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MAS SACHUSETTS
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1993 N/A -
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Massachusetts Institute of Technology Defense & Arms Control Studies
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Program
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Security Studies Program Massachusetts Institute of Technology 292 REPORT NUMBER
Main Street (E38-600) Cambridge, MA 02139
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DEFENSE AND ARMS CONTROL
STUDIES PROGRAM
he Defense and Arms Control Studies (DACS) Program is a graduate-level, research
and training program based at the MIT Center for International Studies. It traces its
origins to two initiatives. One was the teaching on international security topics that Profes-
sor William Kaufmann began in the 1960s in the MIT Political Science Department. The
other was the MIT-wide seminars on nuclear weapons and arms control policy that Profes-
sor Jack Ruina and Professor George Rathjens created in the mid 1970s.
The program's teaching ties are primarily but not exclusively with the Political Science De-
partment at MIT. The DACS faculty, however, includes natural scientists and engineers as
well as social scientists. Of particular pride to the program is its ability to integrate techni-
cal and political analyses in studies of international security issues.
Several of the DACS faculty members have had extensive government experience. They
and the other program faculty advise or comment frequently on current policy problems.
But the program's prime task is educating those young men and women who will be the
next generation of scholars and practitioners in international security policy making. The
program's research and public service activities necessarily complement that effort.
The Center for International Studies is a major unit of the School of Humanities and Social
Science at MIT and seeks to encourage the analysis of issues of continuing public concern.
Key components of the Center in addition to DACS are Seminar XXI, which offers training
in the analysis of international issues for senior military officers, government officials, and
industry executives; and the MIT Japan Program, which conducts research and educational
activities to further knowledge about Japanese technology, economic activities, and politics.
DEFENSE AND ARMS CONTROL STUDIES PROGRAM
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
292 MAIN STREET (E38-603)
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02139
(617) 253-8075
FAX (617) 258-7858
COVER PHOTO: SPANISH WAR VETERANS STATUE
CONCORD AVENUE, CAMBRIDGE, MA
PHOTOGRAPH BY KELLY GREENHILL
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR
ruth be told, the United States took the Cold War more seriously than did any other of
the war's major participants. With great expenditure, much trial and error, and more
than occasional innovative analysis, the United States built a military that was by the war's
end simply unsurpassable. The American military had the best equipment, the most profes-
sional leadership, the most sophisticated training, and most extensive logistical support of
any in the world. It had these attributes because it was expected to be able to fight (and often
did) far from its home bases in the difficult climates against the difficult opponents. The
American military thought it had to be ready to meet the Communist challenge nearly any-
where on the globe it might conceivably appear.
In contrast our European allies came to view the Cold War as essentially a jobs program. Ex-
hausted by the Second World War, they were quick to accept that threat posed by the Soviet
Union could only be met by the United States and, with minor exception, organized their de-
fense efforts to maximize local employment rather than, as America largely did, military util-
ity. Their militaries often expressed preference for American equipment and practices, but
were usually required to accept whatever systems national firms alone or in regional consor-
tia could develop. The training of West European militaries suffered and their ability to
project force at any distance from their borders was quite limited because European politi-
cians were unwilling to impose significant burdens on their populations.
The Soviet Union, the other half of the Cold War, gradually slid into the same policies, al-
lowing its once mighty military to become sclerotic while focusing its attention on expanding
employment in a vast network of factories that produced great quantities of often obsolete
weapons. Like the West European militaries, the Red Army saw little combat during the
Cold War and had little influence in weapon procurement decisions. By the war's end the
great ideological struggle between capitalism and communism was basically a jobs program
for the Soviets as well. As a result, the economies of surviving republics are now burdened
with industrial structures composed largely of arsenals and shipyards thoroughly accustomed
to make-work orders.
Roles are now being reversed. Many of America's allies and former opponents seek to build
capable militaries while America itself is beginning to consider defense as a jobs program.
Chaos is growing along the borders and within the former Soviet Union. Ethnic and religious
fissures, long paved over by Communist regimes, are reappearing, causing bloody conflicts
and waves of refugees. Even when defense budgets are being reduced because of economic
pressures, nations in Europe and Asia want the protection of militaries trained and equipped
to fight. There is talk about shedding conscription to build professional forces, of acquiring
airlift capabilities, and of the need to purchase or de- be said to be in fact post Cold War budgets. There
velop high technology weapons like those used by U.S. are substantial changes ahead for the American mili-
forces. Delegation after delegation stop by for discus- tary.
sions.
