DTIC ADA498042: Studies in Intelligence. Volume 51, Number 2, 2007

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Awards The Sherman Kent Award of $2,500 is offered annually for the most signifi-
cant contribution to the literature of intelligence submitted for publication in
Studies. The prize may be divided if two or more articles are judged to be of
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Studies in Intelligence Vol. 51, No. 2 i
C O N T E N T S
Center for the Study of Intelligence
Washington, DC 20505
EDITORIAL POLICY INTELLIGENCE TODAY AND TOMORROW
Articles for Studies in Intelligence may
The Question of Strategic Counterintelligence
be written on any historical, opera-
tional, doctrinal, or theoretical aspect What Is It, and What Should We Do About It? 1
of intelligence. Michelle Van Cleave
The final responsibility for accepting
or rejecting an article rests with the The State of Strategic Intelligence
EditorialBoard.
The Intelligence Community’s Neglect
The criterion for publication is of Strategic Intelligence 15
whether, in the opinion of the Board,
John G. Heidenrich
thearticle makes a contribution to the
literatureof intelligence.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES
EDITORIAL BOARD
Carmen A. Medina, Chairperson The Beginning of Intelligence Analysis in CIA
Frans Bax The Office of Reports and Estimates:
A. Denis Clift
CIA’s First Center for Analysis 27
Nicholas Dujmovic
Woodrow Kuhns
Dawn R. Eilenberger
William C. Liles
William Nolte The Art of Strategic Counterintelligence
Maj. Gen. Richard J. O’Lear,
The Musketeer’s Cloak: Strategic Deception
USAF (Ret.)
During The Suez Crisis of 1956 47
John W. Perkins
Dwight Pinkley Ricky-Dale Calhoun
Barry G. Royden
Jon A. Wiant
A Retrospective on Counterinsurgency Operations
Members of the Board are drawn from the The Tay Ninh Provincial Reconnaissance Unit
Central Intelligence Agency and other
and Its Role in the Phoenix Program, 1969–70 59
Intelligence Community components.
Colonel Andrew R. Finlayson, USMC (Ret.)
EDITORIAL STAFF
INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC
Andres Vaart, Editor
LITERATURE
Early Cold War Spies: The Espionage
Trials That Shaped American Politics 71
Reviewed by John Ehrman
Spymistress: The Life of Vera Atkins:
The Greatest Female Agent in World War II 77
Reviewed by Thomas F. Troy
iii
Special Agent, Vietnam:
A Naval Intelligence Memoir 81
Reviewed by Michael J. Sulick
The Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf 85
Compiled and Reviewed by Hayden B. Peake
iv
Contributors
Ricky-Dale Calhoun holds an MA in History from Murray State University and
is now a PhD candidate at Kansas State University. He is focusing on foreign af-
fairs and the role of intelligence in decisionmaking.
John Ehrman serves in the Directorate of Intelligence. He is a frequent contrib-
utor and a winner of a Studies in Intelligence annual award.
Andrew Finlayson retired as a Colonel in the US Marine Corps. He has since
held senior positions with the Northrup Grumman Corporation.
John Heidenrich is a consultant to the Intelligence Community and the Depart-
ment of Defense. He has served as an analyst with the Defense Intelligence Agen-
cy. He is author of How to Prevent Genocide: A Guide for Policymakers, Scholars
and the Concerned Citizen and numerous published articles.
Woodrow Kuhns is deputy director of the Center for the Study of Intelligence. He
has served as an analyst in the Directorate of Intelligence, was a CIA historian, and
has taught at the US Naval War College.
Hayden B. Peake is the curator of the CIA Historical Intelligence Collection. He
served in the Directorate of Science and Technology and the Directorate of Opera-
tions. He is a frequent contributor to this and other intelligence journals.
Michael J. Sulick was associate deputy director of operations in CIA before he
retired in 2004. He was a member of the Studies in Intelligence Editorial Board.
Thomas F. Troy is a retired CIA officer who has authored Donovan and the CIA:
A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency and Wild Bill
and Intrepid: Donovan, Stephenson, and the Origin of the CIA.
The Honorable Michelle Van Cleave is Senior Research Fellow at the National
Defense University. She was National Counterintelligence Executive of the United
States during 2003–2006.
v
The Question of Strategic Counterintelligence
Strategic Counterintelligence: What Is It,
and What Should We Do About It?
