam had to
be discerned and reevaluated before
as well as during its execution Center
aarned u rnedlaertsiotonosdh.i pTys paimcaollny,g i ltlh-sotrsuec tpuarretds Naval Historical
problems are those not encountered
previously in exactly the same form
and for which no predetermined and This claim runs contrary to the con- He feared disaster if the evacuation
explicitly ordered responses exist. ventional wisdom on command rela- went awry. Sherman had already told
Such problems seldom stand still tions. But Admiral Doyle clearly un- Joy that he favored Struble for
while decisionmakers try to impose a derstood the challenges posed by Inchon and Wonsan. In particular,
structure on them. Their components ill-structured issues and connections Sherman was unwilling to pass control
and interrelationships may change between the type of problem and ap- of fast carriers to an amphibious com-
enough in a short time to make initial propriate command relations. He pro- mander. Sherman arranged for Lieu-
attempts to grasp them obsolete. This ceeded accordingly. tenant General Lemuel Shepherd,
was the case in Korea. The strategic sit- Commander, Fleet Marine Force Pa-
War for Command
uation evolved rapidly, altering tactical cific, to assume command of the
decisions and, accordingly, operational After the Wonsan-Iwon operation Hungnam operation if Doyle proved
problems for the Navy. in 1950, Doyle told Vice Admiral ineffective. For his part, Doyle found
The magnitude of the Hungnam Charles Turner Joy, Commander, Naval that “Sherman knew little, if any-
problem had to be discerned and Forces, Far East, that he would not thing, about amphibious operations.”
reevaluated before as well as during ex- serve under Vice Admiral Arthur Despite Sherman’s concern, the
ecution. Just as such quandaries do not Struble, Commander of Seventh Fleet, decision by Joy stood. Doyle had con-
admit to computational solutions, nei- in the future. When the time came to siderable leeway in the redeployment,
ther are they effectively solved with hi- organize for Hungnam—a plan for the including command of amphibious
erarchical organizations. Instead they evacuation of U.N. forces was issued ships, naval gunfire, and Marine
are best addressed by decentralized, on November 13—Joy acceded to ground-based air as well as carrier air-
self-organizing systems in which dis- Doyle on the grounds that he needed craft. He coordinated additional naval
cretion resides at many points and ex- him more than Struble. Doyle reported gunfire and air support with Struble.
perts are permitted to exercise judg- directly to Joy and enjoyed significant Joy adopted a hands-off policy and his
ment, principally through lateral discretion. His duties were quite broad command served largely in a support-
communication. and included redeployment, shipping ing role for CTF 90 in the redeploy-
But the learning curve is steep. protection, control of air support and ment. Arrangements also allowed Sev-
Trial and error are the means of gener- naval gunfire in embarkation areas, enth Fleet to maneuver as necessary
ating information and reducing un- and maintenance of the blockade should an air- or sea-based threat de-
certainty, converting something along the east coast of Korea. velop against Japan or Formosa. The
vague into a well-structured problem. Admiral Forrest Sherman, Chief of
Naval Operations, was uncomfortable
about giving such authority to Doyle.
Spring/Summer 2001 / JFQ 55
(cid:2)
JFQ FORUM
In June 1950, Amphibious Group
Map 1. Hungnam and Vicinity
One arrived in Japan to train Eighth
Army in amphibious operations.
Songchon River to3 5H maHgailaemrsuhung SamhoChannel Tmfimuholplon-ouftlrghetdhsa g nboetedn,f olDayrmo ea ypH ltehuo inwkbeigaonnsu asaem lfed,om iristcte einbn. etgE cuiqanimus hatelhe ldyae
North Fire Supoprt Moored Mines oecxoffpmiceeprria.e rAnancbedl e dh buisar icsntkaggf rfW,o wuonhrldidcsh .W hTaahrde IygI a,w ihneaerdde
Perimeters senior and were overqualified for their
Hungnam Swept Airstrip billets. Thus they provided a tremen-
Tongchon Yonpo Anchorage Area Channel dous pool of talent.
