Table Of ContentUnitedStates Marine Corps
Command andStaffCollege
Marine Corps University
2076South Street
Marine Corps CombatDevelopment Command
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068
MASTER OFMILITARY STUDIES
TITLE:
Return ofthe Proconsul:
Unification oftheU.S. ExecutiveBranch atthe Operational Level I
to Produce Unity ofEffortinOverseas National SecurityPrograms and Operations
SUBMITTED INPARTIALFULFILLMENT
OFTHEREQUIREMENTS FORTHEDEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES
AUTHOR:
Major Steven O. Wallace
AY 07-08
Men . ~~eMember:
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4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
Return of the Proconsul: Unification of the U.S. Executive Branch at the
5b. GRANT NUMBER
Operational Level I to Produce Unity of Effort in Overseas National
Security Programs and Operations 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
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Combat Development Command,Marine Corps University 2076 South
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ExecutiveSummary
Title: Return oftheProconsul: Unificationofthe U.S. ExecutiveBranch at the Operational
Levelto ProduceUnityofEffort in OverseasNational SecurityPrograms and Operations
Author: Major Steven O. Wallace, United StatesMarine Corps
Thesis: TheU.S. ExecutiveBranchshould changeits fundamental structure at theoperational
levelto achieveintegratedplanning andregional unityofeffortthroughunifiedregional
executors to synchronizenational securityprograms and operations abroad.
Discussion: TheU.S. has committeditselfto fighting alongwaragainst the forces ofglobal
instability. To fight this war, thePresidenthas transformedthe traditional strategyofmilitary
and economic dominationto one ofpartnership and engagementwith the international
community. To succeed inthis war, theU.S. must synchronize all its instruments ofnational
power atthe operational level. Currently, onlyentities intheU.S. Executive Branchwith the
capabilityto synchronize efforts within globalregions resideinthe DepartmentofDefense
Unified Combatant Commands. All otherdepartments and agencies are adept at generating
discussion andpolicyoptions, but are not capable ofprojecting capabilities overseas. This is not
anewproblem. TheU.S. has struggledwiththe lackofunified actionthroughoutitshistory.
Numerous attempts have beenmade to massage the meansbywhichinteragencycoordinationis
made. These attempts range from changes intheNational SecurityCouncil, to the creationof .
unique commandstructures inVietnam. None havebeenwholly successful andmostrelied
solelyuponthe good:.will ofindividualpersonalities. Theproblem liesnotintheproperwayto
coordinatebetween elements inthe ExecutiveBranchstructure, butinthe structureitselfandits
inabilityto adapt. Atthe operational level, the U.S. ExecutiveBranchmust reorganize under
UnifiedRegional Executorswith authority and responsibilityoverall operations andprograms
withintheirregion. This changewouldrequire ashift from the current emphasis onfunctional
lines to regional ones. Itwould also require the expansionofthe concept ofjointcomponencyto
all departments and agencies that contributeto national securityoverseas. Mostimportantly, this
change wouldrequire amodificationto how departments and agencies are funded and a
reallocation ofresources baseduponnational priorities.
Conclusion: The structureneededto fight a longwaragainstthe forces ofinstabilitymust
provide several capabilities. Itmustprovide single direction, enforcetheprimacyofthepolitical
effort overmilitarypower, achieveunityofeffort, andpromotethe adaptation ofattitudes and
capabilities across militaryand civilian components. The currentU.S. government organization
does notprovide forthese. Inthe uncertainworld ofthefuture, the onlyvariable that the U.S.
government can controlwithcertaintyis howit organizes itself; the enemycan affectvirtually
everyotherfacet. While no structurewill guaranteevictory, no amountofgood-willwill
overcomethe flaws ofan unmanageable structure. Failingto getthe structurerightwill
undermine all other efforts, while successful organizationwillprovideincalculablebenefits to
ensureU.S. national securityis maintained abroad.
