DTIC ADA494535: Army Support during the Hurricane Katrina Disaster

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Army Support During
the Hurricane Katrina
OP 29
Disaster
James A. Wombwell
The Long War Series
Occasional Paper 29
US Army Combined Arms Center
Combat Studies Institute Press
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
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Army Support During the Hurricane Katrina Disaster
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Army Support During
the Hurricane Katrina
OP 29
Disaster
James A. Wombwell
US Army Combined Arms Center
Combat Studies Institute Press
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Wombwell, James A., 1956-
Army support during the Hurricane Katrina disaster / by James A.
Wombwell.
p. cm. -- (Occasional paper ; 29)
Includes bibliographical references.
1. Hurricane Katrina, 2005. 2. United States--Armed Forces--Civic action.
3. United States--National Guard--Civic action. 4. Disaster relief--Gulf
states. I. Combat Studies Institute (U.S.) II. Title. III. Series.
HV636 2005 .U6 W66 2009
363.34’9220976090511--dc22
2009000944

CSI Press publications cover a variety of military history
topics. The views expressed in this CSI Press publication
are those of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the
Department of the Army or the Department of Defense.
A full list of CSI Press publications, many of them
available for downloading, can be found at http://usacac.
army.mil/CAC2/CSI/
The seal of the Combat Studies Institute authenticates this document as
an official publication of the CSI. It is prohibited to use CSI’s official seal
on any republication of this material without the written permission of the
Director of CSI.
Foreword
The Combat Studies Institute (CSI) is pleased to announce its latest
publication in the Long War Series, Occasional Paper 29, Army Support
During the Hurricane Katrina Disaster, by Mr. James A. Wombwell. In
August 2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall as a Category 3 storm and
was the costliest hurricane as well as one of the five deadliest storms in
the history of the United States. It caused extensive destruction along
the Gulf coast from central Florida to Texas. The most severe loss of life
and property damage occurred in New Orleans, Louisiana, where the
levee system catastrophically failed, flooding the city and large tracts of
neighboring parishes.
In preparation for and reaction to the hurricane, the United States
Northern Command established Joint Task Force Katrina at Camp Shelby,
Mississippi, to act as the Active component’s on-scene commander. Some
22,000 Active-Duty personnel eventually assisted with relief-and-recovery
operations in Mississippi and Louisiana. At the same time, all 50 states, the
District of Columbia, and 3 territories sent approximately 50,000 National
Guard personnel to deal with the storm’s aftermath. These men and women
were instrumental in the rescue-and-relief mission, often using their own
initiative and resources in the chaotic aftermath of the storm.
Because the media coverage of this great national disaster tended
toward the sensational more than the analytical, many important stories
remain to be told in a dispassionate manner. One such story is the response
by US Army personnel, both the Active and Reserve components, within
the broader governmental effort to mitigate the horrific effects of the storm.
James Wombwell’s study offers just such a dispassionate analysis of the
Army’s response to the natural disaster by providing a detailed account
of the operations in Louisiana and Mississippi. Much good work was
done by the Army team, but Wombwell shows that there is still room for
improvement.
Sadly, we have not seen the end of natural disasters in the United
States, ensuring that the US Army once more will be called upon to
provide assistance in their aftermath. The insights gained from the
Army’s experience following Hurricane Katrina, as delineated in James
Wombwell’s study, will make that future response even more focused and
efficient. CSI—The Past Is Prologue!
Dr. William G. Robertson
Director, Combat Studies Institute
iii