Embarked with Amphibious Group
to5 2W monilseasn ManHwa DpoortChannel Unswept Mines OTurnnaiient wionhfg e AnTem iatmp wh eAinbbtil oet,uo tsJh aTep ratanrio nowipna sgt r MaCionobimnilge-
Tongjoson SeriuFphtuoS Sea of Japan 0 Nautical Miles 5 mUAbSaMlned Ch. , Latdehd ew booyfr fkCiceoedlro stn oaegsl seEitgdhnweerad rf dot orF osTroenmaemye,
Source:Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson, The Sea War in Korea(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2000), p. 173. time and were known to Doyle. Like
the group staff, the team had been inte-
gral to operations over the preceding
Map 2. Evacuation of Hungnam months. Doyle initially seconded the
team to 1stCavalry Division (which had
no proficiency in amphibious opera-
Docks
tions) to plan the landing at Pohang
Berths Dong. It was formally placed with X
Central Embarkation Corps for Inchon and Wonsan-Iwon,
Control PointDock No. 3 NDoo.c k4 with Forney as corps deputy chief of
staff executing the bulk of the plan-
Dock N
No. 2 ning. This meant that Team Able and
Blue 1 2 1
UnAlmoamdoinDgock No. 1 Beach Green Beach tshtrea nagmerps.h Nibeiiotuhse rg wroeurep Tsetaamff wAberlee annodt
Area Breakwater 2 gXe tC oalropns.g D woyitlhe saanidy othnaet— Faonrnde yw “itchoouuldt
3
compromising himself. This facility
proved invaluable, for the corps com-
Pink Beach Yellow Beach
mander [Lieutenant General Edward
Almond, USA] was at best prickly, at
worst arrogant and overbearing.”2
At Hungnam, Doyle granted his
subordinates considerable authority to
Source:James A. Field, Jr., History of U.S. Naval Operations: Korea(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 290. make arrangements for redeployment
as their experience suggested. This was
key. What made the operation possible
Air Force did not provide air-ground Amphibious Group Three under Rear was the deep reservoir of practical
support to X Corps though it con- Admiral Lyman Thackrey to the west knowledge of amphibious operations
tributed night heckler coverage. In ad- coast while Amphibious Group One re- among Navy and Marine Corps staffs.
dition, its transport resources were es- mained under his direct command to Doyle could grant discretion to his
sential to evacuating the wounded support X Corps on the east coast. This subordinates, confident that they un-
from Chosin. meant that Thackrey conducted opera- derstood their craft. Elements then co-
tions at Chinnampo and Inchon ordinated their efforts through direct
Power Down
largely independently, while Doyle lateral communications.
Doyle had two amphibious groups commanded efforts at Songjin, Won-
Retreat in the Making
at his disposal. With simultaneous ret- san, and Hungnam.
rograde actions by Eighth Army on the General Douglas MacArthur di-
west coast and an independent X rected X Corps to concentrate around
Corps on the east coast, Doyle ordered Hamhung-Hungnam on November 30
56 JFQ / Spring/Summer 2001
Chisholm
1stCavalry Division
landing at Pohang,
July 1950.
Photos
World
Wide
P/
A
while Eighth Army retired southward to plans to solve it. Doyle intended that the plans and procedures proposed for
Pyongyang and Seoul. Doyle placed all “excess supplies and supporting troops Hungnam, which were as yet only hy-
ships on two-hour notice and they sail- would be the first to leave, and as the potheses. The evacuation was simple
ed on November 30 and December 1 beachhead shrank with the embarka- and direct. The troops ashore deployed
from Japan. tion of combat forces, gunfire and air around the city in an arc that was pro-
It remained unclear whether U.N. support would assure no diminution of gressively reduced as men and supplies
forces would withdraw to Japan or combat power ashore. In the final within the beachhead loaded and left.
maintain lodgements at Pusan and stage, bombardment would be our Support ships isolated Wonsan by
Hungnam over the winter. However, only force ashore.”3 shellfire, firing as requested, providing
the Joint Chiefs told MacArthur on De- An opportunity to test this tenta- random harassing at night, interdic-
cember 1 to withdraw X Corps. Discus- tive plan for Hungnam was presented tion fires on selected targets, and star
sions in Tokyo on December 7 modi- in a smaller extraction executed by shells to illuminate the battlefield.
