Table Of ContentSorting Out “National Interests”
Ways To Make Analysis Relevant but Not
Prescriptive
Fulton T. Armstrong
The CIA is neither a policy nor a way to a solution,” a senior
law-enforcement agency—this is national security adviser told me.
our mantra from the day that we For that reason, one party may
sign on. Analysts do not have pol- see the other’s analysis of an
icy preferences. Analytic prod- international matter as a crass
ucts do not lean in specific policy manipulation to achieve an
directions. The Agency produces advantageous policy outcome. In
“
intelligence free from political fact, some solutions are embraced
bias. more readily than are analyses of
the problems. In the late 1990s,
Defining and
We say implicitly that we focus for example, US counternarcot-
prioritizing national
on national interests, not the pol- ics efforts in Colombia received
interests icy or political interests of an bipartisan support, but there was
[has become] more administration or the Congress. nowhere near a consensus on the
urgent and more Every piece of intelligence we causes, effects, and prognosis for
difficult than ever produce is to be both policy rele- the Andean nation’s difficulties—
vant and—despite the correla- or the resultant implications for
before. We in the
tion between relevance and the what we loosely called “US
Intelligence
political stakes behind it—reflect national interests.”
Community have to do
a non-politicized interpretation of
a lot of the defining for the national interest. We say we Analytic papers in the Intelli-
ourselves. can swim without getting wet. gence Community traditionally
have ended with a section that
”
Remaining relevant but neutral lays out the implications of for-
is a noble goal, but not an easy eign developments for US
one. The lure of conforming to national interests. But how do
the view of reality held by inter- intelligence analysts know what
ested players in the Executive measures to use? At the dawn of
and Legislative Branches is the 21st century, rapid changes
strong, although our culture in in international affairs and in
the Intelligence Community how they are covered by the
alerts us to resist. But who deter- information business, of which
mines what is in the national we are a specialized part, make
interest if not the policymakers defining and prioritizing national
and the political processes that interests more urgent and more
empower them? difficult than ever before. We in
the Intelligence Community have
The answer, in a democracy such to do a lot of the defining for our-
Fulton T. Armstrong is a career
as ours, is no one. Our system selves.
officer in the CIA’s Directorate of
Intelligence. He currently serves on encourages a political competi-
the National Intelligence Council. tion to define problems as well as Over the years, I have seen poli-
solutions. “Good analysis of the cymakers and politicians apply
problem gets us 90 percent of the the term “national interest” to
27
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Ways To Make Analysis Relevant but Not Prescriptive
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National Interests
“
No one would argue
against responding
forcefully to an effort
four different types of priorities, mud, hindered the emergence of
to invade our national
only one or two of which are of civil society, and raised the
genuine strategic importance. territory or blockade threat of mass migration. How
US ports. This is safe has the US national interest been
served?
Fundamental National analytic territory.
Security Interests ” Promotion of free trade is
another sweeping policy that
Extremely few matters fall into
enjoys broad support, even as US
this first category of national
patible with our national regulations and legislation at
interests, which comprises goals
interest, but support is not uni- times pull us in the opposite
of a high order on which there is
versal. Many who agree on the direction. Support for free trade
public consensus without debate.
goals assert that there are better is premised upon the belief that
Included here are policies aimed
ways of getting there. every country has a comparative
at protecting the United States,
advantage in some products,
its citizens at home and abroad,
The advancement of democracy which it can use to develop a
and key national economic rela-
in Latin America, for example, is trade pattern that benefits itself
tionships from immediate
a perennial policy that few cavil and its trading partners. Until
threats. These objectives are
with—at least until it is pitched the current economic crisis in
almost universally accepted.
against competing interests. Dur- South America, US trade offi-
Although some observers may
ing a tour as a policymaker at the cials were often faced with a
quibble with aspects of the execu-
National Security Council (NSC), dilemma: Should Washington
tion of the current “war on terror-
I routinely heard (and made support MERCOSUR, the cus-
ism,” for example, no one has
myself) appeals for policies under toms union in the Southern Cone
challenged that it is clearly in the
the comfortable rubric of “promo- of South America that promotes
national interest to destroy
tion of democracy.” But I also free trade among its members
Osama bin Laden, his organiza-
routinely encountered argu- but imposes high tariffs on out-
tion, and its significant enablers.
ments that it was not in our siders?1 What about Brazil, a
No one would argue against
member of MERCOSUR whose
national interest to demand too
responding forcefully to an effort
tone on trade issues bordered on
much from societies that plainly
to invade our national territory
anti-US rhetoric—was that coun-
were not ready. On no issue was
or blockade US ports. This is safe
try a friend or a foe in Washing-
this paradox clearer than on
analytic territory.
ton’s effort to promote free trade?
