Table Of ContentUnited States Marine Corps
CommandandStaffCollege
Marine Corps University
2076South Street
Marine Corps CombatDevelopment Command
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068
MASTEROFMILITARY STUDIES
TITLE
NON-KINETIC OPERATIONS:
THECHALLENGES IN REBUILDINGIRAQ'S INFRASTRUCTUREAND CAPACITY
AUTHOR
FerdinandF. Llantero
Major, U.S. Marine Corps
ConferenceGroup #11
Academic Year2007-08
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4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
Non-Kinetic Operations: The Challenges in Rebuilding Iraq’s
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Infrastructure and Capacity
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United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College,Marine Corps REPORT NUMBER
University,2076 South Street, Marine Corps Control Development
Command,Quantico,VA,22134-5068
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Table ofContents
Page
DISCLAIMER i
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ii
EXECUTIVESUMMARY 1
TITLE 1
THESIS 1
DISCUSSION 1
CONCLUSION 3
BACKGROUND 6
IRAQ'sELECTRIClTYPARADOX : 6
BEFORETHEFIRSTGULFWAR 7
AFTERTHEFIRSTGULFWAR(2,325MW),1991 7
INITIALELECTRICITYRESTORATIONSTRATEGY 7
INITIALELECTRICITYRESTORATIONASSUMPTIONS : c•••••: 8
RECONSTRUCTION FUNDINGSOURCES- ~ 10
PROBLEMSAND CHALLENGES.•..•.•............~•...•...•.••..••....................••...•.•....••..•.....•...•.•12
PRIORTOTHESECONDGULFWAR(4,200MW),MARCH2003 12
COMBATOPERATIONSOFTHESECONDGULFWAR(2,500MW),MARCH-MAy2003 14
REsUSCITATINGTHEIRAQIELECTRICITYSYSTEM(2,500MW),APRIL2003- JUNE2004 19
EMBASSYCONTINUESCPAELECTRICITYPROGRAM(4,250MW),JUNE- OCTOBER2004 21
U.S.REASSESSESELECTRICITYPROGRAMPRIORITIES(3,250MW),NOVEMBER2004 22
NEWINITIATIVESEXECUTED(3,550MW),DECEMBER2004- FEBRUARY2005 23
ADDITIONALREFINEMENTOFTHEELECTRICITYPROGRAM(4100MW),MARCH2005 26
CONCLUSION ~ 27
APPENDIX 30
A. ACRONYMS ; 30
B. ELECTRICITYDEMANDANDSUPPLY 31
u.s.
C. HowMUCHELECTRICITYHASTHE RESTOREDANDADDEDTOTHEIRAQIGRID? 32
D. NOTEONDEMANDFORELECTRICITY , 33
E. NOTEONDECENTRALIZEDPOWEROPTIONS 34
BIBLIOGRAPHY 36
NOTES 37
LLANTEROli
DISCLAIMER
THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREINARETHOSEOFTHE
INDNIDUALSTUDENTAUTHORAND DO NOTNECESSARILYREPRESENTTHE
VIEWS OFEITHERTHEMARINE CORPS COMMANDAND STAFFCOLLEGEOR
ANYOTHERGOVERNMENTALAGENCY. REFERENCES TOTHIS STUDY
SHOULD INCLUDETHEFOREGOINGSTATEMENT.
QUOTATIONFROM, ABSTRACTIONFROM, ORREPRODUCTIONOFALLORANY
PART OFTHIS DOCUMENTIS PERMITTED PROVIDEDPROPER
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTIS MADE.
NON-KINETICOPERATIONS:THECHALLENGESINREBUILDINGIRAQ'SINFRASTRUCTUREANDCAPACITY
LLANTEROlii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Firstandforemost, IthankGodfor giving me the strength, courage, and wisdom to
accomplish mymissions. To Colonel Greenwood, LtColMichaelRonza, andDr. Douglas
McKenna, thankyoufor yourleadership andpriceless mentoringas I finish this year's
curriculum. To myConference Group, "the one-one," thankyoufor your admirable
professionalism andcamaraderie. Andto my advisorand mentor, Dr. Pauletta Otis, I will
always begratefulforprovidingme yourenduringguidance, knowledge, and mostofall
patience while workingonthis thesis. Also, I wouldliketoextendmyappreciation to Dr.
Chris Jasparo for assisting thepanel duringmyoral defense.
To myparents, Tranquilino andNenitaLlantero, family, andfriends, thankyoufor
yourprayers andcontinuingsupport. Andfinally, to myl<:)Velywife, Rose and children,
Christian andLauren, thankyoufor yourunconditional love, inspiration, support,
encouragement, andpatience inputtingup withme whileIfinish school. This is foryou
all......
