Table Of Content-A
The Proposed Fissile-
Material Production
-
Cutoff
CSC
o Next Steps
C Brian G. Chow, Richard H. Speier,
Gregory S. Jones
0
Preparedf or the
Office of the Secretary of Defense
National Defense
Research Institute
This research described in this report was sponsored by the
Office of the Secretary of Defense under RAND's National
Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and
development center supported by the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, the Joint Staff, and the defense agencies, Contract
No. MDA903-90-C-0004.
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Chow, Brian G.
The proposed fissile-material production cutoff : next steps /
Brian G. Chow, Richard Speier, Gregory S. Jones.
p. cm
"Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense."
"MR-586-1-OSD."
ISBN 0-8330-2359-4
1. Nuclear nonproliferation. 2. Nuclear disarmament-
United States. I. Speier, Richard. II. Jones, Gregory S.
III. United States. Dept. of Defense. Office of the Secretary of
Defense. IV. Title.
JX1974.73.C49 1995
327.1 '74---dc2O 95-12856
CIP
RAND is a nonprofit institution that helps improve public
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.000. laam a
.008. la960205s1995 caua 000 0 eng d
.010. la95012856
.020. la0833023594
.027. iaRAND/MR-586-1-OSD
.037. lalc$15.00
.040. laCStmoRicCStmoR
.043. [an-us---
.050. 001aJX1974.731b.C49 1995
.100. 1 laChow, Brian,ld1941-lw
.245. l4laThe proposed fissile-material production cutoff :Ibnext steps /
IcBrian G. Chow, Richard H. Speier, Gregory S. Jones.
.260. laSanta Monica, CA :IbRANDlcl995.
.300. laxv, 51 p. :Ibill. ;1c23 cm.
.500. la"National Defense Research Institute."
.504. lalncludes bibliographical references.
.506. 1 LaUNCLASSIFIED
.520. laPresident Clinton has announced that the United States will take
a comprehensive approach to the growing global accumulation of fissile
material. As an element to that approach, he proposed a multilateral
convention banning production of such material for nuclear-explosives
purposes or outside international safeguards. This report examines and
proposes some "next steps" to the proposed convention, to further
strengthen worldwide control of weapon-usable material. These next steps
would have two main objectives. The first would be to reduce or to
transfer to secure custody current plutonium and highly enriched uranium
stockpiles. The second would be to prohibit or to restrict to fewer
locations the production of these materials. The report also analyzes the
political and economic obstacles that might hinder negotiation of these
next steps, and it suggests measures that would mitigate these obstacles.
The U.S. proposal is described first, then the report quantifies various
countries' inventories and ability to produce weapon-usable material.
.536. laOffice of Secretary of Defense;IbMDA903-90-C-0004;IdRCN 470R
.580. laSupersedes RAND/MR-586-OSD.
.650. OlaNuclear nonproliferation.
.650. OlaNuclear disarmamentlzUnited States.
.695. 1 laNuclear proliferation.
.695. 2 laDisarmament.
.700. 1 laSpeier, Richard H.
.700. 1 laJones, Gregory S.lw
.710. 2 laNational Defense Research Institute (RAND Corporation).
Iblnternational Security and Defense Policy Center.
.710. 1 laUnited States.IbDepL. of Defense.lbOffice of the Secretary of
Defense.lw
.787. lairRAND/MR-586-OSD
.980. laDefense and Technology Planning
.981. laNational Security Research
.982. la3
.983. IaMILITARY STRATEGY AND TACTICS
.984. la199601311b19960131
.986. la19960131
.991. lalntemational Security and Defense Policy Center
.992. 1a9601
.596. lal 2 3
The Proposed Fissile-
Material Production
Cutoff
Next Steps
Brian G. Chow, Richard H. Speier,
Gregory S. Jones
National Defense
Research Institute
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
PREFACE
In September 1993, President Clinton announced that the United
States will take a comprehensive approach to the growing global ac-
cumulation of fissile material. As an element of that approach, he
proposed a multilateral convention banning the production of such
material for nuclear-explosives purposes or outside international
safeguards.
We examine and recommend next steps to the proposed convention.
These negotiating steps or options are to further strengthen the
worldwide control of weapon-usable material. In addition, we ana-
lyze the political and economic obstacles that might hinder the ne-
gotiation of the recommended next steps, and suggest measures that
would mitigate these obstacles.
