DTIC ADA440196: Gradual Failure: The Air War Over North Vietnam 1965-1966

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GRADUAL FAILURE
THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM
1965–1966
JACOB VAN STAAVEREN
Air Force History and Museums Program
United States Air Force
Washington, D.C. 2002
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Gradual Failure. The Air War Over North Vietnam 1965-1966
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Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in Publication Data
Van Staaveren, Jacob.
Gradual failure : the air war over North Vietnam, 1965-1966 / Jacob Van
Staaveren.
p. cm. -- (The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia)
Includes bibliographical reference and index.
1. Vietnamese Conflict, 1961-1975--Aerial operations, American. 2. United
States. Air Force--History--Vietnamese Conflict, 1961-1975. I. Title. II. Series
DS558.8 .V359 2002
959.704´348´0973--dc21 2002003229
ii
Foreword
The United States Air Force reached its nadir during the opening two years
of the Rolling Thunder air campaign in North Vietnam. Never had the Air Force
operated with so many restraints and to so little effect. These pages are painful
but necessary reading for all who care about the nation's military power.
Jacob Van Staaveren wrote this book in the 1970s near the end of his distin-
guished government service, which began during the occupation of Japan; the
University of Washington Press published his book on that experience in 1995.
He was an Air Force historian in Korea during the Korean War, and he began
to write about the Vietnam War while it was still being fought. His volume on
the air war in Laos was declassified and published in 1993. Now this volume
on the air war in North Vietnam has also been declassified and is being pub-
lished for the first time. Although he retired to McMinnville, Oregon, a num-
ber of years ago, we asked him to review the manuscript and make any changes
that seemed warranted. For the most part, this is the book he wrote soon after
the war.
Readers of this volume will also want to read the sequel, Wayne Thompson's
To Hanoi and Back: The U. S. Air Force and North Vietnam, 1966–1973, which
tells the more encouraging story of how the Air Force employed airpower to far
greater effect using a combination of better doctrine, tactics, technology, and
training.
RICHARD P. HALLION
Air Force Historian
iii
The Author
Jacob Van Staaveren (1917–1999) served as a historian for over twenty years
with the Air Force history program, both in Washington and in the field. He
earned a B.A. degree from Linfield College, Oregon, and an M.A. in history
from the University of Chicago. From 1946 to 1950, Mr. Van Staaveren served
with the Allied occupation forces in Japan, initially as an adviser on civil
reforms, then as a historian preparing studies on Japanese economic reforms.
The University of Washington Press published his account of this period, An
American in Japan, 1945–1948: A Civilian View of the Occupation, in 1994.
During his long career with Air Force history, he wrote numerous studies,
including several on the war in Southeast Asia. He was co-author of The United
States Air Force in Southeast Asia, 1961–1973: An Illustrated Account (1977)
and the author of Interdiction in Southern Laos, 1960–1968(1993).
iv
Contents
Foreword. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Author. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Chapter 1
Flaming Dart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
The United States Considers a Reprisal Attack. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Flaming Dart I. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Flaming Dart II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Chapter 2
Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Paramilitary Activities and Bombing Plans. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Rising Pressure from the Services to Bomb the North . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Selecting Major North Vietnamese Targets. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
The Gulf of Tonkin Incident. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Washington Forbids Follow-on Strikes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
The Bien Hoa Incident. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Beginning of a Limited, Two-Phase Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Washington’s Resistance to a Bombing Program Ends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Chapter 3
Rolling Thunder Begins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
The Air Challenge in North Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Command and Control of Air Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Preparations for a Rolling Thunder Program. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
The First Two Rolling Thunder Strikes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
Initial Analysis of Aircraft Losses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
An Air Strategy Emerges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
Beginning of Weekly Rolling Thunder Strikes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
Supporting Operations for Rolling Thunder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Contingency Planning for a Larger Conflict. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
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GRADUALFAILURE: THEAIRWAROVERNORTHVIETNAM: 1965–1966
Chapter 4
Gradual Expansion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Further Decisions on Prosecuting the War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
Initial Bridge-Busting Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
Countering the North’s Air Defenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
The Honolulu Conference of April 1965. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
Rolling Thunder’s Moderate Pace Continues. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
Expansion of the Leaflet Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
Cautious Optimism on Bombing Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
Chapter 5
Pause and Escalation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
The First Bombing Halt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
Rolling Thunder Resumes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
Hanoi Expands its Air and Ground Defenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
The Air Force Organizes for Extended Combat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
Washington Rejects a More Air-Oriented Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
Beginning of Two-Week Bombing Cycles. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
Chapter 6
The SAM Threat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
Initial anti-SAM Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
The First Iron Hand Missions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
Improving Detection of SAM Sites. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
Continued Air Strikes on non-SAM Targets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