Michelle Van Cleave
Ever since Sherman Kent’s sig- Yet to the extent strategic coun-
nature work was published, stra- terintelligence (CI) is addressed
tegic intelligence has been the within CI or intelligence circles,
subject of literature, study, and it is controversial, poorly under-
practice, and, although an author stood, and even more poorly exe-
in the pages of this issue of Stud- cuted because it does not fit
ies will disagree, the subject has comfortably within the existing
come to occupy a well-estab- architecture and approach to
lished place as a core intelli- counterintelligence as it has
“
gence product line and mission.1 developed within the United
States.
‘Strategic CIA historian Don Steury has
counterintelligence’ written: Even though it has been six
remains a relatively years since the office of the
undeveloped concept, in In thinking about intelligence, National Counterintelligence
Sherman Kent began with an Executive (NCIX) was created to
theory or in
understanding of national lead and integrate the US coun-
implementation.
power that was well within the terintelligence enterprise, at
” mainstream of contemporary present we have neither the
American strategic thought.
ability to perform the mission of
Kent’s contribution was to
strategic counterintelligence nor
apply thinking about strategy
a common understanding of
and national power to an
ordered conception of intelli- what it means, much less an
gence analysis as an appreciation of its value to
intellectual discipline.2 national security.a Indeed, it is
one thing to have a national-
By contrast, “strategic counterin- level office to bring strategic
telligence” remains a relatively coherence to wide-ranging CI
undeveloped concept, in theory or activities, as the law provides; it
implementation. Isn’t this curi- is quite another matter (to para-
ous? For if strategic intelligence
takes as its touchstone the whole
aThe Counterintelligence Enhancement
of state interests and the sources
Act of 2002 and Presidential Decision
of state power, then understand-
Directive 75 (PDD-75, January, 2001),
ing the purpose and manner in establishing the NCIX, were prompted by
which other states use their deep concerns over CI’s failure to keep
intelligence resources to gain pace with growing foreign intelligence
activities that were exploiting seams
advantage and mastering the
between the several CI agencies of the US
capability to counter them would
government and targeting not only
seem to be the other side of the national security secrets but commercial
strategic intelligence coin. proprietary information as well.
All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the
author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US gov-
ernment endorsement of an article’s factual statements and interpretations.
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 51, No. 2 1
Strategic CI
Counterintelligence embraces both “information gathered” and
“activities conducted” to counter foreign intelligence threats. countered by a strategic response.
And third, there must be a
national level system that inte-
phrase Henry Kissinger) to of foreign powers, terrorist grates and coordinates diverse
answer the question, “What is groups, and other entities that programs, resources, and activi-
strategic counterintelligence and seek to harm us. Sound security ties to achieve common strategic
what do you do with it?” measures are unquestionably objectives.
vital, but they can only carry pro-
I would like to offer some tection so far. One can pile on so
thoughts on the subject, not to much security that no one can The Threat Is Strategic
quiet controversy but in the hope move, and still there will be a
of provoking more debate. In my purposeful adversary looking for Foreign intelligence operations
view, the US CI community is at a ways to get what he wants.3 The against the United States are
crossroads. Either strategic coun- signature purpose of counterin- now more diffuse, more aggres-
terintelligence is a theoretical telligence is to confront and sive, more technologically sophis-
construct with little to no place in engage the adversary. ticated, and potentially more
the real world of US intelligence, successful than ever before. In
in which case we really do not The tradecraft of counterintelli- recent years, we have seen a
need a national level effort to gence and its several tactical growing number of intelligence
direct it; or it is a compelling functions, which are properly operations within our borders,
national security mission. If it is within the separate cognizance facilitated by an extensive for-
the latter, we are losing precious and competence of units within eign presence that provides cover
time and advantage and should the FBI, CIA, and the Depart- for intelligence services and their
get on with the job. ment of Defense, have well estab- agents.
