Does US Army Humint Doctrine Achieve Its Objectives? What Have Iraq and Afghanistan Taught Us?

143 Pages·2013·1.29 MB·English

NAVAL
POSTGRADUATE

SCHOOL
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

DOES U.S. ARMY HUMINT DOCTRINE ACHIEVE ITS
OBJECTIVES? WHAT HAVE IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN
TAUGHT US?

by

Walter A. Gonzales

March 2013

Thesis Co-Advisors: Wade L. Huntley
Gary D. Espinas
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
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DOES U.S. ARMY HUMINT DOCTRINE ACHIEVE ITS OBJECTIVES? WHAT
HAVE IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN TAUGHT US?
6. AUTHOR Walter A. Gonzales
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13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
The most vital source of National Intelligence information is derived from Human Intelligence (HUMINT).
HUMINT, the eldest intelligence discipline, has proven to be a force multiplier for commanders during the Global
War on Terror.

As the Army downsizes its forces, refocuses priorities, and prepares for its Army 20/20 vision, it will need to ensure
that HUMINT remains at the forefront. In the coming years, the Army plans to downsize its force by 80,000 troops; it
will also shift its focus toward the Asian Pacific region. As this transition happens, the Army should capitalize on ten
years of operational experience. The Army currently possesses a large number of professional and experienced
collectors; and has a unique opportunity to analyze their knowledge to answer the question: Does U.S. Army
HUMINT doctrine achieve its objectives?

To address this question, the author describes problems encountered by HUMINT in Iraq and Afghanistan. By
identifying issues, the Army can adjust its doctrine and training to meet the changing needs of the nation. The author
proposes that the Army should restructure the HUMINT MOS to better fit the current operations. This would improve
the quality of the collector and eliminate shortcomings identified by HUMINT professionals.

14. SUBJECT TERMS HUMINT, Army, Military Source Operations, Interrogations, Intelligence, 15. NUMBER OF
FM2-22.3, 35M, 351M, Intelligence Collection, Human Intelligence PAGES
143
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Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

DOES U.S. ARMY HUMINT DOCTRINE ACHIEVE ITS OBJECTIVES? WHAT
HAVE IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN TAUGHT US?

Walter A. Gonzales
Chief Warrant Officer 2, United States Army
B.A., University of Northern Colorado, 1997

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES
(HOMELAND SECURITY AND DEFENSE)

