Driven Out of Employment? The Impact of the Abolition of National Service on Driving Schools and ...

24 Pages·2010·0.24 MB·English

BritishJournalofIndustrialRelations doi:10.1111/j.1467-8543.2010.00813.x
48:4December20100007–1080 pp.784–807
Driven Out of Employment? The Impact
of the Abolition of National Service on
Driving Schools and Aspiring Drivers
bjir_813784..807
Paul Avrillier, Laurent Hivert and
Francis Kramarz
Abstract
Before 1997, compulsory military service was a way for many young French
men to obtain their driving licence for free. After the abolition of compulsory
conscription in 1997, this sex-based discrimination disappeared. We use this
shock in its two dimensions. First, it was a supply shock, since we show the
abolition induced a decline in the fraction of men holding a driving licence,
particularlyformenlivinginurbanareas.Becausethecausalrelationbetween
holding a driving licence and employment is hard to demonstrate, we use this
policy change as an instrument for the former. Some elements of our analysis
show that employment and having a driving licence are closely related.
However,wecannotfullydemonstratethatourresultsareduetothelackofa
drivinglicenceinitselfratherthanduetootherconsequencesoftheabolitionof
nationalservice(e.g.professionalcoursesortheassociatedlossofexperience).
Second,itwasademandshock,sincethesemenwereforcedtoturntodriving
schools. Here, we are able to show that the abolition of national service had
a direct and uncontroversial effect on the (heavily regulated) driving schools
industry.Thedemandshockresultedinincreasedrents.Theserentstranslated
into an increase in the number of driving schools, stable total employment, a
decrease in average employment, no increase of total sales or value-added, no
obvious decrease in profits per school, but an increase in wages paid to the
teachersinthosecitiesthathadmanyyoungmen.Hence,thosewhobenefited
from increased demand have been the instructors, in limited supply, not the
incumbentschoolsortheconsumers.
PaulAvrillierisattheEcoleNationaledesPontsetChaussées.LaurentHivertisattheInstitut
NationaldelaRecherchesurlesTransportsetleurSécurité.FrancisKramarzisattheCentrefor
ResearchinEconomicsandStatistics.
©BlackwellPublishingLtd/LondonSchoolofEconomics2010.PublishedbyBlackwellPublishingLtd,
9600GarsingtonRoad,OxfordOX42DQ,UKand350MainStreet,Malden,MA02148,USA.
ImpactoftheAbolitionofNationalServiceonDrivingSchools 785
1. Introduction
Adrivinglicenceisclearlyanimportantliberatingasset,moreparticularlyin
dispersedcountries,suchastheUnitedStates.ItisevenmoresoinFrance,
a country with wide geographical dispersion, because the cost of a driving
licence (learning and test costs) is one of the largest in the world. The
difficulty of obtaining this licence (largely because of its cost) has been a
matterofmuchpublicdebate,raisingtheproblemofinequalityofaccessfor
thepoorestandtheyoungestpartofthepopulation.Inthisarticle,westudy
drivinglicencesinrelationwithlabourmarkets.
Todoso,weusethe1997abolitionofnationalservice.Before1997,young
Frenchmaleadultshadtodotenmonths’militaryserviceattheageof18or
they could defer this until the end of their university education. A fraction
among the conscripts had the opportunity to obtain their military driving
licence(Brevetdeconduitemilitaire),whichcouldbeconvertedintoacivilian
drivinglicenceattheendoftheirnationalservice.ManyyoungFrenchmen
therefore obtained their driving licence for free, whereas women were not
offered such an opportunity. After the abolition of national service, this
sex-based,albeitrarelynoted,discriminationdisappeared.
It therefore becomes possible to use the abolition of conscription to
analysetheimportanceofhavingadrivinglicenceonthelabourmarketand
the impact of the abolition on the structure of driving schools. These two
topics, though apparently distant, are indeed tightly related, since the entry
into the occupation of driving instructors, as well as the creation of a new
drivingschool,arebothstronglyregulated.Hence,theabolitionofnational
serviceconstitutesbothalargeandpotentiallypermanent(negative)supply
shockofworkersendowedwithadrivinglicenceonthelabourmarketanda
largeandpermanent(positive)demandshockforthedrivingschoolmarket.
Therefore,weanalysebothsidesinturn.