Establishment of a Target Intelligence Center. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
Deepening Service Concern about Strike Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
The First SAM “Kill” and the anti-SAM Campaign in Late 1965. . . . . . 192
The Air Force Increases its anti-SAM Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
Chapter 7
Toward the Thirty-seven Day Bombing Halt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
Additional Interdiction Changes and Planning for Negotiation. . . . . . . . 202
Continuation of the Leaflet Program. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
Beginning of a Thirty-seven Day Bombing Halt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
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CONTENTS
Chapter 8
Diplomacy Fails. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
Hanoi Rejects American Peace Overtures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
Debate on Resuming the Bombing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
Rolling Thunder 48 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224
More Deployment Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
Rolling Thunder 49 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236
Chapter 9
Rolling Thunder 50. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243
Westmoreland’s “Extended Battlefield” Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243
Selecting Rolling Thunder 50 Targets. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248
Rolling Thunder 50 Begins. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252
The Air Munitions Shortage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263
Circumventing Bad Weather With MSQ–77 Radar. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265
Countering the North’s Air Defense System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267
Improving MiG Watch and Border Patrol. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276
Chapter 10
The Strikes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279
The POL Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279
Approval of a Few POL Strikes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284
Gradual Expansion of POL Strikes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 288
Strikes on Major POL Sites Begin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289
The Honolulu Conference, July 1966. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294
The POL Strangulation Campaign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297
Chapter 11
Summary and Reappraisal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 309
Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325
Glossary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355
Bibliography. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359
Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 366
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GRADUALFAILURE: THEAIRWAROVERNORTHVIETNAM: 1965–1966
Illustrations
Maps
Southeast Asia, Principal U.S. Airbases. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvii
Armed Reconnaissance Route Packages. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240
Figures
1. Rolling Thunder Sorties, Ordnance, and Targets
March–June 1965. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2. Redeployment of Aircraft
August 5–9, 1964 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3. Redeployment of Aircraft by CINCSTRIKE
August 8–21, 1964 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4. Location of USAF Combat Squadrons
February 1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
5. RollingThunder Sorties, Ordnance Delivered, and Principal Targets
March 2–June 24, 1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
6. Troops and Equipment in South Vietnam and Thailand
February and June 1965. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
7. Targets and Air Strikes
As of June 24, 1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
8. Increase in Conventional Antiaircraft Weaponry
July 5–September 30, 1965. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
9. Personnel Shortfalls
February 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
10. Air Force Deployments
1966. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234
11. Sortie Effectiveness
April, May, and June 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263
12. Aircraft Destroyed or Damaged
April, May and June 1966. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267
13. Storage Capacity of Major North Vietnamese POL Installations
1964–1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280
viii
CONTENTS
14. Prestrike and Poststrike Storage Capacity of POL Targets,
Route Package 1
August 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302
15. Prestrike and Poststrike Storage Capacity of POL Targets,
Route Package 6A
August 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302
Photographs
F–105 Thunderchief. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Infiltration route in Laos. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
EC–121s at Tan Son Nhut Air Base . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
North Vietnamese military barracks area under attack.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
U.S. dependents leaving South Vietnam in 1965. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
President Lyndon B. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Gen. Curtis E. LeMay. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
President Johnson and advisers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
USS Ticonderoga . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
A–4 launching from USS Hancock. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
F–102s at Tan Son Nhut Air Base. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Da Nang Air Base. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Gen. William C. Westmoreland. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Farm Gate aircraft at Bien Hoa Air Base. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
F–105s at Da Nang Air Base. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Secretary of State Dean Rusk. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
South Vietnamese A–1s and T–28s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Laotian General Vang Pao. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
President John F. Kennedy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Gen. Earle G. Wheeler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, and
Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge at Tan Son Nhut Air Base, 1964. . . . . . . 36
Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
B–57 in flight. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
B–57s at Da Nang Air Base . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Shipping in Haiphong Harbor. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Burning North Vietnamese Swatow boat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Gen. Hunter Harris. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
B–57 destroyed in Viet Cong mortar attack at Bien Hoa, November 1964. . . 58
ix