Haiti in the late 1990s: Although
Free-traders said “foe,” but the
extensive data indicated that
administration determined that
Administration Priorities opponents of President Aristide
because MERCOSUR drove
were weak and divided, our pol-
regional economic integration
Most policies, however, neither icy was to support the political
and trade expansion it was com-
are so directly linked to the well opposition as a driver for demo-
patible with US objectives.
being of our nation nor enjoy cratic development and a wedge
such broad support. Many are against Aristide’s efforts to con-
The war on drugs is based on a
actually policy preferences laid solidate his less-than-fully-demo-
clear, almost-universal concept of
out by an administration. They cratic power. Now, several years
the national interest—to protect
enjoy the political backing of the later, little, if any, progress
President, his cabinet, and, usu- toward the consolidation of
ally, a significant portion of the democracy has been made and
1MERCOSUR is dominated by Brazil and
US Congress and the public. the suspension of international
includes Argentina, Uruguay, and Para-
Most people would readily con- assistance has driven the Hai- guay. Chile and Bolivia are observer
cede that such policies are com- tian economy deeper into the members.
28 National Interests
National Interests
“
When two sets of
perceived national
interests collide, what
the American people from the and foremost a domestic political
measures should
scourge of psychotropic sub- matter.” You do not have to be a
intelligence
stances and the crime that they cynic to see a link between Cuba
engender—but counternarcotics professionals use to policy, Florida elections, and
policy has not had universal sup- evaluate gains and campaign finances. Most observ-
port and, at times, has butted up setbacks for ers judge that the chance is
against other national interests. extremely slim that explosive
Washington?
Some critics question the moral- change on the island—the sec-
”
ity of the United States spraying toral interest—would result in
herbicides on wide swaths of stability and democracy—the
other countries’ cultivated land measures should intelligence pro- national interest. But that view
when we do so little here at home fessionals use to evaluate the continues to underpin the inter-
to stop the use of the narcotics. gains and setbacks for Washing- pretation of our national inter-
Others focus on the pressures ton from developments in foreign ests in Cuba.
generated by the drug problem areas? Sometimes issues that do
for Washington to cooperate with not affect the whole country In Venezuela and Colombia, the
the likes of former Peruvian become elevated to national interests of US oil companies—in
President Fujimori, whose gover- interest status because of the addition to the US government’s
nance had clearly undemocratic power of their constituencies. desire to ensure oil flows—carry
aspects, and his intelligence While generally consistent with weight in political deliberations.
chief, a human rights abuser and the national interest, these pol- When analysts were studying the
illegal arms marketer. icy priorities favor one parochial potential impact that a proposed
position over others. Their proac- purchase by Chile of advanced
Many such decisions reflect pol- tive constituencies espouse fighter aircraft would have on the
icy preferences that touch on approaches that their opponents military and political balance in
competing national interests. claim overshadow more impor- South America, US aircraft man-
Policymakers consider it in the tant issues. Should analysts ufacturers had already pre-
national interest to promote accept the point of view of nar- sented their case to government
sound environmental practices, row interest groups as valid officials. Should intelligence ana-
but they are often reluctant to expressions of national interest, lysts accept the companies’
condition free trade agreements when an administration appears view—and subsequently the
on such practices. Administra- to endorse them? administration’s position—that
tions put differing emphasis on the sale of arms better served US
strengthening and using multi- On Cuba, senior and mid-level national interests than a continu-
lateral institutions: They pick policymakers have barely ation of arms control efforts in
and choose which summit ven- concealedin the past the fact Latin America?
ues—the Summit of the Ameri- that a relatively small constitu-
cas, the UN General Assembly, ency is the most intense pro- How should intelligence ana-
APEC, the G-7—will be largely moter of the “pressure cooker” lysts, from around the globe to
ceremonial and which will be approach of maintaining the eco- cubicles inside the Beltway, dis-
treated as serious opportunities nomic embargo, isolating Havana cern and prioritize US interests?
to advance US agendas. internationally, and promoting Is a setback for a US corpora-
internal upheaval. One past tion—say, a tariff that hurts its
Coordinator for Cuban Affairs at competitiveness—a setback for
Sectoral Preferences the State Department would the US national interest? What if
answer challenges to the govern- a corporation sells a product
When two sets of perceived ment’s policy, in open forum, damaging to peoples’ health, such
national interests collide, what with the answer, “Cuba is first as cigarettes? What if a firm is
National Interests 29
National Interests
“
Priorities are never as
clear-cut as policy
rhetoric would have
incorporated in the United States request for intelligence on a mat-
them.
but has no American factory or ter that is presented as being of
workforce? What if the company ” urgent national interest, only to
has been involved in a scandal? find out later that our support
Which factors count, and which was used to help one side in a
do not? bureaucratic dogfight.