1
DISCLAIMER
THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREINARE THOSE OF THE
INDIVIDUAL STUDENTAUTHORAND DO NOTNECESSARILYREPRESENT THE
VIEWS OF EITHERTHEMARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE ORANY
OTHERGOVERNMENTAGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDYSHOULD INCLUDE
THEFOREGOINGSTATEMENT
QUOTATIONFROM, ABSTRACTIONFROM, ORREPRODUCTION OFALLORANY
PART OFTHIS DOCUMENTIS PERMITTED PROVIDEDPROPER
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT IS MADE.
Table ofCOlltellts
Page
DISCLAIMER . 1
PREFACE.................. 111
GLOSSARy............................................................................................................................... IV
SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION.............................................................................................. 1
SECTION2: THEU.S. EXECUTWE BRANCH......................................... 3
SECTION3: THERECURRINGNEED FORUNIFICATION.............................................. 5
SECTION4: ATTEMPTS TO UNIFY STRATEGIC EFFORT................... 6
The Operations CoordinatingBoard andForeign Operations Administration.............. 6
TheNational SecurityCouncilPolicyCoordination Committees................................. 8
CoordinatorforReconstruction and Stability................................................... 9
SECTION5: ATTEMPTS TOUNIFYTACTICALAND OPERATIONALEFFORT......... 10
Civil OperationandRevolutionaryDevelopment Support.. 10
U.S. DefenseDepartmentAfrica Command 12
SECTION6: OBSTACLES TO UNITY OF COMMAND...................................................... 13
Differences inPhilosophies ofControl andResponsibility................... 13
CivilianControl oftheMilitary..................................................................................... 14
ParochialDefense ofRice Bowls 15
SECTION7: UNIFICATION: A PROPOSAL........................................................................ 16
Change at the Strategic LeveL ;............................................. .16
Shiftfrom Emphasis onFunctional Lines to Regional Lines........................................ 17
Appoint SingleManager (UnifiedRegional Executor)................................................. 18
Expand Joint Componency............................ 18
ModifyFunding............................................................................................................. 19
Provide aFull-Time Staff...... 19
Source I1Forcesl1 20
AppointUnified Sub-Regional and CountryExecutors................................................ 21
SECTION 8: CONCLUSION 22
APPENDIXA: TheU.S. Federal Government.. 24
NOTES 25
BIBLIOGRAPHY............ 27
111
Preface
As amilitaryprofessional, I am frequently askedto administerprograms and conduct
operationswhich are not traditionalmilitarymissions. Ihave asked, "Whyam I performing
thesejobswhensurelythereis some other agencyinthe Federal Governmenttasked specifically
to do them?" Invariably, the answer from seniors andpeers is, "theinteragencyis broken." As
anAmerican, Ihave seenthe overwhelming amount ofcreativity, resources, and energythe U.S.
canthrow at aproblem, and yet, it seems the U.S. cannotunifyits effortswhenmore thanone
agencyordepartmentis involvedinan operation. This problem, as I see it, has notbeenforced
upontheU.S. from anoutsidepower; we have createdit ourselves. Ifthis is true, we can change
ororganizationandmindset to remove the artificialrestraints we haveplacedonourselves. This
paper explores some ofthe attempts madeinrecentU.S. historyto improve interagency
cooperationandproposes atheoreticallysimple solutionto promoteunityofeffort at the
operational level ofoverseasnational securityprograms and operations.
Throughoutthedevelopment ofthis paper, Ihave usedthe members ofmy Command
andStaffCollege conference group as soundingboards for ideas. I amverygratefulfor their
patience, thoughtfulness, andcreativity. Additionally, Iwouldliketothank Dr. J. William
GordonandDr. DonaldF. Bittnerfor theirmentorship, sage council, andguidancewhich
allowedme to hone and Clarifymythoughts into apresentableproduct.