Thenegativesupplyshockisapossiblesourceforidentifyingthepotential
causaleffectofpossessingadrivinglicenceonemploymentamongdifferent
social and geographic groups. If it exists, this effect should come through
either an extended set of accessible jobs or an extended set of possible jobs
(thosethatrequiretheuseofavehicle).Ifhardlyanyarticlesintheexisting
literaturecanbefoundonthesubject,itmaybebecausetheproblemisnot
seenasessentialinmanycountries,butitmayalsocomefromdatasources
that do not collect information on the possession of a driving licence. In
addition,solvingthecausalityissueispotentiallyhardbecausepossessinga
driving licence is clearly endogenous in relation to employment: one person
whohasatalentforexamsshouldalsoeasilypassthedrivinglicencetestsas
anotherdiploma,andhasthereforebetterchancestogetajob,notbecause
ofthelicencebutbecauseoftheirtalent.Moreover,reversecausalityisalso
an issue when examining the impact of having a driving licence on employ-
ment:havingajobmakesiteasiertopayforyourdrivinglicencebecauseof
your earnings. As a consequence, it is essential to find good (exogenous)
instrumentsforhavingadrivinglicence.
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786 BritishJournalofIndustrialRelations
Thepositivedemandshockisapotentialsourceforidentifyinghowopera-
tionsofdrivingschoolsarerun,inparticulariftheregulationsthatsurround
this industry have any effect. For instance, entry and profits should be
affectedaftertheabolition.
The first contribution of this article is to show that the decline in the
numberofconscriptscausedadecreaseinthenumberofyoungmenhaving
a driving licence after the reform. The fall is identified by comparing the
relative driving licence rate between men and women, before and after the
reform,withindifferentagegroups(differenceindifferencemethodology,in
factatripledifference).Inaddition,becauseofthetiming,theanalysishasa
flavorofregressiondiscontinuity.Furthermore,itisalsopossibletoidentify
those who were most affected, as measured by their socioeconomic back-
ground or their geographic environment (rural or urban). In particular, we
show that individuals living in an urban environment were more affected
than those living in a rural environment. This result is not necessarily sur-
prising, since public transport, more widely available in urban areas, is a
potentialsubstituteforalicence.
The second contribution of our article is to analyse if having a driving
licencehelpsingettingajob.Afterhavingshownthatthereformprovidesa
potentialinstrumentforholdingadrivinglicence,weuseitinouremployment
IVregressions.OurOLSestimates,aswellasourIVresults,indeedshowthat
employmentandhavingadrivinglicencearecloselyrelated.Buteventhough
theseIVregressionsappeartobeimpeccable,reducedformanalysisrelating
employment and our instrument do not convincingly show that those men
directlyaffectedbythereformhadaloweremploymentratewhencompared
with their older peers and their equivalent in the previous generations.
WhethertheIVresultscanstillbeattributedtothelackofadrivinglicencein
itself,toservicesthenationalservicecouldprovide(training,behaviouralhelp,
etc.) or to the loss in work experience associated with national service, our
resultscannottell.Theideaofusingnationalserviceoritsabolitiontoexamine
various economic outcomes is not new. It even has a long history, often
associatedwiththenameofJoshAngrist(seeinparticularAngrist1998and
theassociatedmethodologicaldiscussionsinAngristetal.1996).Mostana-
lystsexaminewages(see,amongothers,Baueretal.2009forGermany),but
MaurinandXenogiani(2007)havelookedateducationandtheabolitionof
national service, showing that university education was sometimes used to
postpone national service indefinitely, and Herpin and Mansuy (1995) have
lookedatyouthemploymentandnationalservice.
Thethirdandlastcontributionofourarticleistoanalysetheimpactofthe
reform on the driving schools industry. As the fraction of women and men
differswidelyatthelocallevel,inparticularinsmallerruraltowns,the1997
abolitionofconscriptioncanbeconsideredasanaturalexperiment:specifi-
cally as a shock on demand for the driving licence randomly distributed all
over the country. All of a sudden, thousands of young men who could
acquire their driving licence independently of driving schools now turned
to them in droves, and the precise increase in demand depended on local
©BlackwellPublishingLtd/LondonSchoolofEconomics2010.
ImpactoftheAbolitionofNationalServiceonDrivingSchools 787
demography. Potential demand for driving schools increased. We examine
the response to the shock from this regulated industry. Potential conse-
quencesarecomplexbecauseofthewebofregulations,bothonschoolsand
instructors. In any case, if the factors limiting supply are not too binding,
employmentandsalesshouldincreaseinthecitiesfacingapositivedemand
shock.However,thisisnotwhatappearstohappen.Eventhoughweobserve
the creation of new driving schools at a local level, average employment
decreases,andthereisnoincreaseintotallocalemploymentorintotalsales
and profits. Over the period, prices remained steadily high and even
increased, whereas wages also increased: driving instructors obviously cap-
turedtherents.