Intellectual Property Rights For intelligence professionals,
A desk officer in a policy agency
(IPR) must be on the agenda of this real world poses tough ques-
who disagrees with a particular
any administration because of tions for analyzing the implica-
policy may leak details to Capi-
the vast sums of money at stake tions of foreign developments for
tol Hill or the press in hopes of
for US businesses. But policy- US national interests. Analytic
stirring opposition to it. Or a
makers are aware that certain papers traditionally address
State Department officer hoping
IPR violations—such as the pro- “Implications for the United
to become an ambassador some
vision of illegally produced drugs States,” not “Implications for
day may act on instructions from
to the desperately ill and pirated Administration Priorities” or
Senate staffers with more alac-
software to small businesses— “Implications for US Political
rity than on guidance from his
help to promote social and eco- Horse-trading.” Such sections
own bosses. How is an intelli-
nomic well-being in less advan- often have a contrived feel
gence analyst to separate the
taged countries. Pirated medical because the genuine national
wheat from the chaff and discern
textbooks enable universities in interests are not clear. The temp-
true national interests? Chaff
the third world to train doctors, tation to take sides in policy
masquerading as “national inter-
which is arguably in the US debates is strong, but analysts
est” handicaps the ability of
national interest. How should can run into trouble even inad-
intelligence analysts to evaluate
intelligence analysts sort out the vertently, because there are so
the impact of foreign develop-
priorities when national inter- many types and levels of
ments on the United States.
ests conflict? “national interest.” If we are not
careful, sections that address
The Real World “Implications for the United
Bureaucratic Interests States” can become policy-pre-
“National interests” are not abso- scriptive simply by describing a
Finally, sometimes a depart- lutes. The complex dynamics that positive outlook that coincides
ment, agency, or employee of the underpin policy preferences are with a policy direction or express-
US government puts parochial or part of living in the real world. ing pessimism about a foreign
personal interests first and sub- Priorities are never as clear-cut country’s course of action, and
sequent actions become de facto as policy rhetoric would have can appear to “poke the policy-
statements of national interest. them. It is the responsibility and maker in the eye,” as former
This happened when the US mili- prerogative of the policymakers Director of Central Intelligence
tary disagreed with aspects of US to determine how conflicting Robert Gates used to say.
policy on Haiti and unilaterally interests will be prioritized for
suspended deployment of mili- their purposes. It is particularly
tary medical personnel to run tough when policymakers’ appe- So What Can We Do?
clinics for Haiti’s poor. An tites for intelligence contribu-
Embassy sometimes soft-pedals a tions do not correlate closely with To stay clear of minefields, the
demarche when it is ordered to the lofty priorities we think we crucial first step is to consciously
register a complaint but does not should be supporting. Indeed, assess the different categories
want to disrupt comfortable rela- many of us have worked late into into which US interests fall—not
tions with the host government. the night to meet a policymaker an easy task because all inter-
30 National Interests
National Interests
“
Our job is to remain
outside the policy and
political process, not to
ests seek to cloak themselves as fine-tuned to address specific,
be ignorant of it.
“national” interests.2 To do that, narrow intelligence problems.
in my opinion, requires intelli- ” Policy support should be called
gence professionals to follow the “intelligence” because of the ana-
policy and political debates and lysts’ value-added, not the clan-
know where various policymak- destine sourcing.
ers and politicians are drawing
the lines on national interests. Use alternative analysis. Single-
Periodic internal reviews of our
Our job is to remain outside the line analysis entails selectivity in
work provide more meaningful
policy and political process, not to the use of evidence and argumen-
insights into the quality and
be ignorant of it. To navigate tation and, therefore, results in a
timeliness of our support to poli-
around the shoals of debate, we relatively narrow interpretation
cymakers. Analysts should also
have to know where the points of of US interests. Explorations of
seek information from outside
contention are. alternative possibilities are more
the administration—from public
intellectually honest, pre-judge
forums, nongovernmental organi-
policy preferences less, and have
We can garner only a piece of this zations, and Capitol Hill. Ana-
a longer shelf life. Reinterpret-
from policymaker “feedback” on lysts should be versant in the
ing evidence based on a recogni-
analysis, although such channels policy and political sides of their
tion that the assumptions,
of communication are important. stories. Savvy intelligence
drivers, and implications in our
In my personal experience, feed- requires it.
main line of analysis may be
back should always be taken
wrong or skewed can force us to
with a grain of salt. Administra-
The Intelligence Community
recognize the legitimacy of differ-
tion officials are human, and it is should consciously embrace avail-
ent perspectives and keep us
natural for them to favor infor- able tradecraft tools to move
from getting too close to one pol-
mation that supports their views. safely and productively through
icy thrust or another. My bet is
Policymakers usually are not the minefield of competing
that, if rigorously worked into
eager to challenge us or put national interests. When applied
analytic products, alternative
opposing views on the table— in a rigorous, systematic fashion,
analysis would be much more
because they see no benefit in these tools help give meaning to
meaningful than the generally
questioning the conclusions, our non-bias mantras.