Preface
Like many Americans, I followed the eents in Mississippi and
Louisiana with great interest in the days after Hurricane Katrina struck
the Gulf coast. The pictures of the destruction wrought by the storm
were oerwhelming. I was appalled by the predictions that the storm and
subsequent flooding killed up to 10,000 people. The reports of looting, rape,
and murder sickened me. As I listened to the media reports, I wondered
how we could allow such things to happen in our country. Where were
the ast resources of our Federal Goernment and, more to the point, the
United States military? Consequently, as I approached this project, I had
to oercome a number of preconceied notions.
What I soon learned was that the United States Army’s response to
Hurricane Katrina was both broad in that a wide range of units with a ariety
of skill sets assisted with the relief effort and deep in that large numbers
of Army troops answered the call for help. An in-depth examination of
the actions of all of the Army units inoled in the relief effort was not,
therefore, feasible. Instead, this occasional paper highlights the actions of
some of the thousands of soldiers inoled in the operation. I hope it will
be useful to soldiers in the field when they are confronted with similar
situations in the future.
As with any project of this size, a number of people were kind enough
to provide me with support and assistance. Since this was my first foray
into writing for the Combat Studies Institute, I would especially like to
thank Mr. Kendall Gott for showing amazing patience and support and
Colonel Timothy Reese and Dr. William G. Robertson for reiewing the
draft and making it much better. The same goes for Marilyn Edwards,
whose fine editing greatly improved my work.
Many other people also helped. Lieutenant Colonel Al Koenig of
the Joint Task Force Katrina History Office was incredibly helpful. He
proided me with many documents, including two impressie collections
of oral history interiews conducted by Army Military History Teams.
Those interiews were crucial to my understanding of the actions taken
by Army personnel during this crisis and sere as one of the important
foundations of this study. Similarly, the staff of the Center for Army
Lessons Learned (CALL) gae me access to hundreds of documents that
were collected during the relief operation. Dr. John Lonnquest sent me an
adanced copy of the US Army Corps of Engineers impressie study of
its Hurricane Katrina related operations. Similarly, Dr. John W. Brinsfield,
the US Army Chaplain Corps Historian, gae me a history of the Chaplain

Corps, which coered the actions of the many chaplains who responded
to the catastrophe. Among the people kind enough to grant interiews or
proide pertinent documents were Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell
IV, Lieutenant General Russel L. Honoré, Major General Tod Carmony,
Brigadier General Lonnie Culer, Brigadier General Gary Jones, Colonel
Bryan Owens, Colonel Tom Johnson, Colonel Barry Keeling, Lieutenant
Colonel Daid Napier, Lieutenant Colonel Vince Mercadante, and
Lieutenant Colonel Tami Zalewski. I would also like to thank my wife
Paula and daughters Natalie, Katherine, and Heather for putting up with
long hours at the office as I worked on this book. This Occasional Paper
would not hae been possible without the help of all of those listed aboe
as well as many others not mentioned. As always, responsibility for any
errors in fact or judgment resides solely with me.
i
Contents
Page
Foreword..................................................................................................iii
Preface........................................................................................................v
List.of.Tables.........................................................................................viii
List.of.Figures.........................................................................................ix
Chapter.1..Introduction.............................................................................1
Chapter.2..History.and.Doctrine...............................................................9
. Historical.Background........................................................................9
. Total.Force.Response.to.Civil.Assistance........................................17
. Laws,.Directives,.Plans,.and.Doctrine.Related.to.Civil.Support.....19
. Summary..........................................................................................27
Chapter.3..The.Storm..............................................................................35
Chapter.4..Louisiana...............................................................................45
. Prelandfall.Preparations...................................................................45
. Immediate.Response.Operations......................................................50
. . Airborne.Search-and-Rescue.Operations...................................51
. . Airborne.Evacuations................................................................58
. . Ground.Operations.....................................................................58
. . Superdome.................................................................................60
. . Ernest.N..Morial.Convention.Center.........................................66
. Recovery.Operations........................................................................69
. . National.Guard.in.Louisiana......................................................69
. Summary..........................................................................................94
Chapter.5..Mississippi...........................................................................111
. Prelandfall.Preparations.................................................................112
. Immediate.Response.Operations....................................................115
. Recovery.Operations......................................................................123
. . Task.Force.Quick.....................................................................128
. . Task.Force.Wright....................................................................129
. . Task.Force.Lee.........................................................................132
. . Task.Force.Kiefer.....................................................................135
. . Other.Task.Forces....................................................................136
. Summary........................................................................................136
vii