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The Challenges of Urban Operations
WilliamG.Robertson
GeneralEditor
LawrenceA.Yates
ManagingEditor
U.S.ArmyCommandandGeneralStaffCollegePress
FortLeavenworth,Kansas
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B
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by
B
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The Challenges of Urban Operations
WilliamG.Robertson
GeneralEditor
LawrenceA.Yates
ManagingEditor
U.S.ArmyCommandandGeneralStaffCollegePress
FortLeavenworth,Kansas
LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationData
LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationData
BlockbyBlock/William.G.Robertson,generaleditor.
p.cm.
1. Urbanwarfare.2. Warfare,unconventional. I.Robertson,WilliamG.
U167.5.S7B562003
355.4’26dc21
CGSCPresspublicationscoveravarietyofmilitaryhistorytopics.
The views expressed in this CGSC Press publication are those of the
authorsandnotnecessarilythoseoftheDepartmentoftheArmyorthe
DepartmentofDefense.
AfulllistofCombatStudiesInstitute/CGSCPresspublications,many
ofthemavailablefordownloading,canbefoundat<http:www.cgsc.army.
mil/csi>.
Contents
Preface.................................................................................................v
Foreword...........................................................................................vii
AttackingtheHeartandGuts:UrbanOperationsThrough
theAges...............................................................................................1
LieutenantColonelLouDiMarco,U.S.Army
TheBattleofStalingrad....................................................................29
S.J.Lewis
“Knock’emAllDown”:TheReductionofAachen,
October1944....................................................................................63
ChristopherR.Gabel
TheBattleofManila.........................................................................91
ThomasM.Huber
TheBattleforHue,1968.................................................................123
JamesH.Willbanks
The31December1994-8February1995BattleforGrozny..........161
TimothyL.Thomas
TheSiegeofBeirut.........................................................................205
GeorgeW.Gawrych
TheSiegeofSarajevo,1992-1995..................................................235
CurtisS.King
TheTakedownofKabul:AnEffectiveCoupdeMain...................291
LesterW.Grau
OperationJUSTCAUSEinPanamaCity,December1989...........325
LawrenceA.Yates
TodooNada:MontonerosVersustheArmy:UrbanTerrorismin
Argentina.........................................................................................373
LieutenantColonelAlanC.Lowe,U.S.Army
HumanitarianOperationsinanUrbanEnvironment:Hurricane
Andrew,August-October1992.......................................................407
JeroldE.Brown
UrbanWarfare:ItsHistoryandItsFuture......................................439
RogerJ.Spiller
AbouttheContributors....................................................................451
AppendixA.TheFuture.................................................................455
iii
Preface
Itisaxiomaticinthemilitarycommunitythatoperationsinanur-
banenvironmentshouldbeavoidedifatallpossible,giventhecosts
theyexactintime,personnel,casualties,andmateriel.Yet,through-
out history,citieshavecontinuouslybeenatthecenterofavarietyof
military undertakings: sieges, street fighting, coups de main, peace-
keepingandpeaceenforcement,stabilityoperationsandsupportop-
erations, and disaster and humanitarian relief. Moreover, this trend
continues through the recent past and up to the present as headlines
concerningBeirut,Sarajevo,Mogadishu,Grozny,Kabul,andBagh-
dadindicate.
Givenmychoiceinsuchmatters,Iwouldechothewordsofanold
songsungbyJohnnyCash,amongothers.Thechantedchorusimplores,
“Don’t take your guns to town, son. Leave your guns at home, Bill.”
Unfortunately,soldiersarenotalwaysgiventhatoptionasavalidcourse
ofaction.Recognizingthatarmiescannotalwaysbypasscities,theU.S.
militarysincethemid-1990shasexperiencedaresurgenceofinterestin
urban operations. As one indication of this renewed attention, the
Commander, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC),
tasked the Combat Studies Institute (CSI), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, to
researchandwriteseveralin-depthcasestudiesthatwouldprovidehistorical
perspectivesonthesubject.Thecasestudiesweretobeusedforprofessional
developmentandcourseworkinallTRADOCschools.
To determine the exact scope of this assignment and the kinds of
operations that should be included, I, as CSI’s director, met with Dr.
RogerJ.Spiller,theGeorgeC.MarshallProfessorofMilitaryHistory
at USACGSC; Dr. William G. Robertson, the U.S. Army Combined
Arms Center historian; and Dr. Lawrence A. Yates, CSI’s research
coordinator. During the meeting, the group reached consensus on the
case studies to be examined and determined that the authors of each
wouldcomefromofficerandcivilianscholarsatFortLeavenworth.I
placedDr.Robertsoninchargeoftheprojectasitsgeneraleditor,with
Dr.Yatesworkingcloselyasmanagingeditor.
The resulting anthology begins with a general overview of urban
operationsfromancienttimestothemidpointofthetwentiethcentury.
ItthendetailstenspecificcasestudiesofU.S.,German,andJapanese
operations in cities during World War II and ends with more recent
RussianattemptstosubdueChechenfightersinGroznyandtheSerbian
siegeofSarajevo.Operationsrangeacrossthespectrumfromcombatto
v
humanitarian and disaster relief. Each chapter contains a narrative
account of a designated operation, identifying and analyzing the
lessonsthatremainrelevanttoday.BeforeinclusioninthisCGSCPress
publication,thefinaldraftofeachchapterappearedonCSI’swebsiteat
<http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/CSI/research/MOUT/urbanopera-
tionsintro.asp>. The chapters will remain on CSI’s publications
websiteforthosewhocannotreadilyaccesstheprintedbook.