The second observation to note is how easily wish-
At the same time, America's military needs are becom- ful thinking can replace clear thinking in the analy-
ing less urgently felt. Bounded by two virtually un- sis of options. The attractive vision often offered in
armed neighbors and two very large oceans, America is academic discussions that has nations cooperating to
REPORT OF
far from most of the post Cold War chaos. The U.S. provide security to threatened peoples ignores much
THE DIRECTOR
armed services have an abundance of modern weapons, unpleasant reality. Nations do not line up to have
much more than their likely force structures will be able their soldiers killed in distant locations unless the
to absorb. Politicians worried about the future of local threat that they are meeting is persuasive to the par-
shipyards and aircraft plants now make the argument for ents of the soldiers as well as to politicians. The
their continuation on employment grounds and rarely troops assigned to these duties will not long tolerate
mention any strategic requirements that could justify exposure to mortal danger unless provided the right
additional production. to retaliate to attacks with overwhelming force.
Forging a coalition of nations that regularly will take
Finding a strategic rationale for maintaining large U.S. on the burdens of intervention is likely to exceed the
forces and busy weapon production lines will be diffi- capacity of even the most accomplished of diplomats.
cult. Without a popularly accepted, overarching prin-
ciple like anti-communism, proposed interventions must Among us Barry Posen has taken the lead in outlining
be argued individually. The budget deficit and a grow- the strategic alternatives. His paper on U.S. grand
ing unwillingness to suffer (or inflict) casualties gives national strategies which was based on testimony
ready excuse to delay or not to intervene at all. Bad ex- presented to the House Armed Services Committee
periences are certain to occur in even our most humani- is already considered a classic. In it he describes the
tarian-oriented ventures. After they do, major foreign premises, arguments, and force requirements for the
interventions will likely require a direct attack against three alternative national security policies prominent
the United States, just as World War Two did, in order in U.S. public discussions - cooperative security,
to achieve sufficient popular support. selective engagement, and isolationism. He has
supplemented this work with related analyses of na-
The MIT Defense and Arms Control Studies Program tionalism, military formats, and specific scenarios
(DACS) has sought to stimulate debate about the secu- such as an intervention in the Bosnian conflict. He
rity requirements of a post Cold War world. Two im- is also conducting fundamental research on the rela-
pressions stand out from this experience. One is the tionship between nationalism and war.
determination on the part of many officials and officers
to avoid discussion of options. Their understandable, The intervention theme has also been explored by
but unsustainable view is that past policies with only Carl Kaysen and George Rathjens in separate
minor modification are sufficient. Thus, the continuing projects based at the American Academy of Arts and
assertion that high states of operational readiness are re- Sciences. Kaysen is leading a multi-stage study that
quired for U.S. forces and that proportional reductions brings together experts from around the world to ex-
among the services are best when cuts cannot be amine the causes and consequences of past interna-
avoided. The new world situation, however, demands, tional interventions. Rathjens is involved in a parallel
it would seem, a total rethinking of force levels and effort that is reviewing the United Nations' experi-
military missions. Moreover, defense budgets that ence in peacekeeping and peacemaking activities.
hardly have receded to those of the Carter years cannot
4 D E F E N S E AND ARMS CONTROL STUDIES PROGRAM
My contribution to the debate has focused on the casu- While some nations may be seeking nuclear status
alty issue. The use of force risks casualties, but is there others are pondering their nuclear legacies. Jack
the political will to take and inflict casualties in ven- Ruina has been considering the future nuclear arse-
tures where national survival is not threatened? Per- nals of the United Kingdom and France, arsenals
haps intervention would be more likely if non-lethal that have grown in relative prominence as those of
options were available. In June 1993 with the support the United States and the former Soviet Union have
of the Army War College and the Office of Net Assess- declined due to treaties and the attrition of peace. A
ment, DACS convened what possibly was the world's related topic, interest in which several of us share, is
REPORT OF
first conference on the use and consequences of non-le- the future of the laboratory complex that supported
THE DIRECTOR
thal warfare technologies. Over 70 specialists partici- strategic systems in the United States. There is
pated in the sessions which were held in Lexington, within these facilities extraordinary technical talent.
Massachusetts and which produced a prescriptive list of What is of concern is how this talent can be effec-
uses for such technologies. tively utilized while maintaining the reservoir of
skills needed for nuclear deterrence.
One conflict we often fear will not only be lethal but
also nuclear is that between the Arabs and the Israelis. The annual report provides public occasion to thank
As part of his work on nuclear proliferation, Marvin those who have been especially helpful in our work.