2. Dataandbackground
TheData
Three data sources are used in our analysis. The first source comes from a
nationwidesurveyconductedonanannualbasisbyaFrenchprivateinstitute
on car use (called ParcAuto, car fleet), the TNS Sofres (Société Française
d’EtudesparSondages).Theannualsampleincludesabout7,000households
(10,000questionnairessentandaresponserateof70percent).Thesampling
planisconstructedincollaborationwiththeFrenchnationalstatisticaloffice,
INSEE (Institut de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques), and is repre-
sentative of the French population. The ParcAuto database, organized,
maintainedandusedatINRETS,TheFrenchNationalInstituteforTrans-
portandSafetyResearch(InstitutNationaldeRecherchesurlesTransportset
leur Sécurité) since 1983, includes all the survey annual waves. We use this
sourcefortheyears1995–2002.Itgivesinformationonthedateofbirth,sex
and holding of a driving licence for each individual. It also provides infor-
mation on the income of the household and information on the place of
residence.Unfortunately,informationontheemploymentstatusoftheindi-
vidualsisnotasked.
Therefore,weuseasecondsource,theglobaltransportsurveyfortheParis
and Ile de France region (called EGT for Enquête Globale Transport), con-
ducted in 1983, 1991 and 2001 by the Paris regional transport authority
(DREIF, Direction régionale de l’équipement d’Ile de France). Each wave
includes 23,000 individuals and 10,000 households. It provides information
on household income, date of birth, sex, education level, activity status
(student,employed,unemployed,retired),drivinglicenceandthedepartment
ofresidenceforeachindividual.
The third and last source of data is a French administrative file on firms,
calledSUSE(SystèmeUnifiédeStatistiquesd’Entreprises,i.e.unifiedsystemof
firmsstatistics)builtbyINSEEonanannualbasis.TheSUSEfiles‘unify’two
sources of data: fiscal data coming from the French fiscal administration
(Direction générale des impôts) on one hand and the EAE survey (Enquête
annuelledesentreprises)ontheotherhand.Itgiveswell-measuredinformation
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788 BritishJournalofIndustrialRelations
on employment, balance sheet data, in particular operating profit, value
added,totalwagesandsalesextractedfrombalancesheets.Finally,theSUSE
files include information on the exact location at the ‘city’ level (French
commune)ofthefirm.Thisvariablewillbematchedwithpopulationdatafrom
theCensus.TheSUSEfilesincludethethreepossiblefiscalregimesthatexist
inFranceforfirms’reports:theBICregime(BénéficesIndustrielsetCommer-
cieux, i.e. industrial and commercial incomes) for manufacturing, trade or
craft activities that aim at making profits; the BNC regime (Bénéfices non
commerciaux,i.e.non-commercialincomes)forindividualprofessionalslike
physicians, lawyers, etc. and other regulated activities such as clerks or
auctioneers; and finally, the BA regime (Bénéfices agricoles, i.e. farming
incomes) for farming activities. The BIC regime comprises three categories
that depend on annual sales: BRN (Bénéfice réel normal, i.e. standard real
incomes)comprisessome800differentvariablesonfirmsandiscompulsory
for firms with turnover exceeding €763,000 (€230,000 for services); RSI
(Régimesimplifiéd’imposition,i.e.simplifiedtaxregime)comprisessome200
different variables for firms with a turnover between €76,300 and €763,000
(€27,000and€230,000forservices),andfinally,themicro-BICregimeisfor
firmswithaturnoverbelow€76,300(€27,000forservices).Wewilluseboth
BRNandRSIdatainordertoincludealmostallFrenchdrivingschools.The
sampleperiodgoesfrom1992to2002.AlongwiththeSUSEdata,weusethe
CensusesconductedinFrancein1990and1999.ThematchbetweenSUSE
and Census allows us to have a view of the economic outcomes of driving
schoolsbeforeandafterthe1997militaryreformatalocallevel.
TheDrivingSchoolsIndustry
Thedrivingschoolsindustryisheavilyregulated.Regulationscovermultiple
dimensions.First,itislongandcostlytobecomeadrivingschoolinstructor.
