Table Of ContentAdaptive Planning
Not Your
Great Grandfather’s
Schlieffen Plan
Soldiers conduct combined
arms rehearsal in
Afghanistan to establish
plan of action for next BG Mark T.
day’s mission Kimmitt, USA,
chief military
spokesman for
the Coalition
Provisional
Authority, and Dan
Senor, Coalition
Information Center
director, brief
U.S. Army (Michael Zuk) press on handover
of responsibilities
to the Iraqi
By RobeRt M. Klein
government
U.S. Air Force (Jacob N. Bailey)
Background: Demolished Iraqi vehicles
line roadway in Euphrates River Valley
after Operation Desert Storm
O
n December 13,
2005, Secretary of Defense form
Donald Rumsfeld approved the backbone of a joint
the Adaptive Planning (AP) adaptive system supporting the development
Roadmap and directed its “expeditious and execution of plans, preserving the best advances in firepower and
implementation.”1 This act represented a characteristics of present-day contingency the lethality of warfare between 1870 and
significant shift in the way the Department and crisis planning with a common process. 1914. Named for its author, Alfred Graf von
of Defense (DOD) thinks about military The need to overhaul the DOD planning Schlieffen, the plan called for rapid mobiliza-
planning. The impetus for change was a and execution system becomes more evident tion and the swift defeat of France with a
recognition that the accelerating pace and when it is viewed against the backdrop of holding action against Russia.
complexity of military operations require history. Planning today is a late 19th-century But the plan’s key assumption, that
that the President, Secretary of Defense, and concept born out of the German general staff Germany could mobilize before France or
combatant commanders have the ability system. It thus seems fitting that a discussion Russia, proved its fatal flaw. Mobilization was
to respond quickly to new threats and about transforming the planning process tied to such precise timetables that once the
challenges. begins with the history of the Schlieffen Plan. trains began to roll, any attempt to stop them
Adaptive Planning is the joint capability would cause mass disruption—a potentially
to create and revise plans rapidly and system- A Fatal Assumption lethal decision if the corresponding enemy
atically, as circumstances require. It occurs From a strategic and military perspec- troop trains continued to the frontiers.
in a networked, collaborative environment, tive, the Schlieffen Plan represented an Contingent on Germany’s ability to
requires the regular involvement of senior imaginative solution to Germany’s strategic mobilize quickly, the plan backed political
Wagner) lreaandgeer so,f a vniadb rlees ouplttsi oinn sp tlhanats ccaonn tbaei naidnagp ate d cvhenaglleefnugle F orfa nbecien agn sda na dhwosictihlee dR buestswiae. eMn oar e- dopectiiosinosn amnadk teirms ein ttoo n ae cgoortinaetre .b My loirmeoitvinerg, the
Dean to defeat or deter an adversary to achieve over, it offered the real prospect of using stra- event of either French or Russian mobilization
D (
DO national objectives. At full maturity, AP will tegic maneuver to overcome technological was tantamount to a German declaration of
war on both nations. The Schlieffen Plan and
Lieutenant Colonel Robert M. Klein, USA, is a War Planner in the Joint Operational War Plans Division (J7) at equivalent schemes of the other great powers
the Joint Staff. comprised a classic example of game theory,
84 JFQ / issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu
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Adaptive Planning Not Your Great Grandfather’s Schlieffen Plan
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robert Klein
in which all players try to maximize returns. outlined Operations Plan (OPLAN) 1003, the process into a capability suited to rapidly
To a large measure, the rulers of Europe, who invasion of Iraq. Secretary Rumsfeld found changing conditions.