fied that plan, with Eighth Army Transport Division 11 at Wonsan com- When Doyle arrived at Wonsan
holding Seoul until it was necessary to mencing on December 3. X Corps re- on December 4, there was no serious
retire to Pusan and then ferrying ported that Wonsan was under heavy enemy pressure, and all but rear ele-
X Corps back south. enemy pressure and that roads and rail ments of 3d Infantry Division had
Doyle and his staff initially re- lines to Hungnam had been cut, re- moved to Hungnam by road.
garded redeployment as an amphibi- quiring amphibious redeployment.
ous landing in reverse. It was an apt Doyle explicitly wanted this initial
comparison and provided a starting evacuation to be a small-scale test of
point for imposing some sort of struc-
ture on the problem and devising
Spring/Summer 2001 / JFQ 57
(cid:2)
JFQ FORUM
ready for movement on immediate,
Placing TNT on bridge
two-hour, or later notice as required.
over Taedong River.
On December 9, X Corps Embarka-
tion Control Group was established to
supervise corps loading. It included a
control officer, executive officer, repre-
sentatives from the technical services of
each corps, and the CTF 90 staff combat
cargo officer who served as liaison offi-
cer. At various times it included groups
from 1st Marine Division, 7th Infantry
Division, 3d Infantry Division, and a
South Korean corps. Like landings at
Inchon and Wonsan, planning for
X Corps was done by marines under
Forney. In a shed on the docks, he as-
signed personnel to key positions in the
control group where their four months
with X Corps had created strong rela-
tionships.
Doyle remembered that Almond
World Photos hleomawdbe a“dre knhasitusi oreenxd a pmthripaoltre ih.t yiHs aess u ebpsotearrbdsoliinnsahnteeedls, ftvohele--
Wide hicles, equipment, supplies, and
AP/ refugees. But he never objected to de-
partures from that order, knowing that
we had good reason....”4
The amphibious group prepared Operations Ashore Forney and his staff selected:
evacuation and redeployment plans The control and loading plan, X Corps units to be loaded on the basis of
based on the lessons of Wonsan. Sub- based on a staff study of the physical available tactical and administrative in-
ordinate unit planning proceeded si- features of the harbor, established a se- formation and assigned shipping in con-
multaneously, and continual commu- ries of control posts at Hungnam which sultation with the operations section of
nication was maintained with Doyle
Task Force 90. Port operating
and his staff in Hungnam harbor on
the amphibious group prepared plans units were then advised of
the flagship USS Mount McKinley. Task
dockside requirements, the
Element 90.04 left Wonsan on Decem- based on the lessons of Wonsan
loading section ground out its
ber 6 to lift a Korean corps from
plans, the movement section
Songjin to Hungnam, completing em- formed a special task organization. The got the traffic down to the water, and the
barkation December 9. Operations at CTF 90 operations section aboard USS rations people laid down these useful
Wonsan ended the following day, Mount McKinley, under the operations items alongside.5
when Doyle took command of port officer, coordinated ship movement, as-
This group was in direct communica-
functions. The group began outloading signed anchorages, provided docking
tion by telephone with all relevant
X Corps personnel and equipment. It instructions, and issued sailing orders
units and CTF 90 operations.
also shifted from shore-based to for all shipping. In addition, it super-
Each corps provided the embarka-
seaborne logistics, with floating petro- vised operations of other control sta-
tion control group a readiness for load-
leum, oil, and lubricants and ammuni- tions. Actual shipping control was
ing report (covering personnel, vehi-
tion dumps, along with an evacuation accomplished by stationing a radio-
cles, bulk cargo, et al.) prior to its time
center and prisoner of war camp afloat. equipped harbor control vessel in port.
to commence loading as promulgated
Doyle issued his loading and con- An officer boarded all vessels on arrival
in the master time schedule, which in
trol scheme and completed plans for to ascertain load status, capacity,
turn relied on the tactical situation.
naval gunfire and air support on De- amount and condition of loading
X Corps broke down data into ship-
cember 11. Two days later he issued equipment, and loading peculiarities.
ping requirements as advised by a
operation order 20-50, specifically The information was radioed to CTF 90
combat cargo officer. CTF 90 opera-
covering redeployment from Hung- operations. Ships were directed to be
tions assigned shipping based on these
nam. The same day, orders for gunfire
requirements and available berths. The
support and air support were finalized
embarkation control group was given
and coordinated.
58 JFQ / Spring/Summer 2001
Chisholm
Koreans fleeing
Hungnam,
December 1950.