Second, entry is difficult. Third, the school presents the candidates and is
therefore able to impose a minimum number of driving lessons (at least 20)
that an aspiring driver has to take. Fourth, to become an instructor, one
needstogetaStatediplomacalledBEPECASER(Brevetpourl’exercicedela
professiond’enseignantdelaconduiteautomobileetdelasécuritéroutière).At
least600hoursoftrainingareexplicitlyneeded(andmoreifmotorcycleand
truckareadded).Butonly60hoursoutof600takeplaceinadrivingschool
tolearnthepracticalaspects,asthemainpartoflessonsincludesveryformal
issuessuchasreports,discussions,etc.Thetrainingcostsamountto€5,000,
andtraininglastsninemonths.Theexamcountsatleastthreedifferentsteps
over a six-month period! In 2006, 1,545 BEPECASER were delivered, and
two candidates out of three passed the exam. In addition to the BEPE-
CASER,alicencefromthe‘Préfet’(theregionalrepresentativeoftheState)
mustbeobtained:thislicenceisvalidforfiveyearsandmustthenberenewed.
Inordertohavetherighttoopenanewdrivingschool,oneneedstohave
atleastthree-years’experienceinteachingdrivingandtoshow‘anabilityto
runafirm’since1999.
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ImpactoftheAbolitionofNationalServiceonDrivingSchools 789
Finally, driving schools benefit from the non-written rule (but heavily
suggestedbyinstructors)thataspiringdriversshouldtakeatleast20driving
lessons.Eventhoughthereisnoexplicitregulationsconcerningthenumber
oflessonstotakebeforetheexam,anecdotalevidencesuggestthatnodriving
school presents students with fewer than 20. Furthermore, the examiner
usually(andillegally,infact)asksthecandidatehowmanylessonsheorshe
took.
The1997ReformofNationalService
The discussions of a potential reform of the military service in France were
initiatedbyPresidentJacquesChiracin1996.Thedifficultiesencounteredby
theFrencharmyduringtheGulfWarconvincedhimofitsnecessity.During
theGulfWar,theFrenchforce(calledDaguet)wasstigmatizedforitslackof
mobility and its lack of autonomy from the American troops. It rapidly
becameclearthatthelargenumberofconscriptsintheFrenchforcedidnot
help.WithFrenchbordersnolongerunderthreatandchangesintherelations
with former colonies, a large army was no longer necessary. The need for a
smaller,moremobile,andbetterperformingprofessionalarmywasbeingfelt.
Eventhoughthedecisioncouldhavesparkedafiercepoliticaldiscussion,
thisdebatenevertookplace.Thereformwasneverdiscusseddespiteitsclear
strategiccharacter(CluzelandThibault2004;Paqueteau1997amongmany
others).Eventhepartiesoftheleft,apriorithemosthostiletowardstheidea
ofaprofessionalarmy(especiallytheCommunistParty,forwhomconscrip-
tion was a legacy of the French Revolution), did not really defend the
existence of a national service, and they all favored a deep reform of com-
pulsoryconscription.
Compulsory military service was broadly perceived by most citizens as a
purewasteoftime.Thisyearoff—awayfromcivilianandsociallife—was
allthemoredifficulttoacceptasittookplaceatacrucialmoment,between
theendofeducationandtheentryintothelabourmarket.Conscriptionwas
suspendedin1997,andthemilitaryadministrationstoppedusingconscripts
in August 2001. According to the military administration, the number of
conscripts stabilized in the early 1990s at roughly 200,000, implying that
40–50percentofeachbirthcohortwasdraftedforthenationalservice.After
Chirac’s initiative in 1996, the number of conscripts declined rapidly from
202,000in1996toalmostzeroin2001(seeFigure1).
3. Impactoftheabolitionondrivinglicences
Wefirstexaminethefractionofmenwhousedtoobtaintheirdrivinglicence
whiledoingtheirnationalservice.Unfortunately,nodataareavailablefrom
the French Ministry of Defense. However, the French Road Safety Agency
hasdataonthenumberofB-typedrivinglicences(thecardrivinglicence,i.e.
forvehicleslighterthan3.5tons)deliveredbydrivingschoolsbetween1990
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790 BritishJournalofIndustrialRelations
FIGURE1
DeclineintheNumberofConscriptsafter1997.
250,000
200,000
150,000
Number Conscripts
100,000
50,000
0
1993199419951996199719981999200020012002
Source: FrenchMinistryofDefense(fromMaurinandXenogiani2007).
and2006(seeFigure2).Before1997,morewomenthanmenusedtogettheir
driving licence from a driving school, but starting in 1997, the opposite
occurred:morementhanwomengottheirlicencethroughadrivingschool.
