DTIC ADA490727: Striking the Balance Between Training High-Intensity Conflict and Counterinsurgency: Maintaining Full Spectrum Dominance in the US Army

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UnitedStates Marine Corps
CommandandStaffCollege
Marine Corps University
2076South Street
Marine Corps CombatDevelopmentCommand
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES
STRIKING THE BALANCE BETWEENTRAINING HIGH-INTENSITY
CONFLICT AND COUNTRINSURGENCY:
MAINTAINING FULL SPECTRUMDOMINANCE IN THE US ARMY
SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENT FORTHEDEGREE OF
MASTEROF MILITARY STUDIES
MAJORWARRENE. SPONSLER, USA
AY 2007-2008
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Executive Summary
Title: Strikingthe Balance between TrainingHigh Intensity Conflictand
Counterinsurgency: MaintainingFull Spectrum Dominance in theUS Army
Author: MajorWarren Sponsler, United States Army
Thesis: TheUS Army's operationaltempo, given currentresources in fighting the wars inIraq
and Afghanistan, is creating a generation ofleaders untrainedto meetthe potential full spectrum
threats that we mustbe preparedto confront onthe battlefield oftomorrow.
Discussion: TheUnited States Armyhas beenfighting the wars inIraq and Afghanistan since
2001 with greatsuccess, especially giventhe challenges ofthe contemporary operating
environment ourjuniorleaders face every day. This success, however, has comewith a cost.
While soldiers, leaders, and units have adapted overthe past six-plus years to fight an adaptive
and innovative counterinsurgency, they have lostmany ofthe full spectrum core-competency
warfighting skillsthat make ourArmythe most formidable inthe world. Althoughnot an
immediate concernas thefocus rightfully continuesto be onfighting and winning the current
engagements, undoubtedlythe wars oftomorrowwill notbethe same as the wars oftodayand
the US Armymustremainpreparedto meetfuture threats. This paper describes some ofthose,
training deficiencies, provides arecenthistorical example ofthis issue inthe 2006 Israeli
HezbollahWar, andoffers recommendations to address the issue. Giventhe wide variety of
units, missions, androleswithinthe US Army, this paperwill focus onmechanizedmaneuver
battalion andbrigade-level organizations.
Conclusion: Unless the US Army's leadership begins amental shifttoward a more balanced
approachto training, the Army will no longer have the institutional knowledge ofhciwto fight
and winto maintaindominance onthe conventional battlefield. The basic core high-intensity
warfighting skills are absolutely necessaryto supportUS military dominance andpromotethe
achievementofUS interests around the world for the future.
Table ofContents
Page
DISCLAIMER : i
PREFACE ii
INTRODUCTION 1
BACKGROUND 2
CORE COMPENTENCIES OF CONCERN 7
HISTORICAL EXAMPLE: ISRAELI-HEZBOLLAH WAR 12
RECOMMENDATIONS 16
CONCLUSIONS 19
ENDNOTES 21
BIBLIOGRAPHY 24
DISCLAIMER
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Preface
Overthepast severalyears, the US military has made significant strides toward developing a
more cohesive and coherent counterinsurgency doctrine inresponse to the ongoing conflicts in
Iraq and Afghanistan. There has, however, been very little attentionpaidto the status ofthe US
military's core warfighting skills. Onthe contrary, many militaryprofessionals viewthe
necessity for these skills as long pastgiventhe rise ofpowerfulnon-state actors whichhave
supersededtraditional state threats. As militaryprofessionals, we must lookbeyondthe conflicts
oftoday in orderto address the directions we are headed inthe years to come in orderto
maintain ournational security and defense posture. This paperis ahumble attempt at
maintaining a forward focus to setconditions for future success.
Inpreparingthis paper, I wouldliketo acknowledge the spirited conversations I've had with
professional colleaguesaround the US Armyand Marine Corps in completingthis study.
Understandably, lpokingto the future canbe an emotional and contentious issue as failure to do
so adequately canhave potentially grave consequences inbloodintreasure. Iwould also like to
acknowledge the assistanceprovidedby Dr. Charles D. McKenna, DeanofAcademics, USMC
Commandand StaffCollege, inpreparingthispaper.
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Sponsler 1
TheArmy existsto servethe Americanpeople, protect enduringnational interests, and
fulfill theNation's military responsibilities. Specifically, the Armymissionis to provide
to combatantcommanders the forces and capabilities necessary to execute the National
Security, National Defense, andNational Military Strategies. Armyforces provide the
capability-bythreat, force, or occupation-to promptly gain, sustain, and exploit
comprehensive control over land, resources, andpeople.1
r
Introduction
The United StatesArmy has beenfighting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2001
I
withgreatsuccess, especially giventhe challenges ofthe contemporary operating environment
ourjuniorleaders face every day. This success, however, has comewith a cost. While soldiers,
leaders, and units have adapted overthepast six-plus years to fight an adaptive and innovative
counterinsurgency, they have lostmany ofthe full spectrumwarfighting skillsthat make our
Armythe mostformidable inthe world. Althoughnot an immediate concern as the focus
rightfully continuesto be onfighting andwinning the current engagements, undoubtedly the
wars oftomorrow will not bethe same as the wars oftoday. TheUS Army ofthe future will
continueto face new challenges around the globeJn support ofvital national interests and
national security. Ifthe Army continues onthe currentpath, itmay find itselfunprepared to
meetthese challenges. The US Army's operationaltempo (OPTEMPO), given currentresources
in fighting the wars inIraq and Afghanistan, is creating a generation ofleaders untrained to meet
the potential full spectrumthreats thatwe mustbe preparedto confront onthe battlefield of
tomorrow. This paperdescribes some ofthose training deficiencies, provides arecenthistorical
example ofwhere this pathpotentially leads and offers recommendations to address the issue.