bungled their way to war in August 1914, the existing plan frustrating. Essentially a Simply put, the 24-month contingency
became victims of their own planning.2 replay of Operation Desert Storm in 1991, it planning cycle was too slow and inflexible
Following World War I, the U.S. military called for a slow, massive logistic buildup to to keep up with fast-paced world events and
began to formalize a planning process, and the support an invasion force of 500,000. The altered planning considerations. As Operation
result was the elaborate series of procedures methodical scheme with its months-long Iraqi Freedom demonstrated, off-the-shelf
known as the Colored Plans. These arrange- timeline did not square with the Secretary’s plans were static, difficult to adapt, and often
ments provided the basis for strategy, as well ideas for a transformed military. The plan had based on outdated assumptions, assessments,
as joint and combined operations, in World been on the shelf since its approval in 1996 forces, and circumstances. Since no formal
War II.3 Planning improvements in the second and was updated in 1998, but its assumptions, mechanisms existed to ensure early and
half of the 20th century included the Joint as Secretary Rumsfeld quickly pointed out, frequent consultation between civilian and
Operational Planning and Execution System were woefully out of date and did not reflect military leadership during plan development,
current intelligence. political leaders entering the cycle at the end
Figure 1. The Schlieffen Plan In a meeting were presented with a fait accompli—a single
n Single option
n Great plan for original assumptions n Defensive option
n Detailed movement tables and n Original assumptions,
Figure 2. assessments, forces not relevant
mobilization timelines built to
to actual situation
support single option
n Not adaptive to changing n Policymakers wanted multiple
options, to include offensive option
circumstances and strategic
n Planning process and technology
decision dynamics
n Mobilization and movement made it difficult to modify plan and
put into execution quickly
timelines backed policymakers
n Required extraordinary effort to adapt
into strategic corner
plan successfully to rapidly changing
strategic circumstances
“The outbreak of war in 1914 is the most tragic example of government’s helpless n The 1003V planning effort provides
dependence on the planning of strategists that history has ever seen.” the conceptual baseline for the
—Gerhard Ritter, author of The Schlieffen Plan: Critique of a Myth Adaptive Planning initiative
“Today’s environment demands a system that quickly produces high-
quality plans that are adaptive to changing circumstances.”
—Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, AP Roadmap, December 13, 2005
and its codification in joint
doctrine, policies, and instructions by the mid-
1990s. Despite these and other institutional on December 4, Rumsfeld
improvements (in areas such as mobilization demanded alternatives and out-of-the-box
and transportation planning), modern plan- thinking. How would the plan be executed military option that bound
ners failed to address the dilemmas that had on short notice versus an extended timeline? political decisionmaking in time-constrained
plagued all contingency plans since the incep- What was the shortest period required to situations.
tion of the Schlieffen Plan. Most critically, deliver enough forces to accomplish the This setting was disturbingly similar
contingency planning remained a flawed, mission? What if the President was willing to what happened with the Schlieffen Plan in
time-consuming process, bound by the origi- to accept more risk? Despite obvious flaws, 1914 (see figures 1 and 2). Clearly, contingency
nal assumptions and largely unresponsive to OPLAN 1003 was the only one on the shelf if plans needed to incorporate more and better
the demands of political decisionmakers who the President decided to go to war with Iraq options and sufficient branches and sequels
required more options. This reality was never immediately. A complete rewrite of a contin- that readily lent themselves to rapid and
more evident than in the events leading up to gency plan would take months.4 regular updating to support crisis planning
the invasion of Iraq in March 2003. and execution.5
On November 26, 2001, Secretary The Mandate Compounding the problem, joint plan-
Rumsfeld flew to Tampa to see General From the months-long planning prior ning has been largely sequential, requiring
Tommy Franks, commander, U.S. Central to Operation Iraqi Freedom, it became evident iterative collocation of planners from senior
Command. In a private session (Rumsfeld that a complete overhaul would be required to and subordinate organizations. Because
insisted that they be alone), General Franks transform the DOD industrial age planning authoritative data have been compartmented
ndupress.ndu.edu issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 / JFQ 85
Adaptive Planning
and are not readily accessible for planning,
Current and Adaptive Planning Processes
course of action development remains a pro-
longed process, necessitating requirements Upto24MonthsorMorefor Deliberate Planning
identification and feasibility analyses (opera-
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adjustments and extending development time-
lines even further. CCuurrrreennttPPrroocceessss ASwPitahuraaetsnieoenIss PPlahnansienIgI EPxheacsuetiIoIIn
Also, interagency involvement generally
MonthstoDaysforCrisisPlanning
occurs late in plan development. Operation
Plans Annex V, which addresses interagency
coordination, is typically written after AAPPPPrroocceessss MonthstoDaysforPlanning
approval of the base plan. Despite advances
in information technology, joint planners IPRs IPRs IPRs IPRs
remained stuck in the 20th century, having SFutrnactetigoinc FCuonncctieopnt FuPnclatnion FunPclatinon
few tools to enable work in parallel across Guidance Development Development Assessment Figure 3.