DOD
the identity of ships assigned along were assigned to port director control. reached its berth just as the first troops
with data on their capacity and fea- The director and beachmaster shared a and supplies to go on board arrived.
tures, and a paper load was planned. radio-equipped landing craft as a dis- CTF 90 operations told the port
Shortages and overages in shipping patch boat. Ships berthed along one of director that a ship would be docked at
were reported to CTF 90 and the con- four docks in seven berthing spaces. Ex- a particular berth. The ship was then
trol group adjusted plans as necessary. perimentation quickly led to proce- directed to proceed from its anchorage
The port director had operational dures for best use of the spaces, includ- and wait in the vicinity of the break-
control over the movement of all ship- ing double-banking ships at docks. Two water for a pilot to dock it. The em-
ping in the inner harbor. Three officers radio-equipped Army yard tugs helped barkation control liaison officer ad-
to dock and undock rapidly. Doyle and vised CTF 90 when a ship would finish
his staff timed the process so a ship
Spring/Summer 2001 / JFQ 59
(cid:2)
JFQ FORUM
Doyle had organic naval gunfire
Evacuating supplies
support under his control. Ships were
from Hungnam Harbor.
stationed to deliver emergency sup-
port for X Corps and simultaneously
defend shipping against air attack. Be-
ginning December 15, positioned in
assigned mineswept channels extend-
ing 10 miles north and south of Hung-
nam, the element began deep support
fires (corps artillery provided close
support), principally interdiction and
harassing fires and illumination
rounds since the enemy tended to
press lines at night. When the perime-
ter contracted, the gunfire support
ships moved to closer stations for di-
rect support. Observation and fighter
aircraft found targets of opportunity
and supplemented ground observers.
Rocket craft were used for reverse
slope fire to attack the enemy on the
right flank overlooking Hungnam. USS
Missouri arrived December 24 to pro-
my vide added firepower. Naval gunfire
S. Ar was maintained in a zone 2,500 yards
U. wide at a distance of 3,000 yards from
the beaches and harbor. In addition to
the barrage, observers called in fires
loading and the latter gave it a chop been squandered without a simple that prevented movement by the
time, which was relayed to the port di- communications system. All control enemy through the zone by day.
rector. At that time the craft was un- posts maintained continuous contact When the last allied troops were off
docked and moved out. via radio. Doyle felt “the most impor- the beaches, destructive fires were de-
The beachmaster control unit tant factor in the operation of the con- livered into the port area. Particular
managed activities in the transport trol organization was the establish- attention was given to railroad cars.
landing ship beaching area, a function ment of [these] special primary and The Chinese elected not to seri-
analogous to the port director. A con- secondary [very high speed] voice ously interfere with operations at
trol officer directed movement of radio circuits directly connecting con- Hungnam. Combined with weather,
smaller craft in the inner harbor and trol stations.” The primary circuit was 1st Marine Division hindered the
was stationed on the control vessel. provided for all stations except for one enemy. “Their losses would certainly
Four officers and seven enlisted men staffed by the CTF 90 liaison officer at have been greater than they could
from CTF 90 assumed this role. The X Corps embarkation control group. have hoped to inflict,” Doyle noted.
control officer also assisted in move- The secondary circuit carried messages “Fire power from the sea would have
ments of landing craft in coordination between the CTF 90 liaison officer at dwarfed what they had already ab-
with the port director and beachmaster. X Corps and CTF 90. A simple numeri- sorbed during their attack on the
The CTF staff civil engineer and cal code was used to identify ships, Marines at Chosin.”7
another officer were on continuous maintaining security. Beyond surface fires, support was
duty with 2d Engineer Special Brigade, Because outloading functioned also provided by 1st Marine Aircraft
which served as the shore party re- without need of direct supervision by Wing from Yonpo airfield near
sponsible for physical aspects of load- Doyle, he could focus on stopping the Hamhung. The wing controlled all
ing. His dual role was advising the enemy from advancing on the planes (including carrier-based) and
brigade on expediting the loading and perimeter. Toward that end he em- acted as tactical air support center until
keeping CTF 90 operations constantly ployed air attacks and naval gunfire December 15. The center then moved
informed of progress. to maintain the necessary separation. to USS Mount McKinley, and CTF 90 as-
Each control element usually “Basically,” he recounted, the notion sumed control within a 35-mile radius
worked independently or coordinated was to “put in front of the U.N. units of Hungnam, including Task Force 77
with others as required. Given the a zone of fire through which the and Task Group 96.8 assets.