Inhisforeword,retiredGeneralDonnA.Starry,U.S.Army,reflects
ontherelevanceofurbanoperationstoday.Dr.Spillerablyreinforces
thispositioninanin-depthconclusionthatpullstogetherthethemesof
thevariouschapterswhileintroducingadditionalissues.Itishopedthat
today’s military professional, as well as interested parties within the
general public, will find these studies stimulating and informative.
For a more conceptual look at cities and how they affect and are
affectedbymilitaryoperations,seeDr.Spiller’sSharpCorners,which
CSIpublishedin2001andcanalsobefoundontheCSIpublications
website.
LAWYNC.EDWARDS
Colonel,Aviation
Director,CombatStudiesInstitute
vi
Foreword
Historyinstructsthatforavarietyofreasons,citieshavealwaysbeen
targets for attack by adversaries. From the earliest of times, attackers
camebearingweaponsrangingfromknives,arrows,andspears,while
inmoderntimes,theyhavebroughtweaponrytheIndustrialRevolution
made available: cannon, rocket artillery, and ultimately bombs and
rockets delivered from aerial platforms and even thermonuclear
warheads, not to mention the potential for chemical and biological
payloads.Inturn,citieshaverespondedtomostofthesethreats.Early
on,forexample,theythickenedcitywallsanderectedotherbarriersto
entry.Butattackersseekingtosubduethecitiessimplycounteredwith
new and better weapons. So the game of measures and coun-
termeasures—theadult,andmuchmoredeadly,versionofthefamiliar
children’s game of rock, scissors, paper—has continued apace for
centuries.
A post-1945 visitor to the Allied zones of occupation in Western
Europewhohadnotbeenonthescenetoviewfirsthandtheeventsof
the long war just ended would have immediately noticed several
strikingfeaturesofthelandscape.Aboveall,many,ifnotmost,ofthe
large cities lay in ruin. By one count there were seventy-two such
places, virtually all famous, old, large, important. Those cities not
destroyedwereseverelydamaged.TheAllieshadpoundedthemwith
strategic and tactical aerial bombing, reduced them to rubble by
artillery and sometimes by ground action, consumed them with fire
(HamburgandDresden),orfinally,movingtothePacifictheaterinthe
caseofHiroshimaandNagasaki,atomizedthem.
Severalofthesewesterncitieshadbeenbombedflatonthepremise
that if the city were “rubbled,” the resultant demoralization of the
workingpopulationwouldadverselyaffectfactoryoutputinthatcity.
Virtually nowhere, however, did such attacks have the predicted
effects. The true cost in aircrews and aircraft lost to demonstrate that
this operational concept was a seriously flawed hypothesis from the
outsetwashighindeed.Operationally,manycitiesbecametargetsfor
destructionpurelyforpoliticalreasons.RememberBerlin.AsAntony
BeevordramaticallyrecountsinTheFallofBerlin1945,JosephStalin
hadtohavethecityforrevenge,andforrevenge,hisarmiespillaged,
plundered, and raped their way through Berlin’s alleys, streets, and
undergrounds. Winston Churchill saw Berlin as a political target,
necessaryforpostwardiplomaticclout.GeneralDwightD.Eisenhower
demurredonmilitarygroundsbecausehebelievedtakingBerlinwasno
vii
longer considered an important objective and thought instead that
defeating German armies in the field was the primary goal. Because
Churchilllinkedmilitaryconcernstoalargerpoliticalframework,itis
likely that Carl von Clausewitz would have sided with Churchill’s
position. Because Eisenhower’s position focused more on strictly
military considerations and less on political factors, Henri de Jomini
probablywouldhaveagreedwithEisenhower.Itisdoubtfulacivilized
personwouldhavesidedwithStalin.
Ourpostwarvisitor,inlookingaround,wouldseeothercities,some
quitelarge,thathadseenlittleifanyobviouscombatdamage.Further,
while some smaller towns and villages showed evidence of combat,
many, if not most, appeared relatively untouched. But even in urban
areas where the visitor encountered extensive damage, it would soon
become apparent that many essential functions of the city were still
operating,albeitwithdifficulty.Waterandelectricitywereavailable;
food could be had; populations had gone underground, surviving and
livingincellars;andpeoplegottotheworkplaceorwhatwasleftofit.
Nottooversimplifythetraumabutsimplytostatefacts,thingswenton
somehow. Postwar Mannheim, for example, leveled in a strategic/
operationalbombingcampaignpredictedtodemoralizethepopulation
and deprive the industrial base of workers, featured a postwar
population of cellar dwellers who, while uncomfortable, were living,
eating,sleeping,andstillworking.
Returning to Western Europe ten years later, the visitor would be
struckbytheextenttowhichthesecitieshadrecoveredfromtheirwar
damage.MarshallPlandollarsandaninherentlyindustriouspopulation
hadworkedwonders.Twentyyearslater,evidenceofwardamagewas
largelylimitedtoremainsofbuildingsleftstandingasmonumentsin
remembranceofthewar:thetowerofBerlin’sancientKaiserWilhelm
KirchealongtheKurfurstendam,forexample.New,vibrantcitieshad
emerged from the ruins of the old, a process not entirely unlike that
foundthroughoutancienthistorywhenanewcitywassimplyplacedon
top of another that had been destroyed. The visitor would have
observed that cities are not inanimate assemblages of buildings and
facilities, but instead, they are more like living things, conceived and
born by some means for some reason. They grow and they mature.
Somethrive;somebecomeillandrecover.Somedieandareforgotten,
and some are destroyed and rebuilt. Not only are cities themselves
living systems but also they are composed of supporting interstitial
systems: water, food, power, communications, transportation, manu-
facturing,economic,commercial,entertainment,andmanyothers.
viii