forced and stilted “Implications
want to avoid the appearance of
for the United States” sections as
unduly influencing analysis, or
Commit to all-source informa- traditionally written.
are too harried to take the time.
tion. Analysts traditionally have
had a bias in favor of clandestine Balance warning and opportu-
reporting, and a brimming inbox nity intelligence. Warning is use-
2Our mission would be simpler if we
worked to the policy agenda of the Presi- leaves little time for seeking data ful to the senior policy
dent only. The agencies of the Intelligence elsewhere. In addition to build- generalist—who uses it to keep
Community belong, after all, to the Execu- ing context for good analysis, all- the regionalists and specialists
tive Branch, the President was elected by
source information gives us a on their toes—but it tends to
the American people, and the Constitu-
deeper sense of what policy, polit- reflect a narrow understanding of
tion gives him leadership over foreign pol-
icy issues. We would cast any warning in ical, and bureaucratic agendas our national interests. Merely to
terms of threats to the President’s initia- are being brought to bear on an warn is somewhat extortionary;
tives, and any opportunities in terms of issue—and helps us steer clear of it tells policymakers that we see
promoting his agenda. We would provide
appearing to take sides. This is circumstances harmful to
only that information and analysis that
especially important in the new national interests according to a
promoted the array of national, policy,
and political interests that the President intelligence age, in which collec- single interpretation of them. It
brought to each issue. tion resources are increasingly covers our rear ends—we can
National Interests 31
National Interests
“
We should provide the
facts and possible
interpretations of
always say we “told you so”—but whether to keep Cuba on the
them, but not apply a
it leaves the policymakers State Department’s list of State
value ruler.
exposed, often without providing Sponsors of Terrorism. It is the
actionable intelligence that ” decisionmakers’ prerogative to
would help them develop a via- decide whether rhetoric hostile to
ble remedy. Good opportunity a US policy—say, criticism of the
analysis, on the other hand, pro- war in Afghanistan—is a “set-
vides the policy community with back” for the US national inter-
financial crisis to worry about.
an inclusive assessment of how est in absolute terms.
An overly Castro-centric inter-
various US interests are affected
pretation of events in Cuba, some
by evolving circumstances. Done The Intelligence Community
would say, has impaired the
right, opportunity analysis should provide policymakers with
United States’ ability to see
reflects the complex array of analytic products that are realis-
opportunities to promote our
interests that policymakers are tic and reflect a range of legiti-
interests effectively on the
trying to juggle. If a foreign gov- mate interpretations of events
island.
ernment is headed toward a deci- and their implications for the
sion harmful to a US interest, United States. We should be the
analysts may see opportunity to The Bottom Line radiologists: We take the picture
promote other interests, perhaps and read the spots on it to the
as a quid pro quo. Foreign policy The policymaker (or his or her best of our ability, but we leave
does not follow a straight line; boss) was elected by the Ameri- the diagnosis and cure to the doc-
analysis should not either. can people to make value judg- tors. We should provide the facts
ments. It is our job to develop a and possible interpretations of
Steer clear of value judgments framework to help policymakers them, but not apply a value
and value-laden labels that weigh multiple options, but their ruler. Our products should reflect
assume a certain interpretation job to determine how to react to an awareness of the immutable
of our national interests. We challenging situations, from “national interests” as well as the
should stick to providing as turning the other cheek to stag- range of policy options and politi-
sharp, complete, and balanced a ing a full confrontation. It is our cal preferences—and not pre-
picture as possible, and leave the job to discern whether the Argen- judge them for the policymaker.
judging to the policy and politi- tine government’s new economic
cal world. In leadership analysis, policies will enable it to survive
for example, monikers such as and satisfy people’s needs, but it
“reformer,” “populist,” or “deci- is the policymakers’ job to deter-
sive leader,” are not as meaning- mine whether Argentina’s steps
ful as laying out evidence about a warrant US and IMF help. It is
leader’s position on an issue of our job to assess the intentions,
specific interest to the US policy- strengths, and vulnerabilities of
maker. Adulation for Argentine violent groups, such as the
President Carlos Menem in the Colombian FARC insurgents, but
1990s, for example, blinded it is the prerogative of senior US
senior officials in the US govern- officials to brand them “terror-
ment, International Monetary ists” and include them in the Glo-
Fund, and elsewhere to the long- bal War on Terrorism. It is our
term damage caused by corrup- job to provide information on
tion during his two terms, leav- whether the Cuban government
ing Buenos Aires (and is supporting terrorist activities,
Washington) with a $140 billion but it is the policymakers’ choice
32 National Interests