short timeframe, speedy communica- enemy could not pass.”6
tion was essential, and the discretion
Doyle gave to subordinates would have
60 JFQ / Spring/Summer 2001
Chisholm
Allied Forces
Fifteen nations other than the United States and Republic of Korea sent combat forces to serve in United Nations
Command. Five other nations deployed noncombatant capabilities in the form of hospitals or ambulance units. Of the
some 150,000 foreign servicemembers who fought in the Korean War, 3,360 were killed, 11,886 were wounded, and
1,801 were missing in action. A total of
1,376 foreign prisoners of war were repatri-
British commandos
ated to 12 countries in 1953.
planting charges near
Ground Forces. Fourteen allies sent
Songjin.
combat formations: Australia, Canada, New
Zealand, and the United Kingdom com-
prised British Commonwealth forces. Bel-
gium, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece,
Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Philippines,
and Thailand fielded battalion-sized units
which were attached to U.S. Army divisions
while Turkey deployed an infantry brigade.
Naval Forces. Eight allied nations—Aus-
tralia, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Thailand, and
the United Kingdom sent over 100 ships to
Korean waters, including carriers, destroy-
ers, cruisers, and frigates. These vessels were
assigned to a carrier strike force (Task Force
77), blockading/escort force (Task Force 95),
amphibious landing force (Task Force 90),
and logistic support force (Task Force 96).
Foreign ships participated in the Inchon
D
landing; evacuation of Nampo, Hungnam, DO
and Wonsan; shore bombardment of North
Korea; and patrols of the sea lines of communication to South Korea.
Air Forces. The first foreign contribution in Korea, 77thFighter Squadron, arrived from Australia in July 1950. It was
attached to an American unit, 35thFighter Group, while 2dFighter Squadron from South Africa joined another American
unit, 18thFighter Group. It provided close air support to U.N. forces. Australia, Canada, Greece, and Thailand provided air
transport units. JFQ
Marine observers provided for- the Pohang Dong operation. Air and for the defensive perimeter and suste-
ward air control throughout the opera- naval gunfire communication was nance for the refugees, tying up some
tion. Doyle recollected that they “un- handled as prescribed for assault am- port facilities for several days. Unload-
derstood the requirements of the phibious operations. ing halted when possible and evacua-
troops and the capabilities of the cov- tion began in ernest. A marked acceler-
Meeting the Unexpected
ering aircraft and their armament ation occurred on December 12. By the
loads.”8 Detachments of a Marine air Based on Wonsan, planners esti- next day, 55 percent of the men, 40
and naval gunfire liaison company as- mated that lift would be needed for percent of the vehicles, and 70 percent
signed to units of X Corps maintained some 25,000 refugees. The actual evac- of bulk cargo of 1st Marine Division
radio contact with the forward air con- uation included more than three times had been loaded.