NON-KINETICOPERATIONS:THECHALLENGESINREBUILDINGIRAQ'SINFRASTRUCTUREANDCAPACITY
LLANTERO!l
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
"Marshall recognized the problem, that Europe's requirements are so much greater
than herpresent ability to pay that she m,ust have substantial additional help orface
economic, social, andpolitical deterioration ofa very grave character. He suggested
a solution that the European nations themselves set up a program for the
reconstruction ofEurope, with UnitedStates assistance.,,1
Title
Non-kinetic Operations: Thechallenges inrebuildingIraq's infrastructure andcapacity
Thesis
The U.S. reconstructionofinfrastructureinIraq, particularlythereconstructionofthe
electrical system, served as anon-kineticforce multiplierfor thecoalitionforces to set
conditions to create asecure andstablecountry.
Discussion
This thesis describes severalchallenges inreconstructingIraq's electrical system
infrastructurein ordertorestore thebasic essential servicesto Iraqi peopleand returnthe
country's stability. Theelectrical systemofIraq was badlymanaged and infrastructures
deteriorated duringthe regimeofSaddamHussein. Iraq'spreviousparticipationinmultiple
wars andcorruptionwithin the governmenthas causedkey infrastructures to beneglected.
Althoughthe United States' (U.S.) action during the liberation ofIraqin2003 was notthe
reason ofthis mismanagement, the United States was taskedto assistinthereconstruction of
allIraq's infrastructurein orderto easefurther sufferingofthe Iraqipeople. This paper
addressedthechallenges inrebuildingthethreemainsectors ofthe electrical system:
Generation, Transmission, andDistribution..These sectorshave to be synchronizedin order
t6providemaximum serviceto thepeople andbusinesses. Sinceelectricityis one ofthemost
NON-KINETICOPERATIONS:THECHALLENGESINREBUILDINGIRAQ'SINFRASTRUCTUREANDCAPACITY
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importantbasic essential servicesinIraq,itaffectedimportantinfrastructures suchas
hospitals, water/sewagetreatmentplants, oilfields, officebuildings, airports, and industrial
businesses. Electricityis servicedto morethan 27.5 millionpeopleinIraq, ofwhich over6.5
millionlivinginBaghdad.
Iraq'sgoverningcapacityhas sufferedfromyears ofcentralizedcontrolthatledto the
decayofcorefunctions inmanykeyinstitutions andministries. Governmentsystems and
processes weakenedinstrategic andpolicyplanning, fi:p.ance, informationtechnology, and
humanresourcesmanagement.Foralmost30years, thecentralgoyernmentneglectedtodevelop
aprofessionalcivilservice; thisfosteredpoormanagementpractices. Mterthefall ofSaddam
Hussein's regimein2003, governingcapacitycontinuedto deteriorate duringtheformation of
multiplegovernments: (1) TheProvisionalIraqi GoverningCouncil, establishedbythe U.S.
ledCoalitionProvisionalAuthorityin2003,IraqiInterimGovernmentin2004, and (2)Iraqi
Transitional Governmentin2005,andelectedGovernmentofIraq, whichtookofficeinMay
2006.2
Anothermajorchallengein thereconstructioneffortis the"supply and demand"- the
declineingenerating/supplyingelectricalpowerand increaseusage ofelectricity throughout
Iraq. Thecause ofthis problemcanbetracedfrom negligence ofkey electricalinfrastructures
and the liberationofIraqin2003 thatsignificantly affectedthe usage ofelectricity due to free
society. Despitecontinuingprogress in addingmore electricalpowerintothe grid by
completingfundedprojects, the gap between"supply anddemand" will remainfor several
years. Demandfor electricity is growingrapidly as Iraqis purchasemany new appliances and
theeconomyrevives. Until electricity "supply and demand" gap starts shrinking, the Ministry
ofElectricity(ME) cannotexpandthe hours ofequitably distributedelectricityto different
regions ofthecountry. Thegap canonlybereducedorstabilized whenpowergeneration
increaseand demandremains atsteady state.
NON-KINETICOPERATIONS:THECHALLENGESINREBUlWINGIRAQ'SINFRASTRUCTUREANDCAPACITY
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Foralongterm solutionto electricityreconstruction andrebuilding, thecoalitionhas
theresponsibility to make suretheIraqihas acceptablelevelofexpertiseinrunning electrical
system andneeds to create anestablishedinstitution. CoalitionProvisionaryAuthority's
(CPA) initial $18.6B reconstructionprogram didnotemphasizecapacity-building, butmore
recently the US Embassyhas redirectedmore spendingto capacity-building. Threebasic tiers
oftraining areneededto buildcapacitywithin theME: (1)PlantManagementtraining on
propermaintenance andoperations; (2) UtilityManagementis trainingonplanning,
budgeting, finance and accountingandcontracting,procurementand logistics; (3) Ministry
Managementtraininginregulatory,policy andplanningfunctions.