echelons in a virtual environment with access
to key planning data. n integrated intelligence planning Adaptive Planning reviews represent
At the direction of the Secretary of n embedded options a departure from the previous planning
Defense, the Principal Deputy Under Secre- n living plans processes, both in frequency and form.
tary of Defense for Policy tasked the Deputy n parallel planning in a network-centric, The intent is senior leader involvement
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Resources collaborative environment. throughout the process, including periodic
and Plans in August 2003 to work with the reviews once the plan is complete. The initial
Joint Staff to create a successor to current The end result is that Adaptive Planning IPRs focus largely on solidifying guidance,
planning processes. Specifically, he sought an for any single strategy implies that resource agreeing on the framework assumptions and
approach that would considerably shorten the requirements are dynamically allocated and planning factors, establishing a common
time it takes to produce plans and to create risk is continuously balanced against other understanding of the adversary and his inten-
plans that can be adapted to a constantly plans and operations. tion, and producing an approved combatant
changing strategic landscape.6 The result was Clear Strategic Guidance and Iterative commander mission statement.
Adaptive Planning. Dialogue. AP combines the best character- Subsequent IPRs may revisit, refine,
istics of contingency, crisis action planning, modify, or amend these outcomes as required.
Adaptive Planning Vision and execution into a single integrated process. Additionally, they will address risks, courses
The 2005 Contingency Planning Guid- Strategic guidance is the first step in the four- of action, implementing actions, and other
ance directed combatant commanders to stage planning process, which also includes key factors. Timely reviews and IPRs ensure
develop designated, priority contingency concept development, plan development, and that the plan remains relevant to the situation
plans using the AP approach. Transforming plan assessment. Each step includes as many and the Secretary’s intent as plans are rapidly
m contingency planning requires modernizing in-progress reviews (IPRs) by the Secretary modified throughout development and
Stor the way DOD thinks about and develops its as necessary to complete the plan. Although execution. Figure 3 illustrates how IPRs are
ert processes, products, people, and technology these steps are generally sequential, they may integrated throughout the AP process.
s
e for planning.7 This transformation does not overlap in the interest of accelerating the Under AP, planning will be expedited
D
on entail complete elimination of current pro- overall process. by guidance that specifies the level of detail
erati cesses. Rather, it requires a mixture of new AP speeds the procedure by providing required for each situation. The amount of
p
O and existing capabilities. The Department of more detailed and focused initial guidance in detail needed is tied to the plan’s importance
n
d i Defense must preserve the best characteristics the DOD planning documents: contingency and likelihood of execution. This helps
e
us of current processes and systems and apply planning guidance, joint strategic capabili- combatant commanders manage planning
s
cle them in unprecedented ways. ties plan, and strategic guidance statements. in the near term. There are four levels of
ehi AP allows combatant commanders to Strategic guidance also includes interagency plans under AP. Level 1 requires the least
V
g produce plans more quickly and adaptively guidance, intelligence assessments, and other detail, level 4 the most. Strategic guidance in
n
hti and of higher quality. Rapid planning and direction from the Secretary during IPRs. the contingency planning guidance and the
g
y Fi greater efficiency are achieved through com- At the combatant command level, planning joint strategic capabilities plan will identify
e
dl bining multiple stovepiped processes into one begins with the receipt of strategic guidance the level to produce. However, the Secretary
a
Br common AP process that includes: and lasts through final plan approval into may increase or decrease the level of detail
of
e a continuous plan-assessment cycle. Ulti- required in response to changed circum-
n
d: Li n clear strategic guidance and iterative mately, AP envisions streamlined strategic stances, changes in a plan’s assumptions, or
un dialogue guidance that feeds war planning through a combatant commander’s recommendation.
o
kgr n integrated interagency and coalition regular updates over a network-centric, col- The Secretary and the combatant com-
c
Ba planning laborative environment. mander confer during IPRs on the nature and
86 JFQ / issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu
robert Klein
detail of planning needed, including branches achieve the combatant commander’s desired require review at least every 6 months. As a worth)
and oIpntitoegnrsa ttoe db eI ndteevrealgoepnecdy. and Coalition eafllfye,c tths eo fp trhoec eosps ewrailtli ofoncaul so obnje cdteivveeslo. pAidndg itthioen - rfoers utrlta, nlisvitiniogn p tloa ncrsi psirso pvliadnen ai nsogl.i dA dfoduitniodnatailolyn, W. Butter
Planning. The past decade of complex opera- intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance military and political leaders are better able to Gary
tions, from Somalia to Iraq, has demon- strategy and synchronize the requisite intel- gauge and mitigate risk across multiple plans my (
Ar
strated that strategic success requires unity ligence support. Because the intelligence cam- and better comprehend the collateral impacts S.