Miller brought together several dozen U.S. and Israeli Prominent among them must be several of our po-
experts in discussion of nuclear weapons in the Middle litical science colleagues - Stephen Van Evera,
East. The conference had the sponsorship of the whose theoretical suggestions continue to intrigue
Rockefeller Foundation. the many students we share with him; Richard
Samuels, chair of the department and a leading expert
Weapon technologies are certain to proliferate. on Japanese defense policies; and Ken Oye, Director
Theodore Postol has been studying the defenses that of the Center for International Studies and a promi-
can be raised against ballistic and cruise missiles carry- nent specialist in international trade and security.
ing a variety of warheads. Aiding him in this effort are
George Lewis and several visitors from Russia and Is- Also we offer our congratulations and best wishes
rael who are members of his Defense Technologies to several MIT affiliates who accepted senior posi-
Working Group. A number of important papers have tions in the new Administration. Les Aspin, former
resulted including the definitive analysis of the Patriot/ chairman of the House Armed Services Committee,
Scud engagements that occurred during the Gulf War. a PhD graduate of the MIT Economics Department,
and MIT's 1992 Commencement Speaker, is the
A frequently expressed concern is that Russia will feed new Secretary of Defense. John Deutch, Professor
world instability by exporting either weapons of mass of Chemistry and former Provost of MIT, is the Un-
destruction or the knowledge how to make them. der Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Tech-
Stephen Meyer examined this and related problems in a nology. Sheila Widnall, Professor of Aeronautics
symposium he organized on the status of Russian Mili- and Astronautics and Associate Provost of MIT, is
tary R&D that was held at the program in November the Secretary of the Air Force, the first woman ever
1992. The general conclusion of the participants was to head a military department. The Under Secretary
that Russian military R&D capabilities are rapidly dete- is the Department of Defense official responsible
riorating and that Russia's export temptations are con- for the Defense Production Act, the main mobiliza-
strained by its own proximity to conflicts and the need tion authority for the nation, and, delegated though
to maintain cooperative ties with the United States. its Secretary, the Air Force manages implementa-
tion activity for the Act. With surely what was
great foresight, just before either John Deutch or
M A S C U E T INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
Sheila Widnall signed up for their jobs, DACS hosted a Finally, we would like to thank Commander Greg
meeting on the 1992 Amendments to the Defense Pro- Hoffman, USN, our first Navy Federal Executive Fel-
duction Act as part of a series organized by the Federal low, for his many significant contributions to the work
Emergency Management Agency and the Army War of the program and that of our students. Greg joined us
College. in the fall of 1992 not quite certain what to expect. He
leaves a year later having convinced us of the value in
In addition to those sponsors mentioned earlier, my col- having military fellows affiliated with the program.
leagues and I would like to thank sincerely the He was ever patient as he helped us to understand how
REPORT OF Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Ford Founda- the military functions and only occasionally laughed
THE DIRECTOR tion, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Founda- openly as we demonstrated to him how university fac-
tion, the W. Alton Jones Foundation, the Plowshares ulties muddle through their many roles.
Fund, the MIT Lincoln Laboratory, the Department of
Energy, the Army Environmental Policy Institute, the
MITRE Corporation, and the John Merck Fund for Harvey M. Sapolsky
their support of our work.
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Cdr. Hoffman on a prior assignment
DEFENSE AND ARMS CONTROL STUDIES PROGRAM
FACULTY
HARVEY M. SAPOLSKY is Professor of Public Policy and Organi-
zation in the Department of Political Science and Director of
both the Defense and Arms Control Studies Program and the
MIT Communications Forum. Dr. Sapolsky completed a B.A.
at Boston University and earned an M.P.A. and Ph.D. at Harvard
University. He has worked in a number of public policy areas,
notably health, science, and defense where he examines the ef-
fects of institutional structures and bureaucratic politics on
policy outcomes. In defense he has served as a consultant to the Commission on Government Procure-
ment, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Naval War College, the Office of Naval Research, and
the RAND Corporation, and has lectured at all of the service academies. He is currently focusing his re-
search on interservice and civil/military relations. In July 1989 he succeeded Professor Ruina as Direc-
tor of the MIT Defense and Arms Control Studies Program. Professor Sapolsky's most recent
defense-related book is titled Science and the Navy, and is a study of military support of academic re-
search. A volume on telecommunications policy he co-edited has just appeared.