that number. Moreover, the Plans were also developed to lift a
at sea there were never fewer than refugees required both food Korean corps from Hungnam to
and shelter while awaiting em- Samchok. Originally, X Corps esti-
four carriers to provide air support
barkation. To meet this chal- mated that only 12,000 troops, a few
lenge the Navy delivered rice. vehicles, and three ships would be
trollers, supporting aircraft, and naval When the redeployment order was re- committed. But lift requirements
gunfire ships. At sea there were never ceived, ships were unloading supplies climbed to 25,000 men, 700 vehicles,
fewer than four carriers to provide air and heavy equipment. More shipping
support, coordinated by CTF 90 opera- would be needed. Intelligence reports
tions with CTF 77 as experienced in on December 13 led to the choice of
Spring/Summer 2001 / JFQ 61
(cid:2)
JFQ FORUM
Bokuko Ko as a site for landing the Mount McKinley departed at 1632, and
NOTES
South Koreans. Task Group 90.8 was the operation ended. No allied person-
formed on December 16 and departed nel had been left. 1The operations were not without
the next day to begin disembarking. matériel and personnel casualties. On De-
cember 20–22, eight soldiers died and 12
Operations continued despite 40-knot The key to this remarkable feat is
became severely ill by ingesting methyl al-
winds, heavy seas, and freezing found in Doyle’s recognition that, al-
cohol. On December 24, prematurely deto-
weather. Ships dragged anchor and though vastly experienced in amphibi-
nated ammunition killed a Marine lieu-
small boats drifted loose. At sea, winds ous operations, he and his staff had
tenant and Navy seaman and injured
reached 60 knots and flight operations never encountered a problem remotely another 34 personnel. And an ROK landing
were suspended. resembling Hungnam. The linchpin ship fouled its propellers with manila line
At 1600 on December 19, Almond was deciding to form an ad hoc organi- and wire. Loaded with more than 7,000
arrived aboard USS Mount McKinley, zation and devise a plan predicated on people, it was extracted from the beach but
and command of all shore operations conducting an amphibious operation remained in harbor overnight to have its
passed to Doyle who, to avoid any in reverse—an arrangement that en- propellers cleared. When a gale came up, an
unknown number of refugees died of expo-
confusion, pointedly told Almond: abled experts to exercise judgment,
sure. See Walter Karig, Malcolm W. Cagle,
“You understand, general, that these identify problems, generate solutions,
and Frank A. Manson, Battle Report: Volume
troops are now under my command.”9 and directly and quickly communicate
VI, The War In Korea (New York: Rinehart,
This was precisely the reverse of the with others.
1952), pp. 432–33.
procedure for changing command in Doyle established and maintained 2James H. Doyle and A.J. Mayer, “De-
amphibious assaults, when command a decentralized, self-organizing system cember 1950 at Hungnam,”U.S. Naval Insti-
passes to the ground commander once that proved highly adaptive, flexible, tute Proceedings, vol. 105, no. 4 (April 1979),
troops are established ashore and am- and suited to the principal constraint, p. 50.
phibious commanders are notified. time. Experimentation and rapid learn- 3Ibid., pp. 47–48.
7th Infantry Division was loaded ing essential to resolve ill-structured 4Ibid., pp. 51–52.
5James A. Field, History of Naval Opera-
on December 20, giving Doyle enough problems were the rule. The plan and
tions in Korea (Washington: Government
confidence in the operational trajec- organization resulted from consulta-
Printing Office, 1962), p. 291.
tory to set December 24 as a tentative tive planning conferences that facili-
6Doyle and Mayer, “December 1950 at
D-day when all troops would be with- tated input from those members of the
Hungnam,” p. 53.
drawn. Two days later it became clear staff with the requisite expertise. The 7Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Man-
that there was sufficient shipping to profound lesson of Hungnam is found son, The Sea War in Korea (Annapolis: U.S.
add 4,000 tons of ammunition and 13 in how the operation was approached Naval Institute Press, 1957), p. 188.
boxcars to outloading. Instructions for and organized. 8Doyle and Mayer, “December 1950 at
D-day embarkation were distributed. The worst fears of commanders in Hungnam,” p. 53.
The next day refugees were loaded. Korea and media in the United States 9Robert D. Heinl, interview with James
H. Doyle, July 3–August 1, 1966. Robert D.
The port director was ordered to com- were not realized in December 1950.
Heinl Papers, Marine Corps University Re-
mence undocking ships at 2200 hours. Hungnam was no Dunkerque, nor had
search Archives.
Harassing fire from gunfire support it been likely to turn into one from
ships was increased. The port was the perspective of the Navy and Ma-
closed an hour later. rine Corps. Many factors led to suc-
At 0950 hours onDecember 24, cess, including the availability of spe-
H-hour was confirmed as 1100. Simul- cialized amphibious shipping and
taneously, aircraft dropped napalm on control of sea and air, but the defining
enemy units that had begun pressing element was effectively organized, ex-
the perimeter. At 1217 hours, two am- perienced professionals and the will-
munition dumps in the Pink Beach ingness of their commander to let
area were prematurely exploded by the them do their jobs. JFQ
Army, causing a loss of lives and boats.
The first elements of combat forces, less
covering forces, commenced loading at
1100. All beaches were clear of friendly
forces by 1405. Five minutes later, dem-
olition charges were detonated around
the inner harbor. General sortie from
the harbor started at 1457 hours, USS
62 JFQ / Spring/Summer 2001