lished objectives and processes
that are not at issue here. What Traditional foes, building on past
The meaning of “strategic
is at issue, what the very con- successes, are continuing efforts
counterintelligence”
cept of “strategic counterintelli- to penetrate the US government,
gence” implies, is the potential while waves of computer intru-
Counterintelligence has its own
for engaging CI collection and sions into sensitive US govern-
distinct logic as an intellectual
operations as tools to advance ment information systems have
discipline. As defined at law,
national security policy objec- confounded efforts to identify
counterintelligence embraces
tives, and, at the strategic level, their sources. We have also seen
both “information gathered” and
to go on the offense to degrade apparent attempts by foreign
“activities conducted” to counter
hostile external foreign intelli- partners to exploit cooperative
foreign intelligence threats.b gence services and their ability to endeavors against terrorist
More specifically, it is the job of
work against us. groups to obtain essential secrets
US counterintelligence to iden-
about US intelligence and mili-
tify, assess, neutralize and
There are three predicates upon tary operations. In addition, a
exploit the intelligence activities
which a strategic CI mission market in US national security
would rest. First, the foreign secrets has emerged that, among
intelligence threat is strategic, other things, enables foreign
bThe definition of counterintelligence
meaning that states use their practices of deception and denial
found in the National Security Act of 1947
still stands: “information gathered and intelligence resources purpose- to impair US intelligence collec-
activities conducted to protect against fully to gain advantage over the tion. And perhaps most trou-
espionage, other intelligence activities, United States and to advance bling, growing foreign
sabotage, or assassinations conducted by
their interests. Second, strategic capabilities to conduct influence
or on behalf of foreign governments or ele-
intelligence threats cannot be and other covert operations
ments thereof, foreign organizations or
foreign persons, or international terrorist defeated through ad hoc mea- threaten to undermine US allies
activities.” sures alone. The threats must be and national security interests.
2 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 51, No. 2
Strategic CI
Growing foreign capabilities to conduct influence and other co-
The proliferation of clandestine vert operations threaten to undermine US allies and national se-
intelligence services is a striking curity interests
feature of the modern interna-
tional security environment. At
the start of the 20th century, no on foreign intelligence adversar- compelling issue is the scope of
state had a standing external ies than it was on the 19 hijack- these activities.
intelligence service; today there ers that September morning.
is scarcely a government that
Historically, embassies and other
does not have one. And we are From the standpoint of foreign
diplomatic establishments in the
only just beginning to under- intelligence interest, there are
United States have served as
stand their modern potential as many potentially valuable targets
hubs for foreign intelligence
an extension of state power.c outside our borders. These would
activity because of the opera-
include US government person-
tional security they afford.
The use of human intelligence nel and the far-reaching activities Accordingly, the 20,000-member
operations by weaker powers to of American commerce and indus- diplomatic community has com-
achieve advantage is a classic try. But the real intelligence trea- manded the lion’s share of US
“asymmetric strategy,” a fashion- sure trove for adversaries is here CI’s attention. Our CI resources,
able term but hardly a new con- in the United States. especially those of the FBI, have
cept. As one student of the been scoped against this threat
concept put it: The central targets of foreign population and its geographic
intelligence interest are princi-
concentrations in Washington
pally within the borders of the
Combatants throughout the and New York and consular
United States:
ages have continually sought to offices in such cities as San Fran-
negate or avoid the strength of cisco, Chicago, Atlanta, and
the other, while applying one’s (cid:127)The institutions and people
Houston.
own strength against another’s responsible for the formulation
weakness.4 and implementation of Ameri-
can plans, intentions, and capa- Now, however, foreign powers
In the eyes of our potential adver- bilities. increasingly are running intelli-
saries, the relative weakness of gence operations with unprece-
the United States and its demo- (cid:127)Intelligence production and dented independence from their
cratic allies clearly is the open- weapons design, the secrets of diplomatic establishments. The
ness of our societies and people. our nuclear labs, and the key number of formal and informal
The opportunity for intelligence R&D activities of our premier ports of entry to the country, the
officers and their agents to move industrial enterprises, such as ease with which people can travel
about freely, develop contacts, and Bell Labs, Boeing, Dupont, and internally, and the relatively
operate unnoticed is no more lost others. benign operational environment
of the United States are tailor
(cid:127)Thousands of facilities engaged made for embedded clandestine
cThe first external service was the British in classified national security collection activities. Thousands of
SIS, which originated in 1909. Other great work and hundreds of thou- foreign owned commercial estab-
powers, notably Russia and Germany had
sands of workers with security lishments in the United States,
intelligence services in the 19th century
clearances dispersed around the routine interactions of trade
but they were principally domestic security
services. One can think of many examples the country and in most every and transnational business and
that straddle both functions, but the essen- congressional district. finance, and the exchange of hun-
tial difference is that a security service dreds of thousands of students
deals with threats to the security of the
The CI problem is not only one of and academicians, all potentially
state while the external service conducts
sheer numbers of potential tar- extend the reach of foreign intel-
collection and other operations abroad to
advance and protect the government's gets or foreign intelligence per- ligence into the core structures of
defense and foreign policy interests. sonnel. The larger and more our nation’s security.
