Table Of ContentDRONES
WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW®
DRONES
WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW®
SARAH KREPS
Cornell University
1
3
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Kreps, Sarah E. (Sarah Elizabeth), author.
Title: Drones : what everyone needs to know / Sarah Kreps.
Description: New York, NY : Oxford University Press, [2016]
Identifiers: LCCN 2015040590| ISBN 978–0–19–023534–5 (hardcover: alk. paper) |
ISBN 978–0–19–023535–2 (pbk.: alk. paper)
Subjects: LCSH: Drone aircraft. | Air warfare.
Classification: LCC UG1242.D7 K73 2016 | DDC 623.74/69—dc23 LC record
available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2015040590
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Printed by Courier Press, USA
CONTENTS
FOREWORD VII
1 Introduction 1
2 Armed Drone Technology 7
3 Proliferation of Drones to Other Countries 59
4 Drones for the Ground and Sea 82
5 Noncombat Technology 106
6 The Future of Drones: Nano, Autonomous
Systems, and Science Fiction 145
NOTES 165
INDEX 187
FOREWORD
My first encounter with the idea of a drone came in the days
after the 9/ 11 terrorist attacks. I was a lieutenant in the E- 3
Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) office outside
Boston and worked on advanced programs related to the E- 3
and other intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance sys-
tems. I recall my boss telling me that our office had received
a “snowflake” originating with the Pentagon. Then- Secretary
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was famous for issuing snow-
flakes, a system of communication between the Secretary and
the many employees of DoD. This particular snowflake was
essentially an all- hands- on- deck call for our community to
think through ways to retrofit as many Predators as possible
with Hellfire missiles. Predators had been used for surveil-
lance in the Balkans, but there had been reservations about
arming them with missiles. After 9/ 11, the “gloves came off”
and there was no question about whether the military would
now make the decision to arm Predators. The question was
how to do it quickly so they could be deployed to the field.
The acquisitions community, of which I was a member, was
not known for expediency. The Secretary, who was known for
urging a leaner and meaner system, was trying to speed things
up. He succeeded. The rest of the story is somewhat famil-
iar. The Air Force, along with the CIA, deployed Predators
viii Foreword
to who reportedly survived the strike, in October 2001, with
the first strike likely a CIA strike of the Taliban’s number-
three leader, Mullah Akhund, on November 8, 2001.1
After that initial introduction to unmanned aerial vehicles,
often referred to as drones, I did not follow their employment
much until 2011. By then I was a professor at Cornell University,
having left the Air Force in 2003 to pursue a PhD that focused
on issues of international security and defense policy. By that
point, the wartime use of drones had not only spilled over into
non- battlefield settings such as Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen
but had also escalated considerably. A US counterterrorism
official reported that there had been about 305 drone strikes
just in Pakistan between 2004 and 2011, with an estimated
2,050 individuals killed, of whom about 392 were civilians.
As a former military officer-turned political scientist, I could
see the operational arguments in favor of drones but was con-
cerned about the strategic and political ramifications. Drones,
armed with precision weapons and able to loiter over targets,
might actually be better positioned to minimize unintentional
damage than alternatives such as local Pakistani air forces, for
example, or ground troops. But because they imposed no risk
to the country that used them, they could also create a moral
hazard, being used in ways, times, and places that might not
otherwise be used were these actors to use the caution that
goes along with having skin in the game with manned aircraft
or ground troops. Plus, from studying theories of democratic
checks in wartime, I had a hunch that the populace, which
would see few obvious burdens of a technology that intro-
duced no casualties, would not be itching to end conflicts in
which drones were involved. This could mean wars without
limits in time or space.
I set out to study the politics, law, and ethics of drones. My
first foray was with John Kaag, a colleague who studies phi-
losophy. We wrote an academic article, several op- eds, and a
book on the topic. The topic of drones did not seem to be going
anywhere and I continued several other projects involving
Foreword ix
public opinion and drones. It turns out Americans think they
love drones but it is in part because of how strikes and casual-
ties are portrayed in media accounts, focusing on contentious
assumptions such as the targets being militants rather than
the possibility that these targets are civilians. Once individu-
als know of the possibility of civilian casualties, they are much
more reticent in their support.
In 2013– 2014, I was a resident fellow at the Council on Foreign
Relations, where I turned to more policy- oriented questions.
In particular, as a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow, I was inter-
ested in drone proliferation, which is governed by the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the 1986 agreement that
guided potential nuclear delivery vehicles, including drones.
My colleague Micah Zenko and I worked on several articles
for both Foreign Affairs and Foreign Policy as well as a Council
Special Report, Limiting Armed Drone Proliferation. I then had
the pleasure of hosting several Council on Foreign Relations
roundtables on the topic everywhere from Dallas to Boston to
New York to Tokyo, where I had the benefit of hearing a range
of feedback on the topic.
It was around this time that Dave McBride, whom I had
worked with on my first book, Coalitions of Convenience,
approached me about writing the Drones: What Everyone Needs
to Know book. He is a wonderful person to work with so I was
tempted. Plus, it seemed like it was something I could write
in my sleep after working on the topic for years. Wrong. The
topic of drones is a moving target. It has evolved considerably
in the last several years, as it surely will in the coming years.
But it is endlessly fascinating and I hope the readers of this
book agree.
In my writing of the book, I must obviously thank Dave for
giving me the opportunity to write it, and to the various CFR
Roundtables where I received feedback on the topic of drones.
I would also like to thank Amy Zegart for inviting me to pres-
ent my research at Stanford’s Center for International Security
and Cooperation and again as a Summer Security fellow at