CARL KAYSEN is David W. Skinner Professor of Political
Economy Emeritus in the Program in Science, Technology, and
Society and a Senior Lecturer at the MIT Center for Interna-
tional Studies. Dr. Kaysen earned his B.A. in Economics at the
University of Pennsylvania, and his Ph.D. at Harvard University,
where he was an economics professor from 1950-1966. From
1966 until 1976, when he came to MIT, he was Director of the
Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton and from 1961-1963 he was the Deputy Special Assistant for
National Security Affairs to President Kennedy. He has served as a consultant to RAND, the Defense
Department, and the CIA. A member of the Committee on Security Studies of the American Academy
of Arts and Sciences, Dr. Kaysen is currently engaged in organizing a project under the Committee's
auspices on emerging norms of justified international intervention.
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
STEPHEN M. MEYER is Professor of Defense and Arms Control
FACULTY Studies and Director of Soviet Security Studies at MIT. Prior to
joining the MIT faculty in 1979, he was a post-doctoral fellow at
Harvard University's Center for Science and International Af-
fairs. He received his Ph.D. at the University of Michigan, Ann
Arbor in 1978. Dr. Meyer's areas of particular interest are de-
fense decision-making, military economics, force planning and
analysis, and arms control in the former Soviet Union. His current work examines the rise and fall of
Soviet military power and the ways in which domestic organizations and institutions influenced Soviet
defense policy. Dr. Meyer serves as an advisor on Soviet security affairs to several U.S. government
agencies and has testified numerous times in open and closed hearings before the House Armed Services
Committee, the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.
MARVIN M. MILLER is a Senior Research Scientist in the Depart-
ment of Nuclear Engineering and a senior staff member of the
MIT Center for International Studies. After undergraduate work
at the City College of New York he earned an M.A. in Physics
from the University of Rochester and a Ph.D. in Electrical Engi-
neering from the Polytechnic Institute of New York. Prior to
ioining MIT in 1976. Dr. Miller was an associate professor of
I ------- ;1-_ _
electrical engineering at Purdue University working on laser
theory and applications. His current research interests are arms control, particularly nuclear prolifera-
tion, and the environmental impacts of energy use. He has studied proliferation issues since 1977, in-
cluding both country-specific and generic problems. In the former, his main interests are in the Middle
East and South Asia, while in the latter he has concentrated on international safeguards and export con-
trols for sensitive nuclear technologies. From 1984 to 1986, Dr. Miller was a Foster Fellow with the
Nuclear Weapons and Control Bureau of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and
is currently a consultant on proliferation issues for ACDA, the International Technology Program of the
Los Alamos National Laboratory, and the Technical Support Organization at the Brookhaven National
Laboratory.
DEFENSE AND ARMS CONTROL STUDIES PROGRAM
BARRY R. POSEN is Professor of Political Science. His most re-
cent book, Inadvertent Escalation, was released from Cornell FACULTY
University Press in Fall, 1991. His first book, The Sources of
Military Doctrine, won the American Political Science
Association's Woodrow Wilson Foundation Book Award for the
best book published in political science in 1984, and Ohio State
University's Edward J. Furniss Jr. Book Award for the best first
book in the field of security studies. Dr. Posen did his undergraduate work at Occidental College and his
graduate work at the University of California at Berkeley, where he earned an M.A. and Ph.D. Prior to
coming to MIT, Dr. Posen was Assistant Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton Uni-
versity. He has also held a number of prestigious positions: Guest Scholar at the Brookings Institution;
Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Center for International Affairs at Harvard; Council on Foreign Relations In-
ternational Affairs Fellow; Rockefeller Foundation International Affairs Fellow and Guest Scholar at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies; and Woodrow Wilson Center Fellow, Smithsonian Institu-
tion. Dr. Posen's current activities include work on U.S. military strategy and force structure, regional
military balance assessment, and nationalism.
THEODORE A. POSTOL is Professor of Science, Technology and
National Security Policy in the Program in Science, Technology,
and Society at MIT. He did his undergraduate work in Physics
and his graduate work in Nuclear Engineering at the Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology. After receiving his Ph.D., Dr.
Postol joined the staff of Argonne National Laboratory, where
he used neutron, x-ray and light scattering, along with computer
molecular dynamics techniques, to study the microscopic dynamics and structure of liquids and disor-
dered solids. Subsequently he went to the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment to study
methods of basing the MX Missile, and later worked as a scientific adviser to the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions. After leaving the Pentagon, Dr. Postol helped to build a program at Stanford University to train
mid-career scientists to study developments in weapons technology of relevance to defense and arms
control policy. In 1990 Dr. Postol was awarded the Leo Szilard Prize from the American Physical Society.
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