U.
of effort not only from the military but also paign plan is directly linked to contingency of execution and changed circumstances.
from the U.S. Government and coalition planning, changes in the global strategic envi- Parallel Planning in a Network-Centric,
partners. Time and again, the United States ronment continually feed plan development Collaborative Environment. The development
and its partners have come short of fully and assessment. of a network-centric information architecture
integrating the diplomatic, informational, Embedded Options. AP features an provides an opportunity to modernize the
military, economic, and other dimensions increased number of options, as well as contingency planning process. Plans, plan-
of power into a coherent strategy. One factor branches and sequels (along with associ- ning tools, and pertinent databases will be
that has contributed to this poor perfor- ated decision points and decision criteria), linked in a network-centric environment,
mance is lack of a unified approach to plan- in order to provide the President, Secretary, whose architecture will enable collabora-
ning. AP recognizes that interagency and and combatant commanders with increased tion among widely separated planners at all
coalition considerations are intrinsic rather execution flexibility that anticipates and command echelons, promoting a better grasp
than optional and need to be integrated rapidly adapts. Such embedded options make of the operational environment and more
early in the process rather than as an after- plans more dynamic. effective parallel planning. Authoritative
thought once the military plan is complete. The term embedded options conveys internal and external databases will be linked
To this end, the combatant commander the idea that branches and sequels, in at least to promote the timely exchange of informa-
may seek approval and guidance from the outline fashion, are identified and developed tion based on appropriate access rules. New
Secretary to conduct interagency and coali- as an integral part of the base plan courses planning tools will be developed to allow this.
tion planning and coordination. The goal of action. Branches and sequels traditionally Adaptive Planning for any single plan
is to ensure that interagency and coalition have been developed toward the end of the implies a mission-based readiness system
capabilities, objectives, and endstates are con- process, often after the base plan is completed. and dynamic force management and logistic
sidered up front in the process. This holistic Under AP, embedded branches and sequels systems integrated by a common suite of
effects-based approach to planning ensures that will form an integral part of base plan design automated planning tools. This requires
correct national or coalition instruments are and development. As AP matures, technology that the defense readiness and Global Force
employed to match the desired ends. As part will enable combatant command planners to Management processes operate across
of the planning process, and with approval develop an extensive menu of such branches multiple plans and operations to allocate
of the Secretary, the combatant commander and options rapidly, well beyond what has resources and balance risk.
may present his plan’s Annex V (Interagency previously been practicable. Base plans may Both identifying and sourcing require-
Coordination) to the Office of the Secretary eventually become a “menu of options” to ments are necessary to determine force, trans-
of Defense/Joint Staff Annex V Working execute based on exigent circumstances. portation, and logistic feasibility. Approved
Group for transmittal to the National Security Living Plans. What distinguishes current courses of action must often be adapted to
Council for managed interagency staffing and planning from AP is that the latter does render them feasible, causing delays in the
plan development. In advance of authorization not allow ideas to sit on the shelf. The final process. Automated collaborative tools will
for formal transmittal of Annex V, the com- step, plan assessment, represents a “living” allow planners to develop these options, deter-
mander may request interagency consulta- environment in which plans are refined, mine their feasibility, and incorporate them
tion on approved Annex V elements by the adapted, terminated, or executed (referred to into the concept of the operation, rather than
Office of the Secretary of Defense/Joint Staff as RATE-ing a plan). At full maturity, AP will developing them after the base plan and select
Working Group. Concurrently, the combatant produce network-centric living plans. A living annexes are completed. Analysis includes
commander may present his plan for multina- plan is maintained within a collaborative, wargaming, operational modeling, and initial
tional involvement. virtual environment and is updated routinely feasibility assessments. Joint wargaming
Integrated Intelligence Planning. Intel- to reflect changes in intelligence assess- tools will allow planners to visualize the plan
ligence campaign planning provides a meth- ments, readiness, Global Force Management, to analyze the operational feasibility, risk,