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
March 2013

Author: Walter A. Gonzales

Approved by: Wade L. Huntley, PhD
Thesis Co-Advisor

Colonel Gary D. Espinas
Thesis Co-Advisor

Harold A. Trinkunas, PhD
Chair, Department of National Security Affairs
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ABSTRACT
The most vital source of National Intelligence information is derived from Human
Intelligence (HUMINT). HUMINT, the oldest intelligence discipline, has proven to be a
force multiplier for commanders during the Global War on Terror.
As the Army downsizes its forces, refocuses priorities, and prepares for its Army
20/20 vision, it will need to ensure that HUMINT remains at the forefront. In the coming
years, the Army plans to downsize its force by 80,000 troops; it will also shift its focus
toward the Asian Pacific region. As this transition happens, the Army should capitalize
on ten years of operational experience. The Army currently possesses a large number of
professional and experienced collectors; and has a unique opportunity to analyze their
knowledge to answer the question: Does U.S. Army HUMINT doctrine achieve its
objectives?
To address this question, the author describes problems encountered by HUMINT
in Iraq and Afghanistan. By identifying issues, the Army can adjust its doctrine and
training to meet the changing needs of the nation. The author proposes that the Army
should restructure the HUMINT MOS to better fit the current operations. This would
improve the quality of the collector and eliminate shortcomings identified by HUMINT
professionals.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.  DOES U.S. ARMY HUMINT DOCTRINE ACHIEVE ITS OBJECTIVES?
WHAT HAVE IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN TAUGHT US? ................................1 
A.  INTRODUCTION............................................................................................1 
B.  PROBLEM 1—HUMINT ROLE IS CHANGING .......................................2 
C.  PROBLEM 2—ARMY HUMINT INCREASED QUANTITY AT
THE EXPENSE OF QUALITY .....................................................................5 
1.  Lowering of ASVAB Score ..................................................................6 
2.  Suspension of DLAB and Language Training...................................6 
D.  PROBLEM 3- REWRITING THE INTERROGATION MANUAL .........8 
E.  METHODOLOGY ..........................................................................................9 
1.  Personal Experience...........................................................................10 
a.  Automation and Research Tools ............................................12 
b.  Reporting Cycle and Intelligence Requirements ...................13 
2.  Scholarly and Military Opinions ......................................................15 
3.  Professional HUMINTer Opinions ...................................................15 
F.  SOURCES .......................................................................................................15 
G.  CHALLENGES ..............................................................................................18 
H.  HYPOTHESES ..............................................................................................18 
I.  OVERVIEW ...................................................................................................19 
II.  CURRENT POLICIES ..............................................................................................21 
A.  CURRENT POLICIES ..................................................................................21 
1.  Doctrine ...............................................................................................21 
2.  Training ..............................................................................................22 
a.  Advanced Individual Training (AIT) .....................................23 
b.  Advanced Training ..................................................................24 
B.  EVALUATION OF CURRENT POLICIES ...............................................27 
1.  Theme 1: Intelligence Scholars and Experts ...................................28 
2.  Theme Two: Legality of Interrogation Doctrine .............................34 
a.  Background .............................................................................34 
b.  Interrogation Legal Advice .....................................................35 
c.  Drawing a Line between the CIA and DoD ...........................38 
d.  Investigations of Abusive Interrogators .................................39 
e.  DoD Releases New Interrogation Manual .............................42 
f.  Implication ..............................................................................45 
3.  Third Theme: Military Professional Opinions on HUMINT .........46 
a.  Need for Greater HUMINT Capability ..................................46 
b.  A Need to Improve Current HUMINT ...................................50 
III.  FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS ...................................................................................55 
A.  DATA AND RESULTS .................................................................................55 
1.  After Action Reviews .........................................................................55 
2.  HUMINT Warrant Officer Opinions ...............................................63 
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3.  On-Line Professional Forums ...........................................................77 
IV.  CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS .....................................................87 
A.  CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................87 
1.  Does U.S. Army HUMINT Doctrine Achieve its Objectives?
What Have Iraq and Afghanistan Taught Us? ...............................87 
B.  RECOMMENDATIONS ...............................................................................88 
1.  Increasing Entrance Requirements to the MOS .............................88 
2.  Regionally Alignment of Soldiers .....................................................91 
3.  Restructuring the HUMINT MOS ...................................................93 
a.  Advanced Individual Training Modifications (10 Level) ......96 
b.  Interrogation Training (20 Level) ..........................................97 
4.  Including Experienced Collectors into National Agencies .............98 
APPENDIX A .........................................................................................................................99 
A.  HAVE “INTERROGATORS” AND “SOURCE HANDLER” EVER
BEEN SEPARATE MOSS? SHOULD THEY BE? ...................................99 
APPENDIX B .......................................................................................................................103 
A.  WHAT WOULD BE THE ADVANTAGES/DISADVANTAGES OF
MAKING THE 35M MOS A 20 LEVEL AND ABOVE ONLY MOS? .103 
APPENDIX C .......................................................................................................................107 
A.  DO YOU BELIEVE SEPARATING THE 35M MOS INTO TWO
SEPARATE TRACKS, ONE FOR MSO AND ONE FOR
INTERROGATIONS, WOULD IMPROVE THE OVERALL
QUALITY OF ALL 35M’S? .......................................................................107 
LIST OF REFERENCES ....................................................................................................117 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .......................................................................................123 

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