IV
Glossary
-Administrative Control (ADCON) - Direction or exercise ofauthorityoversubordinate or
otherorganizations inrespect to administration and support, includingorganizationofService
forces, control ofresources and equipment, personnelmanagement, unitlogistics, individual and
unittraining, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and othermatters not included
inthe operationalmissions ofthe subordinate orother organizations.t
-Combined Warfare -Warfare conductedbyforces oftwo ormore alliednations in
coordinated actiontoward common objectives.t
- Command -The authoritythata commanderinthe MilitaryService lawfully exercises over
subordinates byvirtue ofrank orassignment. Commandincludes the authorityandresponsibility
for effectivelyusing available resources and for planningthe employment of, organizing,
directing, coordinating, and controllingmilitaryforces forthe accomplishment ofassigned
missions. It also includes responsibilityforhealth, welfare, morale, and discipline ofassigned
personnel.t
-Interagency -UnitedStates Government agencies and departments, includingtheDepartment
ofDefense.t
-Interagency Coordination -The coordinationthat occursbetween agencies ofthe US
Government, includingtheDepartmentofDefense, for thepurpose ofaccomplishingan
*
objective.
-Jointforce - A generalterm appliedto aforce composed ofsignificant elements, assignedor
attached, oftwo ormore MilitaryDepartments, operatingundera singlejoint force commander.t
-Joint operations -A generaltermto describemilitaryactions conductedbyjointforces, orby
Service forces inrelationships (e.g., support, coordinatingauthority), which, ofthemselves, do
notcreatejoint forces. Operations carried onbytwo ormore ofthe armedforces.t
- Operational Control(OPCON) - Transferable command authoritythat maybe exercisedby
commanders at anyechelon atorbelowthe level ofcombatantcommand. Operational controlis
inherentin combatantcommand (commandauthority). Operational controlmaybe delegated and
isthe authorityto performthose functions ofcommand over subordinate forces involving
organizing and employing commands andforces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and
giving authoritative directionnecessaryto accomplishthe mission. Operational control includes
authoritative directionover all aspects ofmilitaryoperations andjointtrainingnecessaryto
accomplishmissions assignedto the co.mmand. Operational control shouldbe exercisedthrough
thecommanders ofsubordinate organizations. Normallythis authorityis exercisedthrough
subordinatejointforce commanders and Service and/orfunctional component commanders.
Operational controlnormallyprovides full authorityto organize commands andforces and to
employthose forces as the commanderinoperational control considersnecessaryto accomplish
assignedmissions. Operational control doesnot, in and ofitself, include authoritative direction
for logistics ormatters ofadministration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training.t
v
-Tactical Control (TACON) - Command authorityoverassigned or attachedforces or
commands, ormilitarycapabilityor forces made available for tasking, thatis limitedto the
detailed and, usually, local direction andcontrol ofmovements ormaneuvers necessaryto
accomplishmissions ortasks assigned. Tactical control is inherentin operational control.
Tactical controlmaybe delegatedto, and exercised at anylevel at orbelowthe level of
combatantcommand. (Army)- Tacticalcontrol allows commandersbelow combatant
commandlevelto applyforce and directthe tactical use oflogistics assets but does not provide
authorityto change organizational structure or direct administrative andlogistical support.t
-Unified -Forthepurposes ofthispaper, unified connotesjoint and interagency.
-Unified Command-A commandwith abroad continuingmissionundera single commander
andcomposed ofsignificant assigned components oftwo ormore MilitaryDepartments, and
whichis establishedand so designatedbythePresident, throughthe SecretaryofDefensewith
the advice and assistance ofthe Chairmanofthe Joint Chiefs ofStaff.t
-Unity ofCommand -One ofthenineprinciples ofwar. Allforces operateunderone
responsible commanderwho possesses requisite authorityto direct forces' inpursuit ofa common
unifiedpurpose.t
-Unity ofEffort - Coordination andcooperation among all forces toward a commonly
recognizedobjective, evenifthe forces arenotnecessarilypartofthe same command structuret
tJointPublication1-02: DepartmentofDefenseDictionaryofMilitaryandAssociatedTerms .