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 51, No. 2 3
Strategic CI
US counterintelligence could seize the strategic initiative and be-
gin by working the foreign intelligence target abroad. Why wait until foreign intelli-
gence activities show up on US
soil, with all the operational
To cite just one example of the work against growing foreign advantages of proximity and cover
growth in numbers, Russia, intelligence networks embedded that our rich society provides?
reversing a sharp decline that within American society. Here,
took place during the late Boris CI investigations may result in There is another way. US coun-
Yeltsin’s presidency, now has an prosecutions for espionage or terintelligence could seize the
intelligence presence in the related offenses, demarches, or strategic initiative and begin by
United States equal to its Cold the expulsion of diplomatic per- working the target abroad, with
War level, a sizing decision pre- sonnel for activities inconsistent the purpose of selectively degrad-
sumably indicative of the return with their status. But with rare ing the hostile foreign intelli-
on investment. One need not exception, their disposition is gence service and its ability to
read too much history to know decided on the merits of each work against us. This is the cen-
how successful past intelligence case at hand and not as part of a tral objective of strategic counter-
operations against the United larger effort to counter the for- intelligence.
States have been. There is hardly eign intelligence service as a
an area of national security strategic target.e As a result, I By working the foreign intelli-
endeavor that has not been com- fear we have neither an ade- gence service as a strategic tar-
promised—repeatedly and quate understanding of the for- get globally, US counterintelli-
deeply—by successful espionage. eign presence and intelligence gence should be able to leverage
operations in the United States insights into adversary activities
Strategic threats require a nor an appreciation of their and vulnerabilities to direct CI
strategically coherent response. broader effects on US national operations to maximum effect. At
Instead of looking at the broader security. home, this means that the opera-
implications of these foreign tional and analytic focus of US
intelligence operations, we have Former deputy defense secretary counterintelligence would need to
for the most part adopted a case- John Hamre described the chal- be transformed from its case-
by-case approach to dealing with lenge succinctly: driven approach to one that
the threat they represented. And includes strategic assessments of
by concentrating our CI adversary presence, capabilities,
The goal should not be to catch
resources overwhelmingly inside the spy after he’s gotten into the and intentions. This in turn
the United States, rather than country; we’ve got to stop him would drive operations to neu-
engaging the foreign intelligence from entering in the first tralize the inevitable penetra-
service abroad, we have ceded place.5 tions of our government and pro-
advantage to adversaries.d tect national security secrets and
Perhaps we have been coming at other valuable information.
the problem from the wrong end.
Foreign powers have seized the
The National Security Strategy
initiative, and moved their opera-
of the United States, and in par-
tions to US soil, where our insti-
eOne relatively recent example is the espi- ticular the strategy behind the
tutions are not constituted to
onage case against suspected Chinese
Global War on Terrorism, embod-
agent Katrina Leung, which resulted in a
ies just such a national offensive
plea bargain in 2005 with no jail time, a
dThree-quarters of the US CI budget since $10,000 fine, and 10 debriefing sessions orientation.6 In times past, the
World War II has been devoted to activities with Leung about her interactions with the most pressing terrorism-related
within the United States carried out by the Chinese. The US attorney in Los Angeles intelligence question was most
FBI; most of the remainder, allocated to entered into the agreement because the
often, “who did this?” in turn
CIA, the Defense Department, and to small government’s case was not going well in
leading to manhunts, apprehen-
pockets elsewhere in the government, has the courtroom, but it effectively forestalled
gone to programs and personnel based CI efforts to engage Leung’s future cooper- sion and rendition for trial.
wholly or in part within US borders. ation. Today the strategic imperative is
4 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 51, No. 2