To study and recommend the next steps and measures, we first de-
scribe the U.S. proposal, quantify various countries' inventories and
ability to produce weapon-usable material, and determine what re-
mains to be done beyond the proposed convention. These prelimi-
nary but necessary analyses then lead us to the main part of this
report, where we describe possible next steps, identify potential
obstacles to these steps, and then suggest measures to mitigate
opposition to them. Those who are familiar with the proposed
convention might skip Chapter Two on the U.S. proposal.
The project was conducted under the International Security and
Defense Policy Center of RAND's National Defense Research In-
stitute, a federally funded research and development center spon-
sored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and
the defense agencies.
iii
iv The Proposed Fissile-Material Production Cutoff: Next Steps
The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do
not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of
Defense or the U.S. government.
CONTENTS
Preface ......................................... iii
Figures and Table ................................. vii
Sum m ary ....................................... ix
Acknowledgments ................................. xv
Chapter One
INTRODUCTION ............................... 1
Chapter Two
THE U.S. PROPOSAL ............................ 3
Scope ....................................... 4
Reactions .................................... 7
Chapter Three
THIRD WORLD INVENTORIES AND ABILITY TO
PRODUCE WEAPON-USABLE MATERIAL ............ 9
Inventories ................................... 9
Production Capabilities .......................... 13
Proliferation Risks and Possible Controls ............. 16
Chapter Four
THE PROPOSED CONVENTION'S EFFECT ON
PROLIFERATION .............................. 19
Effects on Specific Countries ...................... 19
General Effects on Access to Weapon-Usable Material ... 21
The Timeline for Negotiations ..................... 23
V
vi The Proposed Fissile-Material Production Cutoff: Next Steps
Chapter Five
NEXT STEPS: OPTIONS, OBSTACLES, AND MITIGATING
M EASURES ................................... 25
Two Promising Options .......................... 25
Stockpile Disposition .......................... 25
Total Cutoff ................................. 27
O bstacles .................................... 28
Naval Reactors .............................. 28
Delayed Effectiveness ......................... 28
Government Attitudes ......................... 29
Mitigating the Obstacles ......................... 32
A Discriminatory Option ......................... 35
Elements of a Comprehensive Approach ............. 37
Chapter Six
CONCLUSION ................................ 39
Appendix
ESTIMATES OF THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES'
INVENTORIES AND ABILITY TO PRODUCE WEAPON-
USABLE MATERIAL ............................ 43
FIGURES
1. Third World Inventory of Weapon-Usable Material in
1995 ..................................... 12
2. Third-World Ability to Produce Weapon-Usable
Material in the Mid- 1990s ...................... 13
3. Reprocessing Capability in Major Countries That Use
Plutonium in Civilian Applications ............... 15
TABLE
1. Third World Inventories and Ability to Produce
Weapon-Usable Material (as of 1995) ............. 10
vii
SUMMARY
Nuclear nonproliferation has long been a principal security objective
of the United States and most other countries. The nuclear nonpro-
liferation treaty (NPT), which took effect in 1970, sought to limit nu-
clear weapons to the countries that then possessed them (the United
States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China). It
is widely believed that, since then, several other states (India, Israel,
Pakistan, and North Korea) have acquired nuclear weapons. One
objective of current nonproliferation policy is to cap and eventually
reverse the nuclear-weapon programs in these undeclared nuclear-
weapon states. Another is to prevent terrorist and other subnational
groups from gaining access to nuclear weapons or to sensitive nu-
clear materials, i.e., plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU).
Such materials are produced in military and some civilian nuclear
programs.
To help achieve these objectives, President Clinton outlined in
September 1993 a "framework for U.S. efforts to prevent the prolif-
eration of weapons of mass destruction." This framework included a
proposed multilateral convention prohibiting the production of plu-
tonium or HEU unless it is for purposes other than nuclear-weapon
production and then only if it is done under international safeguards.
The United Nations General Assembly endorsed the proposal within
three months subject to the important change that the convention be
"nondiscriminatory," that is, that it apply to declared and undeclared
nuclear-weapon states and nonnuclear-weapon states alike.
What will be the effect of such a convention on the future availability
of plutonium and HEU? Can additional steps reduce the opportuni-
ix