Conclusion
TheApril 2005 U.S. ElectricityStrategyconcludedthatthe U.S. programis onthe
righttrack. InApril2004, aU.S. governmentmulti-agencyassessmentteamvisitedIraqand
determined: (1) IRRFfunding was fullyprogrammedand there was littleflexibility to
reprogramprojectsfor otherpriorities, and (2) theEmbassy's electricity andoil sector
assumptions andpriorities were accurate. Withthe summerquickly approaching, the
Embassyalsometwith the IIGPrimeMinisterand DeputyPrimeMinisterto seekhigh-level
supportforproposed summerelectricityplan. Both officials agreed to supportthe initiative
and authorized$150millionfor dieselpurchases. Threemonths aftertheelection, the Iraqi
Transitional.Government(ITG) hadnotyetnamed acabinetand the new ME. In April, the
ME generationremainedsteady atabout4,100MWperday.
, Wecontinueto show unconditional supportandcommitmenttothe IraqiTransitional
Governmentto successfullybringtheelectrical systeminfrastructurebackto servetheIraqi
people. The newIraqi Transitional Government (lTG) tookoveronMay 15, 2005 and Dr.
Muhson Shlash assumedthe office oftheMinistry ofElectricity. TheU.S. is committedto
NON-KINETICOPERATIONS.:THECHALLENGESINREBUILDINGIRAQ'SINFRASTRUCTUREANDCAPACITY
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continuingits supportand the U.S. Embassyelectricityteam has alreadybegunworking with
the ITGofficials toprepareforthe summerspikeindemand. TheU.S. strategyis to
completetheprojects started and to help the MEmaintain the addedMWcapacityonceithas
been added. Byimplementingtheplans describedabove, the U.S. will achieve thefollowing
strategic objectivesfor the electricity sector:
1) Restore or add 3,200MWpotentialInternational StandardOrganization (ISO)
rated generationcapacity to the gridbyDecember31,2005 throughU.S. governmentfunded
programs.
2) Assist the ITGto establish abaselineof5,500MWaveragegenerations by
December31, 2005.
3) Assistthe ITGinincreasing andmaintainingthenational average of12hours of
powerdaily (7-day average) byDecember31,2005.
4) AssisttheITGto increase daily load served (7-day average) to baseline of
115,000MWH.
Anotherimportantpiecetoestablishlongtermstabilityisthenationalcapacity
developmentprograminIraq. Itis acriticalcomponentoftheU.S. government'sgoalof
buildingthecapacityoftheGovernmentofIraqtoprovidesustainablesecurity andservicesto
theIraqipublic. UnderminingtheU.S.-ledefforttobuildIraqicapacityisanoperatingstructure
wherecapacity-developmentactivities arespreadamongmultipleorganizationsandofficesthat
areworkingwithoutclearoverallobjectives,withoutasynchronizedplanforconducting
assignments, andwithoutasystemtomeasureifprogressis oris notbeingmade. Establishing
viableIraqigoverningcapacitywill almostcertainlyrequireaninvestmentofadditionalyears and
resources. This effortwillnotgounchallengedattheoutset, giventhedifficultsecuritysituation
andtheincreasingsectarianismwithinIraqisocietyanditsgoverninginstitutions. Both
international andregional supports arecriticalfactors in theformulaforsuccess. TheIraqi
NON-KINETICOPERATIONS:THECHALLENGESINREBUILDINGIRAQ'SINFRASTRUCTUREANDCAPACITY
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governmentandtheUnitedNationshavemuchhopeinthesuccessoftheInternationalCompact
forIraq.However,this vehicletounifythecountryisdependentuponeachIraqiminister
demonstratingsupportiveleadershipandstrongcommitmentto theCompactandgoverning
capacitytoprovideandsustainsecurityandservicestotheIraqipublic.
Finally, thereconstructionofinfrastructurehas been and willremainacrucial and
enduringpartoftheU.S. programinIraq. CPA's legacyfor ongoingimprovementofthe
powerinfrastructureis largelypositive. TheIraqi governmentmustdeal with the gap between
supply anddemandbyinstituting apricingmechanism, evenifitdoes notfully recovercosts
inthebeginning. Atthe same time, the U.S. and otherdonors mustlay an institutional
foundation forIraqto buildtowards a sustainablefuture. Thatfoundation lies as equallyin
educationand trainingas itdoes inbuildingessential services. Theoldadage stillholds true,
"Givea man afish andhe will eatfor aday, teach amanto fish andhe willfeed thenation."
NON-KINETICOPERATIONS:THECHALLENGESINREBUILDINGIRAQ'SINFRASTRUcrUREANDCAPACITY
