Dollars for Terror: The United States and Islam

403 Pages·2000·9.974 MB·English

by  Richard Labeviere

Dollars for Terror
The United States and Islam

Dollars for Terror
The United States and Islam

Richard Labévière

Translated by Martin DeMers

Algora Publishing
New York
Algora Publishing, New York
© 2000 by Algora Publishing
All rights reserved. Published 2000.
Printed in the United States of America
ISBN: 1-892941-06-6
[email protected]

Originally published as Les Dollars de la Terreur, Les Etats-Unis et les
Islamistes © Éditions Bernard Grasset, 1999.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 00-008415

Labévière, Richard.
[Dollars de la terreur. English]
Dollars for Terror: The United States and Islam / by Richard Labévière;
translated by Martin DeMers.
p. cm.
ISBN 1-892941-06-6 (alk. paper)
1. Terrorism—Government policy—United States. 2. Terrorism—
Kenya—Nairobi. 3. Terrorism—Tanzania—Dar-es-Salaam. 4. Bin
Ladin, Osama, 1957- 5. Terrorism—Islamic countries—Finance. 6.
Taliban—Finance. I. Title.
HV6432 .L3313 2000
303.6'25'0882971—dc21

Algora Publishing
wishes to express its appreciation
for the assistance given by
the Government of France
through the Ministry of Culture
in support of the preparation of this translation.

New York
www.algora.com

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PROLOGUE TO THE AMERICAN EDITION
The Cold War Continues. . . 5

Preface 13

Chapter I 17
The Nairobi and Dar es Salaam Attacks

Chapter II 29
An American Friend at the Palace of Nations

Chapter III 43
Islamism Versus Arab Nationalism

Chapter IV 53
The Mercenaries of Globalization

Chapter V 63
The CIA’s “Afghans” and Their Networks

Chapter VI 99
Osama bin Laden, Our Man in Kandahar

Chapter VII 121
The Muslim Brothers’ Holy (and Financial) War
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Dollars for Terror
Chapter VIII 161
Is There a Pilot Onboard the U.S. Aircraft?

Chapter IX 181
Making Good Use of “Low-Intensity Conflicts”

Chapter X 191
The Privatization of U. S. Foreign Policy

Chapter XI 203
Islamism and Zionism: Complementary Enemies

Chapter XII 211
Iran, the Great Satan’s Alibi

Chapter XIII 231
Why Saudi Arabia Finances Islamism

Chapter XIV 255
The Taleban, Mercenaries of the American Oil Companies

Chapter XV 287
Behind the Luxor Massacre, bin Laden’s “Afghans”

Chapter XVI 309
Islamist Deal-Making and Organized Crime

Chapter XVII 349
Afghanistan and Sudan are the Wrong Targets

Chapter XVIII 375
Islamism as Confrontation

Conclusion 383
The CIA at the Negotiating Table

2
MAPS

1) The Eurasian Chessboard 49
2) Bin Laden’s Network 109
3) Organizational Chart of Dar Al Maal Al Islami (DMI) 243
4) Contemporary Central Asia 269
5) Oil and Gas Pipelines around the Caspian Sea 279
6) The Philippines 319
7) The Network of the “New” Afghans 336

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Dollars for Terror

4
PROLOGUE TO THE AMERICAN EDITION

The Cold War Continues. . .

What’s happened since the bloody bombings of the American em-
bassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in August, 1998? Frankly, not
much. At least 263 were killed and 5,000 more were wounded; the re-
taliatory bombing of a chemical plant in Sudan and of logistics and
training bases in Afghanistan two weeks later had little effect. How
could such counterattacks address the terrorist actions of an interna-
tional nebula with strong ties to many countries? Fifteen people were
indicted; only five of them are currently in American prisons. The FBI
investigation is still underway. The State Department has offered a $5
million reward to any person having information leading to the capture
of Osama bin Laden or any other suspect.
But fundamentally, the State Department is not exerting any real
pressure on the Taleban to “catch” the Saudi billionaire who is happily
whiling away his days in Afghanistan. More pro-Islamist than ever, the
CIA still plays down the criminal misdeeds of its former agent and
maintains the same supportive policy toward the Islamists and against
Russia and China. The Saudi secret service, too, hardly seems eager to
neutralize (much less arrest) its old acquaintance bin Laden, who
bank-rolled the “holy war.” Saudi Arabia, through its “Wahhabi asso-
ciations”1 and other armed religious fanatic organizations, is making its
influence felt more than ever throughout the Arab-Muslim world (and
especially in South Africa and Central Asia). In short, the objective alli-
ance, the convergence of strategic and economic interests between the
5