Clearly,afractionofmenwhoinpreviouscohortsreceivedtheirlicencefrom
thearmyhadtoturntodrivingschoolsafterthereform.Becausethelicence
is expensive, the number of applicants is pro-cyclical. Since the fraction
receiving the licence is essentially stable among those taking the exam, the
decrease observed after year 2000 matches the cycle. Recent numbers show
thatthefractionisbacktoitslevelofthebeginningofthe1990s,eventhough
priceshavebeensteadilyincreasingovertheperiod.1
HoldingaDrivingLicence:ResultsforFrance
The first data source, the Car Fleet data set, was conducted every year
between 1995 and 2002. Hence, we focus on the (representative) sample of
thoseaged18–23,eitheraffectedbythe1997reformornot.Moreprecisely,
welabel‘post-reform’thosemenbornfrom1978on.Indeed,becausetheage
at conscription was most often 19 or 20, Figure1 shows that conscription
started to fall with the 1977 generation (20 in 1997), but that the fall was
strongerforthe1978one(19in1997or20in1998).Therefore,weexamine
how the fraction of men aged 18–23 who hold a licence is affected by their
generationofbirth(bornin1978orafterversusbefore1978).Thischangein
fractionsformenwillbecomparedwiththatforwomen,whohavenotbeen
directlyaffectedbytheabolitionofnationalservice.Thebasicequationis:
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ImpactoftheAbolitionofNationalServiceonDrivingSchools 791
FIGURE2
NumberofDrivingLicencesDeliveredinDrivingSchoolsDividedbytheNumberofPeople
Aged18–24inFrancefrom1990to2006.
0.8
0.75
0.7
0.65
0.6
0.55
Men
0.5 Women
0.45
0.4
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Year
Source: RoadSafetyAgency.
Licence =α+βsex +βcohort +βcohort∗sex +βincome +ε
i 0 i 1 i 2 i i 3 i i
where Licence is equal to 1 if the individual has a driving licence, cohort
measuresiftheindividualisbornin1977orbeforeversusstrictlyafter1977,
sex is an indicator equal to 1 if the individual is a man, and income is an
indicatorforlow-incomeindividuals,andfinallyeisastatisticalresidual.It
isestimatedonindividualsfortheCarFleetsurveyagedbetween18and23.
The coefficient on the interaction term, sex and cohort, tells us if men born
after 1977 are less likely to have a driving licence. It is a difference-in-
differenceestimator(menbornafter1977—menbornin1977orbefore)—
(all those born after 1977 — all those born in 1977 or before).2 Estimation
results of this equation are not reported because the coefficients of interest
yield estimates that are essentially not significantly different from zero.
Therefore,weestimatevariationsonthisbasicequation.Thefollowingequa-
tiongivesthemodifiedspecification:
Licence =α+βsex +βcohort +βcohort∗sex
i 0 i 1 i 2 i i
+βincome +βcohoort∗sex∗income +ε
3 i 4 i i i i
wherethecoefficientofinterestisonthetripleinteraction(samedifference-
in-difference estimator as above, but for the two income categories that we
analyse).ThislinearprobabilitymodelisestimatedbyOLS.Togivedirectly
thecoefficientsofinterest,werewritetheequationas
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792 BritishJournalofIndustrialRelations
TABLE1
TheEffectoftheReformonDrivingLicence(LowIncomevsMid–HighIncome)
Parameter Standarderror
Constant 0.705** (0.011)
Bornbefore1977 0.086** (0.016)
Menbornbefore1977 0.031** (0.017)
Menbornafter1978 0.047** (0.016)
Lowincomesbornbefore1977 -0.078** (0.017)
Lowincomesbornafter1978 -0.087** (0.018)
Men¥lowincomesbornbefore1977 -0.022 (0.025)
Men¥lowincomesbornafter1978 -0.059** (0.027)
R2 0.020
Numberofobservations 9,700
Note: EstimatedbyOLS.Thedependentvariableisanindicatorforholdingadrivinglicence.
Thelow-incomesindicatorismeasuredatthehouseholdlevel.
Source: ParcAuto(CarFleet)AnnualSurveys(1995–2002),fromTNSSOFRES.
Sample: Peopleaged18–23.
* Statisticallysignificantatthe0.10level;** statisticallysignificantatthe0.05level.