Giventhe wide variety ofunits, missions, androles withinthe US Army, this paperwill focus on
mechanizedmaneuverbattalion and brigade-level organizations.
Sponsler 2
Background
The modern operational Brigade CombatTeam (BCT) and subordinatebattalions are
understandablyfocused onone thing: fighting and winning ontheir next deployments. Most
recently, these deployments have becomemore frequent, leadingto less thantwelve months of
dwell time betweenhavingtroops inthe combatzone. This rapidturn aroundhas forced unit
leaders and commanders to make toughdecisions onwhattasks theywill traintheirunits to
accomplish. Understandably, anything thatthe soldiers are not expectedto encounter during
their deployment becomes a lowerpriority and less time is allocated to it. Inmany cases, this
means commanders devote very littletimeto what were once consideredhigh-intensity conflict
(HIC), kinetic core competencies thatwere essentialto aparticularmilitary occupational
specialty orunittype. A core competency is defined as those tasks or skills that aunitmust
performto maintainwarfighting capability. MGRobertM. Williams, then ChiefofArmor and
Coriunanding General at Ft. Knox stated, "While I fully understandthe requirements for training
the Armor Branchto fight the current enemy, we cannotforget thatwe mustalways be prepared
to engage anddestroy the enemy in offensive and defensive operations across the spectrum, as
well as conduct stability and reconstruction operations.,,2 Additionally, withthe severe
limitations intime athome stationbetweendeployments, units have atendency not to trainon
ta~ksthey do not expectto encounter onthe next deploymentinlieuofproviding soldiers more
time athome beforeheading backto combat.
TheUS Army has anobligationto maintainthe capabilityto fight across the breadthof
military operations. Inthe Army's FM-I, The Army, the authors explainthe requirement for the
Army to be preparedto fight across the full spectrum ofconflict. This includes traditional,
irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive threats and a combinationofthese threats employed
Sponsler 3
simultaneously. Furthermore, "the abIlityto prevail inmajorcombat operations is a crucial
responsibility andprimary driver ofcapabilities development. Many capabilities required for
major combat operations apply across the range ofmilitary operations,"with a focus on,
"strategic and operationalmobility; advancedinformationsystemsto support command, control,
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; precisionweaponry; force protection; and
sustainment.,,3
Army doctrine recognizes the importance ofmaintainingthe edge inhigh-intensity, lethal
combat. Inthe introduction ofthe 2008 US Army operations manual, FM 3-0, Operations, it
states, "Despitethe vital importance ofnonlethal actionto changethe civil situation, FM 3-0
recognizes thatthe Army's primarypurpose is deterrence, andshould deterrence fail, decisively
winning the Nation's wars by fighting as partofan interdependentjointteam.,,4
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Understanding andproperly executingreconstruction, stability andcivil support
operations such as those currently conductedbyunits inIraq and Afghanistan remains absolutely
vital to ournational interests. Despitethis requirement, itis crucial thatourbasic fighting
formations maintaintheircore capability -to close withand destroythe enemy. Loss ofthis
capabilityrepresents athreatto ournational securityandthat ofour allies and diminishes the
s
ability oftheNation's leadersto achieve national goals and interests. FM 3-0 recognizes the
dangers offocusing on only oneportion ofthe combat spectrum.
Forces involved in protracted stability or civil support operationsrequire intensive
training to regainproficiencyinoffensive or defensive tasks before engaging in large
scale combatoperations. Effectivetraining reflects abalance among the elements offull
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spectrum operations thatproduces and sustainsproficiency inall ofthem.
Findingthis balance does not meanignoringthose tasks, as has beenthe trend giventoday's
operationaltempo. "TheArmymustbe afull-spectrum force capable offighting inthe
Sponsler 4
counterinsurgency environment, but equally as capable ofbeing dominantonthe battlefieldin
mid- and high-intensity conventional conflicts ... We have never beenvery good atpredicting
where, when, or against whatenemy ornextwar will be fought."?
Today's operating environmentrequires thatthe military professional considerall threats
ofour adversaries for the future - notjustthose ofthe here and now. While many experts
contendthat counterinsurgencywill remainthe mostprevalentandfrequent form ofwarfare the
US military will be requiredto face, there is still anobligationto trainacross the spectrum. The
th
BritishArmy ofthe early20 Centurypriorto World War II serves as anexample ofthetrap of
afailure to train and equip a conventional and lethalmilitary.
TheBritishhad the world's best "smallwar" force- anarmy well-trained and equipped
for fighting bandits and guerrillas- butitwas ludicrouslyinsufficientto deter German
aggression orto defeat Germany once aworld war broke out. Thatmistake, symbolized
by deficiencies intanks and aircraftcarriers, hastened the end ofthe PaxBritannica.8
,
The challenges associated with developing and guidingthe military for the future are not
new, nor does the United States have avery good trackrecord atpredicting howto meetthose
challenges. "TheUnited States has atraditionofplanning for the wrong war.,,9 Priorto World
War I, World War II, Korea and Vietnam, the United States made manning, doctrine,
organizational, and equipmentacquisition decisions for fighting a different type ofwarthatthey
actually endedup fighting. Dueto these miscalculations, the first engagements ofthose major
conflicts were oftendisastrous withunnecessaryloss ofblood and treasure.10
As aresultofthe US military's overwhelming victories in Operation DesertStorm,
OperationEnduring Freedom, andthe opening stages ofOperationIraqi Freedom, our
adversaries understandthatthey cannot face the conventional mightofthe US Military. Our
current andfuture adversaries are paying close attention as the wars inIraq and Afghanistan