*JointPublication3-08: Interagency,IntergovernmentalOrganization, andNongovernmentalOrganization
. CoordinationDuringJointOperationsVolII .
tFieldManual100-5: Operations
1
Commandrelationships are thefirst andmostimportantthingto be determined...
andall elsefalls intoplace afterthat.
- Lieutenant Colonel Charles 1. Hudson, USMCl
To ensure aunitedeffort, the ambassador mustbe aproconsulwith absolute authority
locally overallpolicyandagencies.
- SirRobert Thompson2
Section 1: Introduction
Whenthe cityofRomebecame aRepublic, its people devised a governmentthatwould
provide forthe commongoodwhile limitingthepowerofanysingleman and empoweringthe
people -the Senate ledbyco-equal Consules. As theRomanRepublic grewinto a global power,
however, its people sawtheneedfor arefinementofthis government. Withinthe cityofRome,
the governmentwouldremainunderthe care ofthe Consules. But, at the edges oftherepublic,
intheprovinces, whereimmediate and decisive actionwas called for to defend theborders and
promotejusticeandprosperity, a singleman, theProconsul, was required. TheProconsul
(meaning "actingforthe Consul") had absolute authorityover all activities withinhis province -
militaryandcivilian -andwas constrained onlybythe fact thathis performancewouldbe
.
) .
criticallyjudgedbytheSenate uponhisreturnto Rome.3 TheUnited States (U.S.) finds itselfin
a similarsituation as ittries to expandits globalinfluence and shouldexploretheideaofregional
Proconsules.
Withthe fallacious "peacedividend" from theresolutionofthe ColdWarexpiring, the
U.S. is facedwith anuncertainfuture and the needforthe commitmentto a long waragainst the
elements ofinstability. The continued success oftheU.S. now depends upon defeatingtrans-
nationalterrorist groups, increasingthe numberofstablenations withwhichit fosters economic
relationships, andmaintaining the capabilityto defenditselffrom potentiallyhostilenations.4 To
accomplishthese goals,theU.S. governmentis changingits strategyofeconomic andmilitary
2
dominationto one ofengagement andpartnership withthe international community. Inother
words, iftheU.S. can assist failing, failed, orhostilenations to develop theirown effective,
democratic, andbenevolent governments, U.S. security andprosperitywillbe assured.5 To bring
aboutthis difficulttransformation againstresistant and dynamicpowers, the U.S. willneed to
employall ofits national instruments - diplomatic, economic, military, andinformational - in a
synchronized and directedmanner; itmusthave unityofactioninits overseasprograms and
operations.
National strategic direction, whichis governedbythe Constitution, federal law, U.S.
Governmentpolicy, international law, andnational interests, prescribes unified action.6
Currentlythe U.S. attempts to circumventprerequisiteunityofaction andpursues itsproduct,
unityofeffort, throughan illusive interagencynetwork ofadhoc cooperativerelationships.
While cooperationmayproduce coordination, onlyunityofcommand - giving a single entitythe
requiredresponsibilityand authorityoveranobjective - guarantees unifies action.7
Ofthenineprinciples ofwar, those traits thathave beenconsistently observedin
['
successfulmilitaryorganizations throughouthistory,8unityofcommandis, perhaps, the most
importantbecause it allows the organizationto develop to its fullest potentia1.9 The desire for.
unity, however, is notconfinedto themilitary. President George W. Bushcalled for the
"integrationofeffort" inreconstruction and stabilizationoperations10 and theRAND Corporation
argues thatunityofcommandis as desirablein anationbuilding and stabilityoperation as itis in
war.11
Itis understandable, when dealingwith acoalition ofvarious governments, thatunityof
effortmaybe allthat canbe strivenfor. But, within a singlenation, whose structureis self-
determined, there is no excusenotto achieveunityofcommand. In addition to unityof