TABLE2
TheEffectoftheReformonDrivingLicence(UrbanvsRuralAreas)
Parameter Standarderror
Constant 0.688** (0.014)
Bornbefore1977 0.111** (0.020)
Menbornbefore1977 0.051** (0.020)
Menbornafter1978 0.065** (0.020)
Livinginaurbanareaandbornbefore1977 -0.075** (0.018)
Livinginaurbanareaandbornafter1978 -0.026 (0.018)
Menlivinginaurbanareaandbornbefore1977 -0.037 (0.026)
Menlivinginaurbanareaandbornafter1978 -0.057** (0.026)
R2 0.02
Numberofobservations 9,700
Note: EstimatedbyOLS.Thedependentvariableisanindicatorforholdingadrivinglicence.
Thelow-incomesindicatorismeasuredatthehouseholdlevel.
Source: ParcAuto(CarFleet)AnnualSurveys(1995–2002),fromTNSSOFRES.
Sample: Peopleaged18–23.
* Statisticallysignificantatthe0.10level;** statisticallysignificantatthe0.05level.
Licence =α+β(born≤1977) +β(born≤1977)∗male
i 0 i 1 i i
+β((born≥1978)∗male +β(born≤1977)∗low-income
2 i i 3 i i
+β(born≥1978)∗low-inncome
4 i i
+β(born≤1977)∗low-income ∗male
5 i i i
+β(born≥1978)∗loww-income∗male +ε
6 i i i i
Results of this equation are presented in Table1.3 Table2 presents equiva-
lent results contrasting urban areas and rural areas rather than low-income
versus mid–high income individuals. Finally, Table3 presents results
equivalent to those of Table1, restricting attention to individuals living in
urban areas.
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ImpactoftheAbolitionofNationalServiceonDrivingSchools 793
TABLE3
TheEffectoftheReformonDrivingLicenceinUrbanAreas(LowIncomevs
Mid–HighIncome)
Parameter Standarderror
Constant 0.685** (0.015)
Bornbefore1977 0.079** (0.021)
Menbornbefore1977 0.014 (0.022)
Menbornafter1978 0.026 (0.021)
Lowincomesbornbefore1977 -0.083** (0.022)
Lowincomesbornbefore1977 -0.056** (0.023)
Men¥lowincomesbornbefore1977 -0.007 (0.032)
Men¥lowincomesbornafter1978 -0.070** (0.036)
R2 0.01
Numberofobservations 6,080
Note: EstimatedbyOLS.Thedependentvariableisanindicatorforholdingadrivinglicence.
Thelow-incomesindicatorismeasuredatthehouseholdlevel.
Source: ParcAuto(CarFleet)AnnualSurveys(1995–2002),fromTNSSOFRES.
Sample: Peopleaged18–23livinginanurbanarea.
* Statisticallysignificantatthe0.10level;** statisticallysignificantatthe0.05level.
Results show that those affected by the reform are young men living in a
low-income family, as well as young men living in urban areas.4 Indeed, as
expected,theeffectoftheabolitionisnegative.Interestingly,incomeplaysa
role,aratherunsurprisingoutcomegiventhepriceofgettingtrained.More
surprisinglymaybe,theeffectseemsstrongerinurbanareas;areflection,we
believe,ofthenecessityinFrancetohaveacarinallruralareas.Franceisa
verydispersedcountry,incomparisonforinstancewiththeUK.Withouta
car,inmostruralorsemi-urbanlocations,lifeisvirtuallyimpossible.Hence,
irrespective of the price, getting trained to obtain a driving licence is a
necessity.Bycontrast,inurbanzones,publictransportismorewidelyavail-
ableandprovidesasimplesubstitutefordrivingacar.
HoldingaDrivingLicence:ResultsinIledeFrance
Becauseourfirstsourceofdatahasnoinformationonemployment,weuse
our second source — the global transport survey — that analyses transport
for Paris and its surrounding region (the Greater Paris Region called
Ile-de-France).TheGreaterParisRegionisawideareawithadiversesetof
townsanddiversesocialenvironments.First,dividingParisandthesuburbs
is not fully adequate, since the suburbs themselves are extremely diverse.
Distance to the centre is not even a good summary statistic. In particular,
cities relatively close to Paris sometimes have a very bad connection to the
centre.Conversely,somecitiesfarawayfromParisarewellconnected(both
highways and public transport, in particular by train and by the Regional
Express Network, RER). By contrast, some cities in the Grande Couronne
(the part of the region further from Paris) can be quite rural. However, we
willstillcomparePariswiththesuburbs.Thedatacomprisenowthreesurvey
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