odology for synchronizing, integrating, and transportation availability, guidance, assump- and sustainability of courses of action. In
managing all available combatant command tions, and the strategic environment. Both AP, feasibility analysis occurs much earlier
and national intelligence capabilities with automatic and manually evaluated triggers in the process than previously possible. The
combatant command planning and opera- linked to real-time sources will alert leaders capabilities to conduct detailed assessments
tions. Throughout the planning process, the and planners to changes in
combatant command J2, in coordination with critical conditions that warrant a
both identifying and sourcing requirements
the Joint Staff J2 and U.S. Strategic Command, revaluation of a plan’s relevancy,
are necessary to determine force,
will continue leading DOD through the intel- feasibility, and risk. Top-priority
ligence campaign planning process, which plans and ideas designated in the transportation, and logistic feasibility
develops the intelligence tasks required to contingency planning guidance
ndupress.ndu.edu issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 / JFQ 87
Adaptive Planning
in a matter of days rather than months are a from multiple, viable options adaptable to a
NDU Topical Symposium significant leap forward. variety of circumstances. Gone are the days
By leveraging emerging technologies of outdated, single option, off-the-shelf plans
and developing initiatives, DOD can create of the Schlieffen and OPLAN 1003 variety. As
an integrated planning architecture in which the fluid strategic situation unfolds, emplaced
data is shared seamlessly among users, triggers will alert planners to the need for
applications, and platforms. At present, the modifications or revisions to keep plans
combatant commands and Services use a relevant based on further strategic guidance,
variety of tools for planning that have near- continuous intelligence assessment of threat
term utility in supporting AP. Tools that could assumptions, rapid force/logistic manage-
be rapidly developed and acquired constitute ment processes, and mission-based readiness
an area of special interest. The result will be systems. The confluence of these capabilities
a compressed decisionmaking cycle with an represents a quantum leap that will finally
enhanced understanding of how decisions allow the planning community to break the
affect campaigns. bounds of the Schlieffen Plan and enter the
As part of spiral development, combat- 21st century. JFQ
ant commands are currently using the AP
process to build several of the Nation’s highest NOTES
priority war plans. Nevertheless, at full matu-
rity, Adaptive Planning envisions transpar- 1 This article borrows heavily from the Adap-
tive Planning Roadmap (December 13, 2005).
ency between contingency and crisis action
2 See Adam Gropnik, “The Big One,” The New
planning enabled by integrating readiness
Yorker (August 23, 2004), available at <www.newy-
with Global Force Management processes that
orker.com/printables/critics/040823crat_atlarge>.
Applying dynamically allocate resources and balance
3 See Henry G. Gole, The Road to Rainbow:
risks across multiple plans and operations.
Army Planning for Global War, 1934–1940 (Annap-
Spacepower The implementation of Adaptive Planning olis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2002).
requires spiral development through three 4 Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (New York:
stages: initiation, implementation, and integra- Simon and Schuster, 2004), 35–44.
tion. This approach will enable the Depart- 5 Branches and sequels provide the commander
ment of Defense to begin Adaptive Planning with alternatives and follow-on options beyond the
immediately for selected priority plans, learn basic plan and should similarly have entry and exit
criteria.
from that, and evolve to a mature process.
6 Ryan Henry, Adaptive Planning memoran-
Save Requirements for every successive stage—each
dum, August 26, 2003.
providing planners with a more sophisticated
7 Adaptive Planning has combined seven
the Date. . . capability—will depend on stakeholder feed- categories—doctrine, organization, training, mate-
back and technology maturation.
rial, leadership, personnel, and facilities—into four:
processes, products, people, and technology.
For a relatively modest investment,
April 25–26, 2007
Adaptive Planning may have a significant
strategic impact, creating situations in which
the President, Secretary of Defense, and other
NDU is hosting this capstone
senior leaders play a central role by selecting
conference following a year-long
project assessing the uses of
space.
Experts will present proposals for Marine uses large sand
applying space as an element of table to brief troops on
war plans and positions
national power across the civil,
during Operation
commercial, military, and intel- Enduring Freedom
ligence sectors.
Contact: [email protected] or Roufs)
P.
visit the NDU Web site (www.ndu.edu) for w
information on the agenda and registration Andre
D (
O
D
88 JFQ / issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu
